On 7 August 2016, an event dubbed ‘the biggest rally in the history of the Republic’, attended by approximately five million people, was hosted in Yenikapı Square in Istanbul. From the early hours of the morning, hundreds of thousands flocked to the rally by road and sea. Two and a half million Turkish flags were prepared for distribution in the area. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Spokesman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey İsmail Kahraman, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, Chief of Defence Hulusi Akar, CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli attended the rally. This huge ‘coming together’, registered as the ‘Rally of Democracy and Martyrs’, attempted the creation of a new myth in the history of the Republic of Turkey.Footnote 1 Perhaps none of the symbolic emotional sites of Neo-Ottomanism that I have touched upon so far have matched the national spirit emotionally preached, invoked and addressed at the gathering in Yenikapı. Throughout this chapter, I will consider 15 July 2016 as pivotal to the construction of a new myth that ruling elites hoped would cause a cathartic emotional transformation in the nation’s identity in the aftermath of the attempted coup. In doing so, I will identify the dominant emotion as ‘national narcissism’. National narcissism had previously been invoked in the Neo-Ottomanist narrative but had not yet dominated the national spirit. Eventually, at the rally in Yenikapı, where the rulers of the country, as well as the main opposition leaders and the Turkish Armed Forces gathered, Neo-Ottomanist national narcissism was concretized.

The 15 July coup attempt constituted a major rupture in the emotional climate of the political tradition from which the AKP originated. It transformed a historical narrative dominated by defeat, repression and a discourse of victimization into a radically different one replete with victory and self-adoration. There was an attempt to fill the national spirit invoked after the 15 July coup attempt with positive and inclusive content. To this end, the notion of ‘Yenikapı Spirit’ was circulated with rhetoric that emphasized the grandeur, strength, might and courage of the Turkish nation as a whole. The myth created in Yenikapı was intended to appeal not only to the AKP and its supporters but to be inclusive enough to attract far broader segments of the society, to make them feel the national narcissism which clung to and emanated from the Neo-Ottomanist narrative. This chapter attempts to substantiate this claim, first by elaborating on the significance of myths in the creation of nations and national identities, then by adapting this framework to the ‘legend of 15 July’ to demonstrate that national narcissism was the dominant emotion evoked by the AKP regarding the events of 15 July. It was evident in the event itself, in the imprint it left, in how this imprint was transformed into an ethos and a narrative, in how sanctity was attributed to the event by referring to martyrs, veterans and heroes and finally, in how the event was remembered through monuments, commemorations and other symbolic political tools to secure its place in the popular imagination.

6.1 On National Myths

National myths are constructed through how a nation sees itself, what it wants to be and how it wishes to distinguish itself from other nations. In this respect, national myths define identity and prompt action. They are composed of fragments based on a blend of fantasy and reality; this blend is then turned into an internally cohesive narrative and relayed in colourful, memorable language. National myths are constructed rigidly so as to inhibit questioning of the origin, character and destiny of the nation, and are difficult to disprove. They thus serve certain social and political purposes. Perhaps the most important feature of national myths is that they are linked to the past but have the scope to make sense of the present and future (Kumar, 2013, 94–95). In other words, myths are not only a model of reality, but they constitute a model for the construction of reality as well (Adak, 2003, 513).

Every nation has its myths, populated by certain characters and events. Myth creation is a practice inherent to nation-state formation. Myths act as glue, creating community and binding people into members of a nation. The truthfulness or falsity of myths is not actually in question; in the eyes of those who believe in them, their authenticity is indisputable. What is at stake is the symbolic and metaphorical meanings that a myth contains, the emotions it addresses and the messages it conveys (Rose, 2003, 154).

National myths establish identity. They not only define a given collectivity but also reveal what distinguishes this collectivity from others, and clearly demarcate the boundaries that separate them (Adak, 2003, 513). Anthony D. Smith claims that myths, memories, traditions and symbols are the primary elements that give nationalism its strength and spirit. Through them, national identities are rebuilt and reconstructed in each subsequent generation (1999, 9). Through myth creation, using metaphorical discursive tools such as rebirth and re-awakening, political actors present an ideal of collective salvation that will enable a nation to be healed of the wounds, defeats and pains of the past. By attributing heightened symbolic significance to historical events, myths can be revived and a longed-for golden age of the past is summoned to the present (1999, 68). National myths create symbols that reinforce identities and a sense of belonging. They provide the general suppositions and opinions that form the basis of solidarity, and serve as glue to mend rifts and overcome polarization. Emotional attachments and symbolic resources work together, enabling a nation to respond dynamically to challenges and crises. Gérard Bouchard claims that national myths are durable, persistent and inclusive representations. Inclusivity is one of the defining characteristics of myths—they operate beyond distinctions of class, language, religion, gender and political party (2013, 277). National myths nurture identities, setting in motion powerful narratives to which collectivities can turn in times of distress. They ameliorate feelings of humiliation and defeat, and reinforce a sense of security by presenting more coherent visions of the world. They energize the people during periods of war and other traumas, prompting them to take action for particular purposes. Myths also help to cover up or overcome contradictions of a nation. They provide support for the functioning of institutions and embolden a society to be resilient in the face of difficulties (2013, 277–278).

