Abstract
On June 26, 1945, was approved the Charter of the United Nations, whose Preamble explicitly referred to the “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small…”. Leaving aside the 1937 Irish Constitution, whose Preamble referred to the expression ‘human dignity’, that the first time that the expression ‘[human] dignity’ entered in the legal realm. Where did this category come from? It is undeniable that the historical context after the Second World War highly contributed to the emergence of the human dignity in the legal province, but what were the roots of this notion? Was it somehow linked to the notions of ‘fundamental rights’ originated in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century modern constitutions, and of ‘natural rights’ that emerged in the sixteenth-century colonization of America? This Part (II) describes the precedents of this category. In doing so, I employ a retrospective method, going from the modern to the ancient, instead the other way round (from the most ancient to the most modern), from modern international Declarations and Conventions and national constitutions, to sources from pre-modern and medieval times. This Part also includes a critical analysis of the fragility of ‘human dignity’ as the foundation of human rights, the cornerstone of the entire legal system.
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Notes
- 1.
Spanish Constitution, 6 December 1978; in this respect, see Fernández (1995).
- 2.
Art. 10.1 Spanish Constitution 1978 (EC 1978; available at http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=10&fin=55&tipo=2, date of consultation: 9 January 2017); followed by Art. 10.2 which states that “The rules relating to the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised by the Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements on the same matters ratified by Spain”.
- 3.
- 4.
The first legal text—of which we are aware—in which the notion of ‘dignity’ (human) appears, expressly, was the Irish Constitution of 1937, whose preamble read as follows: “In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, the people of Éire, Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution”; italics added.
- 5.
- 6.
García González (2008), main text between footnotes 68 and 69.
- 7.
- 8.
Article 3°, section I, fr. c), Constitution of México, 1917 (CM 1917), which reforms that of February 5, 1857; the reproduced text includes the reform published on December 30, 1946 (available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/bibliot/publica/inveyana/polint/cua2/evolucion.htm); I thank Dr. José Luis Soberanes for making me aware of the existence of this constitutional reform of 1946, which has sometimes been ignored by scholars of human dignity in Mexican constitutionalism; unless otherwise stated, the italics in the transcribed texts are mine.
- 9.
Article 3, paragraph I, section c), CM 1917; the reproduced text reflects the reform published on 22 January 1992 (see http://www.diputados.gob.mx/bibliot/publica/inveyana/polint/cua2/evolucion.htm)
- 10.
Article 3, clause I, fr. c), CM 1917; the reform published on March 5, 1993 included the text of 1992 (see http://www.diputados.gob.mx/bibliot/publica/inveyana/polint/cua2/evolucion.htm)
- 11.
Article 1, Paragraph Three, CM 1917; this reform was published in the Official Journal of the Federation on August 14, 2001 (I use the version of the Mexican constitutional text found at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/htm/1.htm)
- 12.
In this regard, see Torre (2006), pp. 40–53, which discusses human dignity as a basis for non-discrimination.
- 13.
Saldaña (2006), pp. 57–80.
- 14.
- 15.
Article 1, Paragraph Three, CM 1917; Decree published in the DOF of México on 10 June 2011: “Any discrimination based on ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disabilities, social status, health conditions, religion, opinions, sexual preferences, marital status or any other that violates human dignity and is intended to nullify or impair the rights and freedoms of persons shall be prohibited”; the only difference in this paragraph with respect to the 2001 paragraph was the introduction of the expression ‘sexual’ (after the term ‘preferences’).
Article 1 should read as follows:
In the United Mexican States all persons shall enjoy the human rights recognised in this Constitution and in the international treaties to which the Mexican State is a party, as well as the guarantees for their protection, the exercise of which may not be restricted or suspended, except in the cases and under the conditions established in this Constitution.
The norms relating to human rights shall be interpreted in accordance with this Constitution and with the relevant international treaties, favouring at all times the broadest protection for individuals.
All authorities, within the scope of their competencies, have the obligation to promote, respect, protect and guarantee human rights in accordance with the principles of universality, interdependence, indivisibility and progressiveness. Consequently, the State must prevent, investigate, punish and redress human rights violations, under the terms established by law.
Slavery is prohibited in the United Mexican States. Slaves from abroad who enter the national territory shall, by this sole fact, attain their freedom and the protection of the laws.
[followed by the final paragraph at the beginning of this note].
- 16.
Article 3.B.II.c CM 1917 (Subsection amended DOF 09-02-2012, 26-02-2013).
- 17.
Article 25 CM 1917: “The State is responsible for guiding national development to ensure that it is comprehensive and sustainable, that it strengthens the Sovereignty of the Nation and its democratic regime and that, through competitiveness, the promotion of economic growth and employment and a fairer distribution of income and wealth, it allows the full exercise of freedom and dignity of individuals, groups and social classes, whose security is protected by this Constitution. Competitiveness shall be understood as the set of conditions necessary to generate greater economic growth, promoting investment and the generation of employment”.
