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Human Rights Rules and Principles in the Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Refining the Super-Legality Approach

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ICC Jurisprudence and the Development of International Humanitarian Law

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Abstract

In the present chapter, the methods of treaty interpretation and Robert Alexy’s Theorie der Grundrechte (theory of constitutional rights), notably his distinction between rules and principles, are used to examine the place of human rights law in the legal regime of the International Criminal Court. Are internationally recognised human rights superior to any other legal norms outlined in the hierarchical order in Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court? Put differently, does Article 21(3) of this treaty contain a super-legality norm? If so, what are the contours of the norm in question?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002), 2187 UNTS 90 (hereafter ICC Statute), at Art. 21(3). See also ibid, at Art. 7(3) (‘[T]he term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above’).

  2. 2.

    It is widely acknowledged that this provision indirectly refers to customary international law. See, for example, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3343), Trial Chamber III, 21 March 2016, § 71; N. Clarenc Bicudo, ‘Article 21. Droit applicable’, in J. Fernandez, X. Pacreau and M. Ubeda-Saillard (eds), Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale: Commentaire article par article, Vol. I (2nd edn., Paris: Pedone, 2019) 957–976, at 964–965; M. deGuzman, ‘Article 21. Applicable Law’, in K. Ambos (ed.), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Article-by-Article Commentary (4th edn., Munich/Oxford/Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2022) 1129–1148, at 1138–1141; A. Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1051–1084, at 1072; W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), at 521–523. See contra G. Fletcher and J. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005) 539–561, at 559.

  3. 3.

    G. Edwards, ‘International Human Rights Law Challenges to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy’, 26 Yale Journal of International Law (2001) 323–412, at 387; C. Paulussen, Male captus bene detentus? Surrending Suspects to the International Criminal Court (Antwerp/Oxford/Portland: Intersentia, 2010), at 796, 801, 826.

  4. 4.

    Paulussen, supra note 3, at 825. Cf. J. Gebhard, Necessity or Nuisance? Recourse to Human Rights in Substantive International Criminal Law (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), at 81 (arguing that Article 21(1)(b) ‘is the more appropriate source of law’, because Article 21(3) guarantees only procedural human rights).

  5. 5.

    Pellet, supra note 2, at 1077–1082.

  6. 6.

    Ibid; P. Currat, ‘L’interprétation du Statut de Rome’, 20 Revue québécoise de droit international (2007) 137–163, at 155; Gebhard, supra note 4, at 40; G. Werle and F. Jeßberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (4th edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), at 92; Paulussen, supra note 3, at 824; K. Zeegers, International Criminal Tribunals and Human Rights Law: Adherence and Contextualization (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), at 73; A. Zahar and G. Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 280; Corrigendum to the Brief in support of the “Notice of appeal by Witnesses DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02- P-0228 and DRC-D02-P0350 against the Décision relative à la demande de mise en liberté des témoins détenus DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 et DRC-D02-P-0350 issued by Trial Chamber II on 1 October 2013 (ICC-01/04-01/07-3405)” (ICC-01/04-01/07-3408), Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3411-Corr-tENG), Duty Counsel, 9 October 2013, § 15. See also M. Arsanjani, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 22–43, at 28–29.

  7. 7.

    G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 285–304, at 287.

  8. 8.

    Ibid, at 303; Pellet, supra note 2, at 1080; L. Grover, Interpreting Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 263; V. Nerlich, ‘Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute: Identifying and Applying “Internationally Recognized Human Rights”’, in P. Lobba and T. Mariniello (eds), Judicial Dialogue on Human Rights: The Practice of International Criminal Tribunals (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2017) 73–89, at 75.

  9. 9.

    See e.g. G. Hafner and C. Binder, ‘The Interpretation of Article 21(3) ICC Statute: Opinion Reviewed’, 9 Austrian Review of International and European Law (2004) 163–190.

  10. 10.

    R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), at 77.

  11. 11.

    Ibid, at 75–77.

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    M. Scheinin, ‘Core Rights and Obligations’, in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 527–540, at 535.

  14. 14.

    Alexy, supra note 10, at 77–79.

  15. 15.

