Keywords

1 Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are the two essential actors of the European continent. These organizations have many overlapping areas regarding their members, geographical coverage, and agenda items. Security was the reason for the founding of NATO, while throughout its history, the EU has not had a primary focus on security.

For states and international organizations, identifying and evaluating enduring and new security challenges are crucial for their survival. Such information is collected in classified or public strategic security documents, which serve as the primary references for describing the threats, deciding on proper actions, and determining the need for development to better cope with threats (EU, 2022; NATO, 2022a).

In 2022, both NATO and the EU adopted strategic documents defining the security environment in which these organizations operate. As a military and political alliance, NATO revises its strategic concept approximately every ten years, and the adoption of the 2022 Strategic Concept document coincided with a severe change in the security landscape of NATO members with both the withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. On the other hand, for the EU, accepting the Strategic Compass in such a turbulent time indicates its increasing relevance in security and defense. Although it is not the first time the EU has initiated such a process, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, publishing a document assessing the strategic security environment has more significance for the EU.

This chapter investigates how NATO and the EU shaped their latest strategic documents by considering the significant changes in their security environments. By examining this, it is aimed to reveal whether these organizations could make their roles regarding the safety and security of the European continent apparent in their overlapping responsibility areas. The study analyzes official documents and open-source articles regarding the topic. In the first part, the security governance approach is explained to understand better the theoretical framework for the European security governance between NATO and the EU. The following details examine the previous strategic documents of NATO and the EU and their attempts to establish a strategic partnership on security to track the evolution of the security roles of these organizations. Later, the strategic documents of NATO and the EU published in 2022 are scrutinized to grasp their perspectives better. Based on all these examinations, the final section compares strategic documents under three headings: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.

2 Security Governance Approach

The emergence of new and non-traditional security threats following the post-Cold War era necessitated the solving of problems with the inclusion of various actors and adoption of different cooperation methods, also referred to as “governance without government” (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). Hanggi supports the idea that governance includes horizontal and vertical dimensions, namely the inclusion of several non-state actors as well as an increase in the interaction among these actors in various platforms (2005, p. 7). While Rosenau and Czempiel describe governance as “a more encompassing phenomenon than government” (1992, p. 4), Webber et al. underline that the difference between government and governance is that government is traditionally understood as suggestive of centralized authority, vertical and hierarchical forms of regulation, and an ability to impose policy preferences by coercive means if necessary. Governance, by contrast, is concerned with understanding how the regulation of societies has been supplemented by the roles of political actors other than government as such (2004, p. 5).

The driving forces behind such a transition from government to governance are discussed by Krahmann, who puts forward three reasons: increasing budgetary pressures forcing governments to outsource and privatize some functions, increased awareness of international threats and transnational crimes which cannot be unilaterally solved, and globalization, which allows for more accessible communication and thus creates problems or perpetuates existing ones (2003, pp. 11–12). Governance is applied in many areas, including security. Security governance has also broadened the perspective in the security realm, which was widely accepted as a sole state affair, limited chiefly to national security and implemented primarily through military means. Security sector reform, peacekeeping, demobilization, reintegration, disarmament, and the rule of law can be categorized under security governance.

Security governance in Europe has been a topic of academic investigation (Webber et al., 2004; Schroeder, 2011; Kirchner & Sperling, 2007; Sperling & Webber, 2019). Specifically, European security governance between NATO and the EU has been researched by Tangör (2021, p. 77), who argues that NATO and the EU are complementary in the security realm and practical reflections of such a partnership have characteristics of security governance. In line with this argument, the release of strategic security documents by both NATO and the EU, in which the roles and responsibilities to be assumed for the security of the region are stated, can be evaluated as the main steppingstone for structured security governance in Europe and are significant for this study.

