Early Warning Models in the OSCE: Adoption and Re-invention

Abstract

In the 1990s, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) became a pioneer in conflict prevention: from creating the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) to signing the Helsinki Summit Declaration and establishing the institutution of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Drawing on sociological neo-institutionalism and constructivism, this paper looks at the construction of conflict early warning in the OSCE as first linked to the relevant world cultural models. These include the norm of conflict prevention, inter-organizational cooperation, and bureaucratization that helped its proliferation. Second, the OSCE example shows that standards such as conflict prevention, reflected in the organization’s mandate, can be interpreted, and implemented in a manner that international bureaucracies see as a better fit to fulfill their mission. Such bodies as the HCNM and the CPC thus contribute to implementation and the construction of a specific understanding and, ultimately, the future of conflict early warning.

1 Introduction

“Preventing the outbreak of destructive conflict remains one of our most difficult challenges in the twenty-first century”, noted Alice Ackermann in 2003 (Ackermann, 2003:339), and this remains a crucial challenge for the OSCE region. After the end of the Cold War, the norm of conflict prevention (CP) developed across the international organizations (IOs), drawing on the United Nations Charter and such documents as the 1992 Agenda for Peace (UN, 1992). International bureaucracies, including their leading figures, e.g., the UN Secretary-General or the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), have played an important role in promoting, interpreting, and putting this norm into action. Focusing on the OSCE’s conflict early warning (EW) component, this paper shows the role that the OSCE has played in not only adopting and implementing but also re-interpreting the norm of conflict prevention.

In the past decades, conflict prevention and early warning have entered the agenda of such IOs as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These organizations are among the heavyweights in the sphere of conflict prevention with active conflict prevention/early warning mechanisms and policies (Ackermann, 2003; Matveeva, 2006; Lund, 2009; Wulf & Debiel, 2009), and with a global (in the case of the UN and EU) or regional (in the case of the OSCE and the AU) outreach in this field.

This work contributes to understanding how early warning is constructed in international organizations as it pertains to conflict prevention. Since IOs play a major role in preventing conflicts through early warning (EW) mechanisms, it is important to grasp their understanding of it, as well as of possible responses. At the end of the day, these perceptions and constructions impact action or in-action by IOs (see for example Paris, 2003; McEvoy, 2017). In the past, there have been increasing discussions on the weaknesses of the OSCE and a necessity of reviving its capacities, including in the area of peace and security (i.e. Friesendorf & Wolff, 2022; ICG, 2022; Sammut, 2020; SIPRI, 2020). As shown by the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the menace of violent conflicts is more than real, even in Europe. Uncovering the OSCE’s EW mechanisms and their background, could shed light on prospects of re-activating the role of the organization in early warning and response activities.

This paper sets out to answer the following research question: How is early warning constructed in the OSCE? In this regard, it takes into consideration the role of international bureaucracies (IBs) in promoting the world cultural models of CP and EW. To better understand the case of the OSCE, its developments are considered in the context of similar developments in other IOs and the world cultural environment, into which they are embedded.¹ World cultural models embody the structure in which international organizations operate and which renders influence on their behavior. Since world culture is dynamic and controversial, international bureaucracies take up explaining it and offering expert solutions on the relevant matters as they shape the agendas in the IOs and beyond. To grasp their construction, the focus of this paper is on conflict early warning discourse(s)² among international organizations. It draws on a variety of primary sources originating from the IOs, as well as secondary sources on their work in CP.

2 Conflict Prevention and Early Warning

Starting from the Congress of Vienna and the creation of the United Nations, conflict prevention has been present on the international agenda (Ackermann, 2003). CP encompasses a wide range of measures—from ‘structural’ (long-term) to immediate (short-term) activities. The focus of this work is on operational, reactionary CP, namely early warning and response.

Early warning covers “gathering information and analyzing it to determine when a situation might lead to armed conflict, with a view to taking preventive action” (Rakita, 1998:541). Its stages include: 1. data collection; 2. data analysis; 3. assessment for warning/scenario identification; 4. formulating action proposal; 5. making recommendations; and 6. assessing early response (Austin, 2003). Early warning is literally useless without follow-up action. Early response includes actions aimed at reduction, resolution, or transformation of a conflict (ibid.). It covers such instruments as preventive diplomacy and mediation.

