Keywords

1 Introduction

Estonia, as a small country, next to a big empire, has had a traumatic historical experience with Russia as its neighbor. The historical context includes an occupation spanning for more than 300 years, first by the Tsarist Empire and afterwards by the Soviet Union. During those centuries, the Russian authorities carried out numerous deportations to Siberia, confiscated property, enforced collectivization, and committed illegal killings.

Following the large-scale aggression of Russia against Ukraine in 2022, a mainstream viewpoint has emerged in Estonia media concerning how to assist Ukraine, how to respond to Russia, what to expect from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and how to deal with the inner cohesion of Estonian multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. The least problematic issue is how to help Ukraine, with Estonia emerging as the top donor nation per capita in 2022 (Hankewitz, 2022). Concerning the response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, most Estonian public and elite support significantly more severe sanctions than have been enacted. Although there have been voices that have demanded the direct intervention of NATO in the conflict, the most vital consensus is behind the view that the West should not get directly involved in this war of aggression but instead indirectly support Ukraine to a greater degree.

The chapter will commence by examining the factors that led Russian President Vladimir Putin to opt for a military intervention in Ukraine. It will also assess whether there exist alternative courses of action, potentially more advantageous or less detrimental to both Russia and Ukraine, which are being considered by the West and the People's Republic of China (PRC). It also explores what else can be expected from President Putin regarding aggressive ambitions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and how the European Union (EU) and NATO should respond to Russia’s maneuvers and threats to secure Estonia and the rest of the Baltic States. Finally, the chapter delves into the perspectives and inclinations of various social and political groups within Estonia concerning the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

2 Russia’s Russkiy Mir and Near Abroad Ambitions

Although Russia’s aggressive stance has significantly shaped Estonia's contemporary perception of the country in recent decades, the deeper source of the ill feelingsrelies on Estonia’s painful historical experience with Russia consisting of numerous deportations to Siberia, illegal killings, confiscation of property and relocation of ethnic Russians to Estonia (Kasekamp, 2017).These feelings are also aggravated by the still unresolved challenges of social segregation between Estonian and Russian-speaking communities and the concomitant security threats emanating from Russia (Taagepera, 2009).

Recent history witnessed the incorporation of the territory of Estonia into the Tsarist Russian Empire in the early 18th century, which lasted for most of the 18th and 19th centuries. In addition to previous periods of partial Danish, Swedish, and Polish occupations, the most enduring and extensive occupation was carried out by German crusaders, commencing in the thirteenth century and persisting until the eighteenth century, when the Russian Empire assumed control of Estonian and Latvian territories. Nevertheless, it is the last few centuries of rule by Tsarist Russia, and especially the harsh Soviet occupation that followed (Kasekamp, 2015) that hold significant historical importance.

The high–water mark of the painful history of Soviet occupation in Estonia is the massive killings and the deportation of tens of thousands of Estonian citizens to Siberia in the 1940s. This fact has played a key role in creating solid anti-Russian positions among the political elite and the citizens. The Soviet occupation alone caused Estonia to lose over 20% of its population and around 15% of its territory (Kangilaski et al., 2015).

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 might have been a harbinger of better relations between the neighbors, relations with now-independent Russia remained complicated. In response to Estonia’s refusal to offer unconditional citizenship to local Russian speakers, the first and most pro-democratic Russian government led by President Boris Yeltsin enacted economic sanctions against Estonia early in the 1990s (Veebel, 2022).

During the last two decades, the Estonian elite has been primarily concerned about Russia’s near abroad and “borderization” policy (Toal & Merabishvili, 2019). Russia appears to rely on a geopolitical reading of its identity as a traditional land power, which necessitates maintaining physical control and a sphere of influence over its border regions to guarantee safety and security (Karaganov & Suslov., 2019). Over a decade, the Kremlin has promoted a narrative of a “Global Anti-Russia” in the form of NATO threatening Russia’s independence. The “color revolutions” have been especially troubling to the Russian leadership. In this context, gaining control over its neighbor’s territory, resources, infrastructure, strategic locations, and military capabilities becomes a rational strategy from a geopolitical perspective to avoid a situation in which the competing global powers United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) gain control over the countries bordering Russia (Karaganov & Suslov, 2018).

Russia’s policy has provoked intense apprehension among its closest neighbors. Therefore, since the Russian war in Georgia in 2008 and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Estonia has committed to using all of its diplomatic and media capabilities to warn its allies within the EU and NATO about Russia’s aggressive ambitions. Despite its membership in the EU and NATO, the Estonian political and military elite feared that Russia would use the same arguments and actions against the Baltic States.

