Abstract
On June 26, 1945, was approved the Charter of the United Nations, whose Preamble explicitly referred to the “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small…”. It was the first time that the expression ‘human rights’ entered in the legal realm. Where did this category come from? It is undeniable that the historical context after the Second World War highly contributed to the emergence of the human rights in the legal province, but what were their link to the ‘fundamental rights’ originated in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century modern constitutions, or to the notion of ‘natural rights’ that emerged in the sixteenth-century colonization of America? This Part (I) describes such link. In doing so, I employ a retrospective method, going from the modern to the ancient, instead the other way round (from the most ancient to the most modern). In addition, this Part also analyses the relationship between nature, natural law and natural rights, from Antiquity to Modern times, giving an overview that might help to understand the doctrinal development of these categories which are notably connected to the notion of human rights.
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Notes
- 1.
Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945): “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims. Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organisation to be known as the United Nations”; Loewenstein (1945), p. 275: “…the Second World War taught us that human liberty, like peace, is indivisible, and that no stable world order is possible as long as any government, claiming the sovereignty of its state, can trample underfoot the liberties of its own citizens”; see Arendt (1968), Ch. 9; Moyn (2018).
- 2.
However, it is worth remembering that Hitler came to power by a compromise made by Hindenburg in view of Germany’s ungovernability. In the elections of 5 March 1933 his Nazi Party (NSDAP) won the most votes. Failing to achieve a majority, Hitler had to reach a coalition agreement with the Zentrum-led (the Centre Party) and DNVP in order to break the parliamentary deadlock. It took Hitler only three weeks to arrest all the Communist deputies and most of the Social Democrats, and on 23 March he passed the Enabling Act, ending parliamentary democracy and establishing the notorious totalitarian regime.
- 3.
This does not mean that the Ancien Régime lacked fundamental laws; in this respect, see Coronas (1998), pp. 218–310.
- 4.
Constant (1988).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
On the notion of natural rights in modern Constitutions (particularly in the United States and France), see Loughlin (2003), pp. 117–125; on the declaration of rights in the first French constitutional texts, see Duguit (1937), pp. 203 ff; for a summary of the evolution of the concept of subjective law from Roman law to the French Revolution, see García de Enterría (1994), pp. 47–96; on the interconnection between law and rights in the French Revolution, see García de Enterría (1994), pp. 114–124; Varela (2007), pp. 114–124; Varela (2007), pp. 109–119.
- 9.
For a general overview of the substitution of the nation for the king in the ownership of power or sovereignty in the French Revolution, see García de Enterría (1994), pp. 102–114.
- 10.
The idea of popular sovereignty as an “invention” is described and defended in Morgan (2006).
- 11.
According to the opinion of Tomás y Valiente—and in accordance with his prescriptive definition of Constitution contained in footnote n. 4—, “...from these postulates [of the democratic ideological position] it is lawful to separate the line of our authentic Constitutions (that of 1812, that of 1969, the republican of 1931 and the current one of 1978), that of the degraded Constitutions (those of 1837, 1845 and 1876) and that of the sham constitutional texts (those of 1808, 1834 and those initiated by the New State, created after the military rebellion against the Second Republic)....” (Tomás y Valiente (1980), p. 13).
- 12.
Art. 2 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (June 12, 1776).
- 13.
Preamble to the Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776).
- 14.
Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of America (1787).
- 15.
Preamble of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789); for a historical synthesis of national sovereignty from the French perspective, see Hauriou (2003), pp. 268–306.
- 16.
Art. 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789).
- 17.
Art. 1 of the French Constitution of 1791.
- 18.
In this regard, see my study Masferrer (2011), pp. 639–672.
- 19.
In this regard, see the work Escudero (2011), pp. 459–763.
- 20.
Institutions 4, 1.
- 21.
Institutions 3, 31; on this subject, see the now classic study Wyduckel (1979).
- 22.
Art. 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “The law is the expression of the general will (...). All citizens have the right to take part, personally or through their representatives in its making (...). It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens are equal before it...”; on this subject, see the studies Carré de Malberg (1931, 1998).
- 23.
Art. 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “Liberty consists in being able to do everything that does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has more limits than those which assure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These limits can only be determined by law”.
- 24.
Art. 5 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “The law can only prohibit actions harmful to society. Whatever is not forbidden by law cannot be prevented, and no one can be compelled to do what the law does not command”.
- 25.
Art. 7 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “No man may be accused, arrested or detained except in the cases determined by law, and in the manner prescribed by law (...). It is only when a citizen is called upon to obey by virtue of the law that he must obey immediately”. Art. 8: “No one may be convicted except by virtue of a law established and promulgated prior to the offence”.
- 26.
Art. 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “Society has the right to call every public official for an accounting of his administration”.
- 27.
Paragraph II of the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence of the United States (July 4, 1776).
- 28.
The Ninth Amendment to the American Constitution (December 15, 1791).
- 29.
Díaz (1997), p. 238.
- 30.
It should be noted, however, that the French Revolutionaries quickly became “less revolutionary”. In the various declarations of rights, the right of resistance to unjust government was soon suppressed, which is surprising because the first doctrines, which maintained that “power resides in the people”, tended to start from the right of resistance to the prince who acted unjustly. They were soon dominated by the idea of the State as a finished “totum”.
- 31.
Paragraph II of the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence of the United States (July 4, 1776).
- 32.
And in its 3rd Recital it qualifies as essential that “... human rights be protected by the rule of law, so that man may not be compelled to have recourse to the supreme remedy of rebellion against tyranny and oppression”; therefore, only in a State of Law in which such natural rights are effectively recognised and legally protected, should the individual not feel ‘compelled to rebel against tyranny and oppression’. Otherwise, that is, if the state were not capable of legally recognising and protecting such natural rights, then the individual could feel compelled to do so; see Stuurman (2017), Ch. 9, defending that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a product of thorough consideration and cross-cultural compromise that was agreeable to almost all the signatories. For Stuurman, the Declaration was not a “Western” document, even though its language about individual rights were mostly drawn from Western philosophy. In his view, the fundamental views of common humanity and personal dignity have always been shared throughout the world, even if the individualistic conception of the human person is somewhat of an European peculiarity.
- 33.
The idea that the Declarations and constitutional texts are limited to recognising the existence of rights, and not to ‘creating’ them according to the historical situation or the existing consensus at any given time, is another characteristic feature of modern constitutionalism. Along these lines, and by way of example, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) provides, in its 2nd Recital, that “this declaration aims to ensure the universal and effective recognition and enforcement of rights...”.
- 34.