Warning and response should ideally go ‘hand-in-hand’ but active engagement with the problem—be it by local, national, or international actors on the ground or at distant IO headquarters—often faces a prolonged and sometimes futile decision-making process (see for example Wulf & Debiel, 2010). Improving this process appears rather necessary when one thinks of the conflicts ravaging in the world today (for an overview on the ongoing conflicts see Davies et al., 2022). At the same time, the success of early warning is extremely hard to measure, because “the event that was to have been prevented does not happen” (Miall, 1997, p.83).

The latter might be the reason why early warning has not been a topic as popular among scholars as peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. There are, of course, works devoted to the definition and importance of CP, including EW (Lund, 2002; Rakita, 1998; Ackermann, 2003; Austin, 2003), and more recently, on the evolution of EW (Muggah & Whitlock, 2022), knowledge production on EW across organizations (Engel, 2018a) or in/by particular organizations (Ackermann, 2003; Engel, 2018b). Some papers focus on the role of a particular organization(s) in the field, for example on EW in the UN (Dorn, 2004; Zenko & Friedman, 2011), the EU (Tercovich, 2014), the AU (Cilliers, 2005; Noyes & Yarwood, 2013), and the OSCE (Ackermann, 2009; Neukirch, 2013; Schernbeck, 2017).³ But compared to other security dimensions the number of publications is still small, and the research gap invites further inquiries. Likewise, in other areas, such as inter-organizational cooperation, early warning has not been a favoured topic, with peacekeeping and peacebuilding encountered more often (see for example Paris, 2003; Brosig, 2010; Koops & Tardy, 2015; McEvoy, 2017; Tardy, 2019).

Despite being ‘elusive’ EW is still a very much indispensable part of conflict prevention. Hence, it is necessary to better understand its development. This paper offers a unique account of EW construction since 1990s—both taking into consideration the early warning agenda across international organizations and with a particular focus on the role of the OSCE and its bureaucratic units (HCNM and CPC). To better understand the EW construction in IOs and the role of international bureaucracies in this process, I first turn to theoretical approaches of IR constructivism and sociological neo-institutionalism.

3 Constructivism, World Society Theory, and International Bureaucracies (IB)

Construction of a certain policy area, such as conflict early warning, could be underlain by various factors—both internal and external to organisations. It includes international norms and the impact of influential actors, such as the UN, that promote these norms. Most of these norms are “embodied in the United Nations” and in the UN Charter, including such international principles as sovereignty, peaceful settlement of disputes, and cooperation (Nardin & Marpel, 1992).

A compilation of the existing international norms and principles could be linked to the neo-institutionalist notion of “world culture”. World culture plays a role in defining—while also being defined by—such actors as international organizations (e.g., Meyer & Bromley, 2013; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer et al., 1997). While at times being highly dynamic and controversial (for instance, one could think of the contradiction between the non-intervention and “responsibility to protect” principles), world culture could explain a high level of organization and bureaucratization, as well as the similarity of approaches and policies among actors around the globe, namely isomorphic developments in world politics (Meyer et al., 1997).

International Bureaucracies (IBs) are seen as the most “fit” candidates for disseminating the world cultural models. By abiding to the “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1998) and being related to the norms accepted in the international community, they could also increase their own significance (Barnett, 2010). IBs’ importance continues to grow due to their expertise, social capital, and ability to produce information and shape approaches in the IOs, among its members, as well as in the wider political field globally (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

Considering both the role of the IBs in the construction of policy frames and the importance of the world culture they are operating in, this work explores the construction of conflict early warning in and by international organizations, in particular the OSCE, since the 1990s. The following section briefly overviews the world cultural models that matter most when constructing early warning.

