Keywords

1 Introduction

Kosovo, the youngest Republic in Europe, declared its independence in 2008 but still faces issues of national legitimation since its Declaration of Independence was only supported by some members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Unresolved territorial disputes with Serbia have deeply affected Kosovo’s struggle to become a member state in international organizations compared to the rest of the South-Eastern European countries. However, it is essential to note that the question of Kosovo’s eligibility in the international community is also associated with the role of the leading regional powers in the South-Eastern Europe, notably the Russian Federation, in its capacity as one of the five permanent members of the UNSC as it has continuously opposed Kosovo’s membership in the United Nations (UN) as well as in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Boyka Stefanova, in an analysis of the maturation phases of the OSCE, notes that “the Organization was excluded from the development of a conceptual solution to the Kosovo self-determination deliberations” (Stefanova, 2009). Though excluded from the self-determination deliberations, the OSCE has continuously and comprehensively assisted Kosovo’s state-formation incentives through the activities of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OSCE, 2022). While legally explaining the involvement of international actors in Kosovo’s state building, Dren Doli underlines that “the United Nations General Assembly, the five permanent members of the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the European Union, the OSCE members have altogether played an important role” (Doli, 2019).

This research highlights the vital contribution that the OSCE has provided during the conflict period and when Kosovo’s transformation led toward democratic governance. In light of the fourth level of analysis of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan & Waever, 2003) introduced by the Copenhagen School, this research examines the role of OSCE regional actors in the securitization and de-securitization processes towards the developments of Kosovo-Serbia relations and Kosovo’s democratization path. As different scholars have put it, “securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion” (Balzacq, 2005). De-securitization on the other hand, according to RSCT, can be described as a “rather slow move out of an explicit security discourse, which in turn facilitates a less militaristic, less violent and hence more genuinely political form of engagement” (Hansen, 2012). While analyzing the Western Balkans in light of regional security complex theory, Pejic stressed that “full membership in these organizations provides a completely new quality to the countries and presents a new institutional mechanism for the realization of their national interests” (Pejic, 2016).

This study was conducted via official document analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, at the archives of the OSCE Documentation Center in Prague in the capacity of Researcher-in-Residence from October 2020 to March 2021.Footnote 1 Document analysis represents a critical research method for understanding the existing empirical evidence through content analysis and interpretation (Bowen, 2009). The qualitative analysis reflects the critical positions of regional actors in the OSCE debate. In contrast, the quantitative analysis demonstrates the interest of regional actors in the discussion based on the total number of statements concerning Kosovo-related developments and Kosovo-Serbia relations. This research thus provides an in-depth analysis of the OSCE debate during the Kosovo crisis, starting from 1995, when the OSCE was established,Footnote 2 to 2001, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was welcomed once again as an OSCE participating State. The study compares this period with the positive developments in Kosovo in recent years, starting from 2015, when Serbia was the first Western Balkan country to Chair the OSCE until 2020 and the Albanian OSCE Chairmanship. Hence, this research investigates the role that the regional actors, namely the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU), and the Russian Federation, have played in Kosovo’s domestic developments and relations with Serbia.

Aiming to bring to light the progress made on Kosovo’s path to democratization, this paper reflects on the controversy of Kosovo’s ongoing struggle to have a seat at the table. Kosovo has remained at the center of debate among OSCE regional actors in the South-Eastern Europe since the organization was created. These debates, be they on securitizing or de-securitizing issues of concern, determine the direction of the activities of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo while depriving Kosovo of the right to have its voice heard on important issues concerning its domestic security. Considering the positive transformation in Kosovo’s democratic governance, this paper argues that it is only legitimate to grant Kosovo a seat at the table of the OSCE.

2 An Era of Securitization: The Kosovo Crisis

In light of Regional Security Complex Theory, this section provides an in-depth analysis on the politico-military dimension debate by the main OSCE regional actors during the crisis in Kosovo. The timeframe starts from 1995 with the creation of the OSCE until 2001 when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was welcomed once again as an OSCE participating State.

In late 1998, during the Kosovo war, the Permanent Council (PC), in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1203, decided to establish the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) with an initial 1-year mandate (OSCE, 1998f). Even-though the Ministers raised the issue of the un-cooperative stance of the FRY at the 6th Ministerial Council in Copenhagen, tensions rose even more in 1998. In this regard, at the Oslo Ministerial Declaration of 1998, the Ministers referred to the crisis in Kosovo as a priority of concern in the OSCE area by explaining that “the Kosovo verification mission (KVM) is the largest and most difficult ever put into the field by the OSCE. It marks the international community’s recognition of the organization’s developing potential and expertise to contribute to security” (OSCE, 1998h).