3 NATO’s Strategic Concepts

Since its establishment, NATO has been the leading organization providing security for the Euro-Atlantic area. The Washington Treaty, signed in 1949, is the primary reference document; however, it does not explicitly define a threat because such an operational view is reflected in the strategic concepts. NATO defined a Strategic Concept as an official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature, as well as its fundamental security tasks (NATO, 2022a). When the use of strategic concepts is taken into consideration historically, it can be asserted that they have been used to present an era’s new security challenges and the necessary political and military steps to be taken for adaptation to these challenges. Strategic concepts are adopted by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and additional documents may accompany them. On the other hand, as Ringsmose and Rynning state, “There is no single NATO method for producing a Strategic Concept” (2009, p. 6).

Changes in NATO’s security environment are reflected in the strategic concepts. Since 1949, eight documents have been produced by NATO, with the most recent published in 2022. Regarding the threat perception in these documents, there is a definite need to distinguish Cold War documents from post-Cold War strategic concepts. In 1949, 1952, 1957, and 1968 Strategic Concepts, the Soviet Union was identified as the main adversary and threat (NATO, 2022a). On the other hand, in the post-Cold War era, threats have not been as easy to predict due to the nature of the new security environment, and this ambiguousness can also be found in strategic concepts.

Starting with the 1991 Strategic Concept, the documents have been unclassified. These have not merely been used as a declaration of military strategy but were conceived more as a public diplomacy tool. The 1991 Strategic Concept was published following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the declaration, a more comprehensive definition of security can be found in the following sentence: “In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess” (NATO, 1991). While mainly searching for the relevance of NATO in the new order, the 1991 Strategic Concept underlined unknown risks such as the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage” (NATO, 1991). In the document, the fundamental tasks of the organization were underlined as security, consultation, deterrence, and defense and strategic balance within Europe. In addition to these aforementioned tasks, early versions of crisis prevention, management, and cooperative security can be found in the document (NATO, 1991). The execution of such roles became apparent during subsequent events, such as NATO’s operations in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and the Partnership for Peace initiative.

NATO’s second post-Cold War document, the 1999 Strategic Concept, articulated the organization's security, consultation, deterrence, and defense tasks. Additionally, with special consideration given to NATO’s operation in Kosovo, crisis management and partnership were expressed more clearly in the document (NATO, 1999). The risks that might affect the security interests of the Alliance were listed as similar to those in the previous record except for additional references to organized crime and mass migration (NATO, 1999). Throughout the document, the multiple uses of the term “Euro-Atlantic” to describe the region draw attention and can be assessed as a reference to the possibility of worldwide actions, namely non-Article 5 and out-of-area operations.

Only two years after the 1999 Strategic Concept, the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought about the recognition of the need for a new NATO concept. However, due to the lack of political consensus among NATO members, it took nearly a decade for a new document to be produced. In the meantime, an interim Strategic Concept was adopted in November 2006, dubbed the “Comprehensive Political Guidance” (NATO, 2006). The document identified terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as the main threats. It stated that “[t]errorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years” (NATO, 2006).

In 2010 the third post-Cold War Strategic Concept document was approved (NATO, 2010). Unlike those that preceded it, the 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled Active Engagement, Modern Defense, underlined unconventional threats such as terrorism and cyber-attacks and stressed the need to collectively defend against these emerging security challenges (NATO, 2010). Moreover, the document focused more attention on NATO’s role in crisis management and in the establishment of new partnerships. There was also an emphasis on a civilian approach in conducting operations. This perspective is reflected in the following sentence: “The lessons learned from NATO operations, particularly in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management” (NATO, 2010).

4 The EU’s Security Documents

EU member states had an opportunity to adopt a “comprehensive and cooperative security approach” at the 1973 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE and now OSCE) (Biscop & Coolsaet, 2003, p. 9). However, the first EU security strategy was only prepared in 2003. According to Koziej, the development of the EU’s security approach can be categorized into three stages: pre-strategic, declarative, and initiative (Koziej 2018, as cited in Zielinski, 2020, p. 27). The pre-strategic stage covers the years up to 2003 when the first document containing the word “strategy” was published. In 1990, the EU made efforts to formulate a common foreign and security policy, and the EU was positioned as the region's future political and security actor. As a result of the discussions, in the Maastricht Treaty, the EU adopted the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); however, there remained a need for a security strategy (EU, 1992). On this topic, Biscop and Coolsaet underline that the absence of an explicit strategy can be solved if all those involved in policymaking share the same basic views and can thus easily reach a consensus on policies that fit within these general guidelines, even if they are not explicitly written down. But about the external policies of the EU, distributed among all three EU pillars, this is not the case, in particular in areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its military instrument, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (2003, p. 1).