4 International Organizations and World Cultural Models

As mentioned above, international norms and/or world cultural models play an important role in the policy approaches of IOs that act as promoters and transformers of world culture. Without diminishing the role of IOs as (potential) contributors to international norms (see also Meyer et al., 1997: 151), this section focuses on the world cultural models related to constructing conflict early warning in IOs. These do not pertain to just one specific organization but are shared across IOs and other actors of world politics. First among these world cultural models that have been accepted and promoted by IOs is conflict prevention; second is cooperation (among IOs), including in the EW field; and finally, both models are linked to bureaucratization in world society, which underlies the growing role of IBs and their importance in EW.

4.1 World Cultural Model of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning

The 1980s and 1990s saw conflict early warning enter the realm of world politics—starting with the UN. Despite resistance of some member states, the UN bureaucrats worked on introducing related mechanisms into the UN system (Rakita, 1998). This paved the way for broader promotion of the world cultural model of conflict prevention among various IOs, including the OSCE, the AU, and the EU, (I)NGOs, and states.⁴ Thus, IOs and other actors often share an understanding and principles related to CP that are rooted in the UN Charter and have further developed over the past decades (see Fig. 2.1). The United Nations Charter, Chapter VI refers to such conflict prevention means as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, and arbitration, as well as the ability to “resort to regional agencies and arrangements” in Chapter VIII. The latter is regularly reiterated in the OSCE documents, as well as the fact that the UN remains the primary global actor for dealing with issues of peace and conflict in the world (CSCE, 1992; OSCE, 1999; OSCE, 2002; OSCE, 2011c).⁵

Fig. 2.1

Establishment of conflict prevention and early warning on IO agendas. Source Compiled by the author

1990s. One of the first, seminal documents related to CP per se is the 1992 Agenda for Peace, in which the UN Secretary-General (UN SG) Boutros-Ghali emphasized the need for confidence-building, fact-finding, and early warning, as well as cooperating with regional organizations (UN, 1992).⁶ Moreover, the term “preventive diplomacy” (coined by the UN SG Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960) was reinvented. In the same year, the Declaration on Fact-Finding in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (UNGA, 1992) was adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 1992). The UN Department of Political Affairs was created in order to provide support to the UN SG on the issues of conflict prevention. It came as a replacement for the first early warning system which had existed in the UN since the 1980s (Rakita, 1998).

Similar developments took place in the OSCE (then the CSCE⁷) when its Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) came into existence in 1990. Following this, the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration and Helsinki Decisions put forward early warning, conflict prevention, and conflict management; and established the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who was to become “an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage” (Helsinki Decisions, 2/II, CSCE, 1992).

The creation of the African Union prevention mechanisms similarly took place in 1990s: in 1993 the Cairo Declaration on the Establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution within the Organization of African Unity (predecessor of the African Union) (OAU, 1993) was adopted, and the 1996 Yaoundé Declaration (OAU, 1996) put forward an early warning system on conflict situations in Africa.⁸

2000s. Following the 1999 United Nations annual report on “Preventing War and Disaster” (UN, 1999), two UN Security Council (UNSC) Discussions in 2000 and 2001, as well as two subsequent reports by the UN SG in 2001 and 2006, were devoted to conflict prevention (Lund, 2009, p. 293). The 2001 Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General stressed the importance of conflict analysis and emphasized the efficiency of timely preventive diplomacy (UN, 2001).⁹

In the European Union the importance of conflict prevention measures has been underlined in a number of conferences by the member states (European Communities 1996; European Communities 1997, p. 3), as well as the EU reports (European Union, 2008, p. 9) and conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2009). In 2001, the Gothenburg Programme (European Council, 2001) stressed the role of CP, including early warning, in EU external activities.

In 2002, the AU Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) was adopted by the AU General Assembly (AU, 2002). It defined the details of the African Peace and Security Architecture and put an emphasis on early response. In 2004, the Common African Defence and Security Policy, Para. 13(j) emphasised “early action for conflict prevention, containment, management, resolution and elimination” (AU, 2004).