Spanish Constitution of 1978, Preamble: “The Spanish Nation, desiring to establish justice, freedom and security and to promote the good of all its members, in the use of its sovereignty, proclaims its will to: guarantee democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the Laws in accordance with a just economic and social order; consolidate a State of Law that ensures the rule of Law as an expression of the popular will; protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, their cultures and traditions, languages and institutions”.
- 35.
Article 10.1 CE 1978: “The dignity of the person, the inviolable rights that are inherent to him/her, the free development of the personality, respect for the law and the rights of others are the foundation of political order and social peace”.
- 36.
Art. 9 of the Amendment to the American Constitution (December 15, 1791).
- 37.
In relation to the need to establish limits, it has been said—and rightly so—that violence appears “as a denial of the respect due to the human person, who is reduced to a being to be exploited, humiliated or eliminated. The denial of respect is the result of excess, of hybris, of the lack of a sense of limit, which in each case arises as the unconditional primacy of profit, pleasure or the will to dominate” (Ballesteros (2006), p. 107).
- 38.
In this regard, see the study Cotta (1974), p. 14, in whose introductory study Jesús Ballesteros points out that “the connection between Sastre’s denial of all essence, prior to existence, and his famous phrase in Huis Clos: ‘hell are the others’ is significant. If my freedom lacks intrinsic limits, imposed by my nature, it is the other who appears as a brake and limit to my freedom and therefore as an enemy”.
- 39.
On the falsity of the principle according to which the fundamental rights of individuals necessarily require their express legal or constitutional embodiment in order for the legal system to be able to guarantee their effective safeguard, see Masferrer (2005), pp. 515–544.
- 40.
Regarding German or Central European authors, see the study Carpintero (2016a), pp. 35–58; I do not want to—and cannot—fail to take advantage of that first quotation to Professor Carpintero to thank him expressly for his patient reading of my manuscript, as well as his valuable comments on some of its parts; logically, any errors (‘errare humanum est’) are entirely mine.
- 41.
According to Thomas Hobbes, “individual rights-bearers do not possess rights because they are inscribed in nature or because they can be understood to be expressions of human reason, but only because they have been conferred by the sovereign’s legislation” (Loughlin (2003), p. 86); these theses, which are still prevalent today, are defended by authors such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, among others; in this regard, see the suggestive study Rhonheimer (2005), pp. 1–70.
- 42.
Ballesteros (1974), p. 16.
- 43.
In this regard, see the study Gearty (2010), p. 8, who attributes to Hobbes the fragility of fundamental rights and freedoms in Western legal culture: “...there is no doubt that Hobbes remains hugely influential (...). Hobbes’s residual theory of liberty has proved of immense influence”.
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
In Rousseau’s view, the notions of sovereignty and Law as an expression of the general will were closely linked: “...sovereignty being nothing but the exercise of the general will, it can never be alienated, and the sovereign, who is nothing but a collective being, can only be represented by himself; power can be transmitted but not the will (...). For the same reason that the will is not alienable, it is also indivisible: because the will is general or it is not (...). It is important, then, for the formulation of the general will that there should be no partial society in the State and that each citizen should express his opinion exclusively according to his own understanding” (Rousseau (2007), p. 29).
- 47.
“Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and this cannot be represented: it is itself or it is another; there is no middle ground (...). Any law not ratified in person by the people is null and void; it is not a law. The English people believe they are free, but they are wrong, they are only free during the election of the members of Parliament” (text included in Jiménez (2003), p. 71); see also Jiménez (2001).
- 48.
Art. 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (see footnote n. 23).
- 49.
Art. 5 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (see footnote n. 24).
- 50.
In this regard, see Carpintero (1981).
- 51.
On this author, see the book—already classic—by Carpintero Benítez, F., on Vázquez de Menchaca, see Carpintero (1977).
- 52.
For example, Vázquez, mocking the opposite opinion, declared Roman Law to have no legal value. Still, at the same time, he was a Romanist who based a good part of his opinions on this law and on jurists who were or had been Romanists. On the other hand, as a Jesuit, Suarez considered the validity of Canon Law absurd. But, at the same time, he strongly reinforced the existing order, understanding that everything that exists is the result of the contingent will of God, but He, being perfect, cannot contradict Himself and change the reason by which He has created us. Moreover, he left the legislative power so exclusively in the hands of the national Sovereign that he even denied that custom had the force of law, something that Vázquez de Menchaca did not do, who repeatedly affirmed that “Vox populi, vox Dei”.
- 53.
The interpretation of some was that, in contrast to Hobbes’ “Homo homini lupus”, Rousseaun’s anthropology was optimistic, and this does not quite fit in with the other sources.
- 54.
Let us bear in mind the importance of the “principium unicum, evidens et adaequatum” in modern ethico-political theories. In fact, this requirement was initially present, in the sixteenth century, in several Spaniards. According to this view, justice cannot be broken down into several principles because then there would be different versions of justices.
- 55.
There was an interesting discussion in the early twentieth century between Jellinek and Boutmy on the subject. Jellinek maintained that Rousseau had designed a totalitarian state. Boutmy, using more French esprit, reminded Jellinek of the Rousseauian pathos for liberty. It would be naive to think that this tendency ended in Rousseau. José Luis Díez-Picazo y Ponce de León, for example, understood that any political doctrine that placed any intermediate instance between the individual and the State was “totalitarian”.
- 56.
Ballesteros (2006), p. 115: “Indeed, totalitarian democracy is possible and the revolutionary Convention proves it. It arises where the general will claims to be the supreme norm of justice, in such a way that it is necessary to alienate personal rights to the collective entity, to the whole, which results from such a general will. This absolutisation of the general will also lead logically to the elimination of dissidents, of those who oppose it, considering them as close to delinquents”; on totalitarianism and democracy in relation to Rousseau, see Talmon (1956), pp. 41 ff.
- 57.
In this line, Rousseau pointed out: “A free people obeys, but does not serve; it has chiefs but no masters; it obeys the laws, and it is by the force of the laws that it obeys men (...). A people is free, whatever the form of its government, when those who govern it do not see man, but the organ of the Law. In a word, liberty always follows the fate of the laws, it reigns or perishes with them; I know nothing that is more certain” (Rousseau (1964), p. 842); see Rousseau (2007); on the identification of wills between individual and Nation, of Rousseaunian origin, see Paine (1962), p. 243: “Every citizen is a sharer in sovereignty and as such cannot acknowledge personal subjection, but only obedience to the Law”.
- 58.