According to Koziej’s categorization, the second stage began with adopting the EU’s first security strategy document (Koziej, 2018, as cited in Zielinski, 2020, p. 27). The European Security Strategy (ESS)—A Secure Europe in a Better World was published in 2003 by the European Council. In the document, key threats to European security were listed as terrorism, a proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (EU, 2009). Addressing these threats, building security in the EU neighborhood, and ensuring international order based on effective multilateralism were stated as the strategic objectives of the EU (2009). Following the ESS, the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration of 2008 is referenced as a significant change in the development of EU security and defense due to it containing the first overt expression of the desire for autonomous action capacity (Özen, 2002, p. 237). The ESS was considered a success by some. For example, a report prepared by the General Secretariat of the European Council in 2009 underlines the increased capacity to respond to threats identified in the ESS but also highlights the need to increase coherence through better coordination and strategic decision-making (EU, 2009). Moreover, the report added further threats to cyber security, energy security, and climate change (EU, 2009). According to Klohs and Niemann, “From 2003 to 2014, the EU undertook about 30 missions under the umbrella of the ESDP, with tasks and missions ranging from the support of security sector reform to ensuring compliance with peace agreements” (2014, p. 3). Grevi et al. also believe that the ESDP was a success and that all these missions can be evaluated as “tangible added value” (2009, p. 403). There are some who believe otherwise. For example, according to Zielinski, the document is insufficient due to the lack of “tools that would allow for real execution of the determined strategic objectives: addressing the threats, building security in the neighborhood, strengthening an international order based on effective multilateralism” (2020, p. 28).

Because of strategic changes in the global environment, such as the Russian-Georgian War, the Arab Spring, the financial crisis, and the Russian annexation of Crimea, a new security strategy for the EU was needed. As Biscop states, “Obviously no strategic document remains valid for 13 years. A strategy that cannot be touched no longer is a strategy but a dogma” (2019, p. 2). In 2016, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS)—Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe was published by the EU (2016), and underlined that there was an existential crisis for the EU both domestically and internationally (EU, 2016). The document is significant for its multiple statements concerning strategic autonomy while also stressing complementarity and cooperation with NATO. However, such an approach by the EU was criticized by Howort as follows: “The apparent implication here is that the EU (via CSDP) aims to become a military actor comparable to NATO—while not undermining it or questioning its supremacy. But what exactly does that mean?” (2017, p. 2).

The document listed five broad priorities: the security of the EU, security and defense, counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy security, and strategic communications (EU, 2016). As opposed to the ESS, the EUGS was conceived of more as a policy-oriented strategy, including policy recommendations (EU, 2016). According to Zielinski, in the new EUGS, “the perception of threats to the European security environment, compared to those included in the previous document, has not changed significantly” (2020, p. 29). Namely, WMDs, terrorism and organized crime were still challenges for the EU; however, in addition to these, hybrid threats entered into the EU literature due to Russia’s employment of hybrid tactics, particularly in Crimea. Moreover, the EUGS covered additional threats stated in the 2009 European Council report, such as cyber security, energy security, and climate change (EU, 2016).

5 NATO-EU Strategic Partnership on Security

As the two significant actors with commonalities in members and agendas, a strategic security partnership between NATO and the EU is inevitable. Tardy and Lindstrom highlighted, that “(T)he NATO-EU partnership has become a central component of the broad security governance architecture for a series of reasons” (2019, p. 7). On the other hand, until the appearance of a real threat to the European region in the form of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the division of labor had not been clear between these organizations, especially regarding the discussions on the EU’s strategic autonomy. Although no clear assignment has been made regarding security duties in the latest strategy documents, the collective defense has naturally been left to NATO since Russia was highlighted as the most direct symmetric threat to the alliance. In contrast, crisis-management-related responsibilities requiring economic and political responses were stressed as direct asymmetric threats to the coalition. The related responsibilities seem to be shared between the EU and other international organizations.