Questioning the idea that myth creation is unique to primitive tribes or past civilizations, Bouchard argues that myths are indispensable symbolic tools for both modern and post-modern societies. According to him, myths are deeply meaningful, hybrid creations that emerge from a blending of fact and fiction, reason and emotion, truth and falsehood and the conscious and unconscious. While myths are tightly contextualized and specific to particular historical and social conditions, they also claim to have universal features. They are sanctified by their deep emotional roots. They cannot be simply dismissed as absurd, illogical or false; even the mildest questioning can provoke emotional reactions. The more a myth appeals to the emotional needs of a nation, the more effective it will be. The emotional and sacred dimension of myths reveals why people are ready to die for them. It is difficult to explain such devotion through any mechanism but emotions (2013, 3).

According to Bouchard, national myths are essentially formed by a combination of the following elements, each a building block in the process of myth-making: (1) A structuring event or episode that acts as an anchor: This is a meaningful and determining experience that has occurred in the recent or distant past. Typically associated with misfortune or a trauma, such an event can also be positive or uplifting. (2) Imprint or influence: This element points to a strong emotion in the collective consciousness. An imprint that results from a traumatic event becomes a wound, and manifests as suffering. Conversely, an imprint linked to a positive event may furnish a sense of power and confidence. (3) The translation of the imprint into an ethos (values, principles, ideals, beliefs, worldviews, feelings and attitudes): For instance, unity and solidarity may become fundamental values for a nation experiencing civil war. Or, a society facing challenges such as invasion, military confrontation or natural disaster may be overwhelmed by shame and ultimately seek ways to restore its pride and self-esteem. (4) The construction of a narrative: In order for an event to be continually remembered, its imprint must be perpetually activated and reawakened in different contexts. Narrativization is intended not to heal the wounds inflicted by the event but to remember them, thus bolstering the myth and prolonging its lifespan. (5) The sacralization of the ethos through intensive commemoration: Commemorations become the means of sanctifying the message contained in the myth and asserting emotions as a driving force. Such acts are meant to create a shift in consciousness. At this stage, myth and message become almost doctrines. (6) Spreading a message through effective discursive and communicative strategies: This step is a vital tool, relevant at every stage following the occurrence of an event. For an event to be repeated, remembered and permanently imprinted, it first must be kept alive at the discursive level. (7) The intervention of social actors or coalitions: Instruments such as state institutions, trade unions, political parties, religious actors and the media play a key role in the construction of myths. This element demonstrates that myth creation is always tied to power relations (Bouchard, 2013, 5).

As the building blocks of myth-making processes, these elements offer an instructive framework for my purposes. After this introduction to the nature and operation of myths, I will analyse the 15 July coup attempt as a new national myth in order to substantiate my argument that the mythologization of this event reflects a new national mood invoked by Neo-Ottomanism.

6.2 The Birth of a Myth: 15 July

A period of intense social and political turmoil in Turkey across 2015 and 2016 came to its peak with an unprecedented series of events in July 2016. These events began on the evening of 15 July, and were registered as a ‘coup attempt’. Its agents were identified as members of the Fethullah Gülen community, which, up until 2013 (specifically, until the corruption investigations carried out between 17 and 25 December of that year) had exerted a powerful influence on state institutions and accompanied Erdoğan and the AKP on their political journey. Recall that the coups carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces throughout the history of the Republic have occupied a significant place in the narrative of victimization, as well as in the expression of the emotions that accompany this narrative in the AKP’s political discourse. The 28 February 1997 was the last coup-related moment of victimization for the AKP. In the subsequent years, the AKP government had more or less avenged the Kemalist republican regime and the Turkish Armed Forces (which it associated with the old regime) and had declared itself victorious. Yet by 2016, there was a new ‘enemy’, which, this time, emerged from ‘within’.

‘FETÖ’Footnote 2 members, who had nested within the Turkish Armed Forces stepped out of the chain of command, and launched a military coup attempt on Friday, 15 July 2016 at around 21.00. The coup attempt on 15 July was launched simultaneously in Ankara and Istanbul. In Istanbul, the Bosphorus and Fatih Sultan Mehmed Bridges, Atatürk Airport and Istanbul Provincial Security Directorate were captured. In Ankara, bomb attacks were carried out on strategic institutions of the state such as the National Intelligence Organization, the General Directorate of Security and the Gölbaşı Police Special Operations Centre. In both cities, putschists carried out low-level flights with F-16s they had hijacked. TRT [Turkish Radio and Television) buildings in Istanbul and Ankara were occupied, and the putschist gang members, defining themselves as the ‘Peace at Home Council’, had a statement forcibly read in TRT. In addition to a curfew, the text dictated that all private media organs read this statement. The Presidential Complex, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Prime Ministry, and various municipal buildings were attacked. For the first time in the history of the Republic, a bomb was dropped on the Turkish Grand National Assembly from F-16 planes hijacked by the putschist gang. Addressing the public through a live announcement on national television channels, President Erdoğan stated that the coup attempt in question was the attempt of a small minority within the TAF. President Erdoğan called on the nation to resist the coup in the streets to protect its will, and people took to the streets to prevent the coup attempt. Putschists opened fire on people, who took to the streets unarmed. In the anti-coup protests and resistance actions in Istanbul and Ankara, 248 civilians lost their lives. 1,537 people were injured. 24 putschists were killed and 50 putschists were wounded.Footnote 3

The biggest factor behind the mythologization of the events of 15 July, reported above by the website 15temmuzdirenisi.com, was the ‘failure’ of the attempted coup. President Erdoğan’s call to the Turkish nation to resist the coup, a call he made by connecting to a television station via a smart phone, led hundreds of people to take to the streets. Throughout the night of 15 July, prayers were read from mosques across the country, prompting people to action. In the morning after a night that saw many civilians killed, many state institutions, including the Turkish Grand National Assembly, bombed, and Ankara and Istanbul turned into war zones, life picked back up where it left off.

