Abstract
In the context of the so-called Arab Spring, Tunisia is the only Arab country to have undergone a formal democratic transition since 2010/2011. Such consolidation can be traced back to an elite compromise (Itifaq al nukhba). This specific and initially persistent format of power-sharing was characterized by personal negotiation processes. This practice took place—within and outside—an institutional superstructure that, amid a multitude of sociopolitical and economic challenges, corresponded at least formally to an institutional democracy. Since 2018, a decline of the elite compromise could be observed, culminating in the abolition of the power-sharing arrangement in favor of a presidential monopolization of power. Using sociohistorical reflection, this chapter will provide an overview of the characteristics of the Tunisian format of power-sharing in a three-step process, thus analyzing (1) the creation, (2) the functional implementation and adaptation in terms of institutional constitutionality, and (3) the decline and dissolution of the power-sharing process and system.
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Notes
- 1.
For a simplified illustration, a table showing the main milestones of the power-sharing processes in post-Arab Spring Tunisia is provided as Appendix to this chapter.
- 2.
Similar social structural patterns already characterized the history of Tunisia, around the time of the French withdrawal and thus in the context of Tunisian independence in the 1950s, in which the disputes over the positions and decisions of the Bourguibists and Youssefists, determined the Tunisian liberation movement (Lübben, 2017).
- 3.
This constitution represents the “fourth” constitutional text in the country’s history, after the 1861 constitution, the 1959 constitution (First Republic), and the 2011 law on the provisional organization of public authority (cf. Gaddes, 2014). The following can be highlighted as particular peculiarities of the 2014 constitutional text: (1) the enshrinement of individual freedoms, fundamental freedoms, as well as equality (Arts. 20, 23, 30, 31, 35–37, 46); (2) social and economic rights of citoyeneté (Arts. 12, 38–40), which are the cornerstones for a welfare state with rights and duties; (3) decentralization as the realization of citoyeneté through the establishment of local democracy (Arts. 131–139); (4) Establishment of gender parity in the allocation of public offices and in elections (a first in the Arab world); (5) No references to an Islamic jurisprudence (see Le Monde 2014; Le Point 2014; Netterstrøm, 2015; Yared, 2021: 24).
- 4.
Cf. background discussion with Meherzia Labidi and Mohamed Mahjoub at the event “The Role of the Nahda in the Transformation Process: Experiences and Perspectives,” March 2–5, 2015, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin.
- 5.
Attacks on the Bardo National Museum, hotels in Sousse, and a Tunisian Presidential Guard bus in Tunis.
- 6.
In Saied’s concept, which is also referred to as the “inverted pyramid,” there would be 264 local councils at the top level, corresponding to the number of delegations in Tunisia, whose representatives would be directly elected. This in turn gives rise to the regional councils, which represent the 24 governorates and each contain one member representing each delegation within the governorate. Finally, a parliament with members from the local councils is at the lowest level of the power pyramid.
- 7.
Agricultural engineer Habib Jemli already had government experience between 2011 and 2014 as undersecretary at the Ministry of Agriculture (see Dahmani, 2019b).
- 8.
“[…] would thus position itself as the second most important person in the state, and as the privileged interlocutor of the government” (Translation of the authors).
- 9.
- 10.
July 25 is Republic Day in Tunisia; the two-year anniversary of the death of former President Essebsi; eight years after the murder of political opposition figure Mohamed Brahmi; as well as—not really mentioned in public discourse—the day of Ennahda’s ultimatum to the president for reparations, which in turn stem from political deals made in 2017. These included demands for reparation payments amounting to several million dinars—this brought quite a lot of people to the streets for mass protests on July 25, 2021, despite the curfew.
