Abstract
The present study argues that the differences observed in the forms of political involvement of national economic elites are a product of the interaction of two contingent factors—the degree of cohesion of the material interests of the upper classes and levels of popular sectors’ political mobilization—at two different historical junctures—the wars of independence and the first democratization.
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Notes
- 1.
The divisions produced by the existence of antagonistic economic interests can amplify other types of cleavage—regional, ethnic, ideological, or religious—that also act to exacerbate conflicts rooted in tensions over distribution.
- 2.
Drawing attention to the importance of this factor does not mean ignoring the highly diverse range of situations that it may encompass. It is possible, for example, to differentiate according to the place in the social structure where control of mobilization is located. This allows us to distinguish between mobilization activated and controlled from above, and mobilization from below. Mobilization from above describes events in which the subordination of subaltern social groups remains unaltered, even in circumstances in which these groups are politically activated by a leader or by another social group. In mobilizations from below, the political involvement of non-elite groups becomes an example of collective action in defense of particular interests. While these and other distinctions have theoretical and empirical implications, these implications are not developed further in the present study. Our concern is rather to determine whether popular sectors are present or absent from political competition in the two historical junctures we have identified, and in subsequent trajectories. As the case studies developed in subsequent chapters will show the political activation of these sectors tends to manifest itself in different ways over time. In the C19th, via irregular armed forces and/or bands of electoral supporters. In the C20th, as social movements of peasants and/or urban workers (Collier and Collier 2002).
- 3.
Although the text uses the term “lower classes”, the notion of the popular classes does not imply a definition based on class criteria in the Marxist sense.
- 4.
Constituting the optimal route to polyarchy, in the terms proposed by Robert Dahl (1971).
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Monestier, F. (2023). An Explanation of Three Types of Links between Economic Elites and Parties. In: Economic Elites, Political Parties and the Electoral Arena. Latin American Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46165-1_2
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