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Looking Forwards to the Future of Dignity and Human Rights: New Generation Rights

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The Making of Dignity and Human Rights in the Western Tradition

Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Law and Justice ((SHLJ,volume 29))

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Abstract

At the end of the 1980s, Norberto Bobbio called the present times ‘the age of rights.’ A notable sign of that age is the permanent increase of rights to an extent that they go through a current process of trivialisation. If Parts I and II looked—from the present to the past—at the development of human rights and human dignity, this Part (III) returns again to the present, and in its most recent moment, analysing the rights of the new generations, and looking at the future. In doing so, I describe and warn on the danger that human rights run today, the historical roots of some of their great shortcomings, and the models that the legislator should take into account to take human rights more seriously. I argue that human rights should be in accordance with justice in order to promote and guarantee free and peaceful societies. In this vein, I maintain that not all individual desires should be—constitutionally or legally—protected as rights; otherwise, the law might not be able to protect the most vulnerable people, also including those who are allowed—or even encouraged—to exercise those rights whose main purpose is the satisfaction of their own desires.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Masferrer and García-Sánchez (2016).

  2. 2.

    Peces-Barba (2004), p. 148.

  3. 3.

    Masferrer (2016).

  4. 4.

    In this regard, see, for example, the position of Gómez (2008); in this regard, the sections of Chapter 2 are eloquent: 3. 3.1. The Liberal State of Law: the first and second generations of rights. 3.2. The social State: the third generation. 3.3. The social State: the fourth generation of rights; Peces-Barba (1991), pp. 156 ff; Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 157, footnote n. 117: “Those who consider that there are four generations divide the first generation of rights into the first and the second. Those who consider that there are four generations divide the first generation into two, so that the temporal succession would be as follows: first, civil rights that would reflect liberal freedom; the second, composed of political rights based on democratic freedom; the third, articulated around social rights and reflecting the concept of egalitarian freedom or socialist freedom and, finally, the fourth generation composed of the last rights inspired by the synthesis between egalitarian freedom and the value of solidarity”; see also Vidal (1993), pp. 89–110.

  5. 5.

    Bustamante (2007), p. 17; in this regard, see also Morello (1998), pp. 943–951; Bustamante (2001a, b); Riofrío (2014): see also Peces-Barba (2004).

  6. 6.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 157.

  7. 7.

    Pérez Luño (1997); by the same author, Pérez Luño (1995); see also Pérez Luño (2006).

  8. 8.

    Squella (2002), Corchete (2007), Bustamante (2007).

  9. 9.

    See, for example, Rodríguez (2010).

  10. 10.

    In this regard, see, for example, the study by Rabossi (1997–1998), pp. 42: “La sencillez y obviedad que aparece tener la tesis de las generaciones de derechos humanos hace que se pasen por alto por su presuposiciones e implicaciones teóricas y prácticas”.

  11. 11.

    Rabossi (1997–1998), pp. 42–43.

  12. 12.

    Vasak (1977), p. 29.

  13. 13.

    Vasak (1984).

  14. 14.

    Rabossi (1997–1998), p. 42.

  15. 15.

    In this regard, see, for example, Pérez Luño (1998); Pérez Luño (2013), Pérez Luño (2007).

  16. 16.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 178: “All this anticipates a different world with unknown pretensions and thus justifies this very varied category of rights in which demands with such different presuppositions are included”; the italics are mine.

  17. 17.

    Civil rights include the rights to life, property, ideological and religious freedom, and freedom of expression, among others. Among the political rights, the rights to vote, to strike, to associate freely to form a political party or a trade union, etc., are noteworthy.

  18. 18.

    In this connection, it should be recalled that Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the desirability of “behaving towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.

  19. 19.

    Pérez Luño (2013), pp. 175–176.

  20. 20.

    Pérez Luño (2013), pp. 175–176.

  21. 21.

    Pérez Luño (2013), p. 175.

  22. 22.

    See http://recursostic.educacion.es/secundaria/edad/4esoetica/quincena5/quincena5_contenidos_5.htm (Accessed August 14, 2020).

  23. 23.

    Pérez Luño (2013), p. 168; Pérez Luño (1998), p. 1958.

  24. 24.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 177.

  25. 25.

    In this regard, the title of Pope Francis’ latest encyclical letter, Laudato Si′: On Care for the Common Home [Pope Francis (2015)] is eloquent; see, in particular, ch. 1: ‘What is happening to our home’.

  26. 26.

    Rey (2011), p. 106.

  27. 27.

    Rey (2011), p. 106; the italics are mine; in this regard, see Rodríguez (2010), p. 307, who points out that these rights “are aimed at overcoming relations of domination in the internal sphere of States and in international relations.”

  28. 28.

    Pérez Luño (1995), p. 116; Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 179.

  29. 29.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 179.

  30. 30.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), pp. 179–180, and he adds: “There is nothing more distant and contradictory than to speak of “human rights” and to affirm that their ownership is diffuse. That there is no one to whom to assign them!”.

  31. 31.

    Rey (2011), p. 106.

  32. 32.

    On this subject, see the study by Jonas (1984).

  33. 33.

    Levinas (1994).

  34. 34.

    See note n. 2.

  35. 35.

    In this regard, see Cortina (1986).

  36. 36.

    This has been made clear by Peces-Barba (1991), pp. 156 ff.; Pérez Luño (1995), p. 119; Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 181.

  37. 37.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 181: “…a solidarity extended to all of humanity, to all men and women and to all peoples and corners of the planet and which thus binds and intertwines all in a common interest: that of the global environment, perpetual peace, sustainable development, the enjoyment of the goods proper to humanity, etc. And, at the same time, a solidarity that constitutes the basic platform for modifying and improving many of the realities and miseries of life on the planet and makes it possible to justify these new needs and aspirations that are the rights of the third generation”.

  38. 38.

    Pérez Luño (2013), p. 183: “…the effectiveness of third generation rights does not allow us to contemplate their ownership from the point of view of man in isolation from first generation rights, nor even from the sphere of man situated in the groups and social movements that promoted second generation rights. Today, in the global society, both the individual and the collectivity are insufficient to respond to challenges and aggressions that, because they affect all human beings, can only be counteracted through rights whose holders are aware that the full realisation of their freedoms is something that concerns, actually or potentially, all human beings. The ownership of the third generation of human rights requires, in short, full awareness of the universality and solidarity on which they are based.

  39. 39.

    Pope Francis (2015), n. 27, “Other indicators of the present situation have to do with the depletion of natural resources. We are well aware of the impossibility of sustaining the present level of consumption in the most developed countries and in the richest sectors of society, where the habit of waste and throw-away has reached unprecedented levels. Certain maximum limits of exploitation of the planet have already been exceeded, without having solved the problem of poverty.

  40. 40.

    On biodiversity, see Pope Francis (2015), nn. 32–42, in particular n. 32: “The earth’s resources are also being depleted by immediatist ways of understanding the economy and commercial and productive activity. The loss of forests and woodlands implies at the same time the loss of species that could in the future be extremely important resources, not only for food, but also for the cure of diseases and for multiple services. The diverse species contain genes that can be key resources to solve in the future some human need or to regulate some environmental problem”.

  41. 41.

    On pollution and climate change, see Pope Francis (2015), nn. 20–26.

  42. 42.

    On water, see Pope Francis (2015), nn. 28–31, in particular n. 28: “Drinking and clean water is a matter of primary importance, because it is indispensable for human life and for sustaining terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Freshwater sources supply sanitation, agriculture and industry. Water supply has long remained relatively constant, but in many places demand now exceeds sustainable supply, with serious short- and long-term consequences. Large cities that depend on a significant level of water storage suffer periods of water stress, which at critical times is not always managed with adequate governance and fairness. Social water poverty is particularly prevalent in Africa, where large sectors of the population do not have access to safe drinking water, or suffer from droughts that hinder food production. In some countries, there are regions with abundant water and at the same time others with severe water scarcity.