Duguit (1922), p. 56; on Duguit’s work and his critique of the notions of sovereignty (with respect to public law) and liberty (with respect to the sphere of private law), see the study Grimm (1973) (a review of this study can be found in the Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho, 1975, written by Jesús Ballesteros); see also Duguit (1913); for a reading of this book, see Loughlin (2016).
- 59.
Duguit (1922), p. 57.
- 60.
Duguit (1922), pp. 57–58: “Alongside the myth of national sovereignty, the cult of individual liberty was instituted”.
- 61.
Duguit (1922), pp. 213–214: “Many theologians of individualism have endeavoured to explain it, but without succeeding, because they necessarily came either to make the sovereignty of the State disappear for the benefit of individual freedom, or to sacrifice the freedom of the individual completely to the sovereignty of the State, whatever the sophistry employed to keep the sovereignty of the State intact, while trying to maintain the rights of the individual”; see, in this respect, the following texts of Rousseau: “It is agreed that whatever each one alienates from his liberty is only that part whose use is of importance to the community. It must also be agreed that only the sovereign can judge this importance” (Rousseau (2007), Book II, Ch. IV); “The union [resulting from the social contract] is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has any claim to it, for if any right were left to the individual, as there would be no common superior who could stand between them and the public, the association would necessarily become tyrannical or vain” (Rousseau (2007), Book I, Ch. IV).
- 62.
A synthesis of the myth of a self-sufficient society as a reaction against the absolute State can be found in García de Enterría (1981), pp. 13–31.
- 63.
This means that “the individual, finding the fullness of his being only in the State, the State can be all-powerful without the autonomy of the individual being diminished. Rousseau does not say otherwise when he affirms that by virtue of the social contract which creates the collective will, individuals, obeying this will, obey only themselves. The more powerful this collective will is, the more powerful are the individuals themselves, since it is made up only of individual wills. To affirm the unlimited sovereignty of the collective will of the State is thus to affirm the unrestricted sovereignty of the individual. Individual autonomy acquires reality in the sovereignty of the State and exists by reason of this sovereignty” (Duguit (1922), pp. 215–216).
- 64.
Duguit (1922), p. 214: “The initiator of these sophisms is, indisputably, J.J. Rousseau, who by a singular error is often cited as the inspirer of the liberal doctrines of the Declaration of Rights promulgated in 1789, when, on the contrary, he is the initiator of all the doctrines of dictatorship and tyranny, from the Jacobin doctrines of 1793 to the Bolshevik doctrines of 1920 (...). It is enough to open the Social Contract to see how J.J. Rousseau unreservedly sacrifices the rights of the individual to the omnipotent power of the State”.
- 65.
Duguit (1922), p. 285.
- 66.
In this regard, see Kotzour (2003).
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
This was not the same in all cases, in fact far from it, and the treatment of the indigenous population by the Spanish colonisers was not worse than in other countries, despite what an anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic historiographic current has wanted to show. Thus, for example, Hernán Cortés was motivated by a sincere desire for evangelisation. He did not trust the secular clergy and eventually brought religious Franciscans, even though the Spanish Crown was not based on the Franciscans, but on the Augustinians.
- 70.
For a version of the sermon with language appropriate to the historical moment, see the one given in the main text of footnote n. 147 in Part II; see Loewenstein (1945), p. 273: “Western civilization of our day is predominantly determined by the values of individual liberty, inherited from Greek philosophy, Roman law and the teachings of Christianity.”
- 71.
de Sepúlveda (1984).
- 72.
In this regard, see Maestre (2004).
- 73.
This reasoning was not accepted by Las Casas, who replied: “One cannot generalise the argument of “barbarism” without further ado and, relying, as Sepúlveda does, on the authority of Aristotle, apply it to the Indians of America.... First of all, it is necessary to define the concept of ‘barbarism’... ‘the different classes of barbarians’ and to see in which of these the Indians fall, if they fall into any”; texts collected by Maestre (2004), pp. 117–118.
- 74.
In fact, it was not really a novelty. This doctrine had been held by Valdo and Wycliffe and, more recently, by Armachanus (Richardus Fiztralph), bishop of a French diocese. It was not accepted by any Catholic other than Armachanus. And, before him, it is worth mentioning that the nominalist current, which followed the theory of “In puris naturalibus”, according to which men have two ultimate ends, the natural and the supernatural. This current led to a human-rational knowledge that led to sustaining the rational validity of the natural law with the well-known formula Etiamsi Deus non daretur, which many attribute to Hugo Grotius, but which was already very present before the thirteenth century, for example, in John Duns Scotus. That is why Thomas Aquinas chose to be so concerned with combating it in his youthful work (The Commentaries on the Sentences).
- 75.
In this regard, see Fazio (2006), pp. 33–38, in particular, pp. 33–34.
- 76.
In this regard, it is useful to bring up the well-known distinction between title and cause: the ultimate title of political society was the necessity and the will to live together, while the proximate cause on which the prince could base his power was the consent of his subjects.
- 77.
- 78.
- 79.
Fazio (2006), p. 37.
- 80.
The RAE includes the following three meanings of this adjective: 1. Belonging or relating to Machiavelli or Machiavellianism; 2. For its part, www.wordreference.com is even more explicit: “Having characteristics considered characteristic of Machiavellianism, such as perfidy, unscrupulousness or cunning”.
- 81.
Grotius (1625b), Prolegomena, n.11; it should be noted, however, that this approach to ethics and law did not originate with Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) or, therefore, with Protestantism, but almost two centuries earlier with authors such as John of Gerson (1363–1429) and his disciple Conrad of Summenhart or Gabriel Biel (1420–1495), among others. The latter, a notably active Catholic thinker, wrote: “Nam per si impossibile Deus non esset, qui est ratio divina: aut ratio illa divina esset errans, adhuc si quis ageret contra recta rationem angelicam, vel humanam, vel aliam aliquam, si qua esset, peccaret. Peccatum est voluntaria carentia conformitatis ad rationem rectam debiti voluntati” (Biel (1574), L. II, Dist. 28, quaestio unica, p. 165-E). In short, in posing the question of what would happen if God were dispensed with, Biel already held that the ethical or moral contents of reason would remain the same even if God did not exist—a sin against what reason shows would be a ‘rational’ sin—so that what is good is good and what is evil is evil “even if God did not exist” (“Etiamsi Deus non daretur”); in this regard, see Carpintero (2017), where he argues that “the thesis of the validity of natural law Etiamsi Deus non daretur was a creation of the Nominals who, since they denied that natural law could consist of a “real” or metaphysical order, maintained that it existed only under formal or modal mode. In this way it undoubtedly exists in the heads of men, and whoever denies any of its precepts opposes God, who is the one who gave us the reason we currently have” (Carpintero (2017), pp. 184–185); on this doctrine in Gabriel Biel, two centuries before Grotius, see also López Hernández (1998), p. 226; for another view, see Hervada (1987), pp. 266–268, for whom Grotius was the first to defend this thesis, because previous theologians had shown, in his opinion, an “analogised” being, so that human reason could change by being only analogous to divine reason.
