Governing by Organizing: The Context of Universities in Sweden

Abstract

The chapter provides an overview of how three significant educational reforms, dating back to the late 1970s, have shaped the policy agenda for higher education and research in Sweden. The concept of metagovernance through governing by organizing is applied as a conceptual framework for comprehending the steering mechanisms inherent in these three university reforms. The reforms serve as illustrations, revealing that the state’s governance capacity is strongly contingent upon organizational factors. The application of organizational theory helps uncover new aspects of the state’s role and governance within the domain of higher education and research policy. This mode of steering frequently manifests as the establishment of conditions or the facilitation of capacities for steering mechanisms within specific organizational structures, aimed at achieving policy objectives. The objectives are formulated around various, and often ambivalent, ideas of how to enforce and advance the means through which universities can matter to other parts of society and national development.

Introduction

In May 2023, the Swedish government took a sudden decision to significantly reduce the term of office for board members at universities in Sweden, alongside initiating a reform of the existing process for appointing board members. The decision stands as a vivid illustration of the organizational dimensions of governing, wherein the government exercises control over the internal organizations of universities to address a new political situation. The appointment process that is thus currently under review, and is regulated by the Higher Education Ordinance, was explicitly formulated to strike a balance between the political sphere’s need for influence and control over universities as governmental agencies and universities’ need for academic autonomy.¹ The government has referred to the increased threats to Sweden’s national security as the primary rationale behind the decision, asserting the need to change the board’s profile to align with security policies. However, this explanation has faced substantial scrutiny, being perceived as a pretext for allowing the nationalistic far-right party, the Sweden Democrats, to exert influence over the appointment process. The decision has specifically received strong criticism from representatives of universities as they fear an encroachment on the autonomy of universities by political forces. The development has been described, both nationally and internationally, as a departure from the government’s longstanding tradition of seeking a balance by, on the one hand, recognizing the state’s political interests in steering higher education and research, and on the other hand, respecting universities’ autonomy.²

This balancing act, and its current rupture, underscores the interplay between the government’s perceptions of the significance of universities—ideas about how universities should matter—and the principles of academic autonomy and self-governance. It is inherent in the nature of politics to seek control over governmental agencies; such control constitutes an integral part of the governing framework. However, the context diverges when considering universities, given that they have traditionally enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy. This autonomy has been partly substantiated by the rationale that academic autonomy is essential to the conduct of innovative and high-quality research, wherein academic self-governance is pivotal for the universities’ contribution of knowledge to society.³ The relationship has been approached in diverse ways by policymakers—spanning various organizational dimensions of governing—persistently striving to create a setting conducive to the desired ways of mattering.

Through political science theory on metagovernance (e.g., Jessop, 2002; Peters, 2010; Sørensen, 2006; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011), the government’s decision to alter the term and appointment process of university board members can be understood as a form of “setting the stage” and “governing by organizing” (Jacobsson et al., 2015). These concepts are used by Jacobsson et al. (2015) as they identify five strategies used by the Swedish government to achieve a responsive state administration. In this chapter, I apply their theoretical framework to analyze the governmental steering of the Swedish university sector since the late 1970s. The five strategies are illustrated through empirical examples given in the text. The chapter focuses on three significant reforms within the sector, which are used to identify organizational dimensions of governing higher education and research. To enhance the analysis, relevant examples from contemporary literature on the governance of higher education and research are also included.⁴

Metagovernance and Governing by Organizing

Over the past few decades, a significant body of literature has emerged on the evolving governance structures of and expectations of universities (e.g., Christensen, 2003; Christensen & Lægreid, 2001; Christensen et al. 2007; Gornitzka et al., 2017; Maassen & Olsen, 2007; Ramirez, 2010; Thoenig & Paradeise, 2016; Wedlin & Pallas, 2017). The majority of this literature underscores the growing prevalence of steering mechanisms, including management techniques, strategies, New Public Management (NPM) practices, greater emphasis on research utility and innovation, and alignment with societal challenges. Simultaneously, scholarly work illustrates that universities have adopted diverse “strategic” approaches in response to external change and, to some degree, have adopted formal frameworks employed by business corporations. Consequently, universities have increasingly been characterized as “organizational actors” (Krücken & Meier, 2006) or “strategic actors” (Whitley, 2008). A corresponding development can be said to characterize the Swedish university sector, but in the Swedish context, one also needs to consider the fact that the majority of universities are government agencies, that is, they have the state as their principal and are accountable to the government. The government therefore plays a significant part in deciding upon financing, regulations, missions, and the overall organization of the universities.

In the literature on public administration and the role of the state, scholars have stressed that the model for state influence has changed from government to governance (e.g., Jessop, 1997; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Salamon, 2001; Sundström et al., 2010). The term “government” pertains to conventional hierarchical modes of steering, characterized by rule-based regulations in which the state holds a dominant position. Governance, on the other hand, describes an administrative framework that prioritizes the role of networks, decentralization, and self-regulation. The governance perspective acknowledges a shift toward greater abstraction of the state’s controlling role. This is attributed to the increasing fragmentation and specialization of public activities as well as the heightened interdependence and collaboration between actors at various levels, including those from non-state entities. Scholarship on governance emphasizes the emergence of more fluid modes of control, which encompass informal governance mechanisms and public–private partnerships, among other forms. The governance model implies that crucial elements of public authority are shared with a host of non-governmental or other governmental actors (Salamon, 2001).

