6.1 Introduction

Thus far, all of the obligations we have described in the book are what Kant refers to as “duties of virtue.” That is to say, they are moral obligations that individuals have to perform certain actions (or refrain from performing them)Footnote 1 and to do so for the right reasons. One of the first things that students typically discover about Kant’s ethics is his emphasis on the idea of moral worth—acting from the motive of duty. The Groundwork is, by far, Kant’s most well-known work of moral philosophy, and it begins with a discussion of this concept.

He famously argues not only that we should do what is morally right, but we should do it because it is morally right. If you do what the moral law requires, but you do it only because it is in your self-interest, then you rob your action of moral worth. Kant gives the example of the shopkeeper who charges a fair price only because it is a prudent business practice, and he contrasts this with the idea of “acting from the motive of duty” (G 4:397). He reiterates the point with another example of a philanthropist whose beneficence is motivated by the warm feelings he gets from helping others. Such an action conforms with duty and is therefore deserving of “praise and encouragement,” but Kant says that it “has nevertheless no true moral worth” (G 4:398). By contrast, he thinks we can clearly see moral worth in the action of the philanthropist who helps others without the help of any inclinations whatsoever. He is motivated by pure reason alone; he does it simply because it is the right thing to do.

Many commentators like Allen Wood (1999) and Christine Korsgaard (1996) have rightly pointed out how people are often misled by Kant’s discussion of moral worth.Footnote 2 He is not, by any means, condemning actions motivated by sympathy or telling us to rid ourselves of charitable dispositions like compassion. On the contrary, he tells us in the Metaphysics of Morals and his lectures on ethics that we are morally required to cultivate love and sympathy for others (MS 6:401, 6:546 VE 27:66).Footnote 3

For our discussion in this chapter, the important thing to notice about such “duties of love” is that they would be impossible to enforce or coerce. Try as you might, you can never compel someone to feel a particular feeling or adopt an intention. You are in control of your own intentions, but you cannot direct the maxims of other agents. This means that it is impossible (both in theory and in practice) to enforce duties of virtue.

Duties of right, on the other hand, are ones that can be coerced. They involve acts that you can compel someone else to perform. Kant sometimes talks about our ability to control the external dimension of someone’s behavior (e.g., what they do with their body) as opposed to our inability to affect their incentives or maxims (the internal dimension). Coercion applies only to external duties.

Kant shows how both of these are often implicated in the same situation: “So it is an external duty to keep a promise made in a contract; but the command to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard for any other incentive, belongs to internal lawgiving alone” (MS 6:220). If someone is contractually obligated to repay a loan, we can certainly compel them to fulfill this obligation (a duty of right) by means of external coercion. Kant also thinks that they ought to keep their promise from the motive of duty. But there is nothing we can do to force them to comply with that duty.

He summarizes the distinction in precisely those terms: “What essentially distinguishes a duty of virtue from a duty of right is that external constraint to the latter kind of duty is morally possible, whereas the former is based only on free self-constraint” (MS 6:383). Of course, once we start talking about the possibility of legitimate coercion, we have entered the territory of political philosophy. Kant thinks of the state (and political philosophy in general) in terms of the possibility of legitimate (i.e., rightful) coercion. He begins the Doctrine of Right with a discussion of private right (property, contracts, and status) and he then goes on to develop his conception of the state (public right).Footnote 4

In this chapter, we are interested in Kant’s political philosophy insofar as it offers some distinctive resources for thinking about the possibility of regulating the attention economy. We want to reiterate, however, that it is important to refrain from thinking of regulation as the answer to all of these problems. We should be cautious when it comes to state interventions, as there is a considerable risk of doing more harm than good.

By exercising the state’s coercive power, we inevitably place a constraint on people’s freedom. And, as we will see shortly, Kant thinks that the preservation of freedom is the one and only legitimate foundation for the state. This means that the state should use its power exclusively for the sake of promoting freedom. At first glance, this may seem like a contradiction. How can the state promote freedom by restricting freedom? In the next section, we will explain how Kant resolves this tension. Once we have established the basic framework of Kant’s political philosophy, we will then put his view to work in order to defend the legitimacy of policies that would regulate the attention economy in various ways.