The KVM and the later OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) was the first large operation undertaken by the OSCE, and its functions varied from efforts toward the political settlement of issues of concern, elections monitoring, steps toward building democratic institutions, as well as training and assisting the police force in the country. The mandate of the KVM lasted less than one year because in mid-1999, the OSCE PC decided to close the KVM following the developments in Kosovo and established instead a task force (OSCE, 1999f) that would prepare for the opening of the OMiK.

Despite all efforts, a failure in preventive diplomacy is how experts in the South-Eastern Europe sub-region refer to the crisis in Kosovo (Ghebali et al., 2001). To understand the role of the OSCE in addressing the Kosovo crisis, it is necessary to analyze the regional actors’ role in their securitization approaches. In this regard, this research investigates the role that the USA, EU, and Russian Federation played in arms control and border management, two critical securitization sectors covered under the umbrella of the Politico-Military Dimension of the OSCE.

2.1 The Role of the European Union

The EU placed particular importance on the situation in Kosovo compared to the other South-Eastern European countries since the crisis was severe and turned into a humanitarian catastrophe threatening the security of the South-Eastern European sub-region and the whole OSCE area. Moreover, it expressed strong disappointment toward Milosevic’s regime and his violations of international commitments. Making continuous calls demanding the withdrawal of the Belgrade security forces from Kosovo, the EU emphasized in 1998 “that commitments made by President Milosevic in Moscow did not cover all the requirements set out in the Cardiff declaration…” (OSCE, 1998b).

Moreover, in its securitization approach, the EU made continuous contributions toward verification activities in implementing UNSCR 1160 and 1199 through the deployment of personnel to deal with the security aspects of the situation on the ground as well as through supporting the North Atlantic Council Organization (NATO) verification missions (OSCE, 1998e). The EU also noted that it “…supports NATO’s AI verification mission; good coordination between air and ground verification are essential in verifying compliance” (OSCE, 1998g). Moreover, the EU pointed out that the reports presented by the Chair-in-Office (CiO) in 1998 concerning the crisis in Kosovo were alarming, considering that “…the Yugoslav authorities have placed anti-personnel land-mines at the border between Kosovo and Albania. These mines would immediately threaten refugees and other innocent civilians and constitute a deadly legacy for years to come” (OSCE, 1998d). This was an important securitizing EU call addressing land mining as a serious security threat in the region.

Additionally, the EU constantly underlined the significant role the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was playing on the ground. In 1998, at a PC meeting, it was highlighted that the “EU is determined to provide an increased monitoring presence in Kosovo. We call for a comprehensive approach to promote the early return of refugees. Unhindered access for international humanitarian organizations [is] an essential requirement” (OSCE, 1998b). For the EU, securitization also meant practical efforts toward border management, particularly regarding the Kosovo crisis, where special attention was placed on the essential role of regional cooperation. Therefore, the EU expressed the concern “… that VJ shelling has allegedly violated the international border…”, by calling the authorities “…to do all in their power to reduce tensions over Kosovo” (OSCE, 1998d).

Later in 1999, as the situation worsened, the calls by the EU in the Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC) of the OSCE increased. Its securitization approach shifted toward full commitment not only politically but also militarily in cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) (OSCE, 1999j). Regarding this cooperation, the EU placed particular emphasis on forming the multi-ethnic Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which would facilitate the protection of civilians in cases of emergency. The KPC aimed to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (OSCE, 1999g).

Regarding calls towards the FRY, the EU considered the emerging conflict in 1998 as an urgent matter which required rapid action and the re-establishment of a long-term Mission in FRY. But FRY refused to cooperate with the OSCE due to its expulsion from the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) debate in 1992—a decision taken due to its severe human rights violations. In this regard, the EU expressed “that distances of views over possible conflict-resolution and especially the lack of trust between communities in Kosovo strongly reinforce the need for high-level international involvement in the negotiation process” (OSCE, 1998c).