3 Russkiy Mir Concept and Soviet Nostalgia

Understanding Russian neo-imperial ambitions in the post-Soviet space is worth becoming versed in the Russkiy Mir concept. Within the frame of this concept, the Kremlin attaches to countries such as Ukraine and the Baltic States and emotional geostrategic value. The notion of Russkiy Mir has been developed as an ideological tool in Russia since the late 1990s (Svarin, 2016). It refers to a mythical ideal of Russian culture and the Russian language. Russia has been forging narratives enabling it to consolidate a national spirit. Vital in this regard have been the memories of WWII and the unique role the Soviet Union played in it (Persson, 2022).

Nevertheless, in recent years, this has gradually evolved into the idea that Russia should protect and support anyone who identifies as Russian, speaks Russian, and considers Russia their cultural pivot. What is peculiar is that, by enhancing this idea and targeting the diaspora, the Kremlin expected these narratives would create conditions for the stronger allegiance of the Russophone population to Russia. At the same time, through its actions, the Kremlin has also attempted to fracture its neighbors’ multi-ethnic and multi-lingual communities (Sazonov et al., 2022).

In the eyes of Russia’s political elite, Russia has so-called privileged interests and status, in a way unique and—as they argue—historically specific relations with neighboring countries (Veebel, 2017). This also applies to partly Slavic–populated regions (Berls, 2023). Protecting those identifying as Russians has served as a source of legitimacy for Russian political leaders in recent decades. As Vladimir Putin has asserted, “Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means” (Prague Post, 2014). The Russian Federation used this justification in 2014 after Russia occupied Crimea. It is likewise possible to quote former Russian Prime Minister and President Dmitry Medvedev: “Protecting the rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad remains our most important task” (Estonian Public Broadcast, 2016). The Kremlin had used this logic of justification since the war against Georgia in 2008 when it copied the precedent of Kosovo and started using it for its security purposes. While Moscow has remained thoroughly critical of the intrusion of the West into the sovereignty of Serbia, it can be argued to have mirrored the formal logic of that precedent. Thus, the Kremlin can be seen to have applied lawfare here (Ingimundarson, 2022).

When launching a war against Ukraine in 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin had reason to believe that a significant share of the people living in Ukraine would support Russia’s military invasion or that it would at least help him divide society and create internal tensions and chaos in Ukraine (The Kremlin, 2022), resulting in the autonomy or separation of some regions (Illarionov, 2022). In this way, Putin expected to gain control over Ukraine. As it turned out, this judgment was largely unfounded, and in practice, Russia had minimal success only in the East and South of Ukraine. Thus, Putin could not mobilize the support of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking community and use it for Russia’s benefit. There are various reasons for this failure.

To some extent, those who supported Russia had already left Ukraine for Russia. Likewise, the Russian-speaking community in Ukraine had no authoritative leader under whose flag Russian-speaking Ukrainians could rally. The attempt to reinstate former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in this role was bound to be unsuccessful. Thus, considering also the failure of occupying Kyiv, the Kremlin couldn’t set up an alternative to the current Ukrainian administration.

4 Russian Versus Estonian: Narratives and Attitudes

Due to historical reasons, many Estonian speakers still perceive Russian speakers as occupants. The latter are seen as people sent to Estonia after the Second World War by the Soviet authorities to replace the Estonians recently deported to Siberia. Altogether, more than 30,000 people constituting 3% of Estonia’s population, were deported, although at least 25% of these returned from Siberia after the death of Stalin. During the Soviet period, this created a fear that Russophones would gradually replace the Estonian-speaking population. Today, while Russian speakers form around 25% of the Estonian people, they represent about 50% of the population in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, and more than 90% of the populations of Narva and Kohtla-Järve, two cities among the five largest cities in Estonia (Statistics Estonia, 2023).

Furthermore, there is a long-standing citizenship challenge involving Russian speakers residing permanently in Estonia, who do not have Estonian citizens among their parents or grandparents. Even if people in this group do not have any other form of citizenship, they cannot automatically apply for Estonian citizenship. As a precondition, they must pass the combined exam on Estonian language and culture successfully and can only start the application process afterwards (Estonian Police & Border Guard Board, 2023). Altogether there are around 400,000 Russian speakers in Estonia, of whom 100,000 have Estonian (and EU) citizenship, 100,000 have Russian passports, and 200,000 do not have any citizenship, holding only permanent residency status (The Estonian Cooperation Assembly, 2022).