- 18.
Article 2.A II: “To apply their own normative systems in the regulation and resolution of their internal conflicts, subject to the general principles of this Constitution, respecting individual guarantees, human rights and, in a relevant manner, the dignity and integrity of women. The law will establish the cases and procedures for validation by the corresponding judges or courts”.
- 19.
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999.
- 20.
This Art. 2.1 of the Greek Constitution was amended on 27 June 2008 to read as follows: “Respect for and protection of the value of the human person constitute the primary obligation of the State”.
- 21.
The Parliamentary Council, in public session on May 23, 1949 in Bonn, ascertained that the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, agreed upon on May 8, 1949 by the Parliamentary Council, was approved during the week of May 16 to 22, 1949 by the representations of the people of more than two thirds of the participating German Länder. On the basis of this verification, the Parliamentary Council, represented by its President, adopted and promulgated the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). It was the third constitutional text in German history, after those of 1871 and 1919.
- 22.
“No amendment of this Basic Law is permitted which affects the organisation of the Federation into Länder, or the principle of the participation of the Länder in legislation, or the principles set out in Articles 1 and 20” (Art. 79.3 LFB 1949).
- 23.
In this regard, see Starck (2005).
- 24.
See footnote n. 229 in Part I as well as the corresponding main text.
- 25.
In this regard, it is worth recalling the event that took place at one of the preparatory meetings for the drafting of the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, narrated by Maritain (1949), p. 15: “… someone was astonished to see that people of such different and opposing ideologies had agreed on the approved table of rights. But, in reality, what happened was that they all agreed, as long as they were not asked why and how they had reached this agreement, since the dispute began with the why”.
- 26.
On the various conceptions of human dignity in the Western tradition, from its origins to the Protestant Reformation, see the study by Baker (1947); logically, the notion of dignity is closely related to the question of what man is; in this regard, see Buber (1956); on the dialogical condition of man, see Buber (1979): “Through the Thou a person becomes I”; “Another human being is a neighbor not only on the basis of a generic feeling of humanity, but primarily on the basis of his being ‘another I’” (Wojtyla, K., “Participation or alienation?”, El hombre y su destino, Madrid: Palabra, 1998); Wojtyla (1998): “Another human being is a neighbor not only on the basis of a generic feeling of humanity, but primarily on the basis of his being ‘another I’”.
- 27.
Mises (1944), p. 267, the translation is mine.
- 28.
- 29.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a declaratory document that was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 217 A (III), on December 10, 1948 in Paris; in its 30 articles it gathers the human rights considered basic, from the San Francisco Charter (June 26, 1945). As is well known, the original title of the text in English was “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; Later, the General Assembly, in its resolution 548 (VI) of 5 February 1952, decided to modify all the working documents in Spanish, to use the expression “human rights” instead of “rights of man”, taking into account that the content and purpose of the Declaration “have a broad meaning that does not fit within the Spanish title of ‘rights of man’, bearing in mind also that the body of the instrument alludes to the expression ‘human rights’ and that distinguished Spanish-American representatives “have expressed their preference for the terminology used in the Charter”; Loewenstein (1945): “In recognizing human rights and fundamental freedoms as a legitimate objective of international law and world order, the San Francisco Charter took a momentous step forward. But the path is beset with enormous difficulties which no sober appraiser will easily underestimate” (p. 283); on the San Francisco Charter, see Humphrey (1984), Sohn (1995), Burgers (1997), Morsink (1999) and Sarah (2007–2008), among others.
- 30.
- 31.
A reality that was forgotten in the twentieth century, as Marías (1964), p. 99, makes clear: “What defines the mass man is not to make demands on himself. His morality is the inverse of the motto noblesse oblige. For this reason, he affirms himself as he is, he believes that he has the right to everything, that everything is due to him, that he does not have to strive for anything: to be just, to be intelligent, to be right. He counts on the things he enjoys as if they existed automatically and without further ado, as if they were unproblematic and due to invention, talent, work and sacrifice. He does not listen, he does not admit that others can be right—strictly speaking, he does not even admit that there can properly be others irreducible to him -, and that is why he tries to violently impose his points of view or his desires; more precisely, he pretends that they are spontaneously accepted, without even making an effort to impose them”; see also Arriola (2003), p. 31.
- 32.
Article 22 UDHR: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.
- 33.
Article 23 UDHR:
-
(1)
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
-
(2)
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
-
(3)
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
-
(4)
Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
-
(1)
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
In this regard, see the study by Gros (1995).
- 37.
In this regard, see the study by d’Agostino (2000); this correlativity was clearly stated in the title of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (2 May 1948).
- 38.
In this regard, see, for example, the study by Carpintero (2000), pp. 76–80.
- 39.
- 40.
In this regard, read the Preface to Volume 23 of Studies in International Law, Capps (2009): “A State, in turn, must be understood as the recipient of a legitimacy that comes ultimately from the pursuit of the human dignity of the community it governs, as well as the dignity of those human beings and States are affected by its actions in international relations”.