  43. 43.

    On this subject, see Pope Francis (2015), nn. 43–47, in particular n. 44: “Today we note, for example, the excessive and disorderly growth of many cities which have become unhealthy to live in, not only due to pollution caused by toxic emissions, but also to urban chaos, transport problems, and visual and noise pollution. Many cities are large, inefficient structures that waste excessive energy and water. There are neighbourhoods that, although recently built, are congested and untidy, without sufficient green spaces. It is not befitting for the inhabitants of this planet to live increasingly inundated with cement, asphalt, glass and metals, deprived of physical contact with nature”.

  44. 44.

    See, in this regard, the following conferences and instruments drafted from 1968 to the present: Water Charter adopted by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg (1968); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972); Declaration on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation for the Decade (1990); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit), Rio de Janeiro (1992); International Conference on Water and Environment (Dublin, 1992); Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (1995); Marrakech Declaration, First World Water Forum (1997); Kyoto Convention (1997); Rio+20 Summit (2012); on the ecological question, see also the latest encyclical letter of Pope Francis (2015).

  45. 45.

    Pérez Luño (1995), p. 111.

  46. 46.

    See the principles contained in Art. 1 of the Declaration on a Culture of Peace (1999), without which peace would be impossible to achieve:

    (a) Respect for life, ending of violence and the promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation.

    (b) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-interference in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

    (c) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    (d) Commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts.

    (e) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.

    (f) Respect for and promotion of the right to development.

    (g) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men.

    (h) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information.

    (i) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations.

    and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace”.

  47. 47.

    John Paul II (1990), n. 154: “…despite the international agreements which prohibit chemical, bacteriological and biological warfare, the fact is that laboratory research continues to develop new offensive weapons capable of altering the balance of nature”.

  48. 48.

    In this regard, see Pope Francis (2015), n. 57: “It is foreseeable that, in the face of the exhaustion of certain resources, a favourable scenario will be created for new wars, disguised behind noble claims. War always causes serious damage to the environment and to the cultural wealth of populations, and the risks become greater when we think of nuclear and biological weapons (…). Greater political attention is required to prevent and resolve the causes that can give rise to new conflicts. But the power connected to finance is the most resistant to this effort, and political designs are not usually far-sighted. What is the point of preserving today a power that will be remembered for its inability to intervene when it was urgent and necessary?

  49. 49.

    John Paul II (1981), I.2; and he adds: “The teachings contained in the Encyclical Mater et Magistra of John XXIII, in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes of the Second Vatican Council and in the Encyclical Populorum Progressio of Paul VI move in this direction”.

  50. 50.

    In this regard, see Pope Francis (2015), nn. 48–52.

  51. 51.

    Pope Francis (2015), n. 49.

  52. 52.

    International law does not provide a binding definition of the concept of ‘peoples’. It seems that the right of self-determination is not necessarily confined to peoples under colonial rule, but extends to ‘all peoples. It is, of course, an indeterminate legal concept, which should be clarified in each specific case.

  53. 53.

    Arts. 1 and 2 of the Declaration on the Recognition of the Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1960.

  54. 54.

    General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970); the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties resolution (1974).

  55. 55.

    In this regard, see the study by Tello (2012).

  56. 56.

    The text was adopted at the 17th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Paris from 17 October to 21 November 1972.

  57. 57.

    In this regard, see González (1999); Suñé (2008), pp. 66 ff.; on the right to data protection as a ‘new’ right and a new response to the challenges of NICTS, see also Martínez (2018), pp. 39–42.

  58. 58.

    On this point, see the bibliography in note no. 431.

  59. 59.