- 82.
The divorce between theory and practice might—at least, partly—explain such undeniable, paradoxical reality. In the same vein, today is notably discussed the rise of colonialism and slavery under natural law in the sixteenth/seventeenth century—the very same natural law out of which the idea of human rights would grow. One might wonder how the rise of the ideas on natural rights could go hand in hand with exploitation of thousands of Africans, Asians and native Americans. History shows that ideas and laws not always go hand in hand with the practice. Some ideas might not have any influence over laws, and some laws might be hardly enforced or perfectly ineffective. However, this does not preclude the possibility of studying the history of ideas and see how they were introduced in the legal order, as I’m doing here, even though some of them did not have much impact in the laws or, if they do, were not appealing enough to make such laws effective, as it somehow happened with the Native Indians; the abuses towards Indians led to the creation of the protector of Indians in some Spanish colonial territories, as scholars show: Cutter (1986); Ruigómez (1988); Bonnett (1992); Novoa (2016).
- 83.
On this, see Figgis (1998).
- 84.
In practice, the “theocratic states” tried to impose God’s law by all means, and in a short time they succeeded in controlling urban life more tightly than the Church did in Catholic cities. However, also in Catholic areas this mentality was gradually introduced through “Jansenism”, a religious movement initiated by Jansenius (1585–1638). Although condemned as heretical by the Catholic Church, it enjoyed a certain popularity in Europe. Denying the contest of human freedom, it emphasised original sin, human depravity, and the necessity of divine grace, which saved only the predestined. It was, undoubtedly, a puritanical and intransigent doctrine.
- 85.
L’État, c’est moi in its French version, or Der Staat bin ich in its German version.
- 86.
- 87.
It should be recognised that a certain germ of absolutism can be found in the medieval doctrine of the absolute potestas of the prince, which resulted from his right to plenitudo potestatis, and that the theoretical limits of this power were not always respected in practice. Hence Vázquez de Menchaca’s attacks on this potestas absoluta, which indicates that it was sometimes practised outside the theoretical limits in the government of the Church and of the lay Power; however, it should be borne in mind that the marked limits (of theological, philosophical-moral, political and legal origin) of royal power proper to the Middle Ages began to disappear even in the theoretical sphere from the sixteenth century onwards; in this respect, see, for example, the study by Carpintero (1977), pp. 158–172.
- 88.
On the historical evolution of the limits of political power, see Masferrer and Obarrio (2012); as is well known, monarchical absolutism was the result of a slow and gradual process to which Jean Bodin (1530–1596) contributed decisively in the sixteenth century, who came to uphold royal sovereignty in the following terms: “Maiestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibus soluta potestas” (Six libres de la république, book I, chap. VIII). This is the classic text of the modern theory of sovereignty. Indeed, this definition of souveraineté or summa potestas as in cives ac subditos legibus soluta potestas (‘power over citizens and subjects not subject to laws’), constitutes the theoretical basis of the sovereign power of the State as a supreme, permanent, indivisible and, in principle, legally irresponsible power. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that Jean Bodin never conceived of an unlimited notion of sovereignty, given that it could not transgress divine laws, natural laws and ius Gentium.
- 89.
- 90.
As is well known, ‘martial law’ refers to temporary rule by military authorities in time of emergency when civilian authorities are deemed unable to function. The legal effects of such a declaration vary from State to State, but usually involve the suspension of civil rights, as well as the extension of summary military justice or military law to the civilian population. Although in theory temporary in nature, in practice a state of martial law can be of considerable and sometimes indefinite duration.
- 91.
Although it should be noted that Locke claimed, above all, individual private property, it can be inferred from the reading of his work that personal liberty was a reality “postulated” in view of freedom in the traffic of property. Thus, for example, when he speaks of “The Fundamental Law of Society”, he refers only to property.
- 92.
In this regard, see Helmholz (2005), pp. 1–22.
- 93.
At times, the pretensions of the Church went even further, and the Popes, rather than freeing themselves from this yoke, wanted to extend their power. It is a complex subject which it is not possible to treat it as it deserves to be treated. The great defender of the purity of the Church was, in the fifteenth century, John of Gerson, who demanded a council from the Pope, and in view of his refusals, reminded the Emperor that he also had jurisdictio to convoke such a council. That council came with Trent (1545–1563), but very late and urged on by the Holy See, prompted by the success of the Reformers.
- 94.
On this subject, see Orlandis (2006), pp. 281–282.
- 95.
- 96.
De Bulla Aurea. Andraea II Regis Hungarie, 1222, Verona: Edizioni Valdonega, 1999; see also some chapters in their English version in pp. 181–247, and the bibliography in pp. 249–254.
- 97.
- 98.
- 99.
I remember he used the expression “Mitmachen”, meaning to participate, contribute, play along with, or get involved in something in to transform the social reality.
- 100.
- 101.
- 102.
The expression “Spanish” is only applicable from the reign of the Catholic monarchs (1479–1504), particularly, from Charles V (1516–1556), onward, a period where the political unity of the Spanish monarchy was compatible with the legal diversity. Thus, the different kingdoms and territories of the crown of Castile and Aragon had their political and legal institutions; Masferrer (2009), Ch. 10.
- 103.
See footnote n. 11.
- 104.
- 105.
While Castile and León were definitely united by Ferdinand III in 1230, Aragon and Catalonia were also united in 1137 from the marriage of Ramon Berenguer and Petronila of Aragón; later, the kingdom of Aragón comprised united Valencia, Majorca, Menorca, and the Italian territories of Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and Naples. Hence, most territories of the Basque provinces were united to Castile at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabelle of Castile politically united both kingdoms, from which the Spanish monarchy under the Catholic kings emerged (1469). In 1512, Navarre was incorporated to Castile.
- 106.
- 107.
García Pérez (2008).
- 108.
- 109.
- 110.
Colmeiro (1861), Ch. IX; Cavero (2009); some historians discussed whether the first Cortes of Castile and León were celebrated in Burgos (1187), in San Esteban de Gormaz (1187), or in León (1188); or whether the first Cortes of the Iberian Peninsula occurred in Portugal in 1143; see Martín (2003); See also the works by Fernando Arvizu Galagarra: Arvizu (1988); Arvizu (1994); Arvizu (2002).