    M. Scheinin, ‘Terrorism and the Pull of “Balancing” in the Name of Security’, in M. Scheinin et al., Law and Security—Facing the Dilemmas (San Domenico di Fiesole: EUI Working Paper, Law, 2009) 55–63, at 55.

  16. 16.

    Zahar and Sluiter, supra note 6, at 280.

  17. 17.

    J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beitrage zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), at 309 et seq.

  18. 18.

    R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 388 et seq. Nevertheless, this formula does not exclude irrationality altogether. Scheinin, supra note 15, at 57.

  19. 19.

    See Description (R. Alexy, J. Rivers, A Theory of Constitutional Rights), available online at https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-theory-of-constitutional-rights-9780199584239?cc=de&lang=en&# (visited 27 January 2023).

  20. 20.

    J. Rivers, ‘A Theory of Constitutional Rights and the British Constitution’, in Alexy, supra note 18, xvii-li, at xviii.

  21. 21.

    T. Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht: Konstruktion und Elemente einer idealistischen Völkerrechtslehre (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), at 663–669.

  22. 22.

    ICC Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 8(2)(a)(vi).

  23. 23.

    Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, § 6.

  24. 24.

    S. Egan, ‘The Doctrinal Approach in International Human Rights Law Scholarship’, in L. McConnell and R. Smith (eds), Research Methods in Human Rights (London/New York: Routledge, 2018) 24–41, at 35 (‘usually very general’); J. Smits, The Mind and the Method of the Legal Academic (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012), at 72 (claiming that ‘undisputed [fundamental] rights do not exist and, in so far as they are generally recognized, they are so indeterminate that they offer only little guidance in deciding a dispute’). See also A. Danner and J. Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 93 California Law Review (2005) 75–169, at 89–90 (noting that some, albeit not all, norms of international human right law are contingent and aspirational).

  25. 25.

    E. Klein, ‘Zum (völker-)rechtlichen Unter- und Hintergrund von Menschenrechtsverträgen: Gibt es ein menschenrechtliches corpus iuris?’, 55 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2017) 303–323, at 303–307; M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), at 1287. Cf. C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (3rd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), at 9 (differentiating moral values from human rights based on such values).

  26. 26.

    Scheinin, supra note 15, at 56. For a similar view, see L. Gradoni, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of International Criminal Procedure’, in G. Sluiter et al. (eds), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 74–95, at 86.

  27. 27.

    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), 999 UNTS 171, at Art. 18(3).

  28. 28.

    M. Scheinin, ‘Characteristics of Human Rights Norms’, in C. Krause and M. Scheinin (eds), International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2nd edn., Turku/Åbo: Åbo Akademi University, 2012) 19–37, at 32. See contra S. Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?’, 15 Human Rights Law Review (2015) 101–137, at 134–137.

  29. 29.

    Pellet, supra note 2, at 1080; Gradoni, supra note 26, at 83; Zeegers, supra note 6, at 83–84. Cf. Nerlich, supra note 8, at 88–89 (reserving this function only for internationally recognised human rights which are jus cogens). See contra J. Powderly, ‘The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretative Judicial Function: Reflections on Sources of Law and Interpretative Technique’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 444–498, at 486 (arguing that ‘Article 21(3) does not override the [ICC] Statute as such, but rather comes into effect when more than one interpretation […] is possible, dictating that the interpretation that best conforms with human rights must be adopted’).

  30. 30.

    Bitti, supra note 7, at 303; S. Bailey, ‘Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute: A Plea for Clarity’, 14 International Criminal Law Review (2014) 513–550, at 535–536; Paulussen, supra note 3, at 821–822. See contra Schabas, supra note 2, at 515; R. Young, ‘“Internationally Recognized Human Rights” before the International Criminal Court’, 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011) 189–208, at 193; P. Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 189–216, at 214.

  31. 31.

    Annex I to the Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-102), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 May 2006, § 2; Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-108-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 19 May 2006, § 7. See also, among many others, Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-257), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 March 2008, at 7; Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the pretrial detention of Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-330), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 18 March 2008, at 10–12; Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victims at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 May 2008, §§ 57, 78; Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 March 2009, §§ 44, 126.