Another securitization incitive of the EU during the aggression of Milosevic’s regime towards Kosovo was the imposition of economic sanctions towards FRY. However, in 2001, a decision on the establishment of the OSCE Mission to the FRY was adopted, which, as a result, led to a change in the policy of the EU about the sanctions implemented during the Kosovo war. In this regard, the EU decided to place significant aid programs and “… to lift all sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since 1998 except for the provisions affecting Milosevic and persons associated with him” (OSCE, 2000b). Another historical event that followed was the adoption of the declaration at the General Affairs Council (GAC), where the EU Foreign Ministers gathered in Luxemburg to praise the democratic changes occurring in the FRY after the fall of the Milosevic regime.

In the same year, though the relations of the FRY with Kosovo were heading toward a dramatic decrease in tensions, some violent activities continued to occur, particularly in the territory of Southern Serbia. In this regard, the EU expressed at one PC meeting that “As a contribution to confidence building, the EU has substantially increased its EUMM presence and strongly supports a process of constructive dialogue” (OSCE, 2001c). In its continuous calls, the EU condemned the violent attacks and illegal actions directed particularly toward both the ethnic Albanians and Serbians, while implying that political dialogue would be the only possible path towards a long-term solution, and emphasizing that “The EU urges these groups to abandon violence and respond positively to the new proposals and calls on political leaders in the region to use all available influence to stop the violence; the only long term solution is through dialogue and reconciliation” (OSCE, 2001b). This statement marks not only the start of the neutral approach of the EU towards the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue but also the start of the EU’s interest in European Union integration of the South-Eastern European countries.

2.2 The Role of the United States of America

The role of the USA in the region has been vital, inclusive, and truly effective in promoting security and cooperation in the South-Eastern Europe, particularly from 1995 to 2001. The crisis in Kosovo offers proof of the importance of the USA’s role, as evidence shows that the US troops marked the highest numbers compared with the other allies. While by the time NATO acted, around 250,000 people were dead, and more than 2 million people were displaced from the territory of Kosovo; without the USA’s role in the conflict, the damage would have been more severe (OSCE, 1999e).

According to the USA securitization approach, NATO involvement in the FRY was essential to prevent a further humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. It is of utmost importance to emphasize that the intervention of the USA and other NATO allies in the FRY did not come at a glimpse but after continuous efforts to find a political solution. It resulted from Milosevic’s refusal to comply with UNSC resolutions, the decline of the Rambouillet political settlement, and every diplomatic attempt in this regard. It also came as a result of the deployment of more than 40,000 troops and 300 tanks from the Milosevic’s regime in Kosovo; the continuous use of violence, murders, rape, and property destruction in Kosovo, leading to a severe humanitarian catastrophe; and, most importantly, the violation of all commitments made under international law (OSCE, 2000a). Initially, USA Secretary of State Madeline Albright, due to the continuous police violence, torture, and executions by Serbian forces towards Kosovo, gave the order to freeze consultations about the South-East Cooperation Initiative as well as the Dayton Peace Agreement Implementation with the FRY (OSCE, 1998a). However, that did not stop the Milosevic regime.

The USA was aware that, even after giving utmost priority to the emergency in Kosovo, it would not succeed in ending all of the inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. Still, rather it would mean putting an end to Milosevic’s regime and its ethnic cleansing. In this regard, the United States of America stated that, in cooperation with the European Union, “we must do for South-Eastern Europe what we did for Western Europe after World War II and Central Europe after the cold war. Freedom, respect for minority rights, and prosperity are powerful forces for progress. They give people goals to work for; they elevate hope over fear and tomorrow over yesterday” (OSCE, 1999e).

In its securitizing efforts, as with the EU, the USA supported the civilian organization KPC, which it saw as an essential service aiming toward post-conflict reconstruction and demilitarization, particularly about demining (OSCE, 1999h). Moreover, efforts towards reconstruction were seen in the Rambouillet agreement which, as mentioned earlier, would include a broader cross-sector program covering infrastructure, rule of law, human rights, etc., all aimed towards strengthening democracy. The USA played an important role alongside the European Union in supporting these efforts.

For the USA, in a similar way as for the EU, regional cooperation between the South-Eastern European countries in times of conflict were of utmost importance. One important statement of the USA in this regard was directed to the solidarity shown by Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro during the Kosovo crisis:

Mr. Chairman we cannot thank enough the countries around Kosovo which have opened their borders and their homes to the refugees. The response of the Albanian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin governments is extraordinary. They have done what many of us around this table failed to do sixty years ago -- welcome the human misery created when a genocide last stalked Europe (OSCE, 1999c).

2.3 The Role of the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation also played the role of a dominant power in the region, but not in an inclusive manner in comparison to the USA and the EU. The empirical data show that the Russian Federation’s involvement in the debate was more evident in 1999, with particular emphasis on opposing the use of military intervention in the FRY.