6.3 The Imprint of 15 July: Victory and Omnipotence

The claim that the coup was quashed by people’s resistance shown on the night of 15 July was framed as an act of the Turkish nation ‘claiming their will’ and saving ‘the country from the traitors at the cost of their lives’. A strong sense of victory and pride was unleashed by this rhetoric. The ruling elites attributed almost no role to themselves in preventing the attempted coup. They pointed instead to the ‘Turkish nation’—who took to the streets that night, stopped the tanks, faced the bullets and challenged the soldiers—as the architect of the victory. Such rhetoric revealed the myth’s aims at inclusivity: it was not only supporters of the AKP and Erdoğan who managed to prevent the coup that night, but the Turkish nation as a whole, citizens from young to old, women, men and even children, who ‘loved their homeland’ and ‘who were brave enough to sacrifice their lives for their country’. Indeed, the events were framed as the ‘Legend of 15 July’ by the ruling elites. Not coincidentally, the ‘legendary’ quality signified extraordinary national success and power.

In fact, the seeds of a mood consonant with the spirit of the Neo-Ottomanist narrative were planted by Erdoğan himself, as discussed earlier in the context of the Davos incident. That said, in the eyes of the millet, beyond establishing an identification with Erdoğan, there was no ‘opportunity’ for this spirit to permeate individual members of the nation and be fully embraced by them. The nature and imprint of the ‘Legend of 15 July’ played a crucial role in grounding, ‘top to bottom’, the feelings of victory, heroism and omnipotence preached by the Neo-Ottomanist narrative, and making lay people feel them. On 15 July 2016, the foundations of self-confidence spread to the ‘bottom’ because of the acts of the members of the nation themselves. This new way of feeling, thinking and perceiving national identity was reinforced through widespread participation in the ‘Democracy Watches’ that continued day and night in every province after 15 July.Footnote 4

6.4 The ‘Ordinary’ Actors of an Extraordinary Event: Martyrs, Veterans and Heroes

Immediately after the events of 15 July, the role of people who lost their lives or were injured while resisting the coup and changing the course of events was placed within a heroic narrative by the ruling elites and the media.

The Office of the President prepared several posters to establish a heroic narrative and circulated them in the social media with the title: ‘The Legend of 15 July, with respect to our martyrs and veterans’. In one of those posters, right behind a woman wearing a headscarf stands an uncovered woman and people atop tanks in Istanbul. What these people did that night is presented as an example of ‘extraordinary’ courage. The rhetoric of a ‘victory of the national will’ is further legitimized through the heroicization of ordinary daring people as ‘martyrs and veterans’.

Ömer Halisdemir is the most well-known of those who lost their lives while resisting the coup attempt. Halisdemir, who served as a Petty Officer Senior Sergeant in the Turkish Armed Forces, became a hero after killing Brigadier General Semih Terzi—who arrived with his soldiers to seize the Special Forces Command on the night of the coup—thereby changing the outcome of the attempted overthrow. What made Halisdemir a mythical heroic figure was the fact that he was killed by thirty bullets, fired at him by the putschist soldiers under Terzi’s command after Halisdemir had shot him.

After the failed coup, elites in power forged a potent narrative of Ömer Halisdemir’s courage and martyrdom. In a speech he delivered from a balcony after the coup, Erdoğan said, ‘They did not think that a son of the homeland like Ömer Halisdemir would come out and shoot them in the middle of their foreheads’.

Two other people who lost their lives on the night of 15 July and became heroes were Erol Olçok and his 16-year-old son, Abdullah Tayyip Olçok. The elder Olçok had worked with Erdoğan since 1993, handling the AKP’s advertising, corporate promotion and organizational activities. Olçok and his son were shot dead by putschists on the Bosphorus Bridge, reportedly while trying to demolish a barricade set up by soldiers. During the speech he gave at their funeral, President Erdoğan could not hold back his tears.Footnote 5

According to official reports, 248 civilians lost their lives on the night of 15 July. Interviews with the families of the fallen were documented by TRT under the title For the Sake of a Crescent. The documentary, which consists of 100 episodes, with a sequel in the making, was broadcast on all TRT channels. In each episode, the deep sadness summoned by witnessing the stories of those who lost their lives during the resistance quickly gives way to a discourse of pride and courage. The filmmakers attribute a profound sanctity to the extraordinary heroism of the civilians.