- 41.
- 42.
See http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/inherent; last accessed 30 July 2020.
- 43.
See http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/inherent; last accessed 30 July 2020).
- 44.
See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/es/definicion/ingles/inherent; last accessed 30 July 2020).
- 45.
See http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/inherent; last accessed 30 July 2020).
- 46.
See note n. 2.
- 47.
Art. 10 of the ICCP: “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”
- 48.
Two years later, in 1986, the General Assembly adopted another text as a guideline for new human rights conventions. The text affirms that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person.”
- 49.
Protocol No. 6 concerning the abolition of the death penalty: 28-04-1983; entry into force: 01-03-1985; Protocol No. 6 concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances: 03-05-2002; entry into force: 01-07-2003); on the genesis of the European Convention, see Simpson (2001).
- 50.
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances (Vilnius, 3 May 2002), Preamble.
- 51.
Some rights are inherent to individuals because they derive simply and plainly from their human condition, that is, because they possess a natural human dignity.
- 52.
- 53.
Paragraph II of the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence of the United States (July 4, 1776).
- 54.
Díaz (1977), p. 238.
- 55.
As aforementioned, no one, no human reality, can be ‘pre-political. The human being has many natural faculties, but they are not therefore pre-political. Although the expression ‘pre-political’ is intended to designate a reality “prior to the State” and unavailable to the power of the State, this expression does not seem to be the most adequate. It is more correct to affirm that these rights are ‘inherent’, ‘natural’ (with certain reservations for the same reason), intrinsic or, even better, that they derive from the dignity of man. In reality, the most atomic human datum is dignity sifted by objective human needs.
- 56.
- 57.
Kant (1796), Ch. II (‘On the a priori spring of the will’), p. 52; italics are mine.
- 58.
Kant (1796), Ch. II (‘On the a priori spring of the will’), pp. 51–52; italics are mine.
- 59.
In this regard, see Saldaña (2006), pp. 61–64; on the problematic aspects of the Kantian foundation of human dignity, see Gallego (2005), in particular, pp. 253–256; Torre (2006), pp. 46–48; for an example of a Kantian basis for human dignity, see Gallego (2005). 46–48; for an example of how the quasi-limited autonomous will can become the characteristic feature of human dignity, affirming—taking the Kantian thesis to an extreme that Kant himself would hardly share—that dignity should be recognised only to those beings who are capable of determining themselves, of self-legislation or of proposing to themselves norms of ethical conduct, see Singer (1993).
- 60.
In this regard, see the study by Starck (2002), p. 181: “Human dignity does not mean unlimited self-determination, but self-determination which is exercised on the basis that everyone-not simply the person claiming the right to self-determination-is of value in his or her own right”.
- 61.
Expression taken from Fletcher (1984), p. 171.
- 62.
Bentham (1843), General view of a complete code of laws, Ch. I.
- 63.
Bentham (1843), ‘Pannomial Fragments’, Ch. III: ‘Expositions’, p. 221: ‘Behold the professors of natural law, of which they have dreamed—the legislating Grotii—the legislators of the human race: that which the Alexanders and the Tamerlanes endeavoured to accomplish by traversing a part of the globe, the Grotii and the Puffendorffs would accomplish, each one sitting in his arm chair: that which the conqueror would effect with violence by his sword, the jurisconsult would effect without effort by his pen. Behold the goddess Nature!—the jurisconsult is her priest; his idlest trash is an oracle, and this oracle is a law”.
- 64.
- 65.
- 66.
Bentham (1843), p. 502: “Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts. But this rhetorical nonsense ends in the old strain of mischievous nonsense: for immediately a list of these pretended natural rights is given, and those are so expressed as to present to view legal rights. And of these rights, whatever they are, there is not, it seems, any one of which any government can, upon any occasion whatever, abrogate the smallest particle”.
- 67.
- 68.
The main works in which Immanuel Kant developed his concept of human dignity were written from 1781 onwards [Kant (1781, 1785, 1788, 1797)]; however, some observations on human dignity can be found twenty years earlier, in Kant (1764); on Kant’s human dignity, see Cattaneo (1981); Cattaneo (2002); Shell (2003).
- 69.
This does not mean that Kant based human dignity on human nature, as if he were endorsing a scholastic approach to human dignity. As has been said, and rightly so, “Kant and the notion of ‘natural right’ is not based on an idea of human nature, but on reason and rationality. That Kant still refers to it as ‘natural right’ cannot hide the fact that it is more a right of reason than a right of nature. This qualification is necessary. It does not mean, however, that those reflections on human nature and capacity have no significance for Kant” (Reinhardt 2014, p. 145); on this, see also Thornhill (2013); though it is true that “with the emphasis on subjective rights, Kant completes a central shift from classical to modern subjective law, ‘a shift from the metaphysics of natural law to natural rights’“(Haakonsen (2006), p. 280), he did not deny the ‘laws of nature’ and, in fact—as has been said—connected human dignity with the laws of nature and human nature.