6.2 Duties of Right Versus Duties of Virtue

It would be reasonable to expect Kant’s political philosophy to be a straightforward extension or application of his moral theory. After all, this is how political theory is often done. Utilitarians like Bentham argued that political philosophy should simply be an extension of his moral rule: the principle of utility. He thought that our moral obligations involve maximizing overall happiness, and he advocated for political principles that he believed would accomplish that aim. But this is not how Kant approaches political philosophy. Many readers of the Metaphysics of Morals have been disappointed to discover that Kant does not simply apply the categorical imperative to politics.Footnote 5 Instead, he uses an entirely different foundational principle.

This is the “Universal Principle of Right.” And although it resembles the categorical imperative insofar as it requires us to respect the freedom of others in accordance with a universal law, it is certainly not identical to it:

  • Universal Principle of Right: “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.” (MS 6:230)

As we explained earlier, Kant insists that the state should not be in the business of promoting happiness. His reasoning for this claim is similar to his argument against grounding ethics in the concept of happiness. He believes that human nature is too variable. People have different conceptions of what will make them happy, and he thinks it would be grievously immoral for someone to force their conception of happiness on you. This is especially true of the state. We saw in Chap. 2 how Kant refers to that kind of paternalistic government as “the greatest despotism thinkable” (TP 8:290–91). You should be free to pursue your own version of happiness, no matter what that may be (provided it does not involve wronging others).

What Kant takes to be truly universal is the freedom of rational agents. As beings endowed with rationality, all human beings are free to set and pursue their own ends.Footnote 6 For precisely this reason, in his political philosophy, Kant argues that freedom is the one and only innate right, and he builds his entire political theory on the foundation of freedom. He says, “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MS 6:237).

Given the significant overlap between his moral and political principles, some readers have found it odd that Kant did not simply make the categorical imperative the bedrock of his political theory. But there are good reasons for Kant’s decision to articulate a distinct principle. As we explained in the introduction, the central distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue is the enforceability of the former. The categorical imperative may function perfectly well as a moral principle that tells us which actions are right or wrong, but it says nothing whatsoever about coercion.Footnote 7 Kant’s moral law may tell us that a particular action is wrong, but it does not tell us whether or not it would be appropriate for us to coerce the agent in question.

For instance, imagine you need help moving some heavy furniture. You ask your friend if you can count on her when the truck arrives. She says yes even though she has no intention of helping. The categorical imperative can explain why her action is wrong, but we cannot conclude from this condemnation that it would be appropriate for the state to force her to help you move. If, on the other hand, she comes to your house on moving day and steals something that belongs to you, then it would be perfectly appropriate for the state to force her to return the stolen property. Both actions involve moral wrongs. One of them justifies coercion, and the other does not. Thus, we need a principle that provides some guidance when it comes to questions about the legitimacy of coercion.

This is where the principle of universal right comes into play. According to the principle, the deciding factor is the freedom of choice. Someone may be rightly coerced whenever they act in such a way that they constrain your freedom—your one innate right. Perhaps the most obvious example of this would be someone restricting your freedom of movement (e.g., by physically restraining you). It is very easy to see how this constrains your freedom. By interfering with your person, the wrongdoer is making it impossible for you to pursue your own ends. This principle would extend to any assault on your person. For similar reasons, Kant thinks the state can legitimately enforce your property rights. If someone were to steal your car, this would also constrain your ability to set and pursue your own ends.Footnote 8

Like Locke, Kant foregrounds property rights in his political theory. But Kant departs from Locke, who sees property initially as a relation between a person and a thing. Instead, Kant recognizes that property is fundamentally a relation between persons.Footnote 9 To have a property right is to have a claim that someone else refrain from using (or damaging) an object that is rightfully yours. Kant thinks that the possession of personal property is essential to the exercise of our freedom. Given the kinds of creatures we are, we are prone to pursuing ends that require us to make use of more than just our bodies. For instance, we could not write this book without using our computers.