  32. 32.

    Annex I to the Decision, supra note 31, § 4.

  33. 33.

    G. Sluiter, ‘Human Rights Protection in the ICC Pre-Trial Phase’, in Stahn and Sluiter, supra note 7, 459–475, at 463 (admitting, however, that an overly ‘rigid stance on this matter should be rejected’).

  34. 34.

    Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-679), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 8 November 2006, §§ 10–42.

  35. 35.

    Young, supra note 30, at 201.

  36. 36.

    Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-772), Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006, § 37. See also, among many others, Judgment in the Appeal by Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui of 27 March 2008 against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Application of the Appellant for Interim Release, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-572), Appeals Chamber, 9 June 2008, § 15; Decision on the fitness of Laurent Gbagbo to take part in the proceedings before this Court, Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-286-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 2 November 2012, § 45.

  37. 37.

    O. Svaček, ‘Applicable Law, Interpretation, Inherent and Implied Powers—A Brief Rendezvous with the ICC’, 7 Czech Yearbook of Public and Private International Law (2016) 342–354, at 351–352 (noting that the ICC could have reached the same conclusion with the help of this doctrine, but preferred Article 21(3) as a much stronger legal ground).

  38. 38.

    Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on jurisdiction and stay of the proceedings, Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-321), Appeals Chamber, 12 December 2012, § 100. See also Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-101-tENG-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2006, § 81; Decision on the Prosecution’s Application, supra note 31, § 44 (considering Article 21(3) as a gap-filling tool for a lacuna in the ICC Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes).

  39. 39.

    K. Gallant, ‘International Human Rights Standards in International Organizations: The Case of International Criminal Courts’, 19 Nouvelles études pénales (2004) 397–404, at 402.

  40. 40.

    Bedont, B. ‘Gender-Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in F. Lattanzi and W. Schabas (eds), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I (Ripa Fagnano Alto: il Sirente, 1999) 183–210, at 185. See contra N. Wagner, ‘A Critical Assessment of Using Children to Participate Actively in Hostilities in Lubanga: Child Soldiers and Direct Participation’, 24 Criminal Law Forum (2013) 145–203, at 191–193.

  41. 41.

    O. Svaček, ‘The International Criminal Court and Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges’, in D. Moura Vicente (ed.), Towards a Universal Justice? Putting International Courts and Jurisdictions into Perspective (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2016) 206–221, at 207, 214; A. Jones, ‘Insights into an Emerging Relationship: Use of Human Rights Jurisprudence at the International Criminal Court’, 16 Human Rights Law Review (2016) 701–729, at 721; B. Krzan, ‘Human Rights and International Criminal Law’, in B. Krzan (ed.), Prosecuting International Crimes: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2016) 153–175, at 172–173; Gebhard, supra note 4, at 63–64, 81, 246.

  42. 42.

    D. Scalia, ‘Human Rights in the Context of International Criminal Law: Respecting them and Ensuring Respect for Them’, in R. Kolb and G. Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 575–589, at 582, 585.

  43. 43.

    For a discussion, see S. Masol, ‘War Crimes of Conscription, Enlistment and Use of Child Soldiers: Expendable Human Rights Rhetoric of the International Criminal Court’, 3 Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict—Humanitäres Völkerrecht (2020) 193–208.

  44. 44.

    M. Boot, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2002), at 366–368; K. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 3, 331 et seq.; S. Garibian, Le crime contre l’humanité au regard des principes fondateurs de l’Etat moderne: naissance et consécration d’un concept (Brussels: Bruylant; Geneva/Zurich/Basel: Schulthess, 2009), at 400. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, 10 December 1948, at Art. 11 (2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, at Art. 15.

  45. 45.

    Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-3129), Appeals Chamber, 3 March 2015, § 154. See also Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG), Trial Chamber II, 7 March 2014, § 39. See contra Garibian, supra note 44, at 393 (claiming that Article 21 establishes an express order of consideration rather than a hierarchy of sources).

  46. 46.

    Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-1049), Trial Chamber I, 30 November 2007, § 44.

  47. 47.