The development has varied in extent across different countries. The transformed role of the state does not necessarily imply that its influence has diminished but rather that it has changed. Scholars argue that even with the progression toward governance, the state continues to exercise control (e.g., Capano, 2011; Montin & Hedlund, 2009; Koch, 2013; Pierre, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000). Thus, in the literature, governance has been supplemented by metagovernance. Metagovernance serves as a complement to conventional and hierarchical administrative control. It builds on governance theories while also highlighting the state’s continued influence despite the shift toward governance. Metagovernance describes the ways in which the state exercises control within the framework of governance (Jessop, 2002; Peters, 2010; Sørensen, 2006; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011).

Jacobsson et al. (2015) argue that metagovernance concerns steering actors that have a high degree of autonomy within a governance context. The high degree of self-governance derives from a situation where the object of steering—in this case, universities—operates in circumstances characterized by ambiguity. The issues addressed and actions taken by governments are numerous and diverse, and they evolve in unforeseeable ways as society undergoes continuous political, social, technological, and economic changes (Jacobsson et al., 2015). This poses a challenge for decision-makers, especially for politicians, to formulate clear and consistent goals and strategies. In order to achieve a flexible and responsive administration that is capable of addressing political issues and implementing appropriate measures, the government recognizes the inadequacy of detailed top-down steering. Consequently, in areas with a high degree of autonomy, the administration is generally delegated to organize and decide upon suitable measures.

Swedish universities have traditionally enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in comparison to other governmental agencies. As noted above, this stance derives from acknowledging that knowledge production is a nonhierarchical endeavor and assumes scientific autonomy. In organizations with a high degree of self-regulation and autonomy, the norms and values of the organization are central. This is particularly true in the realm of higher education and research, where academic practices and the evaluation of quality and excellence are based on academic norms and values. However, this distancing can also present challenges for the government, as the administration may become too far away and difficult to control. In the following, I will use parts of the theory on metagovernance to illustrate how the government uses different organizational strategies to handle such challenges. The foundation of this chapter is the interplay between the theory of organizations and governance theory with the aim of adding to research policy and higher education literature.

Governing by Organizing—the Swedish University Sector

Three Major Reforms in the Swedish University Sector

Universities are stable organizations, maintaining a consistent structure internationally for a considerable period of time. Nevertheless, as noted above, it is evident that the higher education sector has undergone significant transformations in the past 50 years or so. In the Swedish context, universities have transitioned from being subject to extensive regulations to becoming decentralized entities, increasingly governed through performance-based management and resource allocation driven by competition, for example, through rankings and bibliometric models (e.g., Hammarfelt et al., 2016; Nelhans, 2013).

The Higher Education Reform (H 77) of 1977 introduced the first Higher Education Act (1977:218), which regulated the mission, internal organization, and responsibilities of higher education institutions.⁵ The Freedom Reform was passed in 1993 and resulted in the repeal of the 1977 Higher Education Act and the adoption of a new law by the parliament, the Higher Education Act (1992:1434), which is still in effect.⁶ The Autonomy Reform in 2011 took a further step in deregulating universities’ internal organization and in phasing out provisions regarding the internal organization, with the exception of the boards and the president.⁷ All three reforms have been subject to analysis by other scholars (e.g., Askling, 2012; Benner, 2001; Gerad Marton, 2000; Lindensjö, 1981). This chapter adds to previous research by analyzing the reforms through the lens of metagovernance, where different organizational dimensions of governing are identified. All three reforms involved assessments of the extent to which the internal organization of the universities should be regulated by the state (i.e., the parliament and/or the government), as reflected in the legislative framework. The parts of the reforms presented in this chapter pertain to how the state has governed the internal organization of universities by regulating or deregulating provisions in the higher education legislation concerning the institutions’ internal structures. The analysis specifically highlights how the government has used the policy instrument “regulations and deregulations of the internal organization” as a way to organize HEIs in alignment with national policy objectives. These objectives were formulated based on the notion of heightened societal engagement by universities and their amplified impact on society, that is, on embedded ideas of mattering.

Five Strategies of Governing by Organizing

According to Jacobsson et al. (2015), metagovernance entails setting the stage, that is, establishing the fundamental organizational structure of a policy domain. This organizational structure endures over time, yet occasionally, political actors perceive a need to reorganize a particular area or sector, resulting in a resetting of the stage (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 45–46). Based on governance theory and organization theory, Jacobsson et al. identify five various steering strategies to bring about an administration that is able to orient and adapt to changing conditions while remaining loyal to the government’s objectives. The strategies are: (1) storytelling, (2) creating formal organizations, (3) fostering competition, (4) positioning, and (5) distancing (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 44–76). In the upcoming analysis, I will outline the five modes of governing by organizing proposed by Jacobsson et al. and demonstrate their utilization in governing the Swedish university sector. Additionally, the text will provide examples of the five strategies, along with an analysis of the various forms they have taken. Naturally, the text constitutes one way of analyzing policy development within the field; as mentioned above, other scholars have studied the same reforms from different perspectives. The analysis serves as a way to broadly identify how various forms of organizational governance have influenced the university sector, thereby providing a modest contribution to both higher education and research policy literature, as well as to the governance literature.