Since Kant recognizes that property is, at bottom, a relation between persons, he believes that property rights cannot exist in any substantive way in the “state of nature.” In the absence of a government, a person’s claim to property can only be “provisional.” Without the coercive power of state institutions, there is nothing to guarantee the kinds of robust property ownership that Kant thinks are essential to the exercise of our freedom.

It is for this very reason that Kant argues we are morally required to leave the state of nature and establish a “civil” or “rightful” condition. To remain in the state of nature is to be in a state of permanent insecurity regarding our fundamental right to freedom. In the absence of laws, you may not be able to “wrong” anyone in the legal sense, but Kant claims that everyone acts wrongly by refusing to establish a state that can safeguard their basic right to freedom. He says “But in general they do wrong in the highest degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one is assured of what is his against violence” (MS 6:307–8).

Unlike Hobbes, who argues that we should leave the state of nature in order to guarantee our basic security, Kant thinks we should leave the state of nature to protect our freedom. Of course, Kant shares Hobbes’s concern with the absence of security in the state of nature. The key difference, however, is their understanding of the tradeoff that one accepts when establishing a civil condition. Hobbes sees the state of nature as a condition of total freedom; every human being has complete liberty (in virtue of natural right) to do whatever it takes to survive.Footnote 10 But Hobbes also thinks that this is a state of constant war and insecurity. By establishing a sovereign, he believes that we accept constraints on our freedom in exchange for the robust protection of our security.

Kant has a very different understanding of the exchange. Freedom, as Kant understands it, cannot possibly exist in the state of nature. Freedom requires the capacity to exercise rights that can be guaranteed only by means of institutions with coercive power. Thus, Kant does not see the state as a restriction on our freedom; he sees it as the only conceivable way for a group of human beings to enjoy their innate right to freedom.Footnote 11

This does, however, set up a tension. On the one hand, Kant fundamentally thinks of the state in terms of coercion, and he recognizes coercion as a restriction of freedom. On the other hand, the state exists solely for the purpose of safeguarding freedom.Footnote 12 These two claims may seem inconsistent at first glance. But Kant resolves this tension by explaining that the state should only hinder the freedom of those who are hindering the freedom of others: “Therefore, if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right” (MS 6:231).Footnote 13 This means that the state is actually promoting freedom when it uses its coercive power. When the state prevents someone from stealing your car, it is promoting your freedom by hindering the thief’s hindrance of your freedom.

This conclusion should not be terribly controversial. After all, some applications of Kant’s political theory may resemble the harm principle that Mill defends in On Liberty.Footnote 14 Mill’s principle certainly yields the same result when it comes to the examples mentioned above (someone stealing your property or restricting your movement). But Kant’s principle of equal freedom has some advantages over Mill’s harm principle, which may lead to both false positives and false negatives. As Arthur Ripstein argues, there are some actions that are clearly wrong even though they do no harm, and there are actions that are harmful but should be permitted by the state.Footnote 15

With its emphasis on the centrality of freedom,Footnote 16 Kant’s political philosophy provides an excellent foundation for our argument in the next section as we defend the possibility of regulations concerning the technologies we have discussed throughout the book. Rather than defending such policies on the grounds that they promote well-being, we will argue that the status quo is incompatible with maximal human freedom in accordance with universal laws. By giving free rein to employers and tech companies, the state is allowing them to hinder the freedom of others. Policies that constrain their actions can thus be seen as promoting freedom by hindering a hindrance.