With the launch of the ESDP in 1999, the EU expressed the need for clearly defined cooperation with NATO, though there was much discussion regarding strategic autonomy in the document. Subsequently, many attempts have aimed at achieving collaboration between NATO and the EU in the security realm. The EU-NATO Declaration on the ESDP of 2002 focused on strategic partnership in crisis management and conflict prevention and paved the way for the Berlin Plus arrangements (NATO, 2022b). Following that, the 2003 EU-NATO Berlin Plus arrangements were adopted. These have been recognized as “The most practical and longstanding EU-NATO cooperative framework” (Williams, 2018). According to the Berlin Plus arrangements, the EU can request using NATO assets and capabilities to supplement an EU operation in a crisis. In some operations, such as the EU’s Operation Althea, the Berlin Plus arrangements were implemented; however, the arrangements’ limits were proven, as was their inability to address the needs of both sides.

Cooperation between NATO and the EU intensified in 2016 with adoption of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (NATO, 2016). In the document, seven areas of cooperation were defined: countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation in the maritime domain, cyber security and defense, defense capabilities, defense industry and research, exercise, and the resiliency of partners (NATO, 2016). Following the document’s adoption, the EU and NATO drafted 74 concrete actions to implement the objectives of the Joint Declaration and progress reports have subsequently been produced to study these. In 2018, a second EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed, which announced the aim of rapid development in four key areas: military mobility; counter-terrorism; resilience to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related (CBRN) risks; and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) (NATO, 2022b). Through these steps, both organizations improved their cooperation in three aspects: achievement of political dialogue, integration of the NATO-EU dimension into the organization’s work, and progress in their operations both in thematic areas and in the field (Tardy & Lindstrom, 2019, pp. 6–7).

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the release of the EU Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept in 2022, the form of cooperation between these organizations became the official question. On 10 January 2023, a joint declaration was published in which the EU acknowledges that NATO is primarily responsible for collective defense while EU contributions complement NATO (2023). Moreover, in the declaration, there is a pledge to advance cooperation in both already existing areas and on newly emerging security challenges, such as space, climate change, and resilience topics (NATO, 2023).

6 Strategic Documents of the EU and NATO

The release of the EU’s Strategic Compass coincided with the release of NATO’s Strategic Concept and significant changes in the security landscape of the European region due to the Russian war in Ukraine. In March 2022, the Strategic Compass asserted that the EU aims “to become a stronger and more capable actor in security and defense: both to protect the security of its citizens and to act in crises that affect the EU’s values and interests” (EU, 2022). The document is also regarded as a “quantum leap” in security matters for the EU's next five to ten years (EU, 2022). In contrast to the quiet welcome of the EU Global Strategy of 2016 by the Council of the EU, the Strategic Compass was endorsed by the foreign and defense ministers and heads of state and government of EU members, which is a sign of increasing interest in security and defense issues (Fiott, 2022, p. 1). Some have also criticized the Strategic Compass for lacking in prioritization and ambition and for not being clear about strategic autonomy and partnerships (Kaim & Kempin, 2022, pp. 3–6).

Moreover, it has also been argued that EU states lack the political will to implement the Strategic Concept, further fragmenting the CSDP with many new projects (Kaim & Kempin, 2022, pp. 3–6). A significant feature of the Strategic Compass is that a comprehensive threat analysis was conducted before its preparation and that regular updates to this analysis are planned (EU, 2022, p. 7). The document covers various threats from Russia and China to climate change and the Arctic. Such a threat analysis can be considered a significant advance compared to previous EU strategy documents.