According to Jacobsson et al., governing by organizing is supplemented by a relatively informal approach known as microsteering (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 129–142). However, in my perspective, this supplementary governance approach does not characterize higher education and research to the same extent as the practice of governing by organizing does. Microsteering entails various informal methods through which politicians and policymakers engage with administrative officials. Due to the relatively autonomous position of universities, this form of close collaboration and control between politicians and representatives of universities is not as applicable in the analysis as it might be in other sections of administration.

Storytelling

Storytelling encompasses the narratives with which a reform or policy initiative is associated in order to justify the purpose of and need for reform. Politicians require narratives to initiate reforms. Reform arises from a longing for rationality and progress, particularly when faced with perceived ambiguities and disconnections. The stories associated with reforms assure that existing problems will be resolved or at least handled sensibly. As Jacobsson et al. emphasize, organizational theorists and public administration scholars have stressed the importance of storytelling as a way to inspire performance, create legitimacy, and control the administration (e.g., Christensen, 2003; Czarniawska, 1997; Rhodes, 2005; Weick, 1995). Storytelling includes images, partly of the problems that the reform aims to solve and partly of future improvements. The narrative provides direction in policy and conveys a positive change that is motivational for those subject to the policy. Policymakers can use both text and speech to create and disseminate narratives. The most central bearers of political narratives are government bills. Within the narrative, winners and losers, as well as heroes and opponents, can be distinguished, which creates movement in the narrative. Positive value-laden words with a high level of abstraction are also present (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 66–73).

In the 1970s, higher education and research became increasingly crucial for national development and emerged as a distinct national policy domain. Consequently, the comprehensive reform in the late 1970s included policy initiatives aimed at the internal organizational structure in order to exert control over university operations. Thus, official documents such as government bills, public inquiries, and other preparatory work include examples of storytelling where the new “unified” higher education sector governed by the same principles would contribute clarity, uniformity, and democratic decision-making.⁸ In the political narrative, obstacles to achieving these goals were primarily attributed to universities’ potential lack of engagement and ability to adapt to the changing demands of politics and society. The lack of trust in the universities’ capabilities prompted the constitutional provisions concerning internal organization. The governance assumed a more planning-oriented role, drawing closer to what has traditionally been considered the internal affairs of universities, reflecting a new perspective on the autonomy of science (Bjare, 2023, p. 91). It was emphasized that a restructuring of the internal decision-making bodies was necessary to “better meet the rapidly changing needs of communication and interaction associated with scientific development.”⁹ Consequently, in order to meet these new demands, universities needed to adapt to changes occurring in other areas of public administration through the introduction of the concept of administrative democracy.¹⁰ Administrative democracy was characterized by the basic premise that all stakeholders within an organization should be given influence over decision-making. The discourse surrounding administrative democracy was associated with the continuous development of state administration as a whole.¹¹

The idea of administrative democracy was connected to reform narratives that encompassed “inclusivity” and the need to “open up” the universities both internally and to external influences. Opening up the organization from within meant that the decision-making authority in internal boards and preparatory committees should no longer be predominantly held by the academic staff. Instead, these internal bodies, such as the Departmental Board, were to include representatives from the academic staff as well as from the administration and the students.¹² The rationale was based on the notion that traditional academic structures required a reformed composition and mission through the development of a new, more inclusive, and corporative, collegiality:

…establishing the collegial governance model at the department level represents a significant step toward broadening the influence of employees and students over the work environment and working conditions.¹³

In the narrative of the reform in 1977, the internal organization thus played a pivotal role in driving social change—to direct the university sector toward a new form of mattering to other parts of society. The aim was to replace the traditional and meritocratic “authority of professors” with a more democratic system and thereby become aligned with administrative policy developments in other governmental domains. The primary focus of the reform was on higher education; however, its positive values of inclusion and openness were also intended to influence research activities. For instance, the higher education regulations introduced provisions stating that the Faculty Board, the central decision-making body within universities responsible for ensuring research quality, could include representatives from research and development work outside the university, thus representing “public interests.”¹⁴ While not mandatory, this provision allowed for a composition that included external representatives on the Faculty Board. The prevailing narrative suggested that the traditional collegial bodies, primarily consisting of professors, had grown excessively conservative, rendering them incapable of adapting to societal changes. According to the reform narrative, by incorporating external perspectives into the internal structure of universities, new viewpoints, as well as innovative research ideas, would catalyze transformative changes from within:

The research freedom that has so far been one of the characteristics of universities will also shape the new higher education institution [sector], as research collaborations expand to encompass diverse educational programs and societal interests beyond the institution. It is my conviction that this will lead to an education that is more firmly grounded in scientific principles and foster a fruitful exchange of information and ideas between society and research.¹⁵

The rationales were used to portray the old structure as conservative, resistant to change, and unwilling to address the new challenges faced by universities and society as a whole. These narratives served as the driving force behind the constitutional provisions governing the internal organizations of universities. The narrative connects the internal organization to the metastory of the crucial role of education and research in shaping the nation’s future. The reform narrative, emphasizing the importance of internal organization in achieving sociopolitical objectives, functioned as a means of governing by organization and setting the stage for the university sector as a whole.

