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Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

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Theory of Cryptography (TCC 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14372))

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Abstract

We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on indistinguishability obfuscation along with any one-way function (Bartusek et al., ePrint:2023/265), or on almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, CRYPTO 2023).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A concurrent updated version of [10] also obtained functional encryption with certified deletion, although in the private-verification settings.

  2. 2.

    One can usually think of \(\mathcal{Z}_\lambda \) as just encrypting its first input and leaving the remaining in the clear. However, we need to formulate the more general definition of \(\mathcal{Z}_\lambda \) that operates on all inputs to handle certain applications, such as attribute-based encryption. See [4] for details.

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Acknowledgements

DK was supported in part by NSF 2112890, NSF CNS-2247727, and DARPA SIEVE. This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency through Award HR00112020024. GM was partially funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA - 390781972.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. UC Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

    James Bartusek

  2. UIUC, Champaign, USA

    Dakshita Khurana

  3. Bocconi University and Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum, Germany

    Giulio Malavolta

  4. Caltech, Pasadena, USA

    Alexander Poremba

  5. Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Michael Walter

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  1. James Bartusek
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  2. Dakshita Khurana
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  3. Giulio Malavolta
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  4. Alexander Poremba
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  5. Michael Walter
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to James Bartusek .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Apple, Cupertino, CA, USA

    Guy Rothblum

  2. NTT Research, Sunnyvale, CA, USA

    Hoeteck Wee

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© 2023 International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Bartusek, J., Khurana, D., Malavolta, G., Poremba, A., Walter, M. (2023). Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion. In: Rothblum, G., Wee, H. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14372. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_7

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