In terms of the tasks of the EU, the document is divided into four baskets: act, secure, invest, and partner (EU, 2022). According to Koenig, these baskets refer to crisis management, resilience, capabilities, and partnerships (2022, p. 1). Under these headings, there are several deliverables with deadlines, most of which are before 2025, making the document more concrete and realistic than previous on. In the “act” basket, the EU aims to enhance the readiness of its armed forces for missions and operations and has requested up to 5000 troops with rapid deployment capacity (EU, 2022). In the “secure” section, the aim is to strengthen the EU’s capacity with regard to hybrid threats and enhance EU security interests in the maritime and space domains (EU, 2022). In the “invest” basket, the focus is on investing in key military capabilities as well as in research and innovation to minimize dependencies (EU, 2022). Lastly, in the “partner” section, the goal is to enhance cooperation with NATO, the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as with bilateral partners, such as the US, Canada and Norway (EU, 2022).

Following the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO published its Strategic Concept in June 2022, 12 years after the previous concept. Prior to its publication, NATO conducted a study entitled NATO 2030: Making a Strong Alliance Even Stronger, which contributed to the new Strategic Concept and helped NATO shape its agenda for 2030. In the NATO 2030 report, various proposals were submitted, such as deeper political consultation and coordination and strengthened deterrence and defense that brought a future-oriented perspective to NATO (2021). Also, in the report, signals were given that NATO’s strategic security environment had changed significantly, primarily due to “strategic competition as well as pervasive instability” (Keyman, 2022, p. 25), and that the new document would reflect these new threats. In line with this, the latest Strategic Concept refers to NATO’s strategic environment as not at peace, mainly due to the Russian violation of international rules (NATO, 2022a, 2022b).

In contrast to the 2010 Strategic Concept, where Russia was referenced as a “strategic partner” for NATO (2010), the 2022 Strategic Concept identifies Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” (NATO, 2022a, 2022b). Authoritarian leaders, terrorism, instability in Africa and the Middle East, and emerging and disruptive technologies were listed among other threats. Unlike the previous document, the new Strategic Concept refers to China as a challenge to the alliance; however, “the document falls short of laying out how NATO can or should respond to this mounting challenge” (Tardy, 2022, p. 11). Sloan also supports the idea that “the Allies have taken the step of identifying China as an aggressive competitor that they had previously been unwilling to take” (2022, p. 21).

In the document, NATO’s core tasks were underlined as deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security (NATO, 2022a, 2022b). According to Keller, “collective defense” has been promoted to an overarching principle to be served by all three core tasks” (2022, p. 36). Under the area of deterrence and defense, NATO sets the aim that “in an environment of strategic competition, we will enhance our global awareness and reach to deter, defend, contest and deny across all domains and directions, in line with our 360-degree approach” (NATO, 2022a, 2022b). Counter-terrorism is considered as a cross-cutting task by NATO and is underlined as essential to NATO’s collective defense. However, “terrorism is inevitably marginalized in the Concept; it is a key threat to the Alliance, but not to the extent that it would deserve the type of response that Russian aggression calls for” (Tardi, 2022, p. 9). In addition, the new Strategic Concept differs from the previous document in that climate change, human security, and the WPS agenda were included in NATO’s tasks as cross-cutting themes.

Sloan criticizes the document since “it does not offer much detail about how the funding and force commitments required of the members will be realized” (2022, p. 18). The Strategic Concept is also evaluated as insufficient due to challenges that may hamper its success such as “achieving sustainability, promoting democracy, internalizing inclusive governance, and advocating for rules-based inter- and intra-institutional alliances rather than transactionalism” (Keyman, 2022, p. 27).

7 The OSCE in European Security Governance

The newly published strategic documents of NATO and the EU are very much influenced by the unlawful acts of Russia as well as by threats that are more complex and fragmented than ever. The OSCE, as an organization established to bring the East and West together for dialogue during the Cold War, is also a significant actor in European security governance. Since 1975, it has been experienced in supporting negotiations on confidence-building measures. In the security realm, primarily through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE “provides support, assistance, and expertise to participating States and civil society to promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and tolerance and non-discrimination” (OSCE, 2022).