2010s. In 2011, the EU Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention explicitly emphasized early action and early warning, in particular the necessity of obtaining information for the purposes of conflict risk analysis from various sources, from member-states to EU Delegations and civil society actors. In 2010s, a particular emphasis was placed by the EU on strengthening mediation as a significant part of its preventive action, building on the 2009 Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities (Council of the EU, 2009). After signing the Lisbon Treaty and on the verge of the EEAS creation, the presentation by the Deputy Director of the EU Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in the OSCE put forward the importance of mediation and strengthening mediation capacity (OSCE PC, 2010). In the documents from the same event—the Annual Security Review Conference—the following year there was a proposal issued for a “Concept on Strengthening Mediation-Support within the OSCE” that includes establishing mediation-support focal point (OSCE CIO, 2011).¹⁰

The year 2011 marked the adoption of OSCE Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on the “Elements of the conflict cycle, related to enhancing the organization’s capabilities in early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and post-conflict rehabilitation” that stressed the importance of “timely and preventive responses to crises and conflicts” that requires, among other things, “a comprehensive early warning capacity across all three OSCE dimensions” (OSCE, 2011c). Both a ‘comprehensive approach’ (e.g., EU, 2016, also) and a renewed stress on mediation (e.g., EEAS, 2021) can be observed in other IOs (see Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019). In the OSCE, mediation capacity in the Conflict Prevention Center developed after 2011, after the adoption of guidelines based on the UN principles of active mediation (ibid.) and the UN General Assembly resolutions 68/303 of 31 July 2014 and 70/304 of 9 September 2016 (OSCE, 2016, p. 113). The Mediation Support Team (MST) within the CPC/Operations Service was created in 2014 (OSCE CPC, 2014). In fact, all four organizations—the UN, EU, OSCE and AU—have created relevant structures such as Mediation Teams. As shown above, the development of similar conflict prevention approaches took place across a number of IOs. Of course, mandates and functions might vary but the world cultural model of conflict prevention is hard to overlook. This is also seen in the similarities in the organizations’ structures, such as 24/7 crisis centers/rooms and mediation teams/groups.

The development and proliferation of the world cultural model of conflict prevention, including its early warning component, has led to a significant “imprint” not only in the normative sense but also in the creation of new structures in international organizations and world politics at large. As the next part shows, the latter was often reinforced by (and helped to reinforce) the cooperation among IOs in the area of conflict prevention.

4.2 World Cultural Model of (Inter-Organizational) Cooperation

In the past decades, international organizations have been developing cooperation in conflict prevention, leading to its institutionalization (signing agreements and memoranda, establishing points of contact), which is largely based on the world model of cooperation (see for example UNGA, 1993a, b). In the past decades, the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and the AU have developed (mostly bilateral) links with one another. Between the OSCE and the UN, as well as the OSCE and the EU, regular meetings, and contact, as well as mutual briefings at high and staff levels take place (see for example UNSC, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021). There is also authorized cooperation among similar units across the organizations, e.g., the EU Situation Room and the UN Operations and Crisis Center (Council of the European Union, 2018; EEAS, 2019). In conflict early warning, international organizations have been building formal ties along the informal relationships that mostly involve information exchange.¹¹ The exchange is easier due the OSCE, EU, and UN membership overlap,¹² as well as the proliferation of the world cultural model of conflict prevention (see previous section).

In the long run, the impact between cooperation structures and CP/EW is mutual—cooperation contributes to strengthening the intersubjective understanding of the latter. First, formalisation of cooperation contributes to the strengthening of the relevant norms. Second, joint conferences and workshops support a common basis for understanding. For example, in 2003 an OSCE representative took part in an AU workshop on early warning in Addis Ababa that “brought together selected experts to assist the AU Commission in determining a road map for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning system” (OSCE, 2003a, 2003b).

Among the latest attempts to build a common understanding are the panel discussion between the office of the HCNM and the UN (OSCE, 2020b, p. 51), the 2019 discussion on “Preventive Diplomacy in the Changing Landscape of Modern Conflict: The Role of Regional Organizations” in New York that included the League of Arab States, the EU, the Organization of American States, the AU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the OSCE, and the UN (OSCE, 2019a), as well as the 2021 OSCE seminar on conflict cycle (OSCE, 2021a).