    This is how Bustamante Donás describes -or tries to justify it- in Bustamante (2007), pp. 16–17, the transition from third to fourth generation rights: “The so-called solidarity rights constitute a third generation that took shape in the second half of the twentieth century, and are based on the action of collectives that claim legitimate rights. They appear in the form of sectoral declarations that protect the rights of discriminated groups, age groups, ethnic or religious minorities, Third World countries, which are affected by any of the multiple manifestations of economic and social discrimination. In the last two decades, these rights have become increasingly important and have led to the development of the concept of North-South dialogue, respect for and preservation of cultural diversity, protection of the environment, preservation of the cultural heritage of humanity, and so on. They are the expression of a new context in which new human needs are emerging and where these demands call for new rights that guarantee universal access to more advanced forms of citizenship and civility, freedom and quality of life. Economic globalisation, as well as ideological and symbolic globalisation, the transition from the information society to the knowledge society, the integration of the world through the universal extension of the mass media, as well as the phenomena of multiculturalism caused by migratory flows, are clear symptoms that something substantial is changing.

    The right to peace and international justice, to be able to intervene from supranational institutions in local armed conflicts, imposing peace from a legitimate force, are beginning to be strongly demanded. The persecution without borders of dictators, the limitation of the right to diplomatic immunity for certain crimes, and the right to create an international tribunal that acts ex officio in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. The right to choose models of sustainable development that guarantee biodiversity and allow for the preservation of the natural environment as well as the cultural heritage of humanity. The right to a multicultural environment that goes beyond the concept of tolerance, allowing the articulation of societies that are home to different cultures.

    These new conditions allow the crystallisation of new rights that aspire to become concrete in declarations such as those of civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. The right to peace and to intervention by a legitimate international power in armed conflicts; the right to create an international tribunal to act in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity; the right to sustainable development that allows the preservation of the natural environment and the cultural heritage of humanity; the right to a multicultural world in which ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities are respected; the right to the free movement of persons, not only of capital and goods, which allows decent living conditions for immigrant workers. This set of rights has been taking shape in recent decades, and opens the way for a major additional challenge in the twenty-first century: the new forms that first, second and third generation rights take in the cyberspace environment, that is, the fourth generation of human rights”; on the autonomous nature of the so-called 4th generation rights and simultaneous connection with other personal rights: Martínez López-Sáez (2018), pp. 48–57.

  60. 60.

    “Principle of lawfulness and fairness. Information relating to individuals should not be collected or processed by unfair or unlawful means or used for purposes contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (Article 1, Guiding Principles for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files).

  61. 61.

    The Cyberspace Bill of Rights is available at http://portal.uexternado.edu.co/pdf/7_convencionesDerechoInformatico/documentacion/conferencias/Los_Derechos_Humanos_en_el_Ciberespacio.pdf; Emilio Suñé Llinás is its author, although the original draft was discussed with specialists from Europe and America: Juan Juan Pablo Pampillo (ELD of México), Yarina Amoroso (University of Havana), Paula López Zamora (Complutense University of Madrid) and Fanny Coudert (University of Leuven, Belgium), among others.

  62. 62.

    Andorno (2012); Gaylin (1984).

  63. 63.

    In this regard, see Albers et al. (2014).

  64. 64.

    “The same is true of what are already known as fourth generation rights, that is, rights linked to technological progress which affect above all questions related to bioethics—euthanasia, abortion, etc.—and genetic treatments” (Martínez de Pisón (1997), pp. 156–157).

  65. 65.

    See, e.g., Ballesteros (2002); Andorno (2009); Andorno (2014).

  66. 66.

    Singer (1975); in Spain, see Mosterín (1998).

  67. 67.

    Bentham (1823), note n. 122: “But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”.

  68. 68.

    Álvarez (2009).

  69. 69.

    Salter (1996), Arslan (1999), Ballesteros (1992).

  70. 70.

    Transhumanism is a forward-looking school of thought that rejects traditional human limitations such as death, disease and other biological shortcomings. Furthermore, it holds that the human species does not represent the end of our evolution, but only the beginning (‘humanity’), passing through transhumanity, to finally arrive at posthumanity.