6.3 The Argument to Be an Attention Ecologist from Duties of Right

There are several important conclusions to take away from the previous section. First, we are dealing with a political theory that takes freedom as its primary concern. Kant makes freedom the foundational principle of his entire political philosophy. While other moral theories could defend regulations on the grounds that they promote various interests or maximize happiness, these justifications are not available to Kantians. The state exists to promote and preserve our freedom. Second, the state must exercise coercive power by compelling people to comply with duties of right. Whenever someone wrongfully constrains the freedom of another person, the state is justified in using its power to prevent such actions. Finally, Kant resolves the apparent tension by arguing that state coercion is not incompatible with freedom. On the contrary, human beings cannot possibly exist in a rightful condition with one another unless the state is there to safeguard our freedom and defend our rights.Footnote 17

With those conclusions in hand, we are in a better position to put forward the argument for regulation. And it is important to recall some of the empirical details from previous chapters. In particular, we must remember the ways that certain agents (or groups of agents) constrain the freedom of others by weakening our capacity to set and pursue our own ends. For instance, we will revisit our discussion of employers, schools, and software developers. Each of those examples presents us with situations where someone’s freedom is externally constrained by the actions of another agent. Thus, they are all candidates for regulation. Here is the general argument for the duties concerning regulation:

  • P1d The state should promote freedom.

  • P2d If P1d, then the state should promote freedom by using legislation to restrict hindrances to freedom.

  • P3d Employers, developers, and other agents hinder our freedom with respect to our use of technology.

  • C1d The state should promote freedom by using legislation to restrict the ability of employers, developers, and other agents to hinder our freedom with respect to our use of technology.

In the previous section, we developed a better understanding of why Kant is committed to the first two premises. But more should be said about violations of the principle of right. What exactly does it mean to hinder the freedom of others?

Under the broadest possible interpretation, this claim about freedom is clearly implausible. Some critics have gone so far as to claim that it is impossible to justify the state in terms of universal freedom, as certain freedoms necessarily come at the expense of others. For instance, G.A. Cohen (and several others) argue that one person’s property rights restrict the ability of other people to make use of the land.Footnote 18 Given that Kant begins the Doctrine of Right with a defense of property rights, this is surely not what he meant.

Kant’s principle of equal freedom does not require us to build a society in which every citizen is unconstrained in every respect. That kind of freedom is indeed incoherent. After all, by simply standing in a particular place, one person constrains the physical location of another. As Ripstein (2009) points out, the equal freedom principle must avoid defining freedom in terms of our capacities to pursue particular interests. Kant’s idea is to build a society in which no person’s general ability to set and pursue ends is constrained by another person. Once we take someone’s interests into account, it is obvious that other people will constrain their ability to pursue that particular end.

If you think of freedom in terms of your ability to own Van Gogh’s Starry Night, then you will see yourself as lacking this freedom. This would also mean that the Museum of Modern Art (which owns the painting), has a freedom that you lack. But this is simply a mistaken conception of freedom. Kant takes the principle of equal freedom to mean that each person is equally capable of setting and pursuing her own ends. It does not mean that every person has equal capacities relative to some particular interest. For Kant, freedom means having the ability to set and pursue the end of art collection if you so choose. You can collect whatever art you are able to buy on the market. That is a freedom that each person can enjoy equally (even if there are inequalities in wealth that allow some people to own more art than others). The principle of equal freedom would indeed be incoherent if it meant that each person has the right to own a Van Gogh.

Freedom means that your will is not constrained by the will of other people. But, once again, there is a risk of overstating the requirements of freedom, particularly with the issue at hand. Employees are constrained by the will of their employers. They are told what hours to work, what tasks to perform, etc. But Kant does not condemn wage labor as a wrongful restriction of freedom. On the contrary, he puts wage contracts on his list of permissible contracts in his theory of private right (MS 6:285). In the previous section, we saw how someone could wrong you by touching your person or property without your consent. If, however, you had given someone permission to use your car, then they would not have wronged you at all. Kant applies the same idea to wage labor as one person consents to letting someone else direct their productive powers in exchange for a specified amount of money.Footnote 19 Kant thinks that this arrangement does not undermine the freedom of the worker because the worker freely consented to the contract, and she could withdraw from this labor contract and begin working for another employer.Footnote 20

So we should not see all wage labor contracts as wrongful restrictions of freedom. But some contracts are indeed prohibited by Kant’s doctrine of right. Most notably, Kant thinks that contracts of serfdom and slavery are incompatible with a rightful condition. For Kant, a contract is an agreement between two persons that unites their will. It is predicated on the idea that each person has rights and duties toward one another. This is why it would be impossible to enter into a slavery contract. Contracts are possible only if both parties have rights. To become someone’s slave is to give them more than just your labor for some specified period; it is to give them your person and forfeit all of your rights. This is incompatible with your innate right to freedom. The right to freedom is not something that you can give away (nor is it something that can be taken from you). Slavery does more than constrain your will with regard to a particular end; it undermines your ability to set and pursue ends more broadly.