- 70.
- 71.
See footnote n. 31.
- 72.
- 73.
Hume (1777); as Eugene F. Miller noted in his Foreword, “the preparation and revision of his essays occupied Hume throughout his adult life. In his early twenties, after completing the three books of the Treatise, Hume began to publish essays on moral and political topics. His Essays, Moral and Political was published in late 1741 by Alexander Kincaid, principal editor of Edinburgh”. This edition included the following essays: (1) “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion”; (2) “Of the Liberty of the Press”; (3) “Of Impudence and Modesty”; (4) “That politics may be reduced to a Science”; (5) “Of the First Principles of Government”; (6) “Of Love and Marriage”; (7) “Of the Study of History”; (8) “Of the Independency of Parliament”; (9) “Whether the British Government Inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic”; (10) “Of Parties in General”; (11) “Of the Parties of Great Britain”; (12) “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm”; (13) “Of Avarice”; (14) “Of the Dignity of Human Nature”; and (15) “Of Liberty and Despotism.” The title of Essay 14 became “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature” in the 1770 edition of his Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (ibid., note 5).
- 74.
Hume (1777), p. 82: “I am of opinion, however, that the sentiments of those who are inclined to think favourably of humanity, are more advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles, which give us a mean opinion of our nature. When a man is predisposed with a high conception of his rank and character in creation, he will endeavour to act naturally, and will despise to do a base or vicious action, which might sink him below that figure which he makes in his own imagination. Accordingly, we find, that all our polite and fashionable moralists insist on this matter, and endeavour to represent vice as unworthy of man, as well as odious in itself.”
- 75.
Hume (1777), p. 83.
- 76.
Hume (1777), p. 86.
- 77.
Hume (1777), pp. 86–87: “In the first place, they found that every act of virtue or friendship was attended with a secret pleasure; whence they concluded that friendship and virtue could not be disinterested. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous sentiment or passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but I do not love him for for the sake of that pleasure”.
- 78.
Hume (1777), p. 89.
- 79.
Hume (1777), p. 509.
- 80.
Burke (1775), p. 223.
- 81.
- 82.
Cartwright (1777), secs. 39, 41, 42, pp. 31–32; (text collected by Carlyle (1941), p. 254–255); on the human condition as a free being and the consequent need to exercise—velis nolis—that freedom, see Ortega y Gasset (1987), t. 4, p. 171; collected by Arriola (2003), p. 57: “To live is to feel fatally forced to exercise freedom, to decide what we are going to be in this world. Not a single instant is our decision-making activity allowed to rest. Even when in desperation we abandon ourselves to whatever wants to come, we have decided not to decide. It is therefore false to say that in life ‘circumstances decide’. On the contrary, circumstances are the dilemma, always new, before which we have to decide. But it is our character that decides.”
- 83.
Adams (1851), p. 205: “All moderate truth-seeking inquirers, ancient and modern, theologians, moralists, and philosophers, have agreed that the happiness of mankind, as well as the true dignity of human nature, consists in virtue; if there is a form of government whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not any wise man recognise that it is more likely to promote general happiness than any other?”
- 84.
Adams (1854a), vol. 9, p. 149.
- 85.
Adams (1854b), vol. 10, pp. 316–317.
- 86.
Adams (1763), p. 15.
- 87.
Adams (1763), p. 26.
- 88.
Home (1762), p. 245.
- 89.
Home (1762), p. 245.
- 90.
Home (1762), p. 246.
- 91.
Home (1762), p. 246.
- 92.
Home (1762), p. 246.
- 93.
And he added: “To express that sense, the term dignity is appropriated. Further, to behave with dignity, and to refrain from all mean actions, is felt to be, not a virtue only, but a duty: it is a duty every man owes to himself. By acting in that manner, he attracts love and esteem: by acting meanly, or below himself, he is disapproved and contemned.” Home (1762), p. 246.
- 94.
Gordon (1743), pp. 210–211.
- 95.
Gordon (1743), pp. 280–281.
- 96.
Mandeville (1732); this work was edited more than half a dozen times and became one of the most controversial works of the eighteenth century for its assertions about the moral foundations of modern commercial society.
- 97.
Mandeville (1732), pp. 43–44.
- 98.
Mandeville (1732), p. 44.
- 99.