  71. 71.

    See, for example, Bostrom (2005).

  72. 72.

    In this regard, see Ballesteros and Fernández (2007), Negro (2009), Postigo (2009), more recently, Cortina and Serra (2015), Damour (2015).

  73. 73.

    On this subject, see MacIntyre (2001), Masferrer and García-Sanchez (2016).

  74. 74.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 224.

  75. 75.

    In this regard, see Prada (2015a), where he aims to unveil the strategies employed by the ‘immense and tutelary power’ that governs the world, prophesied by Tocqueville, to turn peoples into “a hotbed of aphids who are flattered with wifi connection and codpiece rights”.

  76. 76.

    De Prada (2015b): “The political system is now at the service of international usury, of large organisations and corporations. In exchange, the people are given the sweet treat of totally empty rights and freedoms. In the end, they are reduced to a few rights that stultify the people with hedonism, as power has always done throughout history.”

  77. 77.

    De Prada (2015c): “…according to Chesterton’s prophecy: ‘It will not be long before a new religion will be proclaimed which, while exalting lust, will forbid fecundity’. This new religion envisioned by Chesterton (although already proclaimed previously by Sade, with his ‘exultant trinity of contraception, sodomy and abortion’) is what contemporary progressivism calls ‘new social rights’, which are nothing but codpiece rights; and their enthronement has no other object than to keep the enslaved ‘citizenry’ placated and docile.”

  78. 78.

    De Prada (2014a): “The freedoms and rights of the codpiece (adultery, divorce, pornography, contraception, abortion) began as more or less shameful assaults on morality, and little by little they have become that religion envisioned by Chesterton, which at once stimulates lust and forbids fertility. Of course, all of these fly-by-night freedoms are nothing more than smokescreens, ventured to keep the people entertained, rejoicing in the pigsty, while the liberal order (transmuted into progressivism) devotes itself to the only freedom that interests it, which is none other than that of amassing money in the hands of a few.”

  79. 79.

    De Prada (2014b): “Much more important (…) than achieving political power is achieving social control, because in fact political power is nothing more than the effective exercise of a previous social control, in which the various oligarchies, with their right-wing and left-wing deals, can take turns quietly, admitting from time-to-time new partners in the distribution of the cake. By social control we must understand the sibylline mechanisms of mass psychology that achieve the submission of consciences to the cultural paradigms of each epoch (call them ‘financial capitalism’, ‘rights of the fly’, ‘consumerism’, ‘gender ideology’, etc.), to which they yield without realising it, with the same naturalness with which we breathe (…). Thus, for example, the flock will be allowed to rebel against the abuses of the financial system, as long as they don’t stop demanding abortion and other rights of the fly; because the New World Order knows well that the best way to plunder the people and thus better supply the financial markets is to exalt lust and prohibit fertility, so that people do not have children and the plundering they suffer is not perceived as an attack on their offspring.”

  80. 80.

    In this regard, Ortí (2013).

  81. 81.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 187.

  82. 82.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 178, who quotes Haarscher (1991), pp. 41 ff, as well as Massini (1994), pp. 173 ff.

  83. 83.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 180.

  84. 84.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), pp. 180–181: “The same can be said of everyday rights, of everyday claims arising from personal whim disguised as legality, since, at bottom, they constitute as a group a perversion of the concept of rights, an involution of the historical process which, from positivisation to universalisation, has consolidated them as a new code of conduct for humanity and for the twenty-first century. In effect, this tends more to the loss of nature, to the trivialisation of human rights than to their full recognition and protection”.

  85. 85.

    Pérez Luño (1995), p. 117.