In a PC statement in 1999, the Russian Federation expressed that NATO air strikes and missiles in the territory of the FRY caused casualties in the population of the FRY, putting an emphasis not only on the Serbian lives lost but also on the Albanian lives. Therefore, according to Russian Federation, this had led to a humanitarian disaster caused by decisions taken without the authorization of the UNSC or qualification under international law. In Russian Federation’s view, “NATO creates humanitarian disaster by the airstrikes and then conducts a ground operation to prevent this disaster” (OSCE, 1999d).

In this regard, the Russian Federation also called on several OSCE documents that would oppose this intervention, including the Helsinki Final Act decalogues:

We would like to stress that the NATO countries are committing a flagrant, gross and continued violation of the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of sovereign equality, non-use of force or threat of force, territorial integrity of States, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights, fulfilment of the commitments under international law. Justifying the use of force in circumvention of the UN charter and in violation of the Helsinki Final Act principles by referring to the ‘humanitarian disaster’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and more over ‘genocide’ is legally groundless (OSCE, 1999d).

This is quite a contradictory perception from the Russian Federation when in fact all the above-mentioned decalogues of the Helsinki Final Act were initially and solely violated by Milosevic’s regime before NATO had even thought of getting involved. However, looking at the historical developments, a shift in position by the Russian Federation regarding the violations of the FRY can be seen. The initial position was when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared the Head of Mission to Kosovo persona non grata. Following this, the Russian Federation’s calls in this regard started to take on a more serious tone by asking “…Belgrade to refrain from the implementation of the decision mentioned above and to create all necessary conditions allowing the OSCE mission to carry out fully its tasks following decisions of UNSC and OSCE” (OSCE, 1999a).

This tone can also be seen in the historical joint statement of Secretary Madeline Albright and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivanov demanding that the FRY fully comply with the UNSC, particularly concerning police and military units, as well as to cooperate with the International Court of Tribunals of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and support the Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE, 1999b). The cooperation of the Russian Federation in this regard was highly valued by the United States of America, who saw this mutual effort as a strategy to strengthen the “fundamental interest in a long-term, positive relationship with Russia. Russia is now helping to find a way for Belgrade to meet our conditions. Russian troops should participate in the force that will keep the peace in Kosovo, turning a source of tension into an opportunity for cooperation, like our joint effort in Bosnia” (OSCE, 1999e).

The Russian Federation’s “disappointment” started to decrease dramatically after the de-escalation of the conflict later in 2000, particularly as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was once again accepted as an OSCE participating State, having been expelled in 1992 due to severe human rights violations. After a decade of violations toward Kosovo Albanians, with the fall of Milosevic’s regime in 2000, the FRY was approved to return to the OSCE. For the Russian Federation, this meant the beginning of a new era in establishing security in South-East Europe. In a statement later in 2001, the Russian Federation expressed that, although the conflicts in South-Eastern Europe varied, including humanitarian catastrophe, ethnic cleansing, refugee influxes, and the creation of displaced persons, “today it is obvious to everybody that this cannot be achieved either by air strikes or by the extensive military presence on the ground. Other approaches are needed, based in the first place on the political will of the States of the region and active assistance in the international community” (OSCE, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). In this regard, the Russian Federation expressed its willingness to cooperate in joint efforts towards bringing a more prosperous future in the South-Eastern European sub-region in line with the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act, and Charter of European Security.

3 De-securitization: The Roles of Regional Actors

While de-securitization refers to a more genuine political form of engagement, the political power or militaristic authority incentives no longer have a role to play. This endeavor comes mainly due to a positive turn of developments and normalization of the situation on the ground. Lene Hansen categorizes the de-securitization process into three forms: replacement, when an issue moves out of the security discourse, and another problem is simultaneously securitized; re-articulation, when active political solutions are given to address threats that have been securitized; and silencing when an issue disappears from the security discourse (Hansen, 2012).

The OSCE is well-placed in assisting Kosovo and Serbia in their democratization journeys through its field operations on the ground, namely the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) and the OSCE Mission to Serbia. OMiK was established in 2000 following the closure of KVM and currently covers broad activities, including:

protection of community rights; protection of cultural and religious heritage; monitoring the judiciary; gender mainstreaming; media freedom and development; promotion of anti-discrimination mechanisms; improving young people’s participation in political and public life; countering terrorism and cyber threats; providing advanced police training and support to key policing and security strategies; and support to the implementation of agreements stemming from the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrad (OSCE, 2022).