With the release of two separate but significant strategy documents and the concurrent Russian aggression in Ukraine, the role and future of the OSCE have been questioned. Russell summarizes the weaknesses of the OSCE as follows: “limited resources, diplomatic deadlock, and stalled reform efforts” (2021, p. 10). An OSCE member, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine violates international law and OSCE norms, which brings about several questions, such as whether Russia should be excluded and how the OSCE can survive if its members do not respect the norms (Friesendorf & Wolff, 2022, p. 4). Many authors believe that keeping Russia as an OSCE member is essential for maintaining dialogue even as it paralyzes the OSCE’s operational capacity (Friesendorf & Wolff, 2022). Beyond such questions, and although the OSCE has failed in its monitoring and mediating missions in Ukraine, it remains an important participant in the region’s security governance and could arguably still have the potential to play a crucial role in any ceasefire. Specifically, while NATO and the EU have identified Russia as a threat in their latest strategic security documents, the OSCE needs to find a different path in line with the inclusive nature it has maintained since the 1970s.

Regarding what the OSCE can do in such a tumultuous time, Reynolds and Ketola highlight that focusing on security perceptions on the ground rather than what capitals define as security perceptions for the region may help the OSCE find its added value in a new international security environment. Focusing more on the process than any obvious outcomes would resemble the original Helsinki process of the 1970s, where the dialogue on European security was open-ended. Implementing values would still be an intended outcome, but accepting that the OSCE is only one facet in a larger ecosystem of international organizations and donors may help sidestep administrative battles over implementation (2022, p. 8).

8 Conclusions

War on the European continent, geopolitical shifts in the international arena, a rising China, instabilities in the Middle East and Africa, climate change, and cyber threats are common issues addressed in the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2022. Overall, it is possible to identify three significant engagement fields where NATO and the EU could share roles and responsibilities: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

8.1 Deterrence and Defense

In the Strategic Compass, there is an emphasis on the mutual defense clause of the EU, which is believed to be essential in such a turbulent time with Russia posing a direct threat to the European continent. Article 42.7 of the Treaty on the European Union states that “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” (EU, 2012), and the 12 specific referrals to this clause in the Strategic Compass indicate that the EU is trying to take the initiative. As a matter of fact, “the return of collective defense as the main paradigm for organizing European defense efforts is central to maintaining European unity just as much as it is about safeguarding NATO cohesion and the transatlantic link” (Mattelaer, 2019, p. 41). On the other hand, by examining the actions proposed in the document, the mutual assistance article is regarded more “from the perspective of hybrid threats, cyber defense and space rather than a wider conceptualization of how the EU would actually—if at all—respond should Russian tanks enter EU territory” (Fiott, 2022, p. 2). For NATO, an organization established for collective defense, strengthening deterrence and defense has always been the top core task “to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression” (NATO, 2022a, 2022b). As highlighted Mattelaer in this regard, “in practice, the Alliance’s new deterrence and defense-centric approach has already materialized via NATO’s reset of its policy on the Eastern flank, with a series of decisions taken since February 2022” (2019, p. 9–10).

In terms of the division of labor between the EU and NATO for the collective defense of the same territory, a concordat between the EU and NATO would be logical: NATO would be the central entity responsible for collective defense while the EU would assume a supportive role (Biscop, 2021, p. 2). In particular, Finland's NATO membership and Sweden's possible membership would reinforce the inclination to refer to NATO as the main guarantor of security for many European states. At the same time, non-NATO countries would seek to invoke EU Article 42.7. In addition to the division of roles in collective defense, cooperation in the defense-industrial sector is significant. Still, it is being undermined “by considerations of economic competitiveness and strategic autonomy” (Fiott, 2022, p. 48).

8.2 Crisis Prevention and Management

The EU’s Strategic Compass addresses crisis prevention mainly under the “act” and “secure” headings and articulates the necessary actions that the EU must take: “We need to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary”, and, “We need to enhance our ability to anticipate threats, guarantee secure access to strategic domains and protect our citizens” (EU, 2022). NATO’s Strategic Concept also stresses the importance of experience gained in crisis prevention and management and underlines the need to “invest in crisis response, preparedness and management, through regular exercises” and to leverage the “ability to coordinate, conduct sustain and support multinational crisis response operations” (NATO, 2022a, 2022b).