After 15 July, not only those who lost their lives but also those who survived the night, occupied a significant place in the ruling elites’ discourse, the media and on social media as living heroes of the mythicization process. They were regarded as symbols of national courage and self-confidence. Perhaps the most striking of these was Metin Doğan, who became a symbol of resistance due to the photograph taken of him on the night of the coup attempt.Footnote 6 Doğan’s attempt to prevent a tank from moving by standing and even lying in front of it was narrated and described as an act of ‘extraordinary courage’. Doğan was invited as a ‘hero’ to speak at many universities, state organizations and rallies, and received plaques honouring him.Footnote 7

It was not just men who were made heroes after 15 July. Among the women who took to the streets that night to protest and prevent the coup, several were chosen and made into symbolic heroines. Perhaps the most striking of these was Şerife Boz, who allegedly gathered the young people in her neighbourhood into the back of a truck on the evening of 16 July and drove them to Taksim Square to protest the coup. Early on, a photo of her in the driver’s seat became emblematic of the night of the coup. Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım confessed that he cried when he saw the image,Footnote 8 noting:

I saw a photo, and was deeply impressed. A lady in a burqa is behind the wheel of a truck; next to her is a woman with her head bare, dressed in modern clothes, sitting in the passenger seat. Packed with people in the back of the truck. [...] They’re going fast. This is the bond that unites Turkey. This photo is the one that caused the teardrops to fall from my eyes. We have no difference, together we are Turkey.Footnote 9

Binali Yıldırım’s speech focused on the coexistence of a woman wearing a burqa and a bareheaded woman, rhetoric that accorded with the claim to inclusiveness attempted in the transformation of 15 July into a myth. This rhetoric was highly useful, emphasizing the supra-ideological dimension of the resistance to the coup and conveying that ideal values such as courage, bravery and valour are not unique to Turkish men but to Turkish women as well. Indeed, after the failed coup, its heroines were likened (in a reference to the glorious past) to Nene Hatun, the mythical female figure from the War of Independence.Footnote 10

Another female figure who was made a heroine was Safiye Bayat, reportedly the first person to initiate the Bosphorus Bridge resistance. Footage of Bayat, a young woman in headscarf, on the night of the coup shows her approaching the tanks stationed on the Bosphorus Bridge and attempting to talk to the soldiers there, who fired into the air to drive her away. Bayat made it through the night with injuries and became one of the surviving heroines of the resistance. She was interviewed while she was still in hospital, with the main news bulletins emphasizing her courage and patriotism. In the statements she gave to the press, she retold with great pride and enthusiasm her experiences with the putschist soldiers.Footnote 11

On the night of 15 July, a hadith kept ringing in my ears: ‘Love of homeland comes from faith.’ I think that these words gave me strength. I knew I was going to a jihad. The commander pulled me to himself and opened fire over my cheek, but I didn’t move a muscle. I said, ‘Are you trying to scare me with this? Don’t you realize yet that I am not afraid of you?’Footnote 12

The attempt to mythicize the events of 15 July began by attributing the titles ‘democracy martyrs’ and ‘veterans of democracy’ to the aforementioned people and by telling their stories to the public. Among those listed as heroes were many lay people, from the doctors who gave first aid to the wounded on the street, to the police chief who confronted the putschist soldiers with the officers under his command and the villager who burned the crops in his fields to prevent the insurgent planes from taking off in Ankara’s Kazan district. All were made into actors in the narrative of 15 July as a historic victory—almost a second War of Independence. Each of them—as patriots, as Muslims—was transformed into symbols embodying such values as loyalty, faith, courage and self-confidence, putting their country and nation above their own life. Thus was the transformation of the imprint of 15 July event into ethos—into values, principles, ideals, beliefs, feelings and attitudes embodied in the actions of those deemed heroes or heroines—complete. The translation of this ethos into a holistic and inclusive narrative of victory would take place at the ‘Rally of Democracy and Martyrs’, which was held in Yenikapı Square on 7 August 2016.

6.5 From Ethos to Pathos: Yenikapı Spirit and the Establishment of National Narcissism

During the period from 15 July to 7 August, remarkable progress was made in the heroization and making of an ethos tied to myth creation. By then, the Turkish public knew the names of the ‘heroes’ and ‘martyrs’ and their stories. Thousands of people attended the ‘Democracy Watches’ held in the squares of many cities to voice opposition to the coup and support a rhetoric of democracy. In a TV program he participated in on 30 July, President Erdoğan announced that the democracy watches would be accompanied with a rally in Yenikapı on 7 August. Preparations for the rally, which would be held under the auspices of the Presidency, were carried out by the Governorship of Istanbul and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. A statement released before the rally, details the care taken to ensure the nonpartisan nature of the meeting: ‘As a token of our national consciousness, only our glorious flag will be flown, and no other party flag, pennant or placard will be used’.Footnote 13 On the invitation posters to Yenikapı rally, it was written that: ‘Our President, our chief commander invites the whole nation to the Rally of Democracy and Martyrs. Victory belongs to democracy; the squares belong to the nation’.

The Yenikapı Rally was conceived according to the motto ‘one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state’, which has long dominated Erdoğan’s political discourse. After a moment of silence for the martyrs and the National Anthem, followed by the recitation of Quran, mass prayers, led by the Chief of Religious Affairs, were performed for the martyrs of 15 July. Religion and religious rituals were a key part of the state ceremony, as central as the National Anthem, as the collective prayer revealed. The legitimacy of religion in the eyes of the state, which constitutes one of the most powerful symbolic political tools in the AKP and Erdoğan’s political journey from victimization to omnipotence, was made clear at this gathering, which included the head of the CHP among the participants. The effort to establish Islam as the dominant marker of national identity, a goal which has characterized the AKP’s journey to power was thus crowned, and the national character of Neo-Ottomanism entered a new phase that can be defined as an ‘Islam-Turkish’ synthesis. In this equation, Turkishness was imagined entirely within the framework of Sunni Islam, with Islam (basically synonymous with Turkishness) as the dominant characteristic of national identity. The term ‘Yenikapı Spirit’ was coined to reflect this new national identity.