Thus, the mutually strengthening world cultural models of CP/EW and cooperation lead to the reinforcing of new approaches both inside and across the IOs. Nevertheless, these developments would not be the same if it were not for the bureaucratic nature of IOs. This has made possible the creation of the specific structures and mechanisms in the IOs based on the world cultural model of conflict prevention.

4.3 Bureaucratization in World Society

We can now observe worldwide what Meyer, Driori and Hwang have called the “organizational structuring of social life” (Meyer et al., 2006: 25). Commonly accepted policy standards and world models, as well as modern formal organizations with elaborated technical structures aimed at achieving policy-related goals are a result of this global process (Meyer et al., 2006). In the past decades, the relevant bureaucratic structures, mechanisms, and roles have also developed in the IOs regarding early warning and response (EWR) (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Bureaucratic units in charge of conflict early warning and response in the IOs

International bureaucrats are responsible for looking for trends and patterns in conflict situations and monitoring, data collection, and analysis (AU, 2018; EEAS, 2021; UN, 2020, 2021). These functions are usually fulfilled by a specific body in the headquarters, such as the EU and AU Conflict Warning Systems, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, EU and AU Situation rooms, OSCE Operating Room, UN Operations and Crisis Centre, or in the case of the African Union also in the Observation and Monitoring Centres of the Regional Economic Communities. Since the capacity of the bureaucratic units is limited, situation monitoring can also be undertaken by country teams, delegations, and missions on the ground. In subsequent stages, fact-finding missions, e.g., the UN SG fact-finding mission (UN, 1992), the EU in-country and follow-up missions (EEAS, 2020), the AU fact-finding missions (AU, 2012), or the OSCE fact-finding missions (OSCE, 2005; European Parliament, 2005) could take place to evaluate a situation.

Early Response, such as preventive diplomacy and mediation measures, is also implemented by international bureaucracies. For example, the OSCE SG made the CPC/Operations Service a focal point for mediation support (OSCE CPC, 2014). “Quiet diplomacy” or “good offices” of the UN SG are renowned in this regard, as well as “diplomacy for peace” by the UN special envoys and representatives (see UN, 2006, 2020). Early action by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities takes place in the first stages after they and their office identify a situation as worrisome.

But I know, of course, in the UN and the EU… I think, mediation efforts are very similar. … I don’t’ think, there’s a particular OSCE, let’s say, method of mediation, which is unique compared to the EU and UN (Interviews 2022).¹³

With the establishment of the permanent structures and world cultural models on which IBs base their activities on, their importance and legitimacy increased.¹⁴ Their increased significance would also mean they could ‘turn the wheel’ now and use their acquired importance and legitimacy to strengthen further the world cultural models of cooperation and conflict prevention. As the next section indicates, IBs can also impact the interpretation, implementation, and further development of world cultural models such as conflict prevention/early warning—be it due to their preferences or situational needs. The following case studies demonstrate some peculiarities of conflict early warning construction in the OSCE in the past decades, focusing on the role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Conflict Prevention Center in its structure.

5 Construction of Conflict Early Warning in the OSCE

Being embedded into the world culture, the OSCE both contributes to and adopts the principles, components, and mechanisms of conflict early warning that are being promoted by and exist in the UN and other organizations with developed EWR systems.

5.1 High Commissioner on National Minorities

The OSCE’s EW is primarily managed by the principles put forward in the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, which was especially important because it created the position of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (CSCE, 1992).

„The High Commissioner provides “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early action” at the earliest possible stage regarding tensions involving national minority issues that have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability, or relations between the participating States“ (Helsinki Decisions, 23/I, 1992).

Here, it is necessary to emphasize that, contrary to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) or the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the HCNM’s primary task is to monitor and address the threats of inter-ethnic conflict, not the rights of minorities per se (OSCE, 2008). And although this is a specific type of conflict, most of the conflict early warning discourse of the OSCE in the 1990s and 2000s can be found in the HCNM addresses and reports.