  86. 86.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 180: “We speak of the rights of animals, of the rights of plants and, perfectly well, we could speak of the rights of rocks. In truth, we should rather speak of a special care or sensitivity towards other non-human beings, or towards nature. A sensitivity that can permeate the culture and customs of a people. But, from there, to making them subjects of rights as human rights there is an unbridgeable abyss. In view of these last considerations, we must reject outright the inclusion of the rights of non-human beings in this third category of rights by their very essence.”

  87. 87.

    In this respect, see the study by Zimmerling (1990); in it the author provides a concept of necessity that is relevant for ethical discourse, since it demands that it meets the requirements of objectivity and universality. In the case of objectivity, she incorporates useful arguments to distinguish a “need” from a “desire” or a “preference” insofar as the former does not depend on thought or the functioning of the brain, but on “how the world is” (pp. 47 ff.); see also Rodríguez (2010), p. 383, where she states that the rights of the new generation, “…although they reflect moral claims that shape and limit Power, are channels of political and social participation and a means of resolving benefits for the satisfaction of basic needs, initially, they cannot be reduced to isolated individual claims and sometimes they are indissolubly linked to already consolidated fundamental rights”.

  88. 88.

    Ollero (2005), vol. I, pp. 595–598.

  89. 89.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), pp. 186–187: “I refer to the rights of future generations. Indeed, in the face of the above-mentioned risks, there is also growing concern for the continuity of humanity’s historical and natural legacy which, to date, has remained almost unchanged, but which, increasingly, is in danger of being seriously impaired. In this sense, there is a growing concern to bequeath to future generations economic, social and natural conditions at least equal to those enjoyed by the present generation.”

  90. 90.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), pp. 222–223: “Another trend that with unusual force is transforming rights is their inflationary tendency, the incredible increase in social demands that are assuming the status of rights, which require their recognition, protection and realisation. This phenomenon is also called the ‘trivialisation’ or ‘denaturalisation’ of rights and is connected with the previous statements on the impact of globalisation on the emergence of new rights, although, to be honest, the emergence of new categories follows other paths. The inflation of rights is, in fact, one of the most striking aspects of the current panorama, which is intended to indicate the tendency to increase the number and quality of rights. By now, it is well known that rights have emerged in generations: those of the first generation are civil and political rights; those of the second generation are economic, social and cultural rights; and those of the third generation are diffuse rights. And along with these, there are those who speak of a fourth and even a fifth. What is certain is that new sensitivities and new claims are emerging that seek access to the status of human rights: everyday rights, rights to eroticism (freedom of sexual relations, homosexuality, abortion, etc.) and the rights of the non-human matters (rocks, rivers, mountains and of animals and plants). And, in some cases, they find recognition.”

  91. 91.

    Massini (1994), p. 176 (text taken up by Martínez de Pisón (1997), pp. 223–224).

  92. 92.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 223.

  93. 93.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 223: “Already between the first and second generation there are notable differences, some being rights of freedom and others rights of equality. One implies a passive attitude of the State, the other, on the contrary, a decisive action with policies and social programs. For this reason, there are many clashes and conflicts. Third-generation rights are a category that presents even greater difficulties in defining their characteristic elements. Precisely for this reason, they are called diffuse rights. Not to mention the new claims that have to do with non-human beings or inanimate beings. All of this means that the profiles of rights have become blurred, that there is talk of denaturalisation and trivialisation, and not without reason”.

  94. 94.

    Rabossi (1997–1998), p. 50.

  95. 95.

    Rabossi (1997–1998), p. 50.

  96. 96.

    Rabossi (1997–1998), p. 50.

  97. 97.

    Rabossi (1997–1998), pp. 50–51; in facing this danger, perhaps Loewenstein’s thesis contained in his work entitled ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights’ might be applicable (Loewenstein 1937).

  98. 98.

    Martínez de Pisón (1997), p. 156: “…following this criterion, the generations of rights can be infinite if there is no kind of control or supervision. It would only be enough for new interests to emerge for a new right to emerge, which is, on the other hand, what has been happening in recent decades with the process of specification in which, when considering the new circumstances in which the human being finds himself in his vital context and in the different stages of his life, it is understood that new rights of provision emerge.”