The differences between the two main language groups in Estonia encompass various facets and have significant consequences, with Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities in Estonia differing significantly in terms of their attitudes towards the EU, NATO, and Russia. A significant implication that concerns the security and foreign policy of Estonia is the diverging attitudes towards the international organizations Estonia belongs to as well as towards Russia. The Estonian speakers are mostly positive towards NATO and the EU and critical towards Russia. In contrast, local Russian speakers see the logic of Estonian relations with the EU, NATO, and Russia the other way around. For example, according to the 2021 RAIT Faktum & Ariko study, Russia is regarded as an aggressive and hostile actor by 70% of Estonian speakers, a view shared by only 20% of Russian speakers. Interestingly, the opinion of NATO is the opposite, with 80% of Russian speakers seeing NATO as a hostile and aggressive actor and 75% of Estonians fully supporting NATO membership and its presence in the region (RAIT Faktum & Ariko, 2021).

Although the situation depicted requires government intervention to prevent increasing tensions and potential escalation within Estonian society, both the current and past administrations have instead acted with a degree of unawareness regarding this risk, despite the intricate security circumstances. Russian populated regions are treated very similarly to the rest of Estonia, without the implementation of additional programs for integration. The Estonian Public Broadcasting Company covers Russian language media; however, the Russian language channels covered by state-owned media are less popular among Russian speakers in Estonia, who tend to watch the more entertaining Russian channels (Estonian State Chancellery, 2022).

In 2022 and 2023, the differences in understanding of Russian actions in Ukraine and expected engagement towards the Baltic states had only grown between Estonian and pro-Kremlin Russian speakers. The main reason for this is the success of Russian propaganda and the removal of several well-known Soviet time war monuments (Brüggemann & Kasekamp, 2008) by the decision of the Estonian government (Republic of Estonia Government Office, 2023). The most considerable tensions appeared in August 2022 around removing the T-34 tank monument in Narva (The Guardian, 2022). Altogether there are calls to remove or release at least 200 monuments that are seen as having propaganda value for Russia and pro-Kremlin groups (Republic of Estonia Government Office, 2023).

The picture depicted above is increasingly complicated by the large influx of Ukrainian refugees following Russia’s invasion in 2022–2023, as Ukrainian refugees also use the Russian language for everyday social communication. Ukrainian refugees exceeded 40,000 by August 2022 and reached 70,000 in June 2023, accounting for around 6% of the current Estonian population. The Ukrainian refugees are welcomed as victims of Russia but also as a valuable boost to the labor force for the aging Estonian society (Statistics Estonia, 2022). At the same time, nationalist and populist political groups (represented in the Estonian Parliament by EKRE Party) see them as a source of corruption, prostitution, diseases, money laundering, and tensions with local Russian speakers (Jakobson & Kasekamp, 2023).

There are different views among the language groups in Estonia regarding the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Among Estonian speakers, there is a strong inclination toward advocating for a robust response against Russia. They express satisfaction with Europe's support for Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions on Russia (Estonian Ministry of Interior, 2022a). At the same time, Russophones in Estonia mainly support Russia’s official claims about the Ukrainian war. They are, therefore, not only critical of but even angry towards the Western and Estonian responses. Finally, the Russian-speaking non-Russians mostly support Ukraine (as most of them are Ukrainians) and the Western and Estonian support packages to Ukraine, as well as the sanctions against Russia (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2022a).

4.1 Related Rise of Energy Costs and Inflation

In most energy sectors, affordability is the main issue. Even as Estonia itself consumes very little Russian gas, oil, and electricity, the absence of these from the European market is raising the prices of other suppliers to new heights, making them unaffordable for many social groups. This has a powerful impact on less well-off groups, such as local Russian speakers in Estonia, whose average income is 25–30% lower than the national average (The Estonian Cooperation Assembly, 2022).

As far as electricity is concerned, Estonia produces almost as much electricity as it consumes. Nevertheless, deficits and high prices are very present in the Estonian market under EU conditions. The closure of the Ignalina nuclear plant in Lithuania aggravated this. More solar and wind energy investments would help, but these are currently hindered by bureaucratic rules that do not allow small private producers to join the market quickly enough. Regarding gas, Estonia uses it in a minimal amount. While the country used to rely on Russian gas in the past, nowadays Estonia is switching to liquefied natural gas (LNG), with a new terminal finalized in Paldiski and a partnership agreement with Finland to share LNG resources (Estonian Ministry of Economy & Communication, 2022). High prices and unaffordability will thus continue to present significant challenges. In turn, oil-based fuels for the future will primarily originate from European markets.