The Mission to Serbia was re-established in 2001 and aimed at helping Serbia in cooperation with the governmental institutions, civil society, and media to “…build strong, independent, accountable and effective democratic institutions… in the areas of rule of law and human rights; law enforcement; democratization; and media development” (OSCE, 2021).

As noted earlier, the empirical evidence proves that analyzing the role of the regional actors during the conflict period offers a good indicator of the power relationship of the regional actors during the Kosovo war. Therefore, investigating the role that these regional actors play in Kosovo’s democratization path from 2015—when Serbia was the first Western Balkan country to chair the OSCE—until 2020—when Albanian OSCE Chairmanship occurred—is equally important, particularly because South-Eastern European countries have now become security providers rather than security-receivers.

3.1 The European Union

The European Union saw the work of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo as crucial to building a democratic and multi-ethnic society. It used a de-securitization approach to emphasize the rights of minorities. The EU supported the OMiK “… for its democratization and human rights activities”. It highlights that functioning independent institutions, the fundamental freedoms legislation, and the anti-discrimination package should remain a priority (OSCE, 2015a). As indicated in a statement in 2015, the EU also de-securitized the issue of land disputes in Kosovo by commending “OMiK for its activities in the area of democratization and human rights which includes inter-faith dialogue and working with civil society…”, and proposed that OMiK takes “…a lead within the international community in a resolution of the land dispute between the Decani municipality and the Decani monastery” (OSCE, 2015c).

Another issue actively de-securitized by the EU was the impact of the domestic problems in Kosovo concerning migration flows toward the EU. In this regard, the EU expressed that the “Recent demonstrations in Pristina and the rise in irregular migration from Kosovo to the EU show that much remains to be done to address the root causes of popular discontent” (OSCE, 2015a). A high percentage of the Kosovar population is located in various European countries, which could reflect the lack of cooperation between the domestic political forces in promoting stability. In this regard, in 2016, the EU called on the government and opposition to respect majority rule as the basic principle of democracy; to ensure open and transparent debate in the Assembly on all issues, be they domestic or regional; and to enhance dialogue by improving communication, particularly regarding the dialogue with Serbia (OSCE, 2016b). These calls by the EU aimed to establish a genuine dialogue between the opposition and the government to look for shared solutions to enhance the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue further.

It is essential to mention that the role of the European Union in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, in principle, should be based on unbiased mediation and continuous efforts towards finding a solution to normalize the relations between the two countries, which, as illustrated earlier, have had a very tragic conflictual past. For the EU, it was essential to de-securitize the issue of the uncooperative stance of the political parties in Kosovo. Therefore it called the “…opposition parties to respect the basic principles of democracy, including majority rule, and allow for a free and open debate in the Assembly on all issues regarding Kosovo” (OSCE, 2016c).

Thus, cooperation between the political parties on long-standing issues in Kosovo was vital for the EU and a strong determinant of the desired democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo to represent a common language regarding the dialogue with Serbia.

In 2017, the position of the EU on the democratization in Kosovo shifted towards de-securitizing concerns on the freedom of media by expressing support for “…the Mission’s work in the area of democratization, in particular regarding strengthening public oversight, coordination and communication between central and local governance, and its activities on strengthening media reporting, the freedom of the media and safety of journalists” (OSCE, 2017a). As the statement highlights, for the EU the principles of democracy are very closely associated with the role that media plays in communicating domestic and regional developments. In 2018, apart from reiterating its support for OMiK’s efforts in ensuring the functioning of democratic institutions in Kosovo, the EU also de-securitized the importance of civic participation in decision-making (OSCE, 2018d). Furthermore, the EU supported OMiK’s “…commitment to helping democratic institutions fulfill their role effectively in line with relevant international standards and good governance principles, particularly regarding strengthening public participation in decision-making and improving accountability and transparency of institutions” (OSCE, 2018a).

Lastly, following the positive developments in Kosovo as well as the willingness of both countries to proceed further in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, the EU highlighted in 2020, “both sides now must build on this positive momentum and make substantial additional efforts, to reach a comprehensive legally binding agreement. Such an agreement is urgent and crucial for both to advance on their respective European paths, in line with the European perspective of the region” (OSCE, 2020b).