At the Yenikapı Rally, the leaders of the Turkey’s political parties gave speeches.Footnote 14 That of Devlet Bahçeli (leader of the Nationalist Movement Party), who took the stage first, was dominated by praise and pride for the audience before him:

Despite the games played against us and the strife, you stood up with courage. You proudly raised our flag. You bravely defended the martyrs. You have defended the brotherhood with faith. [...] You ran to Yenikapı without falling, and said, I’m standing. You gave the good news of a resurrection. I am happy because I am proudly watching the rise of our Turkey. I am happy because the nation, the will, the faith are all here. Wrist that won’t be twisted, heads that won’t bow, an invincible national power are all here, in this square.Footnote 15

Speaking next, the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, described 15 July as a victory for democracy, noting ‘We have 240 martyrs who lost their lives that night. They will take their place in the golden pages of our history of democracy. We will not forget them. We will not forget’. He stated that this event, which he addressed as a ‘calamity’, had opened the door for reconciliation in Turkish politics, ending his speech with the lines of poet Nâzım Hikmet: ‘To live like a tree sole and free and brotherly as a forest, this invitation, this longing is ours’. The predominant tone of Kılıçdaroğlu’s speech was reconciliatory, and he preached a style of politics compatible with basic values of the Republican regime such as democracy and secularism.

The then-Chief of Defence Hulusi Akar, who took the stage after Kılıçdaroğlu, also appealed to pride and heroism:

The heroism and self-sacrifice of our noble nation for the dominance of the national will and the maintenance of democracy at the expense of one’s life is beyond all appreciation. They will always be remembered with respect and gratitude. For this reason, I once again express my respect and gratitude to our noble nation embodied in you.

Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım claimed that ‘15 July is the Second War of Independence. Thanks to Allah, thanks to our martyrs who lie proudly under the ground, today we live as one and independent’. He ended his speech by emphasizing the omnipotence of the audience he was addressing: ‘I heartily congratulate our youth and women who lay in front of the tanks. Our Rabia, one state, one nation, one homeland, one flag and our flag with a crescent and star is enough for all of us’.

Spokesman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, İsmail Kahraman, referred to the continuity between a glorious past and the present:

You are the grandchildren of Selahaddin Eyyubi, who devastated the Crusader armies that went on expeditions to destroy Islam. You are the grandchildren of Sultan Mehmed, who conquered Istanbul, the most beautiful town of the seven climates, by riding his grey horse to the Golden Horn, saying, ‘I will either take Istanbul or Istanbul will take me,’ who received the good news in the Hadith of the Prophet. You are the heirs of a state that ruled three continents and seven seas. You are people full of faith who will carry the Republic of Turkey to a point worthy of its past.

Finally, when it was President Erdoğan’s turn to speak, he was invited to the stage as the ‘Commander-in-Chief’. He took his place to the sound of the enthusiastic applause and cheers of the audience. At the very outset of his speech, emphasizing that the greatest role in this victory belonged to the Turkish nation, he said, ‘My dear nation, who once again did not surrender their country to FETÖ and the invaders at the cost of their lives on the night of 15 July, for its independence and future, I greet you with my most heartfelt feelings, longing and affection’. Erdoğan continued:

At the very beginning of my words, I would like to express my gratitude once again to all my brothers and sisters who had the courage to take to the streets, to the squares and crowded the airports on the night of 15 July, and to stand in front of the gun barrels, tanks, helicopters and planes. [...] Those millions of our citizens who poured to the streets and squares that night, and those who received the honour of martyrdom and veteran, have their names written in history with golden letters. [...] My brothers, this nation is distinct. In fact, the Turkish nation stood up to the coup plotters on 15 July with the same feeling as the faith that opened the doors of Anatolia in Manzikert a thousand years ago.

On whatever foundations Osman Gazi built history’s most powerful state in 1299, we also defended Turkey that night on the same principles. With whatever understanding our ancestors fought to the last drop of blood in Çanakkale, we repelled FETÖ on 15 July with the same will.

Ey my people! Do you accept captivity and humiliation? No one will ever be able to hold this nation captive.

Based on these speeches, what can the emphasis on victory, sacrifice, courage, self-confidence and omnipotence tell us about the national mood which was attempted to be invoked? What is the dominant emotion that clings to and emanates from the ‘Yenikapı spirit’? I contend that it is basically narcissism. The concept of narcissism derives from Greek mythology and is rooted in psychology and psychiatry. The myth is based on the story of Narcissus, a young man who falls in love with his own reflection upon the water’s surface. Narcissism, in the Freudian sense, suggests a mood of powerfulness, self-confidence, arrogance, self-admiration and constant demands for the admiration of others. It is an enchanting sense of existence, which is why it is mostly nurtured by fantasy rather than reality (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006, 618). The basic patterns of narcissism are feelings of arrogance and grandeur, suffused with fantasies of success and power, grounded in a belief in the uniqueness and superiority of the self. Narcissists require constant admiration and approval due to their fragile self-perception. After a past experience of humiliation, defeat or loss, narcissism works as a defence mechanism. At the root of narcissism lies an insatiable need for recognition and power. It goes hand in hand with an indifference to the worldviews of others, a lack of empathy, persistent paranoia, anger and hypersensitivity (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006, 619–622).

