Abstract
In this chapter we will address the relationship between truth and deliberation in Aristotle from the perspective of Rhetoric. In particular, we will bring out the idea that rhetoric, far from being the discipline that ‘says goodbye to truth’—as Plato claimed—has to do with a specific kind of truth of human deliberation, the rhetorical truth, which corresponds to the Aristotelian notion of eikos (‘plausible’ or ‘probable’), whose specific characteristic is that it is by its very nature debatable and refutable. This is one of the reasons why deliberative processes always have an agonistic dimension. The other reason is the fact that - according to Aristotle—logos, in order to produce deliberation, must always involve the sphere of desire (orexis), and that different orexeis produce potential conflict. In the last section of the chapter, we will relate this inherently agonistic and conflictual dimension of deliberative processes in Aristotle’s framework to the thought of Gorgias, an author who is usually seen, rather, in opposition to Aristotle.
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Notes
- 1.
Aristotle and Kennedy (1991) Rhetoric (Rhet.).
- 2.
Just as an example of this general disregard see the metaphor used by Jonathan Barnes to describe the Rhetoric: “Rhetoric, as Rhet. presents it, is not a constellation of three bright stars. A different metaphor is needed: rhetoric is a magpie, thieving a piece of one art and a piece of another, and then botching a nest of its own” Barnes (1995), p. 263.
- 3.
See Plato’s Phaedrus, 273a-b (Plato and Yunis 2011).
- 4.
See Piazza (2008), pp. 13–16 and the bibliography discussed there.
- 5.
Since the semantic density and theoretical value of the term logos, we prefer to leave it untranslated.
- 6.
As the verb ‘bouleuesthai’ is the technical term for deliberation in the Aristotelian lexicon, we prefer to translate it as ‘to deliberate’ rather than ‘to debate’.
- 7.
Aristotle et al. (1984) Nicomachean Ethics (EN).
- 8.
See also Rhet. 1391 b7-21.
- 9.
- 10.
Aristotle and Smith (1984) On the Soul (DA).
- 11.
See, for example DA 432a 31–33.
- 12.
See also EN 1098a 4–5.
- 13.
Also, for example, in the above-mentioned Kennedy translation, which we have modified at this very point.
- 14.
On the relationship of emotions and reason in Aristotle see, among others, also Bombelli (2018).
- 15.
On this aspect, see Lo Piparo (2003), pp. 14–19.
- 16.
We prefer the more literal translation of ‘euboulia’ as ‘good deliberation’ and not as ‘excellence in deliberation’ because it seems closer to Aristotle’s intentions. Furthermore, we prefer ‘not without logos’ to ‘reasoning’ for the reasons mentioned above and translate ‘logizetai’ as ‘arguing’ instead of calculating in order to maintain the reference to the linguistic dimension. Finally we changed the emphasis as Ross/Urmson had italicized ‘correctness of thinking’. See also EE 1226a 1–17.
- 17.
See Di Piazza (2017).
- 18.
On this point, see also Serra (2017), pp. 139–141.
- 19.
Indeed, according to Aristotle, mostly in the case of opinions concerning human affairs—on which we deliberate—there is always a relationship between opinion (doxa), judgment (krisis) and passion (pathos), as is clear, for example, in the definition of passions Aristotle gives in the second book of Rhetoric: “The emotions (pathē) are those things through which, by undergoing a change, people come to differ in their judgments (kriseis) and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure”. (Rhet. 1378a 20–22, trans. Kennedy) For an overview of the Aristotelian analysis of emotions, see, among others: Conley (1982); Leighton (1982); Gastaldi (1990); Cooper (1996); Striker (1996); Nussbaum (1996); Fortenbaugh (2002); Gross (2006); Dow (2015); Centrone (2015).
- 20.
This is the typical case of the deliberative genre, where the fact that the person who has to judge is involved himself in the decision that he will make—contrary to what happens in the judicial genre, where the judge deliberates on something that does not concern him—makes the capacity for judgment even better (Rhet. 1354b 28–30).
- 21.
Gorgias (2003).
- 22.
Indeed, the conceptual core of the text is the explicit assertion that persuasion is a form of violence. A thesis that most fifth century Greeks (not to mention moderns) would have found paradoxical, since persuasion and violence were usually considered as two alternatives.
- 23.
For the sake of clarity, we give a summary here of the content of Encomium of Helen. In this text, Gorgias tries to exonerate Helen from the accusation of having caused the Trojan War. To do so, he identifies four possible causes (gods or fate, force, speech, love) and for each of them he tries to show that Helen was forced to do what she did (go to Troy with Paris by betraying her husband Menelaus).
- 24.
A different question is whether Gorgias thinks this condition affects all men or leaves room for some exception. In our opinion the right answer is the first one.
- 25.
- 26.
For more details on the Gorgianic perspective see Serra (2017), pp. 19–87.
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Di Piazza, S., Piazza, F., Serra, M. (2023). Rhetorical Truth: Aristotle (and Gorgias) on Deliberation and Agonism. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N.M. (eds) Aristotle on Truth, Dialogue, Justice and Decision. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45485-1_8
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