This goes back to the distinction from earlier. Freedom should not be understood in terms of any particular end but in terms of the general capacity to set and pursue ends. A typical labor contract will constrain what you do at a certain time, but it does not undermine your capacities in the general sense. On the other hand, if the labor contract requires you to do something that is at odds with your capacity to be autonomous, then it may indeed violate a duty of right and be subject to constraint.

We do not, by any means, want to suggest that labor contracts are equivalent to slavery. The point here is simply that Kant’s doctrine of right explains what is wrong with contracts that undermine someone’s future freedom. Slavery is the most extreme form of that. By entering into bondage, someone forfeits all of their future freedom. They give up their entire personhood, and Kant thinks that such a forfeiture can never be permitted by a political system grounded in our innate right to freedom. In general, compromising someone’s capacity to set and pursue their own ends is something that is at odds with Kant’s principle of right.

As we saw in Chap. 3, there are reasons to believe the problematic use of mobile devices has just such an effect on us. It not only affects what we do with particular moments of time, it also affects our capacities and our authenticity more broadly. Thus, when employers require employees to remain in constant communication by means of mobile devices (even after hours), they may be contributing to the deterioration of the employee’s autonomy. In his explanation of the principle of right, Ripstein (2009) explains how it also entails a definition of wrong: “uses of a person’s powers to set and pursue ends in ways that are not consistent with the ability of others to use their powers” (2009, 363). If employers require employees to use their mobile devices in ways that undermine their autonomy, then this would fall within the domain of the doctrine of right. Thus, there are not only duties of virtue at stake (as we argued in the previous chapter), there are also duties of right.

This means that policymakers would be justified in using the state’s coercive power to regulate the behavior of employers. Once again, we will avoid making specific policy recommendations. Our job as moral philosophers is to explore the ethical framework through which different policies could be justified. We believe that policy experts are in a better position to work out the precise details of laws that would be entailed by these moral commitments.

For instance, in Chap. 3, we mentioned the French labor law that requires employers to negotiate after hours email policies. This has come to be known as the “right to disconnect.” Policies like this are in line with what we are suggesting here. Legislation of this kind can be seen as hindering the employer’s ability to hinder the freedom of their employees. But we do not have a strong view about the details. For example, the French law applies only to companies that have 50 or more employees. In Canada, the rule applies to companies with more than 25 employees. We leave it to policymakers to determine the size and nature of such exceptions. Perhaps there are good reasons to carve out exceptions for small businesses or for certain industries. But we believe that the status quo justifies having the state intervene in order to protect workers’ autonomy from being undermined by overly demanding tech policies.

The same could be said for public education. As we explained in the previous chapter, there are serious concerns about exposing young children to screens, and it is important to make informed choices about the content that is used in educational settings. For instance, there is evidence to support the claim that there are advantages to reading on paper rather than reading on screens.Footnote 21 Schools should be mindful of this research when using digital technologies to promote literacy. They should also be cautious about using “gamification” to increase student engagement. There is a danger of giving too much weight to certain metrics (e.g., hours spent with learning materials) at the expense of other values. Kant’s political philosophy gives us some reasons to be concerned about the ways that we are using digital technology in the classroom. Careful, thoughtful deployment of technology can enhance the autonomy of students, but there is also the danger of undermining students’ capacities through excessive reliance on technology.

Of course, the state has control of public education, so there is already a regulatory framework in place that could be used to implement more thoughtful technology policies. But, in the US, regulatory control of schools is highly decentralized. Educational policies are issued at nearly every level of government (federal, state, and local school district). On the one hand, this will make it difficult to standardize tech policies. On the other hand, this gives individual citizens greater control, as they can discuss these issues at their local school board meetings. However the policies are implemented, the idea behind them would be to keep an eye on the autonomy of students when using technologies (especially mobile devices) in the classroom.