Mandeville (1732), pp. 43–44: “To introduce, moreover, an emulation among men, which divides the whole species into two classes, very different one from the other: One consisted of the most abject, low-minded people, who are always hunting immediate enjoyment, were wholly incapable of self-denial, and without regard to the good of others, had no higher aim than their private advantage; as enslaved by voluptuousness, yielded without resistance to every gross desire, and made no use of their rational faculties, but to heighten their sensual pleasure. These vile growling wretches, they said, were the dross of their kind, and having [44] only the shape of men, differed from brutes in nothing but their outward figure. But the other class was made up of lofty high spirit creatures, that free from sordid selfishness, esteemed the improvements of the mind to be their fairest possessions; and setting a true value upon themselves, took no delight but in embellishing the part in which their excellency consisted; such as despising whatever they had in common with irrational creatures, opposed by the helpof reason their most violent inclinations; and making a continual war with them to promote the peace of others, aimed at on no less than the public welfare and the conquest of their own passion.”
- 100.
Thomasius (1705); see also Thomasius (1688).
- 101.
Christian Wolff (1740–1749).
- 102.
John Trenchard (England, 1662–1723) would be one of these exceptions. Besides stating that many authors use the expression without understanding it, he gave a rather negative view of the ‘dignity’ of human nature; Trenchard and Gordon (1721).
- 103.
See, e.g., Cooper (1737), p. 195.
- 104.
Turnbull (1740), vol. 1, pp. 13–14.
- 105.
Turnbull (1740), vol. 2, p. 700.
- 106.
Turnbull (1740), vol. 2, p. 611.
- 107.
Turnbull (1740), vol. 2, p. 705; see also Turnbull (1742), p. 108.
- 108.
Welzel (1971), p. 146, note 113; Welzel’s view is highly questionable and, however much his work has been republished, his efforts to disqualify the Catholic Church and Catholic thinkers are evident and undisguised. He was translated, as is logical, by Felipe González Vicén, who also shares his point of view to a large extent. Welzel wanted to give a lot of importance to Pufendorf. The reason? Pufendorf repudiates all the above and calls the Church, already in the prologue of his De jure naturae et gentium, ‘Kingdom of darkness’ (‘Regnum Tenebrarum’). As is well known, Pufendorf was very controversial, so much so that he was dismissed from his University. It was not clear whether he had Faith or not, but in any case, he severed all relation between the reason of God and that of men, from which it follows that the natural law (entia moralia) which we men know through our reason, is a ‘jus inutile’; on this, see Carpintero (2013), p. 225.
- 109.
In this regard, see the study by Saastamoinen (2010).
- 110.
We use an English edition: Pufendorf (1931).
- 111.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation III, p. 235: ‘A man is destined by nature to lead a social life with men’. The italics are mine.
- 112.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 240 ff.: ‘reason dictates that a man should take care of himself, so that human society is not led into disorder.’
- 113.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 240–241.
- 114.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 241–242.
- 115.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 242–243.
- 116.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 243: (1) That anyone should protect his own life and limbs as much as possible and save himself and what is his. (2) That he should not disturb human society, or, in other words, that he should do nothing that would make society among men less peaceful. These laws ought so to conspire, and, as it were, be intertwined with one another, as to coalesce, as it were, into one law, namely, That each should be zealous so to preserve himself, that society among men be not disturbed.”
- 117.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 247–249.
- 118.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 247.
- 119.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation IV, pp. 247.
- 120.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation V, p. 279.
- 121.
Pufendorf (1931), Observation V, p. 279.
- 122.
I use here a French version: Pufendorf (1762 & 1759).
- 123.
For an exhaustive overview in this regard, see the study by Pelé (2006), pp. 839 ff.; whom I follow in the analysis of the Pufendorfian work cited in the previous note.
- 124.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), Préliminaires, § II, p. 2.
- 125.
Carpintero (2013), pp. 235–237.
- 126.
Carpintero (2013), p. 238; on Pufendorf’s contradictions, see pp. 228 ff.
- 127.
- 128.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. I, Chap. III, § I & III, pp. 38–39.
- 129.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. I., Chap. I, § IV & VI, pp. 5–6.
- 130.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), Préliminaires, § III, p. 4.
- 131.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. II, Chap. I, § V, pp. 145–146.
- 132.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. III, Chap. II, § I, p. 308, where recourse was had to the idea that God wrote the law in the heart of man.
- 133.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. III, Chap. II.
- 134.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. III, Chap. II, § I, p. 309; according to the opinion of J. Barbeyrac, Pufendorf here drew his inspiration from the poetry of Statius, Thebaid, Lib. XII, v. 556 ff.
- 135.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. III, Chap. II, § VIII, p. 316.
- 136.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. III, Chap. II, § VIII, p. 317.
- 137.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L. III, Chap. II, § VIII, p. 317.
- 138.
Pufendorf (1762 & 1759), L.III, Chap. II, § VIII, p. 319.
- 139.
Grotius (1625), Book II, Ch. XIX: ‘On the Right of Burial’, II, p. 216: “But the most obvious explanation is to be found in the dignity of man, for whom surpassing other creatures, this would be a shame, if it be an act of compassion then, said Quintilian, to preserve the bodies of men from the ravages of birds and beasts. To be torn by wild beasts, as Cicero observes in his first book On Invention, must be deprived of those honors, in death, because of our common nature…”
- 140.
