Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Palgrave Companions ((PC))

  • 30 Accesses

Abstract

Wahman argues that Santayana’s account of knowledge as a leap of faith is a unique, important, and underappreciated contribution to epistemology. She explains that Santayana’s account of animal faith does not so much express a limitation of knowledge as a characterization of what it actually achieves: a faithful and practical transition of the mind from thoughts to the natural things that undergird them.

“There is no avenue to the past or the future, there is no room or breath for progressive life, except through faith in the intellect and in the reality of things not seen.”

SAF, 29

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    The book ends with an invitation to the reader to investigate the realms of being made available by establishing knowledge as animal faith (SAF, 309).

  2. 2.

    At the end of the Meditations, Descartes refers to his initial doubts as “exaggerated” and, indeed, “laughable” (Descartes 1984, 61).

  3. 3.

    As I explain below, the presence of the datum is certain only in a vacuous sense, as the SPM does not involve any claim that the given is, in fact, given.

  4. 4.

    In “Corpulent or a Train of Ideas? Santayana’s Critique of Hume,” I argue that Santayana did not fully appreciate the similarities between Hume and himself (Wahman 2007). It is possible that William James’s more radical empiricism caused Santayana to misunderstand the modern thinker and to overstate Hume’s focus on the experiential as philosophical subject matter.

References

  • Descartes, Rene. 1984. Meditations on First Philosophy. In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. II. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Santayana, George. 1923. Scepticism and Animal Faith. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. [1955 reprint].

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1948. Dialogues in Limbo, with Three New Dialogues. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wahman, Jessica. 2007. Corpulent Or a Train of Ideas? Santayana’s Critique of Hume. Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society 25 (25): 1–9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jessica Wahman .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Wahman, J. (2024). Knowledge as a Leap of Faith. In: Coleman, M.A., Tiller, G. (eds) The Palgrave Companion to George Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith. Palgrave Companions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46367-9_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics