Abstract
We introduce an emerging arbitrary message passing (AMP) problem across multiple blockchains, which concerns transmitting general information from one blockchain to another. We develop a framework to highlight defining properties of AMP solutions and highlight that AMP protocols naturally generalize asset bridges and are special types of oracles.
Authors are listed alphabetically.
Z. Wu—Independent.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For example, Ethereum docs define “generalized message passing bridges” that share similarities with AMP protocols [Link], although the definition there additionally requires asset transfer functionality.
- 3.
Therefore, as a practical implication, we note that any destination-chain contract that may be called by the destination-chain gateway should be aware of this potential risk. Such risks are also not purely theoretical. For example, Li.Finance, a bridge aggregator service, got hacked for $600K in 2022 Q1 [Link] since they allow arbitrary messages and didn’t check for potential attacking messages encoded off chain.
- 4.
In this sense, we can also view asset transfer and oracle protocols as solving consensus problems on different targets. For asset transfer, it is about an asset-specific event such as locking or burning funds while for oracle, it is about any information (either on chain or in the physical world).
- 5.
For example, a Hashed Timelock Contract (HTLC) features atomicity.
- 6.
In practice, transaction nonces are often used to ensure ordered delivery.
- 7.
Some protocols like Hyperlane have built-in liquidity routing modules, while others like Axelar delegate liquidity routing to third-party services.
- 8.
Notably examples include Swing, Bungee, Chainswap, Li.Finance, and BoringDAO, etc.
- 9.
Separately, although we found bridges to feature vastly different mechanisms, subtle trust assumptions, and varying security guarantees, they are typically hidden by existing bridge aggregators. Hence, they might expose users to the vulnerability of the least secure underlying bridge.
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Li, J., Wu, Z. (2023). An Introduction to Arbitrary Message Passing. In: Machado, J.M., et al. Blockchain and Applications, 5th International Congress. BLOCKCHAIN 2023. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 778. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45155-3_20
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