- 111.
- 112.
Nieto (2011), pp. 197–241.
- 113.
Fernández (1988).
- 114.
For this view, see González and González (2018).
- 115.
González (1944), pp. 23–26.
- 116.
Fernández (1993), pp. 93–117.
- 117.
Seijas (2016); see this version—with some minor corrections—in the Appendix of the book.
- 118.
Mezey (2022).
- 119.
- 120.
Such customs included the Fuero de León approved in 1017; see Fueros locales del Reino de León (910–1230). Antología, Madrid: Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2018 (available at https://www.boe.es/biblioteca_juridica/publicacion.php?id=PUB-LH-2018-61).
- 121.
Magna Carta, Ch. 39: “No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned or deprived of his rights or property, nor put outlawed or banished or otherwise deprived of his rank, nor shall we use force against him or send others to do so, except by virtue of judicial sentence of his peers or by law of the realm.”
- 122.
Magna Carta, Ch. 39: “No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned or deprived of his rights or property, nor put outlawed or banished or otherwise deprived of his rank, nor shall we use force against him or send others to do so, except by virtue of judicial sentence of his peers or by law of the realm”; Ch. 40: “We will not sell, deny or delay to anyone his right or justice.”
- 123.
International Memory of the World Register (2013)
- 124.
- 125.
Lorente (2016).
- 126.
Masferrer and Obarrio (2012).
- 127.
- 128.
See footnote n. 12.
- 129.
Cited in the footnote n. 12.
- 130.
Dávila (2017).
- 131.
Font (1983), p. 50.
- 132.
Font (1983), p. 53.
- 133.
Font (1983), p. 59.
- 134.
Font (1983), p. 218.
- 135.
Font (1983), pp. 218–219.
- 136.
On some population charters with obvious political overtones, see Font (1983), pp. 222–223.
- 137.
Izquierdo (1990), p. 95.
- 138.
Font (1983), pp. 219–220.
- 139.
On the lifting of restrictions on civil rights, see Font (1983), pp. 226–228.
- 140.
Ramadan (2009), pp. 40–43.
- 141.
- 142.
This doctrine constituted the “Communis omnium possessio” which St. Isidore of Seville had specified as part of natural law. The other great part was the “Omnium una libertas”. Gratian, trained in early medieval sources, was necessarily familiar with the “Etymologies” of St. Isidore, which used to be the textbook in the various schools before the medieval university.
- 143.
In this regard, see Carpintero (1981).
- 144.
On this question, see, for example, Helmholz (2010).
- 145.
- 146.
López Hernández (1998), p. 208.
- 147.
López Hernández (1998), p. 208.
- 148.
López Hernández (1998), p. 213.
- 149.
According to Brian Tierney, some have misinterpreted Ockham’s thesis. This does not seem to be the opinion of other authors after analysing the work of William of Ockham: López Hernández (1998), pp. 214–223; Hervada (1987), pp. 189–191; Carpintero (2013), pp. 116–121; on Ockham, see the classic work by Villey (1969a), pp. 116–121.
- 150.
Hervada (1987), p. 189.
- 151.
Hervada (1987), p. 189.
- 152.
Carpintero (2013), p. 118, argues that “Ockham did not fully propose a nominalist philosophy: the first nominalist system was that of Thomas Hobbes”.
- 153.
Carpintero (2013), p. 118.
- 154.
Carpintero (2013), p.118.
- 155.
López Hernández (1998), p. 216.
- 156.
López Hernández (1998), pp. 216–217.
- 157.
William of Ockham, Comment. Sent., III, q. 12, CCC (collected by López Hernández (1998), p. 217).
- 158.
William of Ockham, Comment. Sent., I, 1, 6, P, R (collected by López Hernández (1998), p. 217).
- 159.
López Hernández (1998), p. 217.
- 160.
- 161.
Ockham, Dialogus, pars III, tract. II, lib. III, cap. IV (we quote the translation of Hervada (1987), p. 190, the Latin text of which appears in footnote n. 407.
- 162.
Carpintero (2013), p. 118.
- 163.
- 164.
- 165.
Ockham, Opus nonaginta dierum, 61, 2 (collected by López Hernández (1998), p. 219).
- 166.
Ockham, Opus nonaginta dierum, 6, 4 (collected by López Hernández (1998), p. 219).
- 167.
López Hernández (1998), p. 219.
- 168.
“Lex evangelica est lex libertatis”, he states in his work Magistri Guilhelmi de Ockham super potestate de summi pontificis octo quaestionum decisiones, Lyon, 1496, q. 1, Ch. 6 (collected by Carpintero (2003), p. 79, footnote n. 183).
- 169.
Carpintero (2003), p. 78.
- 170.
Ockham, Opus nonaginta, Ch. 65, pp. 574, 577 (collected by Carpintero (2003), pp. 78–79, footnotes nn. 179–180).
- 171.
Ockham, Opus nonaginta, Ch. 66, p. 581 (collected by Carpintero (2003), p. 79, footnote n. 179).
- 172.
Carpintero (2003), p. 79.
- 173.
- 174.
See footnote n. 132 as well as the corresponding main text.
- 175.
Ockham, Magistri Guilhelmi de Ockham..., q. 3, Ch. 4 (taken up by Carpintero (2003), p. 80, footnote n. 184); Carpintero then notes how the source of this freedom is twofold, God and nature, a faithful reflection of the puris naturalibus theory, which defended an independence of the natural order (nature) from the supernatural order (God), so that man has two distinct ends, human fullness (natural) and the life of grace (supernatural), as if man could attain fullness and happiness apart from God.
- 176.
- 177.
- 178.
- 179.
Guzmán (2013), p. 81.
- 180.
- 181.
Gerson, Liber de vita spirituali animae: “Dicamus igitur, quod omne ens positivum quantum habet de entitate et ex consequenti, de bonitate, tantumdem habet de iure sic generaliter definito. In hunc modum, caelum ius habet ad influendum, sol ad illuminandum, ignis ad calefaciendum, hirundo ad nidificandum, immo et quaelibet creatura in omni eo quod bene agere naturali potest facultate: cuius ratio perspicua est, quoniam omnia omnia talia convenient eis secundum dictamen rectae rationis divinae, alioquin nunquam persisterent; sic homo etiam peccator ius habet ad multa, sicut et aliae creaturae naturis suis derelictae”; collected by Guzmán (2013), p. 82; by the same author, see also Guzmán (2009), pp. 18–19, footnote n. 13.