Finally, oil shale is a sector that must be addressed within the Estonian economy as a provider of both energy and employment. The industry is relevant for Estonia economically, producing about 5% of the country's GDP and employing approximately 2.5% of the total labor force. It has enormous importance in regional, socioeconomic, and security-related terms. A recent study (Praxis, 2020) concludes that closing down the oil shale industry in the Ida-Virumaa region could mean that at least 8,000 people will be at risk of poverty. Closing local oil shale mining companies also have a broader negative impact on the tax revenues of local governments in the region which, in turn, affects the potential for economic growth in this area. The situation is complicated because mostly Russian-speaking people live in the Ida-Virumaa region and work in the oil shale mining industry there. The loss of jobs could lead to increased regional social and financial tensions, potentially prompting some Russian speakers to actively align with pro-Kremlin sentiments. 

Growing energy prices have also caused a rapid growth of inflation, reaching 20% in May 2022 and continuing to show double digits in the first half of 2023 (11% in May 2023) (Euro-area statistics, 2023).

5 Policy Trends in Estonia in 2022–2023

According to the recent studies of the Estonian State Chancellery (Estonian State Chancellery, 2022) and Estonian Ministry of Interior (Estonian Ministry of Interior, 2022a), Estonians are sensitive to any Russian interference in Estonia and Europe. Any signs of such activity on behalf of Russia find much attention in traditional media and on social media. Russian interference is often suspected even without facts supporting it. Estonians see other Europeans as more blind or even naïve. Thus, they believe that the latter needs to be warned (Veebel, 2022). Based on media statements and the author’s interviews, many Estonian militaries (Herem, 2022) and political elite consider only the US capable of deterring or adequately responding to Russia. Nevertheless, collective effort from other NATO member states is believed to have a good effect (Laanet, 2022) potentially.

Next to the West, a critical question touches on the role of non-Western third nations such as China and Turkey as de facto friendlier nations towards Russia. Their primary objective is to establish alternative trade channels to replace those disrupted by Western sanctions and the voluntary withdrawal of Western companies from Russia. The measures by which the rest of the world shares the West’s condemnation of Russia are vital. Based on the interviews conducted by the authors of this chapter, according to the Estonian elite, global views and third countries’ policies will ultimately play a crucial role, and the West should actively try to engage these third countries as allies. The view is that Estonia should engage with everyone who can help defeat Russia. The role of third countries, such as China, India, Brazil, Egypt, Vietnam, and Bangladesh, is crucial. Russia aims to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions by engaging in trade with these nations. These states may also help Russia to access technologies sanctioned by Western countries. In Estonia, it is primarily the position and role of China that is debated, sometimes India as well, while the role of other countries is somewhat neglected. The most complicated questions often concern the positioning of the closest Western allies. Some of these have already started to support Russia. From the Estonian perspective, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey have been doubtful partners in the past due to their relations with Russia.

5.1 Estonian Donations to Ukraine

Since the beginning of the conflict, Estonians have continued to support Ukraine with both military and humanitarian aid and have also supported the delivery of large-scale private aid to Ukraine. Per capita, Estonia has been among the biggest donors of military and other assistance to Ukraine and in May 2022 Estonia was the leading nation in the world (Hankewitz, 2022). Altogether, by May 2022, a total of €230 million worth of military aid had gone to Ukraine from Estonia in the form of around 3,000 EUR-pallets and 20 machinery units. In addition to Javelin anti-tank missiles and 122 mm−155 mm howitzers, Estonia had sent minesweepers, anti-tank grenade launchers, guided anti-tank systems, and other military and supporting equipment. Estonia has also delivered 4 × 4 armored vehicles to Ukraine. By August 2022, the Estonian government had provided Ukraine with a total of €250 million in military aid, including howitzers, anti-tank munitions and weapon systems, grenade launchers, communication equipment, light weapons, tactical gear, medical supplies, and food (Rojoef, 2022). However, by the end of 2022, Estonian defense forces reached their limits of assistance to Ukrainians, as further help is only possible by sacrificing Estonian own readiness and capabilities.

Next to the gunnery and munitions, Estonia has deployed military personnel supporting the UK’s initiative to train Ukrainian forces. The country also sent medical supplies and set up a field hospital for Ukrainian troops in partnership with Germany.

According to the Estonian Minister of Defence, Hanno Pevkur, the Estonian Defence Forces are exceptionally proficient in training reservists for combat in an intense conventional war against a larger adversary—meaning, precisely for the kind of war that Ukraine is in right now”. Also, “our moral responsibility is to continue supporting Ukraine. They are fighting for our shared values, and if there is anything we can send to Ukrainians, we must do so” (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2022b). This way, Estonia has donated one-third of its military budget to embattled Ukraine to strengthen its fight against Russia.

In addition, the Estonian government has helped to deliver tens of millions of euros worth of privately collected aid, all of which reached Ukraine. As to humanitarian aid, the Estonian people, government, and private sector have given over €20 million to Ukraine (Estonian Centre for International Development, 2023). Even if shocking, the war in Ukraine has not been surprising for Estonians.

Alongside the public sector, non-governmental organizations have been active and successful in helping Ukraine. Volunteer groups like “Slava Ukrainu” have also bought, donated, and delivered many SUVs and ambulance cars requested by the Ukrainians (Estonian Public Broadcasting, 2022a).

Another example of voluntary aid concerns medical equipment. In February, the National Defence Promotion Foundation, with the Estonian Reserve Officers’ Association, started a charity campaign to support purchasing and sending medical equipment and supplies to Ukraine to help treat the wounded. By mid-May, the donation campaign had successfully raised over 2 million EUR, of which 1 million had already been used to provide aid to Ukrainian hospitals directly. So far, the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ECCI) has successfully dispatched two humanitarian aid shipments to the border between Poland and Ukraine. These shipments included essential medical equipment that was handed over to the Chernihiv and Dnipro chambers of Commerce, respectively. The Ukrainian government then provided these supplies to local hospitals and the front lines (Estonian Chambre of Commerce & Industry, 2022). In addition, the ECCI’s campaign has supported the purchasing and delivery of 12 fully equipped ambulances to Ukraine. Likewise, it helped with crises and psychological assistance for refugees, especially children.

In March 2022, a consignment of essential medicines worth €200,000 was sent to Ukraine, including 9,000 medical packages. In addition, they are presently in the process of finalizing an extra 4,500 first aid kits. This campaign has also provided backing for the creation of the DocuMental health support program aimed at assisting those affected by the war. Furthermore, it has financially supported the Triumf Hero Development program, offering free mental health support for children in the Ukrainian language.  Together with the Tallinn Children’s Hospital Support Fund, the campaign also supported the purchase of two respirators for the Kyiv Children's Hospital (Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2022).

According to the Kiel Institute for World Economy, per GDP, Estonia has donated far more to Ukraine than any other nation, including the US, the UK, and other larger European economies. Back in April, it was estimated that Estonia had donated 220 million EUR; considering the country’s population, it is the largest donor per capita (Hankewitz, 2022). Along with Estonia's donation, its fellow Baltic state Latvia donated nearly one-third of its military budget to Kyiv. In contrast, Poland donated almost 13% and Slovakia 11.6%, according to an infographic accompanying a tweet by the Andalou Agency (Donmez, 2022).

5.2 Internal Activities: Deterrence and Information

The Russian war against Ukraine has revealed the weaknesses of Estonia’s deterrence posture and defense capabilities. As a result, efforts have been initiated to reevaluate Estonia's defense strategy and enhance its military capabilities and equipment. Central objectives include doubling the size of the Defence League and procuring mid-range air defense and MLRS rocket launchers. The main acute concern touches on Estonia’s ability to improve the effect of the NATO collective deterrence posture simultaneously (by additional deployments and exercises) in the region and to strengthen its national defense capability quickly enough to avoid possible Russian aggression in the upcoming years. The budgetary limits have caused the most considerable complications, long procurement cycles of weapon systems, and the current high demand for weapon systems in the global market. On the positive side, budgetary concerns have been bypassed in 2023 and the coalition has supported extraordinary allocations to the defense forces for reforms and capability building.

NATO’s collective deterrence in the Baltics has relied on a model of deterrence by punishment (Freedman, 2021), stationing only so-called trip-wire troops to be located in the three small states.  However, as the Ukrainian war has demonstrated that Russia may embark on risky, if not irrational conventional attacks, the need for a permanent stronger presence in the Baltics, amounting to deterrence by denial (Veebel, 2018), has become a new accepted norm.