The Freedom Reform, on the other hand, focused on the importance of autonomy and gave a renewed emphasis on scientific self-governance, primarily by altering the regulations regarding the composition and responsibilities of the Faculty Boards. The narrative had shifted; now the internal systems with too many stakeholders were regarded as the source of the stagnation. Once again, inefficiency was deemed to characterize the internal decision-making bodies, but this time, the solution was believed to lie in deregulation, and in granting professors most of the power within the academic institutions:

However, the system has become cumbersome and appears to distort the missions of higher education institutions. The multitude of bodies with partially overlapping responsibilities, the difficulties for external representatives to fully engage in the operations, the rigid structures of decision-making bodies, and the fact that the academic staff have been in the minority have led to problems.¹⁶

The notion of self-governance and deregulation was intertwined with performance-based management and the need for decentralized operations, reflecting broader administrative policy trends. Emphasizing decision-making closer to those directly involved in teaching and research was seen as necessary for ensuring quality, representing a key value within the narrative. The reform also conveyed the idea of universities emancipating themselves from state control, leading to greater flexibility and efficiency in adapting to external needs and contextual conditions; “freedom, flexibility, and institutional diversity” were to be combined with “incentives, evaluations, and quality competition.”¹⁷ The concept of competition was portrayed as a positive transformative force, explaining the shift toward reduced regulation in policymaking alongside the growing importance of external funding of research. The narrative underscored the need for universities’ internal organizations to adapt to competition, while the notion of self-regulation in science encompassed the internal organization’s capacity for adaptability.

In the preparatory documents for the 1993 reform, the government emphasized the distinct role of universities within the public sphere, justifying a higher degree of autonomy compared to other public organizations. The texts initially presented universities as “unique” and “special” organizations within the public sector, indicating policymakers’ awareness of norms that emphasize the importance of academic self-governance. This way, the policymakers demonstrated an understanding of the academic norms when shaping the reform. While the policy highlighted the universities’ exceptional position in the public sphere, there were also acknowledgments of the need to align with ongoing reforms in the public sector. This rationale indicates the policymakers’ efforts to exert increased control within the higher education sector, all the while maintaining the image of upholding the long-standing autonomy principles that have traditionally governed academia. Here existed a balancing act as the policy sought to include universities in the state administration reforms—characterized by ideals of accountability, efficiency, and unity—while at the same time purporting to defend academic freedom and the self-governance of science.

All three reforms encompass storytelling narratives characterized by opponents and winners as well as positively charged abstract values. In the 1977 reform, there are examples of the former, where the internal processes of professorial control were depicted as opponents, as barriers to desired change. Simultaneously, administrative democracy was portrayed as enabling the opening up of universities. In the Freedom Reform of 1993, the slow internal processes of administrative democracy were portrayed as sources of resistance. On the other hand, teachers and researchers were depicted as winners and, ultimately, as the guarantors of quality and efficiency. This also applied to the Autonomy Reform, but this time deregulation was presented as having intrinsic value through the increased freedom it provided to the university as an organization; the reform entailed an expanded decision-making mandate delegated to the governing board and the president. Through the delegated mandate given to universities, the activities were expected to develop in the desired direction. Values such as efficient resource utilization, mobility, organizational diversity, and individual responsibility were interwoven into arguments promoting Swedish education and research internationally. In both the Freedom Reform and the Autonomy Reform, the values of freedom, autonomy, and quality were closely linked to the concepts of competition, efficiency, and accountability. Deregulating the provisions of the internal organization was presented as a central part of this endeavor.

Creating Formal Organizations

Creating formal organizations is the second form of governing by organizing. It describes a basic strategy that the government uses to establish and shape formal organizations, which involves creating bodies such as government authorities or councils. This includes deciding on instructions regarding authority, goals, and resources. Creating formal organizations sets a clear location for issues within a policy area and provides a structure for the organizational body that sets the agenda. This includes deciding which organizations (such as councils or authorities) should exist and how they should be organized. When creating formal organizations, specific institutional conditions are established for gathering information and developing knowledge about the issues that the organizations are responsible for addressing. Additionally, the organization can recruit experts with a specific interest in and knowledge of the policy area (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 47–50).

The 1977 reform was a way to govern the formal organizations of universities by determining which institutions were to be included in the public higher education sector (den nya högskolan) with related mandates, funding, and authorities. In the reform, specific universities (designated as universities) were granted the authority to conduct research and also serve as research resources for other universities lacking research capabilities and resources. This organizational arrangement exemplifies a mode of organizational control by regulating objectives and resources based on the vision of sector-wide coordination and central planning. The comprehensive provisions concerning the internal organization of universities represent a form of control achieved through the creation of formal organizational structures. Decisions pertaining to the establishment and mandates of Regional Educational Boards (regionstyrelser) and internal decision-making bodies within universities, such as Line Councils (linjenämnder), were shaped by conceptions of how utility and societal relevance could be integrated into academic endeavors.