This year (2023), our home state of Florida enacted a law that bans the use of social media in public schools. Students are now unable to access any social media platforms through the school’s internet. Of course, students can turn off their Wi-Fi and continue to access social media through their phones’ mobile data, but this does create a minor roadblock to accessing social media at school. What’s more, teachers are now allowed to regulate the use of phones in their classrooms. It is especially encouraging to see that the law requires students in grades 6 through 12 to receive lessons about the “negative effects of social media on mental health, including addiction; the distribution of misinformation on social media; [and] how social media manipulates behavior…” (FL HB 379). We think that educational policies of this kind are a step in the right direction. By teaching students about the dangers of social media at an early age, we can hope that children learn to be more careful and deliberate about their engagement with the attention economy.Footnote 22

But the discussion of children’s autonomy should extend beyond public education as well. States also regulate daycare facilities. They limit the size of classes; daycares are subject to state oversight, licensing, and more. Some states (including Florida) also have rules about the use of screen time in daycare facilities. Florida does not permit children under two to be exposed to any “electronic media,” and it limits media time for older children to two hours per day.Footnote 23 This may not go far enough, however. Florida’s policy gives a rather coarse-grained definition of “electronic media” as it encompasses “television, videos, movies, or computer games,” and we ought to have more specific definitions.

As we learned in the previous chapter, not all content has the same effect on the developing brains of small children. Policies governing screen time in schools and daycares should be updated in order to take account of the empirical findings about the effects of the attention economy on the brain. Given the current verbiage of the Florida daycare policy, it would be permissible to give a two-year-old child two hours of tablet time. But we should do more to protect the autonomy of small children from the harms associated with this kind of use. It is our duty as guardians of the child’s “right to an open future.” This obligation extends beyond parents and teachers, it is something that the state ought to do to protect and foster the autonomy of children from the many things that threaten to undermine it.

Finally, we would like to consider the possibility of regulating the tech industry itself. We began by discussing employers, schools, and daycares, but each of these are instances of people deploying technologies that already exist. It may be worth considering what could be done upstream of these implementations. What, if anything, should the state do to regulate the companies that produce, disseminate, and market the technologies that capture our attention?

Once more, we think it is important to exercise caution. Freedom of speech is vitally important, and there are great dangers associated with allowing governments to moderate the content of the attention economy. Exceptions can be made (and have been made) for speech that incites violence or that violates some other law (e.g., child pornography). But outside of those narrow exceptions, there are very good reasons for prohibiting the state from restricting the exercise of free speech in any way. In “Theory and Practice,” Kant says that “freedom of the pen” is “the sole palladium of the people’s rights.”Footnote 24 Without free speech, people cannot possibly defend their rights.

As we will explain in greater detail in the next chapter, social media platforms have become notorious for spreading all kinds of false and inflammatory content. This happens because people are prone to diving into the rabbit hole of algorithmically curated recommendations, and the platforms tend to direct users toward increasingly radical ideas. This is part of why so many people (possibly as many as 30 million Americans) believe the earth is flat.Footnote 25 It also helps explain the rise of vaccine hesitancy, as an alarming number of people have come to believe all kinds of false claims about vaccines.Footnote 26 Once someone dips their toes into the waters of vaccine skepticism on social media, they are quickly pulled into the vortex of misinformation. It begins with false claims linking vaccines to autism (a claim that has been repeatedly discredited),Footnote 27 and then it moves to even more ludicrous suggestions about vaccines containing microchips.

As harmful as these false beliefs might be, there are still very good reasons for preventing the state from interfering with people’s right to create and spread this kind of misinformation. Of course, the social media platforms themselves are not bound by the First Amendment in the same way. The state is strictly prohibited from restricting free speech, but platforms have every legal and moral right to set their own terms of service and to see to it that users comply with those terms. They own the platforms that are hosting the content, so they are permitted to take down content as they see fit.