Before the Russian attack against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it was considered that a Russian-initiated imperial war could expand from Ukraine to Moldova and potentially involve Belarus but would not reach NATO territory. Nonetheless, since the launch of the conflict, this position has changed based on Russia´s aggressive rhetoric and conduct. It is believed that Putin could target NATO territory, even with nuclear assets. Estonian Chief of Defence General Herem argues that if Russia is not defeated in Ukraine, an attack against the Baltic States will follow in the coming years (Herem, 2023a). Accordingly, Estonia is preparing for a possible full-scale conventional conflict with Russia. Against this backdrop, the current deterrence level is insufficient to counter Russian ambitions. In parallel, Estonia supports Ukraine as much as possible, hoping that Russian losses will postpone, if not prevent, Russian military action against the Baltic States.

According to the interviews conducted by the authors, the role of the allies is also crucial to achieve effective deterrence by denial. In that regard, there are concerns in Estonia regarding its strategic partners. While the US and the UK are considered to meet Estonia´s needs and expectations, the same cannot be said for France, Germany, and Italy. Thus, although not directly applicable, the Estonian elite has confirmed a longtime trust in NATO and relative distrust in the EU’s defense arrangements. At the same time, Baltic cooperation and unity have been working well, and the partnership with Poland has become more assertive. Both are also considered vital for Estonia’s survival.

Even while Russian aggression against Ukraine was, in general, expected and foreseen in Estonia, the amplitude of the war and Russian tactics used in Ukraine have initiated changes on a strategic level in terms of the deterrence and assurance posture, as well as redefining benchmarks in terms of fighting capability (firepower, ammunition reserves, etc.) and social resilience.

NATO has received the need to switch from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. At the Madrid summit in 2022, the North Atlantic Council considered the assets and structures needed to prevent Russian aggression and decided to deploy a division to each Baltic state, including a division headquarters (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2022). Estonia has also prioritized additional consultations on allied assistance in case of regional escalation. In terms of individual defense, an immediate need for mid-range air defense capabilities has been recognized, as has to improve the readiness and size of the paramilitary National Defence League, increasing its active membership from 10,000 to 20,000. To meet the immediate needs for development, extraordinary budgetary allocations to the Defence Forces of €800 million to €1 billion were approved for new capabilities, building up ammunition reserves, and developing new structures (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2022c).

Views on a future European relationship with Russia differ significantly between ethnic groups and political parties. The future trajectory of relations with Russia following the conclusion of the war in Ukraine largely hinges on the war's outcome. The current governing coalition and most Estonian speakers in Estonia would prefer a scenario where Russia does not succeed in the war in Ukraine. They hope that, combined with sanctions, this might lead to a change in the leadership in the Kremlin. On the other hand, elderly and Soviet nostalgic people in Estonia believe that the conflict will end with Russia retreating to a new, more favorable border and resisting any discussions related to compensation, resulting in minimal changes (Estonian Ministry of Interior, 2022b). The radical pro-Putin group—represented mainly by Russian speakers in Estonia—follows the narratives of the Russian propaganda and believes that Ukraine is controlled by Nazis and Western anti-Russian states which are planning to attack Russia and that the only way to stop this process is via the complete occupation, demilitarization, and denazification of Ukraine. They expect that Russia will successfully reach Kyiv and force a regime change. The West is expected not to respond as it cannot match Russian conventional superiority and nuclear threats and, after a decade or so, will accept the new status quo.

6 Conclusion

Among the Estonian political elite, the Russian war against Ukraine was expected to continue after the end of 2023. Estonian predictions on this mostly follow those by US and UK official sources. The main question for Estonia is if and when, after the war in Ukraine, Russia might be ready and motivated to challenge NATO in the Baltic states. If the aggression comes, there is still time to prepare both in terms of national defense capability building and strengthening NATO´s deterrence efficiency in the region through additional deployments, exercises, and commitments. Meanwhile, it is well realized that current defense costs for Estonia are not sustainable in the long term and may not yield rapid results when not assisted by other member states of the alliance.

The discussion of what victory would entail in the Ukrainian conflict has been a topic that Estonian public debates, including both the media and politicians, have generally avoided. The best possible outcome for Estonia is that the war will cause regime change in Russia and bring more, even partially, democratic forces to power. However, Ukraine is only expected to be able to liberate some of its territoryes and obtain war reparation payments from Russia. Its military and economic weakening might also be sufficient to secure the Baltic states for the upcoming 3–5 years. For this, Russia needs to suffer 50% more losses in Ukraine and struggle with internal complaints and a loss of public support (Herem, 2023b). The impact of economic sanctions is present, but it is slow, and it started to have economic effects from the end of 2022, while there are no visible effects on Kremlin’s public popularity even in June 2023.