The reforms introduced in the 1990s and onwards, involving the establishment of two foundation-based universities alongside strategic research foundations, served as governance strategies through the creation of formal organizations. The two foundation universities were to foster “organizational diversity” (organisatorisk mångfald) within the sector and address part of the rigidity and uniformity that policymakers believed had characterized the sector.¹⁸ While the Freedom Reform and Autonomy Reform entailed the deregulation of certain aspects of the formal organization, they concurrently introduced novel forms of governance through regulations on performance-based management and increased external funding. This represented a relatively novel governance approach, where the stage was set to align with the interests of external funders. Such organizational restructuring affected both universities as organizations and intensified the dependency of university researchers on external research funding.

The regulation and deregulation of the internal organization reflect divergent perspectives on how to use regulation as a policy instrument when steering universities and university research. This assessment is intertwined with a valuation of risks involved in deregulation together with the norms that govern the specific policy domain of higher education and research. In the case of H 77, the motivations for regulation stemmed from the idea of exerting influence on academic activities through the implementation of administrative democracy, with the aim of power sharing among various stakeholder groups within universities. The legitimacy of this approach relied on an organizational model wherein representatives were appointed through a cooperative and participatory process. During the Freedom Reform, the Faculty Board assumed a clear role in bearing scientific responsibility within the framework of the organizational professional model, encompassing competence, ethics, and norms. Legitimacy was ascribed to the Faculty Board as a representative of the research activities. Concurrently, elements of market-oriented models emerged, and increased cooperation with industry and intensified competition for resources were emphasized:

However, there is a need to develop organizational solutions within higher education institutions, or in close connection to them, to facilitate collaboration among researchers from different fields as well as between researchers and the business sector. Within higher education institutions, it is important to better recognize the unique conditions of industry-oriented research, such as problem identification and interdisciplinary approaches.¹⁹

Today, the organization of public research funding constitutes one form of steering through creating formal organizations with mandates and allocation of resources. The government distributes research resources directly to universities, research councils, and other research funding agencies. This way of “setting the organizational stage” for higher education and research influences universities’ internal management, strategies, and priorities. It also influences the actions and strategies of individual researchers in their pursuit of external funding (Bjare, 2023; Laudel & Gläser, 2014; Leisyte et al., 2010; Luukkonen & Thomas, 2016; Miller & Neff, 2013).

The current organizational structure for public research funding was introduced over 20 years ago with the aim of better coordinating and simplifying a system that was considered excessively fragmented. The reform can be regarded as a way of setting the stage through the establishment, consolidation, and dissolution of agencies in order to create an overall sector that is aligned with policy goals. Today, the goals set by the policy level primarily focus on quality and societal relevance, which are reflected in the directives to the latest governmental inquiry on the organization of research funding, whose overall purpose is to establish a clear division of roles between universities and state research funders to “promote high-quality and socially relevant research.”²⁰ Thus, the organizational dimensions of governing research funding aim to create environments that emphasize the mattering aspects of universities.

The current organizational structure for research funding, characterized by the presence of multiple public funding sources, imposes a considerable demand for in-depth knowledge of the system among researchers in universities. This knowledge is effectively employed in establishing networks and cultivating relationships, and in research practices. Researchers, however, express concerns regarding the potential risks associated with funders prioritizing similar subject areas, which may result in a state of scientific stagnation. Nonetheless, the ability to seek funding from diverse sources is perceived as a means of fostering researcher autonomy, mitigating reliance on the evaluations of a single funder. Moreover, the reliance of university research on external nonpublic research funders exerts a significant influence on the governance system. Researchers navigate interactions with both public and private funding entities within the overarching governance framework (Bjare, 2023, pp. 158–188).

Even within universities, there are organizational dimensions of governing in relation to the formal decision-making structure, as the university management determines the governance model for each university. The design of the internal organization, including the establishment of decision-making and advisory bodies, reflects a way of creating a formal organization within the institution. Research reveals a relationship between the chosen governance model and researchers’ perceptions of steering in research activities. Researchers at universities with a high degree of line management perceive a higher degree of influence in their research activities from the internal university management compared with researchers at universities with a low degree of line management and a more collegial management model (Bjare, 2023, pp. 135–157). Thus, there is a correlation between researchers’ perceptions of room for autonomy in the research process and the internal management model of universities. This implies that the ways in which decisions are delegated and distributed within the institution, that is, the formal organizational setting, can impact researchers’ perceptions of the scope of scientific autonomy. Yet, the majority of Swedish HEIs have adopted a line-management structure at the departmental level (Ahlbäck Öberg & Boberg, 2022; Boberg, 2022; Sundberg, 2013, 2014; SOU 2015:92).

Fostering Competition

The third aspect of governing by organizing, fostering competition, involves implementing steering mechanisms that incentivize competition and specialization. In the public sector, this can involve establishing evaluation functions whose results affect resource allocation or authorizations. The social welfare system demonstrates an example where services with “user choice” have been introduced. This allows the users, or “customers,” to choose private instead of public providers. User choice can be supplemented with open comparisons, where actors are ranked by other users. Competition can be introduced at different stages and levels within the public sector: nationally, regionally, and locally. It can be encouraged between public organizations as well as between public and private ones. Jacobsson et al. use the higher education sector as an example of an area where governance is based on competition for students (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 57–60).