    See e.g. Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, supra note 2, § 74; Werle and Jeßberger, supra note 6, at 91–92. See contra А. Кузнецов, ‘Международное уголовное право: понятие, признаки, система’, 7(2) Журнал прикладных исследований (2022) 196–203, at 201.

  48. 48.

    Jones, supra note 41, at 729; Y. McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), at 31. Cf. M. Shahabuddeen, ‘Consistency in the Case Law of the ICTY’, in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds), Individual Rights and International Justice: Liber Fausto Pocar (Milan: Giuffrè, 2009) 899–911, at 900–902 (claiming that inconsistencies should be avoided, but sometimes certain variety may be useful to making an informed choice).

  49. 49.

    Decision on an Amicus Curiae application and on the “Requête tendant à obtenir presentations des témoins DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 aux autorités néerlandaises aux fins dásile” (articles 68 and 93(7) of the Statute), Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-3003-tENG), Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2011, § 73. See also Redacted Decision on the request by DRC-DOI-WWWW-0019 for special protective measures relating to his asylum application, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-2766-Red), Trial Chamber I, 5 August 2011, §§ 72–88.

  50. 50.

    Pellet, supra note 2, at 1081.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Decision on the application for the interim release of detained Witnesses DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 and DRC-D02-P-0350, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3405-tENG), Trial Chamber II, 1 October 2013, §§ 29–30.

  53. 53.

    Decision on an Amicus Curiae application, supra note 49, §§ 64, 68.

  54. 54.

    Decision on the application for the interim release of detained Witnesses, supra note 52, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert (ICC-01/04-01/07-3405-Anx), § 6; A. Davidson, ‘Human Rights Protection before the International Criminal Court: Assessing the Scope and Application of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’, 18 International Community Law Review (2016) 72–101, at 95–96; G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 and the Hierarchy of Sources of Law before the ICC’, in Stahn, supra note 29, 411–443, at 439; Pellet, supra note 2, at 1081. Cf. V.-D. Degan, ‘On the Sources of International Criminal Law’, 4 Chinese Journal of International Law (2005) 45–83, at 82–83 (claiming that the sole function of Article 21(3) is the acknowledgement of jus cogens norms in international human right law); Nerlich, supra note 8, at 88–89 (drawing parallels between the functions of Article 21(3) and jus cogens).

  55. 55.

    Order on the implementation of the cooperation agreement between the Court and the Democratic Republic of the Congo concluded pursuant article 93(7) of the Statute, Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-158), Appeals Chamber, 20 January 2014, § 26 (emphasis omitted).

  56. 56.

    Cf. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (IT-94-1), Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, § 58 (‘It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human rights’); Werle and Jeßberger, supra note 6, at 70 (claiming that in clashes between sovereignty and human rights international criminal law favours the latter).

  57. 57.

    Hafner and Binder, supra note 9, at 174–176.

  58. 58.

    Ibid, at 174. See also K. Gallant, ‘Individual Human Rights in a New International Organization: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law. Volume III—Enforcement (2nd edn., Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999) 693–722, at 702–703; Clarenc Bicudo, supra note 2, at 972. See contra Davidson, supra note 54, at 83–84; Paulussen, supra note 3, at 827.

  59. 59.

    D. Akande, ‘Sources of International Criminal Law’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 41–53, at 47; Davidson, supra note 54, at 95. Cf. Gebhard, supra note 4, at 64 (‘the explicit right’).

  60. 60.

    G. Pikis, The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: Analysis of the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Regulations of the Court and Supplementary Instruments (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), at 89.

  61. 61.

    Hafner and Binder, supra note 9, at 174. See also Clarenc Bicudo, supra note 2, at 972. See contra Paulussen, supra note 3, at 827–828; Zeegers, supra note 6, at 76. Cf. G. Hochmayr, ‘Applicable Law in Practice and Theory: Interpreting Article 21 of the ICC Statute’, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 655–679, at 676 (saying that the analysis of its wording does not give a clear answer).

  62. 62.

    I. Caracciolo, ‘Applicable Law’, in Lattanzi and Schabas, supra note 40, 211–232, at 225.

  63. 63.

    C. Chamberlain, Children and the International Criminal Court: Analysis of the Rome Statute through a Children’s Rights Perspective (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2015), at 48; Akande, supra note 59, at 47.