Indeed, there is room for cooperation between NATO and the EU in countering hybrid threats and finding ways to respond to these, which essentially requires civilian expertise (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021, p. 3). Since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, strategic communication, formal training and exercises for crisis response, and resilience are the areas that were enhanced by NATO and the EU (Smith, 2019, p. 17). Especially in the area of cyber insecurity, there is an improved possibility of cooperation between NATO and the EU because these organizations “share many of the same priorities in cyberspace, their policies are largely identical—based on the principles of resilience, deterrence, and defense—and their tools are becoming increasingly complementary” (Lete, 2019, pp. 29–30). According to the concordat proposed by Biscop, the EU needs to assume the lead in confronting non-military threats and building resistance, while NATO would take a supportive role in these aspects (2021, p. 3). In particular, regarding how to deal with China, the EU needs to take a leading role in confronting China in the non-military realm, such as addressing vulnerabilities in global supply chains and confronting economic espionage. NATO would thus play a supporting role to the EU in terms of complex security. From the angle of crisis prevention, especially regarding its southern flank, the EU seems to be a more fitting organization than NATO in supporting the governments of that region, particularly at a time of actual possibility of conventional war in Europe. In this regard, Biscop also underlines that the “EU should favor an indirect military approach: supporting the states of the region through long-term capacity-building, rather than assuming executive tasks itself” (2021, p. 4).

8.3 Cooperative Security

The EU’s Strategic Compass acknowledges the role of partnerships in addressing common threats and challenges and signals this via the “partners” heading (EU, 2022). The EU aims to enhance partnerships on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Regarding cooperation with NATO, it is stated that “further ambitious and concrete steps need to be taken to develop shared answers to existing and new threats and common challenges,” and improved political dialogue, shared situational awareness, and parallel and coordinated exercises were listed among the possible ways to consolidate such cooperation (EU, 2022). In addition to NATO, the OSCE, AU, ASEAN, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are among the other organizations listed for relations with the EU (2022).

NATO’s Strategic Concept also emphasizes the importance of partnerships, and a special focus is given to the relation with the EU. Nonetheless, despite the significance of cooperation between NATO and the EU emerging from strategic documents, these organizations have been described as “unstrategic partners” (Koops, 2010), their relationship as a “frozen conflict” (NATO, 2007) and the Berlin Plus agreement as a “straitjacket” (NATO, 2007). However, following the 2016 Declaration, there have been concrete developments. In particular, the latest strategic documents reveal that both organizations are increasingly aware of the benefits that their synergy will bring to the European continent, especially with war in the region requiring a united front.

According to the analysis of the institutional genesis of both organizations through security-related documents, it can be argued that collective defense will remain an area reserved for NATO as long as nuclear weapons exist. In light of NATO’s hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, expeditionary missions have become a target of discussions within NATO, and with the Russian war in Ukraine, crisis prevention and management have lost prominence for most NATO members. This situation has brought the EU to the fore as a potential leading actor in crisis prevention and management. Although there is a natural and uncodified division of labor between NATO and the EU, this does not imply that the other party should do nothing.

On security-related topics, counter-terrorism is where the possibility for NATO-EU cooperation is the lowest. There are differences in approaches between NATO and the EU regarding combating terrorism, which also result in differences in their incentives for collaboration. Because fighting terrorism requires hard and soft power capabilities, neither organization can take the lead or leave the matter to the other. However, other issues have recently appeared on NATO and EU agendas, such as the WPS agenda, emerging and disruptive technologies, and climate change, in which cooperation is necessary and easy to implement.

The Strategic Compass and Strategic Concept published in 2022 are significant opportunities to bolster cooperation between NATO and the EU and “to mend the schism between them” (Biscop, 2021, p. 1). At a time of war in Europe and a change of balance in the global arena, NATO and the EU must be more united than ever and complementary. A zero-sum game mentality would be detrimental to European security interests, and it is time to reap the benefits of synergy.