Even with regard to fostering competition, there are clear signs of governing by organizing within the Swedish university sector. It can be observed through the focus on competition within and between universities that was put forward in both the Freedom Reform and the Autonomy Reform. The norm of competition was also applied to the question of organizational forms, not only by expecting institutions to develop the best possible organization based on the new conditions but also through the initiative to transform two universities into foundations. In conjunction with the Freedom Reform, Chalmers University and Jönköping University were transformed into foundation universities. As foundations, they are no longer government agencies. One of the goals of this initiative was to increase competition between universities as organizations; the government explicitly stressed the initiative as a way to foster “competition through organizational forms” (konkurrens genom organisationsformer) with the aim of creating more flexible organizational structures with efficient management.²¹ In the preparatory documents, it was put forward that being government agencies placed constraints on the institutions’ ability to find flexible solutions for their operations, thereby hindering competition between organizational forms and limiting efficiency. Thus, the transformation from government agencies to foundations was part of a vision of creating a variety of organizational forms within the university sector. This example also illustrates how the various aspects of governing by organization and setting the stage intersect with each other; the establishment of university foundations involves both fostering competition and creating formal organizations as a means of governance. In the preparatory work for the Freedom Reform, competition, in conjunction with deregulation, was presented as the path away from the problems of rigidity, uniformity, and inefficiency inherent in centrally planned systems (Bjare, 2023, pp. 98–115). Competition within the governance system was intended to serve as a catalyst for usefulness and quality in research. Competition was seen as a natural regulator within the contractual relationship, characterized by information asymmetry.

Recent governance initiatives have incorporated elements of competition, whereby policy instruments are employed to stimulate competition between universities. This is achieved through governance mechanisms directed toward universities, aiming to incentivize “strategic action.” Illustrative examples of this include the government’s endeavor to foster “profile areas,” where universities engage in a competitive evaluation process that is connected to the allocation of research funding.²² In such performance-based models, rankings and bibliometrics are often addressed as “neutral” indicators of quality, fostering university competition (Hammarfelt et al., 2016). Similarly, the mandate of the Swedish Higher Education Authority (UKÄ) to assess the quality assurance efforts of universities, which since 2017 has encompassed both higher education and research, serves as a means of comparing different institutions while concurrently holding each institution accountable for ensuring and enhancing the overall quality.

However, today competition in the research landscape extends beyond the inter-organizational, manifesting itself among researchers when they compete for external funding. The centrality of competition for external funding within the governance framework is evident, indicating that governing by an organization, through the promotion of competition, plays a pivotal role in steering research within the university sector. Particularly noteworthy is how this form of governance is perceived by individual researchers. The competition for research funding significantly shapes the actions researchers take in order to create space for autonomy in research. It has been demonstrated that competition primarily impacts the trajectory of research through adjustments in research areas and questions (Bjare, 2023, pp. 144–151). Consequently, competition determines the nature and scope of research endeavors undertaken. Moreover, competition influences researchers’ strategies, encompassing their establishment of networks to shape research policy through advocacy or manipulation, engagement in commissioned research endeavors, and creation of opportunities for autonomy in collaborative research projects with external entities, including corporations and non-state actors (Bjare, 2023; Gläser et al., 2010; Laudel & Gläser, 2014; Leisyte et al., 2010; Luukkonen & Thomas, 2016; Miller & Neff, 2013). Consequently, competition assumes a central role in researchers’ negotiations for autonomy, spanning the selection of research topics, formulation of research questions, and even publishing strategies. This establishes the current framework for scientific autonomy, wherein discussions regarding researchers’ societal responsibilities, the utility of research, and its advancement—aspects of mattering—occur at the level of individual researchers. Analogously, the internal management landscape of universities is also influenced by competition, particularly when negotiations for autonomy predominantly occur between individual researchers, research groups, and external entities, often non-state actors (Bjare, 2023, pp. 209–210).

Positioning

The fourth form of governing by organizing is referred to as positioning. It concerns the relationships and connections that organizations have with other parts of the sector and/or society, depending on the policy area. This governance strategy involves the deliberate linking of organizations within a given area. The linking requires that the organizations position themselves in relation to one another, both to external actors (i.e., nonpublic actors) and internal actors within the state. Essentially, it is about which actors an organization is exposed to within the governance area. As an example, the Swedish forestry policy is mentioned, where the government decided that the Swedish Forest Agency should include external stakeholders in the work on the goals of the Forestry Act. This meant that the agency collaborated with 17 other actors, both external and internal, in developing detailed goals for forest management (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 50–57).

Organizational positioning in relation to actors can occur at different levels and can be expressed through work methods, the level within the organization at which contacts are made (i.e., who is subject to governance through positioning), and the frequency and proximity of contacts. Thus, positioning involves both, which other actors an organization needs to relate to and which actors within the organization manage the positioning. It may involve organizations within a given area having different goals and missions, but through governance, they are “forced” to meet and relate to each other, which affects how their operations are shaped (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 50–57).

The strategy of positioning can also be applied to comprehend the interrelationships among actors within the governance system. In the context of the university sector, it becomes apparent that both universities and individual researchers strategically position themselves in relation to other actors within the system. The implicit regulations of governance shape the timing and nature of interactions among actors in the system, thereby influencing the behaviors of researchers and their positioning efforts in pursuit of autonomy. Within this governance system, university researchers are compelled to navigate the perceived expectations of research funders regarding the relevance and direction of their research. These positioning endeavors occur at various stages of the research process and to differing degrees. Furthermore, they are contingent upon the nature of the external funder. Researchers who receive funding from government research councils, particularly the Swedish Research Council, perceive less need to align the research process with the interests of external funders in comparison to researchers funded by external sources such as companies or industries (Bjare, 2023, pp. 158–188).

Moreover, the act of positioning serves to highlight the inherent interdependency in the sector where universities, in their internal governance, need to position themselves in relation to the governance system as a whole. Universities are required to establish relationships with other actors within the governance system or the sector and strategically plan and organize their operations accordingly. This includes considerations of external funders, who impact the direction of research conducted within the university, and regulatory bodies that evaluate higher education and research activities; it also entails adapting to bibliometric means of governance at different levels within the institution (Hammarfelt et al., 2016; Nelhans, 2013, 2022). Additionally, it encompasses international relations, where the universities position themselves within international collaborations and rankings. The strategy of positioning can provide insight into why the internal management strategies at times serve as buffers against external steering initiatives; for example, management may make efforts to minimize the impact of the way that external funding is distributed across different disciplines and departments within the institution. In other cases, the external steering mechanisms become incorporated into the management by, for example, including external funding as an “excellence indicator” that is rewarded in the internal allocation of resources. Notwithstanding the variations in behavior across different universities, the internal management dynamics underscore their strategic positioning in relation to other actors operating within the governance system that take part in “setting the stage.”

Further examples of positioning can be observed in the 1977 reform, where, as noted above, external representatives were appointed to “represent public interests” (företrädare för allmänna intressen), and administrative staff were incorporated into the decision-making structure with the principle of administrative democracy.²³ Through regulation, the external representatives were included in the collegial bodies within the universities. The introduction of administrative democracy entailed a form of positioning within universities where teachers and researchers needed to consider the interests of other groups in the planning of internal operations. However, this form of internal positioning was abolished through the Freedom Reform and the Autonomy Reform. In the preparatory work, it was stressed that the power of contributing new and fruitful perspectives within research belonged primarily to the academic staff. Adding to this, both individual researchers and Faculty Boards were positioned in relation to external funders; Faculty Boards were encouraged to introduce peer-review processes for the allocation of internal research funds, similar to how the research councils were organized.²⁴ Throughout the various reforms, the policy level has consistently assessed which actors the internal decision-making bodies within the university should be positioned against in order to fulfill the sociopolitical objectives.

Distancing

The fifth and final form of governing by organization, distancing, concerns delegated decision-making. The delegation of mandates involves finding a balance between democratic principles, as represented by the parliament and government, and the efficiency of control. Delegated decision-making assumes that the administration responds to control while maintaining a certain degree of autonomy. The extent of this autonomy depends on the assessment of implementation risks. In order to maintain democratic legitimacy, the government must have the ability to influence decisions for which it may be held accountable. This requires a vertical responsiveness within the control system.

One approach to ensure that the administration aligns with the government’s objectives is to regulate decision-making authority within an organization. In contrast to positioning, control through distancing primarily concerns the vertical relationships between organizations within a system. Thus, governing by organizing through distancing pertains to the vertical relationship between the government and agencies. Through control mechanisms, the government can choose to maintain a certain distance from an agency, granting it a higher level of autonomy. As a result, responsibility is further delegated within the administration, based on the principle that the greater the autonomy an organization possesses, the less likely it is that the government will be held accountable for any failures that may occur (hands-off approach). Conversely, when control is closer (hands-on approach), the aim is to increase the influence of the policy level over the organization’s operations, which also entails a higher risk of accountability (Jacobsson et al., 2015, pp. 60–66).

The university sector also provides examples of distancing as a form of governing by organizing. The assessments made at the policy level regarding the extent and level of control have shown variation over the past five decades. Furthermore, the delegation of decision-making authority has entailed considerations of which actors are best suited to make decisions within a university. In the case of H 77, a certain degree of delegation and decentralization of administrative and financial decisions occurred, granting autonomy to the universities. A prerequisite for such delegation was the establishment of rules governing the composition of decision-making bodies within the universities. The overarching objective was to enhance societal accountability. Notably, a clear hierarchical structure was in place, emphasizing obedience, and the introduction of a new corporative collegial form of governance was regarded as a significant element in the allocation of mandates.