  64. 64.

    Alexy, supra note 10, at 43.

  65. 65.

    ICC Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 69(7) (emphasis added).

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Hafner and Binder, supra note 9, at 174. See contra Paulussen, supra note 3, at 828 (conjecturing that internal consistency should not be exaggerated, because different parts of the ICC Statute were drafted separately).

  68. 68.

    To be fair, such a provision is not unique. An absolute and automatic exclusionary rule exists in neither the criminal law of most national legal systems, nor the law of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. A.M. Thake, ‘The (In)Admissibility of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence at the International Criminal Court’, 28 Hague Yearbook of International Law (2015) 161–187, at 163, 169–174.

  69. 69.

    See, for example, D. Piragoff and P. Clarke, ‘Article 69. Evidence’, in Ambos, supra note 2, 2037–2088, at 2087; W. Jasiński, ‘Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Proceedings before International Criminal Courts’, in Krzan, supra note 41, 201–223, at 221; Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/60, 10 April 2014, §§ 17 et seq.

  70. 70.

    Judgment on the appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr. Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Mr. Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Mr. Fidèle Babala Wandu and Mr. Narcisse Arido against the decision of Trial Chamber VII entitled “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido (ICC-01/05-01/13-2275-Red), Appeals Chamber, 8 March 2018, § 280.

  71. 71.

    Zahar and Sluiter, supra note 6, at 382. See contra Jasiński, supra note 69, at 222–223.

  72. 72.

    A. Walker, ‘When a Good Idea Is Poorly Implemented: How the International Criminal Court Fails to Be Insulated from International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process Guarantees’, 106 West Virginia Law Review (2004) 245–304, at 281–282.

  73. 73.

    S. Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 253.

  74. 74.

    Decision on the confirmation of charges, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007, § 81.

  75. 75.

    Ibid, § 84. See also Decision on the confirmation of charges, Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 December 2011, § 61.

  76. 76.

    Decision on the confirmation of charges, supra note 74, § 85.

  77. 77.

    Ibid, § 86.

  78. 78.

    G. Abi-Saab, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Development of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’, in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra (eds), Liber Amicorum—Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 649–658, at 658.

  79. 79.

    Hafner and Binder, supra note 9, at 175.

  80. 80.

    ICC Statute, supra note 1, Preamble.

  81. 81.

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    H. Kelsen, ‘The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals’, Judge Advocate Journal (1945), No. 3, 8–12 and 46, at 11.

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    O. Martelly, ‘La légitimation des juridictions pénales internationales par la consécration dans leurs Statuts d’un droit commun du procès équitable autour de l’article 14 du PIDCP’, Annuaire de Justice pénale internationale et transitionnelle (2014) 49–81; T. Rauter, Judicial Practice, Customary International Criminal Law and Nullum Crimen Sine Lege (Cham: Springer, 2017), at 52. At the same time, the human rights telos of the modern international criminal tribunals may empower victims, thereby bringing in the Nuremberg rhetoric through the back door. ICC Press Release, ‘ICC Prosecutor visits Egypt and Saudi Arabia’ (ICC-CPI-20080509-MA13), 9 May 2008, available online at www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=press+release+media+advisory_+icc+prosecutor+visits+egypt+and+saudi+arabia (visited 27 January 2023); Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement to the Press, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 20 July 2013, available online at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/wu/ED181_ENG.pdf (visited 27 January 2023), at 2; A. Cassese, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Human Rights’, 4 European Human Rights Law Review (1997) 329–352, at 332; R. De Gouttes, ‘Droit pénal et droits de l’homme’, Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé (2000), No. 1, 133–144, at 139; E. van Sliedregt, ‘International Criminal Law’, in M. Dubber and T. Hörnle (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 1139–1162, at 1142.

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    Krzan, supra note 41, at 170.

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    Sergii Masol

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Masol, S. (2024). Human Rights Rules and Principles in the Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Refining the Super-Legality Approach. In: Faix, M., Svaček, O. (eds) ICC Jurisprudence and the Development of International Humanitarian Law. Global Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45994-8_5

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