But they are financially disincentivized from doing so. The conspiracy rabbit hole is incredibly lucrative for social media companies, as they are known to keep users engaged for hours on end.Footnote 28 As of now, platforms like YouTube permit people to post videos about vaccines or about the flat earth conspiracy, but they simply add a disclaimer linking to articles about vaccines and science. In other cases, they go some way toward taking down content that violates their rules (whatever those rules might be).Footnote 29 But we should not give this power to the state. It is one thing to give companies the right to take down content hosted on their own servers, but it is quite another to give this power to the government.

So we will not defend such policies here. We do not think it would be productive (or morally defensible) to advocate for state moderation of online content. But that is not to say that the state should do nothing to regulate the tech industry. Once again, the state has a particularly strong interest in protecting children from the effects of mobile devices and social media. Even if we think that fully capable adult humans should be free to make their own choices with respect to the attention economy, we may not feel the same way about young children. The state has already made similar rules about other activities that are harmful and addictive. Children are not permitted to gamble, smoke, or drink alcohol. The state respects the choices of autonomous adults who choose to do these things, but it does not allow children to do the same.

Florida is not the only state that has taken action to limit children’s access to social media. Utah has taken even more dramatic steps in this direction. While Florida’s recent law pertains only to social media and mobile devices in school, the Utah law applies to children’s use of social media in general. Social media companies are now required to get permission from parents before allowing a child to create an account. Parents are also given access to that account, and children are prohibited from using social media between the hours of 10:30 pm and 6:30 am. What’s more, Utah’s law bans social media companies from using “practices, designs, or features” that are known to promote addiction in children. We are in favor of policies like these as well, and Kant’s political philosophy provides a helpful justificatory framework for them. These policies hinder the capacity of tech companies to hinder the freedom of children.

It may seem striking that so many of our policy recommendations involve children. But this restriction of our focus is intentional. There are several reasons for giving special legislative attention to children. First, as we explained in previous chapters, children are uniquely vulnerable to the harms of the attention economy. Their capacities have not been fully formed. Their brains are particularly susceptible to being rewired by the surges of dopamine they receive from media content. In Chap. 3, we explained the importance of the frontal lobe’s executive function when it comes to capacities that matter for autonomy. Executive function refers to a set of capacities including self-control, following directions, and staying focused. This skill first emerges in children between the ages of three and five, but it continues to develop in adolescence.Footnote 30 This is the first reason why it is so important to focus on protecting the autonomy of children. They are especially vulnerable.

Second, we should be extremely cautious about interfering with the free choices of fully autonomous adults. Kant’s political philosophy (and liberal political philosophy more generally) rarely permits us to interfere with citizens’ choices (provided that they are not harming others), even if we believe that they are failing to do what is in their own self-interest. Morally, paternalism is inconsistent with respect for someone’s humanity, and politically, it is wrong to coerce someone in order to promote their own well-being. Kant’s framework does allow the state to intervene when one person is undermining someone else’s freedom (as we argued in the case of employment), but, absent interference with the freedom of other citizens, the state should take a hands-off approach to interfering with the free choices of autonomous adults. But children are not fully autonomous, so they are not wronged by policies that restrict their options, especially when those restrictions are put in place to promote their future autonomy.

In an interview with the New York Times, Governor Spencer Cox, who signed Utah’s bill, draws on precisely this distinction. The government can do certain things to protect children even though it cannot do the same thing for adults:

We’ve done our homework on this one. We’ve spent time with parents and children, all across the state, and there is a general consensus and acknowledgment that social media and access to these devices is causing harm. Significant harm.

If you look at the increased rates of depression, anxiety, self-harm since about 2012, across the board but especially with young women, we have just seen exponential increases in those mental health concerns. Again, the research is telling us over and over and over again that it is not just correlated, but it’s being caused, at least in part, by the social media platforms…

Again, we have a longstanding tradition in our country of drawing lines around ages for brain development when it comes to certain activities. We don’t let kids smoke or drink or drive a car before certain ages, because we know the danger and the damage that is being done there, and the science will back that up.