It has become possible to take up narcissism as a political, psychological and sociological phenomenon rather than as an individual ‘pathology’ thanks to studies of narcissistic leadership. Before putting forward my claim about national narcissism, allow me to sketch out a framework of the relationship between narcissistic leaders and their followers. In an article on narcissism in the context of political psychology, Jerrold Post emphasizes that individuals with narcissistic injuries are drawn to charismatic leaders. According to him, the relationship between a charismatic leader and his followers is formed by a vision of the leader as nearly superhuman (an Übermensch). A remarkable emotional investment is made in the leader: people whose sense of self has been damaged in the past, desire to associate themselves with a strong personality; the charismatic leader represents salvation for them. By acting heroically and in a manner that meets the needs and desires of his supporters, the leader satisfies their hunger. His success becomes the success of his supporters. People depend on the charismatic leader to fulfil their need to feel safe and secure; the perception of the external world as threatening emerges as a threat to one’s existence. Followers with an injured sense of self, wish to establish a coherent identity by gaining a sense of an us through their commitment to a charismatic leader. The self, thus, exists as a relation. The group with which the self relates is idealized; the essence of the group is attributed to the leader’s essence (1986, 676–685).

According to Post, narcissistic leaders are mirror-hungry; constantly in need of people who will approve of and admire them. Their supporters, meanwhile, are ideal-hungry; they consider themselves valuable only when they follow and associate themselves with someone they think is strong enough to admire. A mirror-hungry leader presents himself to his supporters as an omnipotent figure—a proposition that is extremely alluring and enchanting to supporters. Especially in times of crisis, people desire a leader who they believe is omnipotent; the narcissism of the leader is thus attractive, as it becomes synonymous with saviourhood. Such an association also reshapes the self-perception of the nation and satisfies a search for wholeness and perfection (1986, 686). Additionally, narcissistic leaders consider all manner of attacks on and reactions to them as attacks on their country—for them, their country, their nation and them are one and the same (Post, 1993, 110).

Here, national narcissism, the dominant emotion invoked by the Yenikapı Spirit, is produced by this association. The concept is inspired by collective narcissism, which holds that narcissism is not just an individual psychological state of mind but can spread to groups, societies and even nations. Collective narcissism results from an intense emotional investment in the unrealistic belief in the greatness of a group. It stems from the intersection of an elevated self-image and low public perception. Experiences of facing injustice or being exposed to criticism, doubt and humiliation can prompt narcissism at the collective level. Since narcissistic groups constantly expect approval and admiration, their perception and intolerance of threat are heightened. Aggression and hostility can become the dominant behaviour pattern of the group. The insistence on seeing the outsider as a threat and not forgiving any wrong therefrom runs parallel to a desire for social superiority and dominance. For this reason, collective narcissism generally opens the door to right-wing authoritarianism and blind patriotism (Zavala et al., 2009, 1074–1076). Meanwhile, national narcissism is a state of mind that is expressed as an over-emotional investment in and devotion to the symbols of the nation and an uncritical idealization of it. The most dangerous aspect of it is the possibility that hypersensitivity to threat can devolve into defensive and vengeful impulses; the greater the perception of the nation’s own vulnerability, the greater the power of national narcissism (Zavala & Cicocka 2011, 215–216).

In an article that explores nationalism through narcissism, José Brunner describes national narcissism as a kind of ‘infatuation’ generated through a reliance on shared fantasies of the past and present in order to cover up individual and collective impurity and vulnerability. These fantasies, Brunner adds, are dominated by the illusion of being an omnipotent, superior, historically unique nation. Those who think that their own nation’s history is being deprecated, belittled and ignored by others will eagerly accept the invitation of national narcissism (1997, 261–263). Truth does not matter; the most important thing is to extract examples from history that will nurture the present image of the collective. For this purpose, past and present victories are transformed into narratives and extant forms of togetherness are sanctified. Values from the past are re-performed in the present in order to re-establish and restore both national self-esteem and a perception of continuity.

So, what does this theoretical interlude on the nature of narcissism tell us about Neo-Ottomanism under the AKP? Let me recall both the national pride predominant in the speeches given by various members of the state, from the government to the opposition and the Chief of the General Staff to the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at the ‘Rally of Democracy and Martyrs’, and the unequivocal attribution of the coup’s successful overthrow to the nation. Both were efforts to invoke national narcissism. Indeed, the first steps towards attributing sanctity to the 15 July were taken at the Yenikapı Rally. The events of 15 July were transformed into a narrative of victory in a manner consonant with a national mood that harbours national narcissism. The pathos of the events, accompanied by an emphasis on the majesty, power, superiority, omnipotence and past and present victories of the Turkish nation, was presented as a remedy that would heal the self-perception of the AKP and its supporters, and ultimately the Turkish nation. What was needed was the intensive application of symbolic instruments that would ensure that this new national mood was fully embraced by the people.

