Abstract
Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors’ intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.
This work was supported by the University of Melbourne’s Research Computing Services and the Petascale Campus Initiative; and by the Australian Research Council (Discovery Project DP220101012; OPTIMA ITTC IC200100009).
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Notes
- 1.
www.preflib.org, accessed 14 Mar 2023.
- 2.
Ties are also possible, but very rare for elections with many ballots.
- 3.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method, accessed 14 Mar 2023.
- 4.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith_set, accessed 14 Mar 2023.
References
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© 2024 International Financial Cryptography Association
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Blom, M., Stuckey, P.J., Teague, V., Vukcevic, D. (2024). Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections. In: Essex, A., et al. Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops. FC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13953. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6
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