Officially, the HCNM (along with the OSCE Secretary General and OSCE participating states) can issue an early warning in order to draw the attention to the seriousness of the situation and call for the involvement of the OSCE and its participating states (Helsinki Decisions, 3/II, 1992). The HCNM has formally issued early warning only 2 times—in 1999 for Macedonia (now—North Macedonia) with regard to the refugee influx from Kosovo to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in 2010 concerning the inter-ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan (OSCE, 2022b).

In May–June 2010, before the “Kyrgyz Events,” the High Commissioner visited the country. After the situation deteriorated, a formal early warning was issued on June 12th (OSCE, 2010). The 2010 HCNM appeal included a call for action by the OSCE participating states and drawing the attention of the UN Security Council to the matter (ibid.). Unfortunately, no decisive action followed, even though the Participating States received the full information promptly (OSCE, 2011a/HCNM2011).

In such a politicized and diverse organization as the OSCE, issuing the formal early warning thus does not guarantee success.¹⁵ From the early years, this dubiousness led to a re-interpretation of a more practical mandate that offered a niche in which the HCNM could apply its powers.

The focus has switched to early action preceding the formal early warning, leaving it up to the “more potent institutions or forces” to act upon this (OSCE, 2003b, pp. 4–5). As the example of Kyrgyzstan shows, such action might not live up to expectations. Thus, High Commissioners have tried to avoid issuing early warnings until all other means are exhausted:

But the approach for every High Commissioner has been to try not to issue early warning, until he or she … has really no means to influence the situation anymore. …And every High Commissioner sort of turned it around: let’s have a lot of early action to avoid issuing an early warning (Interviews, 2022).¹⁶

Here, we can see how the international bureaucracy has transformed the usual model of moving from early warning to early response/action to fit better the existing constraints and opportunities of the organizational structure and it's political “filling”.

Drawing on the existing mandate and the relative autonomy it offers, the HCNM has often turned to such early action as fact-finding, quiet diplomacy, and mediation, as well as providing legal and policy advice to governments to avoid issuing an official early warning (see also OSCE, 2008, OSCE, 2018a). Gathering information for analysis through visits to the states of interest and meeting with the parties forms a considerable part of HCNM activities (HCNM, 1999). Based on the above, recommendations are made, and specific facilitation steps are undertaken, including discussions with the relevant parties (Helsinki Decisions, 12/II, 1992).

The HCNM remains important regarding both “quiet diplomacy” and the long-term prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts (OSCE, 2021c). This, however, does not exclude making open statements as a public figure to encourage the governments to abide by the international norms of peace and security; for example, the latest speeches of the HCNM have included an appeal to the authorities of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Uzbekistan to resolve their territorial disputes peacefully (OSCE, 2019b, 2020c, 2021f).

5.2 Conflict Prevention Centre

The OSCE CPC in Vienna oversees monitoring the situation and contributing to sustaining peace in the OSCE region through providing information, analysis and recommendation to the OSCE Secretariat and its participating states. The CPC “functions as the OSCE-wide focal point for early warning, while its Mediation Support Team is in charge of dialogue facilitation and mediation support” (OSCE, 2020a). However, the CPC has a lot of other functions, such as supporting inter-state dialogue in the context of the Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC), and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The latter has to do with military activities and security at large. In addition, the CPC oversees planning, restructuring, and closing field operations. In short, there are a lot of functions and tasks that call for prioritization. CPC monthly reports from past decades show an apparent inclination toward military issues, from non-proliferation to ammunition to mélange extraction, rather than an early warning.

Although the Forum for Security Cooperation could potentially serve as a platform for early response in the OSCE (OSCE, 2012), EW has not always received much attention from the CPC (especially considering the high level of HCNM involvement in many relevant conflicts when they qualify as inter-ethnic).

In the wake of the failure to address the inter-ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (see also OSCE, 2012), there was a serious emphasis on “developing a ‘culture’ of early crisis response in the OSCE” that included both the role of the HCNM and the Secretariat’s CPC (OSCE, 2011b/CPC 2011).