- 182.
Guzmán (2013), p. 83.
- 183.
Guzmán (2009), p. 20.
- 184.
- 185.
- 186.
Summenhart, De contractibus licitis atque illicitus tractatus, Treatise I, q. 1 (taken up by Carpintero (2003), p. 89, footnote n. 245).
- 187.
Summenhart, De contractibus licitis atque illicitus tractatus, Treatise I, q. 1, p. 4, 1st col (collected by Guzmán (2009), p. 26, footnote n. 28).
- 188.
Guzmán (2009), p. 26, who points out, in footnote n. 29, that “the expression ‘acción posible’ abbreviates the original ‘acción que le es permitido ejercer’, because it is not about the action actually executed”.
- 189.
Guzmán (2009), p. 26.
- 190.
Summenhart, De contractibus licitis atque illicitus tractatus, Treatise I, q. 1 (collected by Carpintero (2003), p. 87, footnote n. 223).
- 191.
Summenhart, De contractibus licitis atque illicitus tractatus, Treatise I, q. 1, p. 1 (collected by Carpintero (2003), p. 87, footnote n. 227).
- 192.
- 193.
Summenhart, De contractibus licitis atque illicitus tractatus, Treatise I, q. 5, p. 22 (taken up by Carpintero (2003), p. 88, footnote n. 229).
- 194.
Carpintero (2003), p. 88.
- 195.
Summenhart, De contractibus licitis atque illicitus tractatus, Treatise I, q. 1, p. 1 (collected by Carpintero (2003), pp. 89–90, footnote n. 246).
- 196.
Carpintero (2003), p. 90.
- 197.
- 198.
- 199.
To refer directly, or in the near future, to God was an English and Reformed thing. Hence the Defence of the Catholic Faith against the Errors of the Anglican Sect (1613), by Francisco Suarez. This was a doctrine very expressly condemned by the Catholic Church, which only held that political power was necessary by natural right. The appointment of princes was the task of legitimacy in hereditary succession, or of the election of subjects.
- 200.
- 201.
- 202.
Guzmán (2009), pp. 35–36.
- 203.
Guzmán (2009), p. 37, taking up the Thomist source in Suma Teológica 2ª 2, Cuesti. 57ªart. 1°, solut. 2ª: “lex non est ipsa ius, proprie loquendo, sed aliquis ratio iuris”.
- 204.
- 205.
In this regard, see Guzmán (2009), pp. 62–91.
- 206.
Guzmán (2013), p. 83.
- 207.
Guzmán (2009), p. 92.
- 208.
In this regard, see Guzmán (2009), pp. 112–141.
- 209.
Guzmán (2009), p. 111.
- 210.
Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, p. 281 (collected by Guzmán (2009), p. 117, footnote n. 246).
- 211.
Guzmán (2009), p. 127.
- 212.
Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, II, p. 284 (text translated and collected by Guzmán (2009), p. 122, footnote n. 258).
- 213.
On this, see Guzmán (2009), pp. 143–188; for the abundant literature on Suárez, see a part of it collected in pp. 189–190, footnote n. 386.
- 214.
Luis de Molina, De iustitia et iure opera omnia tractatibus quinque, trat. I, disput. 1ª, núm. 4 (text collected by Guzmán (2009), pp. 146–147, footnote n. 299).
- 215.
Luis de Molina, De iustitia et iure opera omnia tractatibus quinque, trat. II, disput. 1ª, princ. and no. 1 (text collected by Guzmán (2009), p. 148, footnote n. 301).
- 216.
In this regard, see Guzmán (2009), pp. 189–230.
- 217.
Francisco Suárez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore (collected by Guzmán (2009), p. 191, footnote n. 388).
- 218.
Francisco Suárez, De legibus..., lib. I, cap. 2, no. 4: “facultas quedam moralis, quam unusquisque habet, vel circa rem suam, vel ad rem sibi debitam” (collected by Guzmán (2009), p. 192, footnote n. 390); for Guzmán Brito, the distinction between ius in re and ius ad rem, as well as the notion of moral faculty, constituted the two great contributions of Suárez to the doctrine of right-faculty (pp. 228–230).
- 219.
Guzmán (2009), p. 192.
- 220.
Francisco Suárez, De legibus..., lib. I, Ch. 2, no. 4 (collected by Guzmán (2009), p. 193, footnote n. 393).
- 221.
Guzmán (2009), pp. 222–223.
- 222.
- 223.
Guzmán (2009), pp. 231–232, in particular the bibliography in footnote n. 471.
- 224.
Guzmán (2009), pp. 231–251.
- 225.
Guzmán (2009), pp. 239–240: “Grotius places qualitas moralis as the next genre of his definition while Suárez resorts to the genre of facultas moralis. But the difference lies only in the choice of a different level of generality. Facultas, in fact, is one of the species of the predicate of qualitas; so Grotius is only more generic than Suárez; which means that Suárez also sets out a qualitas when he speaks of facultas, just as Grotius sets out a facultas when he speaks of qualitas”; see also Guzmán Brito, “Historia de la denominación del derecho-facultad como ‘subjetivo’”, III, 4 in fine: “Thus, in speaking of qualitas, Grotius was going back to the remote genus, where the earlier authors, and still much of the later ones, remained in the proximate genus.”
- 226.
Hobbes (1968), pp. 183–192.
- 227.
- 228.
Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium (1672, Francofurti - Lipsiae, 1759), lib. I, Ch. 1, para. 20 (collected by Guzmán (2003), III, 3); on the subjective law, see Denzer (1972), pp. 129–134; on the presence of this definition of faculty right in other Central European authors in the seventeenth century (Christian Thomasius, Nikolaus Grundling, Gottfried W. Leibnitz) and first half of the eighteenth century (Christian Wolf), see Guzmán (2003), III, 3.
- 229.
It is the old, medieval distinction between the ‘pactum societatis’ and the ‘pactum subjectionis’.
- 230.
Although this Cartesian distinction had fundamentally different scope, more in the field of delimitation of the search field of Mechanics, its possible influence in this respect cannot be ruled out; see Masferrer (2020). Moreover, it is worth remembering that the separation—beyond the simple distinction—between the Natural and the Human is very medieval: Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and was taken up by John of Gerson, Konrad Summenhart or Gabriel Biel, who transmitted it to the Spaniards and to the Modern Age. The great difference between the medieval nominalists and the modern ones lies in the fact that the former relied on God—the Prima justitia Dei—, while the modern ones dispensed with God. However, their vision of nature was the same, which has been erroneously attributed only to the Modern Age.