Grotius (1625), II, XIX, II, 4.
- 141.
- 142.
In fact, Cicero, in De Officiis, explicitly included this expression when he stated the convenience of one’s own conduct being in accordance with “the superiority and dignity of our [human] nature” (Book I, n. 30); in Book I, n. 17, he stated as follows: “For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and order into the transactions of daily life, we shall be conserving moral rectitude and moral dignity” (I used the English version available at http://www.stoics.com/cicero_book.html)
- 143.
See footnote n. 42.
- 144.
Some authors distinguish between ‘intrinsic dignity’ (that which everyone possesses by the simple fact of being human, and not that reserved for the virtuous) and ‘extrinsic dignity’ (which depends on the mentality and behaviour of persons); in this regard, see Stetson (1998), pp. 15–18; Andorno (2012), p. 73 distinguishes between ‘intrinsic dignity’ and ‘ethical dignity’, basing the concept of human dignity on the former.
- 145.
According to the opinion of Alonso (1986), t. II, p. 956, the expressions ‘dignidad’ and ‘dignitat’, understood as ‘calidad de digno’ or ‘merecedor de dignidad’, come from the end of the fifteenth century (1495); I thank Dr. María del Refugio González Domínguez, who suggested me to investigate this point and with whom I could consult this Dictionary in her work office.
- 146.
In this regard, see Stuurman (2017), ch. 5, including the protest against the Spanish treatment of the Native Americans voiced by the Dominican friar Antonio de Montesinos (1511), the justification and critique of the Spanish Empire by Francisco Vitoria in the mid-sixteenth century and the criticism of Spanish rule by Bartolomé de Las Casas (1514–1566); see also the study by Sánchez de Movellán (2014).
- 147.
I handle here the text available at http://www.dominicos.org/kit_upload/file/especial-montesino/Montesino-gustavo-gutierrez.pdf; for a more modern version of the sermon, see the one collected in the main text of footnote n. 70 in Part I.
- 148.
- 149.
Vitoria (1967), p. 17.
- 150.
Thomas Aquinas, In III Sententiarum, d. 29, q. 1, a. 7: grace does not modify nature, but fully realises it; Vitoria took from Thomas Aquinas some ideas in applying to the Indians the following three principles: “(1) Every man, in so far as imago Dei, has a personal dignity and therefore is the subject of fundamental rights independently of whether or not he shares the Christian faith, to which he is free to adhere, as he is also free for the choice of political government; (2) The forms of power and dominion were introduced with human right, which is not annulled by divine right; (3) The Church has no power over infidel peoples who are not subject to her de iure et de facto, or who do not occupy lands of Christian kings. Therefore, she cannot force them to choose or change their political regime. This does not exclude an indirect intervention of the Church itself, appealing to its spiritual purposes” (Savignano (2011) p. 107).
- 151.
- 152.
- 153.
- 154.
- 155.
Mora (2013), pp. 37–38.
- 156.
- 157.
- 158.
- 159.
Vitoria (1967), pp. 14–31.
- 160.
Mora (2013), p. 39.
- 161.
Vitoria (1967), p. 31.
- 162.
Mora (2013), p. 44.
- 163.
Savignano (2011), pp. 105–106; and adds: “The defence of the rights of the Indians seems evident when he puts the question of the principle, in the three fundamental chapters [of Vitoria (1967)]: those referring to the recognition of the ‘human dignity’ of the Indians, to the right of those peoples to defend their sovereignty (dominium), and to the right of the world to collaborate constructively in solidarity among peoples”.
- 164.
- 165.
- 166.
Savignano (2011), p. 113, where it is cited, in a footnote, the work Las Casas, (1975), p. 343; one might celebrate Vitoria’s rejection of slavery for the Indians, lamenting at the same time the absence of public debate on the African / Trans-Atlantic slavery in the sixteenth-century Spain. How can this be explained? Antonio Montesino, Bartolomé de Las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria, among others, touched upon the Indians because they encountered a real, close problem (human, social and political) that needed to be addressed and solved, they feel responsible for it and saw themselves in the position to find a solution to such a serious moral issue. The fact that they did not tackle the African / Trans-Atlantic slavery should not be seen as if they undervalued African / Trans-Atlantic slaves (in comparison with the American ones). It rather reveals that their intellectual and doctrinal efforts were not due to their academic curiosity and love for abstract categories, but to their commitment to real and practical moral issues that arose in the context of a colonization carried out by their own monarchy.
- 167.
Las Casas (1975), § II, p. 15.
- 168.
Las Casas (1975), § XIII, p. 339; in this regard, see in particular §§ XV-XVI, p. 373–393; see also pp. 17–23, 35, 39, 45, 51, 63, 79–81, 87–89, 111–115, 203, 211, 307, 327, 335, 343, 343, 349, 357–359, 363, 367; in this regard, see Castañeda (1990), XVII-XLII.
- 169.