6.6 The Banal Manifestations of National Narcissism: Monuments, Commemorations, Marches and Designations

After the Yenikapı Rally, the AKP government and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey made various moves to spread the myth of 15 July and ensure its adoption by all segments of society. The most notable of these was the declaration of 15 July as a public holiday—named the ‘Day of Democracy and Freedoms’—by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.Footnote 16 In the same session, the name of a district in Ankara previously known as Kazan was changed to KahramankazanFootnote 17 after a group of farmers there entered the Akıncı Air Base with their tractors on the night to prevent putschist planes from taking off.Footnote 18

Immediately after the coup attempt, monuments commemorating 15 July were built across Turkey, particularly in Istanbul and Ankara. The biggest of these monuments was built at the exit of the Bosphorus Bridge, one of the night’s most contested sites. The eleven decare space on which this monument is located was designed as ‘Martyrdom Park’. 250 cypress and rose trees were planted to represent the 250 people who lost their lives.Footnote 19

Another monument was built on the grounds of the Presidential Palace in Ankara. Four figures symbolizing ‘one nation, one flag, one homeland and one state’ and 81 human figures representing Turkey’s 81 provinces were sculpted with the Turkish flag in their hands. The construction of the monument was completed in the short span of just twenty-four days. On the monument’s inner surface is a lithograph of the names of those who lost their lives.Footnote 20 Erdoğan announced that a 15 July Museum would be built right beside this monument in Beştepe.Footnote 21

In addition to grand monuments in Istanbul and Ankara, several monuments and parks were situated in every province to commemorate the historical event. Yozgat’s Akdağmadeni Municipality built a 42-meter-high statue of a flag. The Martyrs’ Monument, consisting of a single piece of marble weighing 107 tons, inscribed with the names of the martyrs of 15 July, was built in Bursa. The 15 July Martyrs’ Monument erected in Denizli depicted citizens who stopped a tank and prevented it from moving during the attempted coup.Footnote 22 In short, in public parks and gardens, government institutions and university campuses, monuments of various sizes were created to immortalize 15 July.

There were more banal manifestations of the event too, involving the naming of squares, streets, avenues, schools and parks after people who lost their lives on the night of 15 July. Istanbul Bosphorus Bridge was renamed ‘15 July Martyrs Bridge’. A giant sign proclaiming ‘The Legend of 15 July’ was placed in Ankara’s main Kızılay Square, which was retitled ‘15 July National Will Square’. Again in Ankara, the site of the General Staff Junction was renamed ‘15 July Martyrs Square’, while the road leading to Esenboğa Airport became known as ‘Martyr Ömer Halisdemir Boulevard’.Footnote 23 Niğde University became ‘Martyr Ömer Halisdemir University’, and TRT announced that the studio where the coup statement was read on the night of 15 July would now be called ‘15 July Millet Studio’.Footnote 24

To render the ‘Legend of 15 July’ lasting in the curricula, the Ministry of National Education decided to hold ‘15 July Victory of Democracy and Martyrs Commemoration’ events in all public schools in the first week of the 2016–2017 academic year. On the first day of school, a booklet entitled ‘The 15 July Legend of National Will’ was distributed to students in state schools across the country. The foreword of the booklet was written by Erdoğan, and his portrait was printed on the inside cover. Quran recitations were held in some schools for the martyrs of the resistance, and poetry, prose, theatre and painting competitions about 15 July were held throughout the academic year.Footnote 25

In addition to all these practices of banal nationalism enacted by the Ministry of National Education and other official state institutions to popularize both the events of 15 July and the emotion of national narcissism in daily life, many events were held with reference to 15 July, from sports competitions to theatre performances, concerts to poetry recitals, and several books written that depicted 15 July as an epic, published under such titles as The Legend of Resurrection, The Legend of a Nation, and 15 July, The Longest Night.

In another manifestation of the adoption of 15 July by non-official organizations, various non-governmental organizations were established under such names as the 15 July Association, the 15 July National Will and Democracy Association and the 15 July Ankara Veterans and Martyrs’ Relatives Association. Further, several songs and anthems were composed in reference to the failed coup. The most prominent of these was the ‘15 July Democracy March’, broadcast by TRT Music. The lyrics are as follows:

It was the night of 15 July, the weather was hot/An attempt at betrayal burned the country/Today was the day, the whole nation stood up/

Children, old and young people poured into the streets/Democracy took a blow, and the nation was shocked/Either freedom after that, or disgrace/The footsteps of millions shook the ground/Flag in hand takbir ran forward/

We are the witnesses to the legend of democracy/We are the martyrs who are resurrected once they die/The Commander-in-Chief gave the order/

Take care of the holy homeland/ Take care of the holy homeland/ We passed through the storm, homeland, for God’s sake/

The entire world saw this/From the ground to the sky while those traitors scattered death/Many souls were martyred while raising the flag/Some defied the tank, some the gun/So that democracy would not be trampled on one more time.Footnote 26

Many commentators on a YouTube video of this anthem—the lyrics of which are remarkably memorable and impressive—regard it as the best anthem in the country’s history. Listeners reported that it gave them goose bumps and brought them tears. Still, it seems essential to pose the question: to what extent was this heralding of emotion successful? To what extent did the feelings evoked by the myth which ruling elites tried to bring about after the events of 15 July find broader social resonance and legitimacy? Answering these questions will allow us to make some claims about the outcome of the effort to mythologize 15 July in a manner evoking national narcissism, and the point thus reached in the AKP’s political journey.