The delegation of decision-making authority to universities regarding their internal organization has increased since the 1990s. However, certain fundamental regulations are still outlined by the government and/or parliament. This pertains to the manner in which decisions concerning core activities, such as the direction, quality, and organization of education and research, are entrusted to teachers and researchers within the universities. Similarly, the categories of teaching staff and the decisions pertaining to the appointment of professors are regulated to be made by the institution’s president, without delegation within the university. Despite the increased decision-making authority over internal organization and resource allocation, it appears questionable whether the reform has translated into increased autonomy for individual researchers in practice. Instead, governance has taken on a different form, focusing on both central capacity and control, as well as coordination and networks. Notably, researchers perceive a stronger influence over the research process from external funding than from internal management (Bjare, 2023, pp. 144–151). This observation suggests that positioning and competition play a more significant role in governing higher education and research practices than distancing.

Concluding Remarks

Although universities are generally regarded as stable organizations, significant changes have occurred within the sector since the 1970s. These changes have resulted in a shift from heavily rule-governed institutions to decentralized organizations that rely increasingly on performance management and competitive allocation of resources. As underlined by Gornitzka et al. (2005), the ideological or normative foundations of a policy are often ambiguous or inconsistent, and policymakers frequently prioritize conflicting rationales during the policy formulation process. The government’s capacity for intervention and the complexity and uncertainties of the policy area are crucial factors in this decision-making process (Howlett, 1991). This is particularly interesting in relation to the governance of the semi-autonomous university sector. To understand the governance of this sector, it is necessary to consider a range of aspects, including traditional hierarchical planning (vs. self-regulation), control mechanisms, and soft governance.

Analyzing policymaking through the prism of governing by organizing gives insight into the use of different policy instruments and how they are combined in the specific context of higher education and research. The empirical examples in the chapter show that the governing capacity of the state has depended on organizational factors. The organizing strategies in practice are used together in complex ways and, as stressed by Jacobsson et al. (2015, p. 75), the ways the government steers are strongly dependent on, and explained by, institutionalized ideas and practices. Policy areas entail goal conflicts and embedded tensions (Gornitzka et al., 2005) and the organizational structure does not entirely determine outcomes within a field. Yet it is clear that the organizational dimensions of governing play a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics and interactions within a policy area.

Thus, in this chapter, I have used the theory of metagovernance—through governing by organizing and setting the stage—to contribute to the understanding of the development of governance in the university sector since the late 1970s. The analysis has taken a broad approach, highlighting examples from major reforms and current developments. Reforms in the university sector have included storytelling through reform narratives, which in turn have led to the creation of formal organizations. These two aspects of governing by organizing establish the fixed conditions for universities, through regulations and other governing documents, forming the formal organization of the university sector.

In addition, competition, positioning, and distancing have influenced the relationships within the system. These are different ways of governing that also include relationships to non-state actors within the research system. As demonstrated, these relationships exist between multiple actors within the system, both vertically and horizontally. The trend of fewer regulations on university organization, increased reliance on external research funders, and more policy instruments designed to emphasize the university management as “strategic,” have resulted in changed forms of state governance that can be connected to competition, positioning, and distancing strategies.

Throughout the process of policy formulation, varying degrees of consideration have been given to the special position of higher education and research within society, while there has been a push to utilize universities as vehicles for achieving social policy objectives. The level of trust in the academic community’s ability to construct, safeguard, and develop a functional organization in accordance with the societal needs has varied depending on how policymakers have perceived the internal organization’s efficiency and capability. Hence, the policy instruments have been used in various ways. This contributes to the understanding of why policymakers choose a specific policy instrument; to some extent, it opens up the black box of government practices with relation to the circumstances in the university sector.

The starting point of this chapter was the recent decision by the Swedish government to reduce the term of office for university board members and initiate a reformed appointment process for board members. This decision has been regarded as a significant policy shift, where the government has been criticized for moving too far away from the previously observed distancing approach in governing universities. In this chapter, I have demonstrated the Swedish government’s attempt to strike a balance between various demands and values inherent in the university sector through five organizational dimensions of governing that operate both horizontally and vertically. Regarding the board members, both vertical (distancing) and horizontal (positioning) strategies lie behind the decision, although they fail to tell a story that is perceived as legitimate and trustworthy by university representatives. Instead, it is considered an ignorant approach to managing the delicate balance of governance, neglecting both the unique position of universities among the government agencies and the inadequacy of detailed top-down steering in a policy area that requires self-regulation and autonomy. How this form of governance will unfold and its effects are key questions for universities.

The organizational dimensions of governing have been motivated by a persistent endeavor to align the relevance of universities with political objectives, to determine how universities should matter, alongside ambivalent positions toward academic autonomy and self-governance. The government consistently seeks novel approaches to enhance its governance, while many governing instruments recur. In the case of the board members, however, it is conceivable that we have witnessed a shift in the contractual relationship that to various degrees has characterized the organizational dimensions of governing. In this instance, the government has crossed a boundary, proceeding without the conventional dialogue and grounding and on ambiguous premises, becoming too close and detailed when regulating the process. The development has led to an increasing number of actors advocating for a transformation in formal governance of universities, whereby the organizational structure of universities would be reconfigured into an alternative public legal framework, endowed with a heightened degree of autonomy akin to that of the Swedish courts.²⁵ Even this could be perceived as a manifestation of governing by organizing, albeit one that would ultimately curtail the government’s ability to continue its current practices, wherein universities themselves define the requisite organizational structures to make universities matter.