Savignano (2011), p. 114, collecting in note 58 the work of Las Casas (1967), t. III, c. 48.
- 170.
Savignano (2011), p. 114, footnote 60, where is cited another work of Las Casas (1965), pp. 1249–1250, making it clear that all men, equal by nature, are free, rejecting slavery; see also Las Casas (1965), t. II, pp. 1069–1071.
- 171.
In this regard, see the study by Beuchot (1994), pp. 45–47.
- 172.
Las Casas (1967), book III, chap. 48, pp. 257–258.
- 173.
Las Casas (1967), p. 258.
- 174.
Las Casas, (1967), p. 258.
- 175.
Las Casas, (1967), p. 259.
- 176.
The reader may miss the study of other great authors, internationally known, such as Domingo de Soto (qui scit Sotum, scit totum), Martín de Azpilcueta (El Navarro), Luis de Molina (apostle of individual freedom) or Diego de Covarrubias (the Bartolus hispanus), but this has not been our purpose from the beginning.
- 177.
- 178.
Mirandola (2006).
- 179.
“The excellent Artificer, therefore, established that he whom he could endow with nothing of his own, should have in common with all that had been given to him separately from the others. He therefore took man thus constructed, a work of indefinite nature, and having placed him at the center of the world, He spoke to him in this way:
O Adam, I have given you neither a definite place, nor an aspect of your own, nor a peculiar prerogative in order that you may possess the place, the aspect, and the prerogative which you consciously choose and which in accordance with your intention you obtain and retain. The definite nature of other beings is constrained by the precise laws prescribed by me. You, on the other hand, not constrained by any narrowness, will determine it according to the will to whose power I have consigned you. I have placed thee in the center of the world so that thou mayest observe more comfortably all that exists in it. I have made thee neither celestial nor terrestrial, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that thou, as arbiter and sovereign artificer of thyself, may inform thyself and shape thyself into the work of thy choice. You may degenerate into the inferior beings that are the beasts; you may regenerate yourself, according to your will, into the superior realities that are divine.
O supreme freedom of God the Father, O supreme and admirable fortune of man to whom it has been granted to obtain what he wishes, to be what he wishes! Beasts, at the very moment of their birth, bring with them from the womb, as Lucilius says, all that they will afterwards possess. The superior spirits, from the beginning, or soon after, were what they will be eternally. To man, from his birth, the Father bestowed germs of every species and germs of every life, and, according as each man has cultivated them, they will mature in him and give him their fruits” (Mirandola 2006, pp. 5–6); for Stuurman (2017), “[a]n incipient notion of common humanity became thinkable when humans began to demarcate themselves from animals, imagining a hierarchy of sentient beings with humans at the apex of the pyramid. By enumerating the attributes that distinguished humans from animals, such as speech, morality and reason, they summed up the faculties all human beings were supposed to share” (Introduction).
- 180.
“But what is the purpose of all this? Why, that we may understand, since we are born in the condition of being what we will, that it is our duty to take care of all this: that it may not be said of us that, being in so high a degree, we have not realised that we have become like brutes and stupid beasts of labour” (Mirandola 2006, pp. 7–8).
- 181.
Beuchot (1999), where he deals with human dignity and human rights in Thomas Aquinas (pp. 49–60), Francisco de Vitoria (pp. 61–69), Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, (pp. 70–79), Fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz (pp. 80–89), Jacques Maritain (pp. 90–98), in the Social Doctrine of the [Catholic] Church (pp. 99–110); in this regard, see also Gonzalo (2016), p. 2446.
- 182.
The ‘inherent’ character of human rights constitutes another reason that makes it advisable to historicise the evolution of such rights, as stated by Escudero (2015), pp. 1046–1047: “And if human rights are those inherent to the person, and the man of the glebe or the galley oarsman was the bearer in his tribulation of such an egregious moral deposit, it does not seem reasonable to throw into the attic the seventeen centuries prior to the eighteen centuries (with their Declarations) or the eighteen previous ones (with their Constitutions). Human rights have been historically recognised or denied in many ways and not only sub specie of Declarations and Constitutions. That is why I, who am not a medievalist, call for more attention to the medieval and the ancient world, as did a rather little-known section of German historiography in the 1930s”.
- 183.
Rosen (2012), shows how Thomas Aquinas, for example, uses this expression; according to Aquinas, “Dignity means something that is good in itself”.
- 184.
In this regard, see the study by Carpintero (2016).
- 185.
Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 63, art. 1: “In nomine enim personae intelligitur personae dignitas” (taken up by Carpintero (2016), p. 104, footnote n. 11).
- 186.
“…the dignity of the human nature of Christ is not less than in us, and that it must be maintained that personality is the name of dignity: Personalitas autem ad dignitatem pertinet” (“…natura humana non est minoris dignitatis in Christo quam in nobis. Personalitas autem ad dignitatem pertinet, ut in primo habitum est”, Summa Theologica, III, q. 2, art. 2; collected by Carpintero (2016), p. 114, footnote n. 55).