6.7 Whose Legend is 15 July? National Narcissism or Collective Narcissism?

Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to analyse the events of 15 July and the features of the national myth that the AKP elites sought to create after these events. Less than a decade ago at this point, it is both too early and indeed too late to claim that the events of 15 July were ‘nationalized’ with the aim of inclusivity, and that they address a mood that appeals to all segments of the nation equally. Indeed, in the subsequent years, the spirit of national unity and solidarity has been out of sync with the political and social reality.

After 15 July, the AKP government declared a state of emergency to establish security and ‘expell traitors’ from state institutions. Under the state of emergency, almost anyone who was not a supporter of the AKP and Erdoğan, both at the state and institutional level and in broader society, was declared a ‘traitor and terrorist’. The AKP government and its supporters have once again instituted a strict divide between us and them by mobilizing a perception of threat and paranoia as manifestations of collective narcissism. The national narcissism invoked through the discourse of Yenikapı Spirit rather quickly lost its ‘national’ character as a result. Thus, it is apparent that after the ‘Legend of 15 July’, a remnant of collective narcissism remained that chiefly appealed to supporters of the AKP and Erdoğan.

After the declaration of the state of emergency, the prominent distinction between the AKP and others was consolidated with reinforcement, strictly articulated by the government both discursively and in practice. The distinctions between us and them, the friend and the enemy, patriot and terrorist, were once again dominating the discourse of Erdoğan and the AKP.Footnote 27 There is evidently a huge gap between the Yenikapı Spirit that emerged immediately after the 15 July coup attempt and the national spirit as it has been articulated in the years since. It thus seems essential to revise my argument at the beginning of this chapter: In the aftermath of the abortive coup, a mood of national narcissism was expected to spread across the country in accordance with the Neo-Ottomanist narrative. However, this narrative of the grandeur of the Ottoman Empire has weakened and is now less likely to be embraced by all segments of society because of the failure of the 15 July myth to fulfil its promise of inclusiveness—its failure to be ‘nationalized’. The possibility of a narrative of past and present that all segments of the society might adopt has withered. Arguably, the predominant narrative has regressed to one that appeals only to Erdoğan, the AKP tradition and their current supporters. Additionally, the perception of continuity between the Turkish nation and the Ottoman Empire was broken rather than consolidated after the events of 15 July. Plenty of data and observations strengthen this claim. Posters produced by the presidential office after the attempted coup caused various controversies.Footnote 28 Some argued that the Turkish Armed Forces had been humiliated by the posters, or that those who tried to stage a coup were ‘FETÖ’ members among members of the Turkish Armed Forces, or that the AKP and its staff had acted in concert with those alleged to be responsible for the 15 July coup attempt for years, debates which demonstrate that neither 15 July nor the Yenikapı Spirit could be as encompassing or ‘national’ as intended. Another manifestation of this failure is that the propaganda film Kurtlar Vadisi: Vatan (Valley of the Wolves: Homeland) did not receive the expected reception at the box officeFootnote 29; movie theatres remained empty, even though some municipalities showed the movie free of charge.

During events held in 2017 to mark the first anniversary of the attempted coup, the dimensions of the political disintegration that took place afterwards became even clearer: photographs of CHP deputies taken in parliament on the night of 15 July were not included in a photo exhibition that opened in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.Footnote 30 CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu did not attend the commemoration in Istanbul. The CHP’s Gürsel Tekin claimed that Kılıçdaroğlu had been banned from speaking at the ceremony.Footnote 31 Kılıçdaroğlu, in a special session held at the Grand National Assembly on 15 July 2017, spoke of this exclusion and said, ‘Unfortunately, the opportunity to create a strong democracy, which emerged in the climate of reconciliation created by the spirit of 15 July, was wasted’.Footnote 32

Although the ‘Legend of 15 July’ was aired as a myth in line with the spirit of the Neo-Ottomanist narrative, it was unable to achieve the level of inclusiveness and ‘national’ articulation. The legitimacy of 15 July and the Yenikapı Spirit could not be ensured, neither among the people nor on the political stage. In the course of the AKP’s political journey from victimhood to omnipotence, 15 July was a moment of ‘collective narcissism’ characterized by self-worship, which enabled the creation of new enemies and threats, rather than a new narrative of national victory. The legitimacy of Neo-Ottomanism as a narrative of ressentiment filled with nostalgia and romanticism also lessened with the reactivation of a dichotomy between us and them after the events of 15 July. Meanwhile, the MHP confined itself to embracing and instrumentalizing 15 July on a discursive level in order to justify its political manoeuvres. Indeed, the speech of MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli in the parliament on the first anniversary of 15 July was a confession of this failure:

Despite the fact that one year has passed since 15 July, the persistent polarization and vicious fights on this issue are an alarming and painful loss for our independence. [...] Why can’t we agree on the 15 July FETÖ coup attempt? Why can’t we all stand up to the oppressors together? Why can’t we be one breath around rightfulness, truth, people? What is it that separates us? What comes between us? How should we explain and interpret the existing differences of opinion when it is obvious that 15 July was an assassination attempt on Turkey, a murder aimed at destroying our nation?Footnote 33