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Appendix: Milestones of the Power-Sharing Processes in Post-Arab Spring Tunisia
Appendix: Milestones of the Power-Sharing Processes in Post-Arab Spring Tunisia
Initialization | 17 December 2010–14 January 2011 | The revolutionary upheavals that led to the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali | |
14 January 14–15 March 2011 | The “ancien régime” attempted to regain hegemony over the revolutionary process—“Kasbah I” and “Kasbah II”—Mobilization of counter-protests | ||
15 March–23 October 2011 | Development of essential foundations for democratization (principles, norms, practices) | ||
3 March 2011 | Announcement of free & fair elections with the goal of electing a Constituent Assembly | ||
7 March 2011 | Installation of a technocrat government under Prime Minister Béji Caiid Essebsi | ||
15 March 2011 | Establishment of the Haute Instance pour la Réalisation des Objectifs de la Révolution (HIROR) | ||
23 October 2011 | Implementation of the elections to the Constituent Assembly (ANC) with Ennahda as election winner | ||
October 2011–January 2014 | Contested constitutional process incl. negotiations of individual constitutional articles and two political assassinations | ||
Elite compromise (Itifaq al nukhba) | 13 August 2013 | Meeting between the main political players, Essebsi and Ghannouchi, in Paris | |
26 January 2014 | End of the constitution-making process through the adoption of a consensual constitutional text | ||
Consolidation | 26 October/23 November/21 December 2014 | First parliamentary and presidential elections (first & second round) based on the new constitution with Béji Caid Essebsi as newly elected president | |
November 2014–January 2015 | (Informal) Coalition building processes and President Essebsi’s approach of a majority government based on consensus between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda | ||
January 2015–July 2016 | Habib Essid as new prime minister and the controversial inclusion of Ennahda as a junior partner in the governing coalition | ||
13 July 2016 | Formation of a Government of National Unity (NUG), formalized as Carthage Agreement I | ||
August 2016–May 2018 | NUG’s ambivalent track record under the leadership of Prime Minister Youssef Chahed: Progressive reforms were largely postponed for the sake of consensus | ||
Fragmentation | January 2018–May 2018 | Crumbling of the NUG: Two of the original signatories publicly distanced themselves from the Carthage Agreement | |
28 May 2018 | An expert panel presented the Second Carthage Agreement, shortly after the first free and fair municipal elections | ||
24 September 2018 | President Essebsi announced the official end of “consensus politics” | ||
15 September/6 October/13 October 2019 | Parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in a fragmented party system with the loss of power of the established parties, in favor of political outsiders, such as Kais Saied, as well as new parties | ||
From Spring 2019 | Covid-19 Pandemic exacerbates/reinforces a governance crisis | ||
27 February 2020 | Appointment of Elyes Fakhfakh as the new prime minister by President Kais Saied | ||
15 July 2020 | Resignation of Elyes Fakhfakh as prime minister | ||
25 July 2020 | Appointment of Hichem Mechichi as new prime minister | ||
January–July 2021 | Worsening government crisis due to stalemate between presidency and parliament | ||
Monopolization | 25 July 2021 | President Kais Saied assumes sole power: the beginning of a “Sonderweg” incl. the Monopolization of Power by implementing a declaration of a state of emergency under Article 80 of the 2014 Tunisian constitution | |
23 August 2021 | Extension of the state of emergency indefinitely | ||
22 September 2021 | Saied issued presidential Decree 117—the suspension of the constitution in force since 2014 and thus of the political system with separated powers | ||
6 February 2022 | Dissolution of the Supreme Judicial Council | ||
24 February 2022 | Announcement to revise Decree 88 to prevent foreign donors from influencing civil society organizations | ||
30 March 2022 | Virtual Meeting of 120 of the suspended parliament’s 217 deputies and dissolution of the parliament | ||
9 May 2022 | Appointment of new members for the Instance supérieure indépendeante pour les éléctions (ISIE) | ||
1 June 2022 | Decree dismissing 57 judges from service | ||
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Dihstelhoff, J., Simon, M. (2024). Power-Sharing Processes in Post-Arab Spring Tunisia: From Elite Compromise to Presidential Monopolization. In: Aboultaif, E.W., Keil, S., McCulloch, A. (eds) Power-Sharing in the Global South. Federalism and Internal Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45721-0_5
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