  99. 99.

    Squella (2002).

  100. 100.

    Bidart (1989), p. 160; see also pp. 349–350; in this respect, Rabossi points out—quoting Bidart Campos—that “it is possible to appeal to other strategies. For example, to stop speaking in these cases of ‘rights’ and use other notions, such as diffuse interests” (Rabossi (1997–1998), p. 51).

  101. 101.

    Bustamante (2007), p. 15.

  102. 102.

    Bidart (1989), p. 238.

  103. 103.

    Bidart (1989), p. 271; in this regard, see also Pérez Luño (2000), p. 167.

  104. 104.

    Bidart (1989), p. 271: “If positivity accuses and registers delays, the science of human rights has to go on opening paths, and the philosophy of law has a good part of the responsibility to seriously incite to that task. Modestly, we are trying to contribute something of our effort”; in this respect Rodríguez Palop, points out—in relation to the foundation of these rights - that “it is possible to relate them to the ‘radical needs’ and to the axiological content on which they are based” (Rodríguez 2010, p. 307).

  105. 105.

    Bobbio (1996).

  106. 106.

    Art. 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (26 August 1789).

  107. 107.

    As we have already seen: the Cortes of León of 1188, the Magna Carta of John without Land of 1215, the conquest of the Indies and the Second Scholasticism or the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, are some examples.

  108. 108.

    See, in this respect, footnote n. 7 and the corresponding main text.

  109. 109.

    See, in this connection, footnote n. 4 and the corresponding main text.

  110. 110.

    See, in this regard, footnotes nn. 5 y 58 and their corresponding main texts.

  111. 111.

    See, in this regard, footnote n. 64 and its accompanying main text.

  112. 112.

    See, in this connection, footnotes nn. 7, 11, 12, 81 and 108 and their corresponding main texts.

  113. 113.

    In this regard, see, for example, the study by Nieto (1971).

  114. 114.

    I share, in this respect, the opinion of Gilbert K. Chesterton, who in his well-known essay Orthodoxy (Chesterton (1908), ch. VI, 2nd par. in fine) points out that “Evolution is only good if it produces good; good is only good if it helps evolution”.

  115. 115.

    Thus, for example, if one were a Catholic believer, it would be preferable to have recourse to the statements of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church only insofar as they could serve to exemplify, synthesise or summarise the reasons and social experiences that explain one’s own way of thinking.

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Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Some Cited Normative Sources and Declarations

Some Cited Normative Sources and Declarations

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  • Virginia Declaration of Rights (June 12, 1776).

  • Declaration of Independence of the United States (July 4, 1776)

  • Constitution of the United States of America (1787).

  • Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789)

  • French Constitution of 1791.

  • Amendment to the American Constitution (December 15, 1791).

  • Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 June 1945).

  • American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (May 2, 1948).

  • Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 10 December 1948).

  • Declaration on the Recognition of the Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples, United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1960.

  • General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970).

  • Charter of Economic Rights and Duties (1974).

  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ and ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, although the latter entered into force two months earlier (3.I.1976) than the former (25.III.1976).

  • Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace and Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace (United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 33 of 15 December 1978).

  • Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997).

  • Declaration on a Culture of Peace (UNESCO, 1999).

  • Cyberspace Bill of Rights (2008).

3.1.1 Some Charters and Declarations on Ecological Matters:

  • Water Charter adopted by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg (1968); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972); Declaration on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation for the Decade (1990); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit), Rio de Janeiro (1992); International Conference on Water and Environment (Dublin, 1992); Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (1995); Marrakech Declaration, First World Water Forum (1997); Kyoto Convention (1997); Rio+20 Summit (2012).

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Masferrer, A. (2023). Looking Forwards to the Future of Dignity and Human Rights: New Generation Rights. In: The Making of Dignity and Human Rights in the Western Tradition. Studies in the History of Law and Justice, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46667-0_3

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