- 187.
“His most general statement expresses that Dignitas eorum quae sunt ad finem, praecipue consideratur ex fine: man’s life has an end, which is the contemplation of God, and human dignity is measured from this end” (“Respondeo dicendum quod dignitas eorum quae sunt ad finem, praecipue consideratur ex fine”, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 174, art. 2; collected by Carpintero (2016), p. 111, footnote n. 40).
- 188.
Carpintero (2016), p. 100.
- 189.
Moschetti (1969), p. 41 (collected by Carpintero (1981), p. 69, footnote n. 108).
- 190.
Carpintero (2016), p. 103.
- 191.
- 192.
On this subject, see my studies, already cited in footnote n. 72.
- 193.
See the bibliography in footnote n. 22 in Part I.
- 194.
- 195.
On the ‘proceduralisation’ of law as a false alternative, see Ollero (2007), pp. 347–348.
- 196.
Mitchell (1972), pp. 23–24: “There are, of course, not universally accepted conclusions about human nature. Many scholars, especially since John Locke, are under the impression that the term ‘human nature’ is a real irony and, in fact, there is no such reality. Like other fictitious inventions, ‘human nature’ is nothing but a claim, which does not correspond to reality in the material world (…). A more modern theory suggests that man is simply what he does. Some are domesticated, some are wild. Some share, others accumulate; some monogamous, others polygamous (…). As you see, he goes on to reason, there is no human nature at all, only human behavior. The possibilities are infinite, in terms of the behavior that a given person or a given society can engage in. This view, which I call ‘man-as-neutral concept of human nature’, is probably the most widely accepted position on human nature in the scientific community of the twentieth century”.
- 197.
On this issue, see Masferrer (2013a), pp. 37 ff., arguing that fundamental rights have a pre-political character, in the sense that their recognition and protection is what justifies the existence of the political order itself.
- 198.
Heyd (2003), p. 168.
- 199.
Griffin (2008), p. 14: “Natural law began as part of a teleological metaphysics capable of supporting strong interpretations of how morality is rooted in nature, and which ended at the close of the eighteenth century in something akin to vacuity. Not that the strong, non-vacuous conception of natural law is without its own considerable problems. Still, many scholastic conceptions of natural law gave us at least something to decide what natural rights exist. Once the metaphysical and epistemological background they provided is abandoned, as it was in the course of the Enlightenment, what is left, and is there enough left?”; on the enlightened roots of human rights, see Hunt (2007).
- 200.
Nietzsche (1974), Section 125: “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How can we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? That which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives: who shall cleanse this blood of ours? What water is there that we may be cleansed? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we invent? Is not the greatness of this act too great for us? Shall we ourselves be no gods simply to appear worthy of it?”
- 201.
Foucault (1994), pp. 341–342.
- 202.
Tepe (2014), p. 64.
- 203.
Pope Francis (2013), n. 209.
- 204.
In this sense, see, for example, Knox (1821), where the author describes how the political despotism of a state can claim to be justified by being at war; referring to ‘natural rights’ as ‘nonsense’, or to ‘fundamental rights’ as mere creations of the state which it imposes with no other legitimacy than the binding force of the law (understood as a simple mandate of the state), seems to be the best ‘legitimation’ for violating rights when the state considers them inconvenient for whatever reasons, as recent experience shows; in the fight against terrorism, for example, it is evident that States have gone beyond what can be assumed to be reasonable in the framework of a constitutional democracy; on this point, see the bibliography cited in footnote n. 67.
- 205.
Some examples of how human dignity has been applied in German and French jurisprudence in recent years can be found in Gonzalo (2016), pp. 2449–2453.
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Some Cited Normative Sources and Declarations
Some Cited Normative Sources and Declarations
2.1.1 Spain
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Fueros locales del Reino de León (910–1230). Antología, Madrid: Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2018 (available at https://www.boe.es/biblioteca_juridica/publicacion.php?id=PUB-LH-2018-61).
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Las Constituciones de España (compilation and foreword by Jorge Esteban). Madrid, CEPC, 2000.
2.1.2 International
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Textos básicos de la Historia constitucional comparada (ed. and prologue by J. Varela Suanzes). Madrid, CEPC, 1998.
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Virginia Declaration of Rights (June 12, 1776).
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Declaration of Independence of the United States (July 4, 1776)
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Constitution of the United States of America (1787).
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Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789)
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French Constitution of 1791.
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Amendment to the American Constitution (December 15, 1791).
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Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 June 1945).
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (May 2, 1948).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 10 December 1948).
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Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances (Vilnius, 3 May 2002).
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Masferrer, A. (2023). Looking Backwards on the Notion of Human Dignity: From the Spanish 1978 Constitution to the Discovery of America. In: The Making of Dignity and Human Rights in the Western Tradition. Studies in the History of Law and Justice, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46667-0_2
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