In 2012, the Early Warning Guidelines were worked out by an internal working group that included representatives of the HCNM and CPC and were disseminated to all the OSCE executive structures (OSCE, 2012). The document stressed the importance of field institution heads, the Secretary-General and CPC Director, and the Chairmanship of the Permanent Council in addressing early warning issues and the importance of cross-dimensional and cross-body coordination. It suggested a working definition and relevant early warning procedures (from data collection to analysis to communication) with case-by-case decision-making and a goal of timely response.

These developments have created momentum for the so-called “informal early warning” in the OSCE that is, to a large extent related to the field office focal points reporting to the CPC on potential risks (OSCE, 2012). The primary function of these focal points is collecting, analyzing, and delivering the relevant information to the headquarters. These focal points are the Network of Early Warning Focal Points in the executive structures, including field offices and missions (OSCE, 2018b). While some missions, e.g., the Mission to Skopje (OSCE, ), have an explicit early warning mandate, some structures do not, e.g., the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. However, there still may be a focal point—a person in charge of gathering and analysing the relevant information for the CPC (OSCE, 2018b, 2019¹⁷). Since 2012, a meeting of the focal point representatives for information exchange and capacity-building has been held annually (OSCE, 2018b).

In the past decade, early warning has become more and more associated not only with the HCNM, but also with the work of the CPC and its Network of Early Warning Focal Points, as well as field offices, e.g., in North Macedonia or Georgia (the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism) (see OSCE, 2018b, 2019a, 2020b, 2021c, 2022a).

Here, as with the HCNM, we see a unique way in which international bureaucrats have been able to pursue EWR that goes beyond the formal early warning in the OSCE. In the case of the CPC, “informal early warning” has become an important part of its activities in the organization's conflict prevention and EWR framework.

6 Conclusion

It is impossible to talk about constructing conflict early warning in the OSCE—or other major international organizations—without discussing the universal norms and the so-called world cultural models (commonly accepted approaches and standards of policymaking). This work has focused on world cultural models necessary for constructing conflict prevention and conflict early warning in IOs: the world cultural model of conflict prevention that lays a foundation of generalized perceptions of CP/EW among organizations and the model of cooperation, as well as their bureaucratization that contribute to sustaining similar policy approaches across organizations.

As the OSCE example shows, the world cultural models reflected in the organization’s mandate can be interpreted in a manner that international bureaucracies see fit to fulfill their mission better. Such bodies as the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Conflict Prevention Centre thus contribute to implementing CP/EW policies and constructing their understanding and, ultimately, the future of conflict early warning.

Taking a closer look at the OSCE, this study has uncovered interesting elements of EW interpretation on account of the specifics of the organization at large, as well as the role of the HCNM, which has become one of the first “instruments” for dealing with inter-ethnic conflicts. Due to the challenging international environment and difficulties in making the early warning and response work, the HCNM has put early action before early warning. The HCNM’s “quiet diplomacy” —primarily based on the principle of confidentiality—has become a more critical element of the job than preparing and officially issuing early warnings, which the HCNM has exercised only twice, namely in Macedonia (now North Macedonia) in 1999 and Kyrgyzstan in 2010.

Additionally, external events can trigger discursive and subsequent structural changes in the organization. After the “failure” to address inter-ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the early warning became more prominent in the OSCE agenda, including its Conflict Prevention Centre. This also relates to “informal early warning” (including information gathering and analysis) via the Early Warning Focal Points in the field offices that report to the CPC. Similarly to the office of the HCNM, the CPC has re-invented early warning—in this case, by focusing on “informal early warning.”

Unfortunately, recent developments in the Azerbaijan-Armenia confrontation and the war in Ukraine demonstrate once more¹⁸ that the result of these debates are long overdue, and a more decisive approach is needed in order to revive the OSCE’s role in conflict prevention and early warning. They also call for the re-evaluation of the organization’s role and finding its “niche” when the conflicts are over,¹⁹ as well as keeping up conflict prevention and early warning efforts in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Western Balkans.