- 231.
In this regard, see the study by Baggolini (1966), which is still being published today.
- 232.
In relation to the rejection of natural law in nineteenth-century German science, two observations should be made: the first is that the positivists revolted above all against modern natural law (ius naturalism), which spoke only of states of nature and social contracts; they reacted against this excessive individualism, and hence the ‘organicist’ theories that appeared in the nineteenth century (Otto von Gierke, for example). At the same time, they pigeonholed the states of nature and all conception, in general, of natural law (regarding the antipathy against the states of nature, see the study by Francisco Carpintero (1989); the second is that Germany was politically too fragmented; the Germans wanted a strong, single “state” with only one set of laws, those dictated by the state (on this subject, see Carpintero (1993)).
- 233.
The following text by Fichte, published in 1813, is eloquent in this sense:
“The State is an organisation of property owners, and the power of the State is only the servant of these owners, who is paid by them to render this service. The owners of property are the original citizens and the founders of the State, and those who come after them have their rights determined by what they decide; in their zeal for liberty there is hidden nothing but the eagerness for the lack of regulation, of law, in their acquisitions. With the affirmation that the church, school, trade corporations, guilds, and in general everything that does not refer to legislation, are not part of the State but are organisations for private persons, they only pretend that the State does not take charge of them and that consequently, they are not economically burdensome; therefore, they understand that the State would disappear if there were no more thieves.
From all this the following follows. In the first place, Humanity is divided into two great branches: that of the proprietors and that of the non-proprietors. The former does not, properly speaking, constitute the State, for they are prior to the State; rather it is they who maintain the State, just as a lord maintains his servants, so that they are his servants. He who can afford a servant does not work, and this—since the State is only a servant of the owners—explains why only non-owners become members of the State, for he who has his own property does not lower himself to serve: the servant serves because he has nothing, seeking a salary, like the soldier.
The State is (for the owner) a necessary evil because it costs money; consequently, it is a matter of making that evil as small as possible.
All war destroys property, and therefore peace is the first civic obligation. To be a citizen means to be an owner and to exercise an industry, as opposed to a wage earner. The prolongation of war destroys property, the supreme good of man together with life, and threatens life and health, the supreme goods. For this reason, it is necessary, by every means, to shorten the war.
Prejudices of barbarian times, such as the divine origin of kings, the sanctity of oaths, or national honour, are nothing to those who are clear about this simple rule: life comes first, money second, and the nation third. That is why the owners lose nothing when, after the war is over, they pay a new lord and remain secure; it is simply a relationship of dependence, which changes. What is important is that the victor actually secures the property of the one who has been disarmed, that he does not allow his soldiers to pillage, that he leaves trade free and does not introduce customs barriers” Fichte (1920), pp. 40–45 (text translated into Spanish and collected by Carpintero (1989), pp. 141–142).
- 234.
We follow here the synthetic description of Guzmán (2003), V, 1–4.
- 235.
As Guzmán Brito points out, Kant (1724–1804) still used the scholastic means of expression, although already in German, to refer to the figure. He would say: ‘Der Rechte als (moralische) Vermögen’ (‘Right as moral power’) (Kant (1785), B, 2, p. 237); or: ‘Recht, als Befugnis (facultas moralis generatim)’ (‘Right as faculty—as moral faculty in general’ (Kant (1785), II, Einleutung, II, p. 383 (p. 222)).
- 236.
Darjes (1745), p. 12, para. 12: “...it follows that the system there composed is, truly and properly conceived, a natural law, which is called a system of natural law or law of nature objectively considered, which can be distinguished from natural law subjectively considered”; by the same author, Darjes (1751), observat. I, para. 6: “The word ‘law’ is taken grammatically or technically (...) Technically it is taken subjectively or objectively. Subjectively taken to mean a certain quality of the person, which is a faculty (...) If looked at objectively, it either means the same as ‘law’ (...) or it is taken systematically, as a science...”; translation by Guzmán (2003), footnote n. 59.
- 237.
Nettelbladt (1767), para. 229: “The faculty to act, that is, the possibility to act, is called moral if it comes from the law. But the moral faculty to act is called ‘right’ when it is subjectively considered, to which objectively considered right is opposed”); translation by Guzmán (2003), footnote n. 60.
- 238.
Achenwall (1750), para. 23: “The physical faculty of man, insofar as it is not impeded by any moral law, is a moral faculty and, in a word, (moral) right, taken broadly and subjectively, i.e. as an affection of the person”; translation by Guzmán (2003), footnote n. 61; on this point, see also Carpintero (1987), p. 491, footnote n. 44.
- 239.
Guzmán (2003), V, 2; and develops it as follows: “Kierulff (1806–1894), for example, spoke of “s. (o) g.(enannte) Recht im subjectiven Sinn” (the “so-called right in the subjective sense”); and Savigny himself, after expressing himself in the more traditional terms of “Recht im subjetiven (-objektiven) Sinn”, added: “according to the linguistic usage of some moderns” (“nach dem Sprachgebrauch mancher Neueren”). In the latter author also uses the expression “subjektives Recht”, as opposed to “objecktives Recht”; but after resorting to this form of speech, Savigny feels obliged to add that it is according to a “known linguistic usage” (“nach einem bekannten Sprachgebrauch”), or “according to some of the modern linguistic uses” (“nach dem Sprachgebrauch mancher Neueren”). In fact, when Savigny first introduces the notion in his System, he prefers the even older, properly almost scholastic (“faculty”) way: “Diese Macht nennen wir ein Recht dieser Person, gleichbedeutend mit Befugnis”; and only then does he add: “Manche nennen es das Recht im subjectiven Sinn”. He does something similar with law as a rule: “Diese Regel nennen wir das Recht schlechthin, oder das allgemeine Recht: manche nennen sie das Rechts im objectiven Sinn””.
- 240.
Guzmán (2003), V, 3; and develops it as follows: “In 1843, Karl Adolph Vangerow (1808–1870), organises book I of his Leitfaden für Pandekten-Vorlesungen into a 1st chapter dealing: ‘Von den Quellen des Rechts, oder dem Rechte im objectiven Sinne’; and a 5th chapter, whose No. 1 is headed: ‘Begriff der Rechts (im subjectiven Sinn)’.” The same duality is used by Karl Ludwig Arndts (1803–1878) in the Lehrbuch der Pandecten (1852). But in 1860, Leopold August Warnkönig (1794–1866) writes in his Institutiones iuris Romani privati (1819): “Iuris vocabulum hoc sensu intellectum [sc. as facultas] ius in senso subjectivo, i. (d) e.(st), subiective sumto insignire hodie dicunt”.