If I could wave the magic wand and have all adults spend less time on these devices, social media platforms, I would love to be able to do that. But that isn’t something I could do. It’s not something I’m comfortable doing, and it’s not something that sits nicely within the general legal tradition of our country. (Coaston 2023)

The comparison to cigarettes is particularly instructive. Not only does the government prevent children from purchasing cigarettes, tobacco companies are not permitted to target their advertisements to children.Footnote 31 For decades, tobacco companies pushed back against public health efforts that aimed to convince people that cigarettes are harmful and addictive. The current conversation about tech companies should sound eerily familiar.

In 1970, Richard Nixon signed a bill banning TV advertisements for cigarettes. Tobacco companies were not too troubled by the law, however. The FCC’s fairness doctrine required TV stations to give equal time to public service announcements about the dangers of smoking.Footnote 32 Those statements were effectively bringing about a reduction in smoking, so the tobacco industry simply moved to other media to market its products.

By the 1990s, dozens of states were suing the tobacco companies. The attorneys general of more than 40 states brought suits against them, and one of their contentions was that tobacco companies were marketing cigarettes to children. Joe Camel was an especially stark example of this practice. Eventually, the tobacco companies settled the lawsuits and they agreed to a set of restrictions that prevent them from targeting children with their advertisements. They also agreed to pay billions of dollars (in perpetuity) to compensate states for the added medical costs that result from smoking. Some of the settlement money is also being used to fund anti-tobacco initiatives and anti-smoking public service announcements.

Once again, there are striking parallels with the current situation facing tech companies. Not only has the public become increasingly aware of the fact that mobile devices and social media are harmful and addictive, some groups have begun to bring lawsuits against tech companies. In January 2023, Seattle Public Schools filed a lawsuit against TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, and Snapchat, alleging that social media has done considerable harm to the mental health of their students. As of now, more than 40 other school districts across the country have joined Seattle by filing suits against social media companies. Families have brought separate lawsuits making similar allegations. The Seattle lawsuit alleges that tech companies “have successfully exploited the vulnerable brains of youth, hooking tens of millions of students across the country into positive feedback loops of excessive use and abuse.”Footnote 33 It also claims that “Youths are particularly susceptible to Defendants’ manipulative conduct because their brains are not fully developed, and they consequently lack the same emotional maturity, impulse control, and psychological resiliency as other more mature users” (Ibid.).

It is difficult to say how such lawsuits will fare. Similarly, the political prospects of legislation that regulates the tech industry may be dim. Regardless of how the aim is accomplished (whether by judicial decisions or legislation) there is a strong justification for state intervention. By giving tech companies the unfettered ability to market their addictive products to children, we are allowing them to hinder their freedom. We open the door to rampant manipulation in ways that are inconsistent with the principle of universal freedom. Every human has a right to equal freedom in accordance with universal laws.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we showed how Kant’s political philosophy could be used to justify certain state interventions that would regulate the attention economy. According to Kant’s doctrine of right, the state should use its coercive power only for the sake of promoting freedom. When it restricts certain activities (such as the marketing of addictive products to children), we should understand these policies as a “hindrance of a hindrance to freedom.” By requiring employers to negotiate tech policies with employees, we promote the freedom of workers to be free from an unhealthy relationship with their mobile devices—one that would undermine their autonomy more generally.

Government regulation is not a panacea. As we will see in the next chapter, there are collective social problems that require the cooperation of millions of people. We cannot fix everything by passing a few laws. But if we believe that the state has an obligation to protect the freedom of its citizens, then we must recognize the implications this has for the tech industry and the products that undermine our autonomy. Kant thinks of freedom as the one innate right of all rational beings. To neglect the duties of right that stem from this innate right is to imperil our most precious capacities. We should never allow a human being, endowed with an inalienable right to freedom, to become a mere tool of someone else’s will. Not only do we have moral duties to refrain from treating people in such a way, we have political obligations to create the social conditions that prevent such mistreatment from occurring.