- 241.
Guzmán (2003), V, 3: “In the first edition of his Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (1862) he had reluctantly referred to the “s. (o) g.(enante) Recht im subjectiven Sinn”. But in the fifth edition (1879) he no longer refers to the two expressions in use and speaks of “Rechts im objectiven Sinn, objectives Rechts” and “Recht in subjectives Sinn, subjectives Rechts”. However, the later Heinrich Dernburg (1829–1907), in his Pandecten (2nd ed., 1884), adheres to the older usage of “Recht im objectiven–subjectiven Sinn”, while the no less late Ernst Immanuel Bekker (1827–1908), in his System des heutigen Pandekten Rechts of 1886, speaks of “objective–subjective Rechts””.
- 242.
Guzmán (2003), V, 3 in fine.
- 243.
- 244.
Guzmán (2003), V, 4.
- 245.
August Thon, Rechtsnorm und subjektives Recht (1878), Carl Gustav Freudenstein, Die Rechtskraft nach der Reichscivilprocessordnung und ihre Wirkungen auf die subjectiven Rechte (Hanover, 1884), Georg Jellinek, System des subjectiven öffentlichen Rechte (1892) and Eduard Hölder, Ueber objectives und subjectives Recht (Leipzig, 1893).
- 246.
In this regard, see Ballesteros (2016).
- 247.
Arnaiz (1971), vol. II, p. 26.
- 248.
“Sovereign will is the antithesis of subjective will. And since the expression of this will takes the form of law, sovereignty in reality means the sovereignty of law” (Loughlin (2003), p. 87).
- 249.
Gearty (2010), who highlights the ongoing pernicious effects of Hobbesian thought: “But his [referring to Hobbes] well-known vision of the government of a state as the entity of absolute sovereignty, with the ability to exercise the power which could not be gained by those subject to it, was inevitably agreeable to those who, in subsequent generations, were to feel the need to act against a variety of perceived threats to the security of the state. Hobbes provides an important backdrop to the attacks on liberty in the name of security that have been such a feature of the democratic era, supplying that thread to the discussion which says security matters above all and (recalling our second point above) that security does not infringe liberty: that not only are those who do not notice repressive laws free, but so too are those coerced by fear into sullen obedience” (p. 10). And later, referring to the English sphere, he adds: “By the end of the 19th century, it is clear that Hobbes’s security-state with a residual model of liberty, but without any strong notion of pre-political inalienable rights, is firmly in place” (p. 12).
- 250.
- 251.
Cicero, De re publica, book 1, n. 25: “…an assemblage of the multitude associated by common consent, for reciprocal rights, and reciprocal usefulness” (I used the English version available at https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/54161/pg54161-images.html); Ballesteros (2006), p. 113; see also Obarrio (2011).
- 252.
Ballesteros (2006), p. 114.
- 253.
Fried (2007), p. 165: “But that is my point. In modern, liberal, welfare-administrative democracies, the impositions on liberty are likely to be gentle, marginal. But we must be vigilant, recognise them for what they are, or we will lose our grip on what liberty is, coming to confuse it with comfort, a generalised decency, or just democracy itself-a confusion that lovers of the state would be glad to foist upon us. But liberty is not the same as democracy.”
- 254.
Fried (2007), p. 72: “It is because our rights emanate from whom and what we are that we may form, re-form, or accept states in order to make our rights more certain and secure. So those who say that our rights depend on or are the creatures of the state have it the wrong way around”. This raises, however, a problem that is not lost on Fried and he describes as follows: “What we cannot get to on our own, without laws and so without a state, is the content and detail of those rights. And rights without content are empty. Liberty means honouring our rights, and if the content of our rights is only what the state says it is, then while the general idea of rights, and the general idea of liberty may be secure against the state, the substance of each depends entirely on the state after all.”
- 255.
I understand that here the expression ‘natural’ is preferable to ‘pre-political’, although the expression ‘natural rights’ can also pose the same problem depending on the meaning given to it. This terminology, ‘pre-political’, prior to the State, was that of the natural legal philosophers (iusnaturalists), who started from the status naturae, in which isolated individuals (not persons) live, bearers of ‘natural rights’ (hence the risk of also using this expression), who create political power by convention, in order to defend their rights in political society. Those of us who think that the figure of the isolated individual is a fiction, which has never existed and never will exist, do not use the expression ‘pre-political’. Not in vain, Aristotle already affirmed that man is, velis nolis, a political animal. As the human being is born in the bosom of a society, of a political community, more or less civilised, there is in fact no pre-political right, in the same way that there are not or have not been pre-political men. Therefore, the adjective ‘pre-political’ should be reserved, stricto sensu, to refer to what is most immediately influenced by modern natural law (iusnaturalism), such as the American and French Bills of Rights, emphasising that this term comes from a group of very questionable theories, such as those of the modern natural legal philosophers (iusnaturalists). That said, since the expression ‘natural rights’ also carries a similar danger, one could use the expression ‘pre-political rights’ in the same sense as ‘natural rights’, that is, referring to the fact that the State does not create these rights, but recognises them, not emanating from the power of the State, but from the very dignity of each human being.
- 256.
Fried (2007), pp. 144–145: “If we have some rights, and therefore liberties, that are pre-political rights which the state is bound to recognise, rights that are there before the state gets down to the business of defining rights, then, like Archimedes with his lever, we have a place to stand, and liberty can move the world. To put it in more traditional language, unless we have natural law, pre-political rights, liberty is not secure”; on this, see also pp. 80, 84–85, 90–94 and 155.
- 257.
- 258.
One might think that this statement is excessively harsh, perhaps applicable stricto sensu only to some countries such as North Korea or, perhaps, Venezuela, but not to the USA or the countries of the European Union. However, in Western states there is more and more undue interference of political power in the lives of citizens, and even more so in the current global context, in which financial and media power is remaining in a few hands; on this subject, see Masferrer (2019a), pp. 11–20; Obarrio (2021a).
References
Doctrinal and Bibliographical Sources
Achenwall G (1750) Ius naturae in usum auditorium. Sumptibus Victorini Bossigelii
Amos A (1856) Ruins of time: Exemplified in Sir Mathew Hale’s history of the pleas of the crown. Deighton Bell, Cambridge
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Some Cited Normative Sources and Declarations
Some Cited Normative Sources and Declarations
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Masferrer, A. (2023). From Human Rights to Natural Rights. In: The Making of Dignity and Human Rights in the Western Tradition. Studies in the History of Law and Justice, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46667-0_1
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