3.2 The United States of America

In its de-securitization approach, the USA emphasized in 2015 that the Mission in Kosovo plays a crucial role in implementing programs related to promoting human rights, the rule of law, and democratization (OSCE, 2015b). In the USA’ view, Kosovo has gone through dramatic changes in its efforts toward building democratic structures. However, as with the rest of the South-Eastern European countries, Kosovo faced deep polarization and a lack of cooperation between political forces. In the USA’s view, “The freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, including peaceful protest, are fundamental to any democracy. Kosovo’s parliament should be a place where meaningful public policy debates are conducted and people listen to each other respectfully, even when they disagree” (OSCE, 2016a). The difficulty of the political leaders to find common ground on issues in Kosovo, be this domestically or regionally, has remained of high concern for some time. For the USA, these issues deeply impact the progress of democratization in the country. Therefore, in its de-securitization approach, its calls were often directed at the political forces to not only look for solutions to enhancing genuine dialogue but also to cooperate with OMiK and other OSCE participating States on resolving the domestic concerns in the country.

In this regard, it is essential to mention that the USA has historically supported a democratic and prosperous Kosovo and has continuously promoted peace and stability by cooperating closely with the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. This can be seen in several statements, including in 2017 when the USA vowed to “continue to champion a democratic, multi-ethnic, inclusive Kosovo that is fully integrated into the international community and an integral part of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”, by adding that the USA looks “…forward to the day when Kosovo will be present in the Permanent Council as an OSCE participating State” (OSCE, 2017b). In its de-securitization approach, the USA put utmost importance in having Kosovo granted with a seat at the tables of the international community, including at the OSCE. The USA sees the presence of Kosovo officials at the chambers of the OSCE as a crucial step for the country to hear directly from the participating States’ views on the issues affecting its democracy (OSCE 2017d). In this regard, later in 2018, the USA underlined:

As Kosovo prepares to celebrate its 10th anniversary as an independent nation, the United States will continue its close partnership with you and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) to help Kosovo develop as a peaceful, stable, democratic, and multi-ethnic country at peace with its neighbors. Mr. Chair, the United States supports a democratic Kosovo that is fully integrated into the international community and part of a Europe that is strong and free. We look forward to the day when Kosovo will be present in the Permanent Council as an OSCE participating State (OSCE, 2018b).

The USA put great emphasis on the need to work on electoral oversight mechanisms as well as to address issues of concern with regards to the missing persons. Later in 2018, the USA also noted that the work of OMiK has been of high importance, particularly in ensuring that the voices of the youth are being herd. The USA expressed support for the “…exchange programs through the Dialogue Academy and through sports diplomacy. With Kosovo’s large youth population in mind, OMiK has rightly fostered youth engagement in conflict resolution and political life and has promoted media and information literacy for young people” (OSCE, 2018e).

With regard to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, the USA also played a key de-securitizing role by ensuring the promotion of the normalization of relations as well as the full integration into the Europe Union of both countries as two democratic states. In a statement in 2019, the USA stressed that “All parties must de-escalate tensions, remove all obstacles to the Dialogue talks—this includes Kosovo lifting the tariffs—and focus on reaching a comprehensive agreement” (OSCE, 2019a). In this regard, the USA played an important role in 2020 as well by making possible the signing of the Agreement of the Normalization of Economic Relations between the two countries as a step forward which would ensure a prosperous and stable future not only for Serbia and Kosovo but also the entire region. The USA has played a significant role in gearing up for the European Union Integration of Kosovo and all the South-Eastern European countries. It has lent its voice to grant Kosovo a seat at the tables of the international community continuously in its statements.

3.3 The Russian Federation

The Russian Federation is the only regional actor that applies silencing as a form of de-securitization concerning the developments in Serbia, aiming to vanish Serbia’s domestic concerns from the OSCE’s security discourse. Yet, for the Russian Federation, Kosovo has always been far from being democratic. This view in the form of a replacement approach to de-securitization was also noted in a statement in 2017 when the Russian Federation stressed that “to confirm the increasingly obvious divide between the reality in Kosovo and the declared goals of creating a safe and democratic society in the territory […] the time has come to replace the paradigm of blind and undemanding patronage from certain Western countries” (OSCE, 2017c).

Furthermore, these views were also reflected in a statement in 2018 when addressing the role of the Kosovo police, which, according to the Russian Federation, “cast a shadow over the many years of assistance that the OSCE has provided for their development. It is clear, as this latest case shows, that the work of the police in Kosovo is still far from democratic standards, to say the least” (OSCE, 2018c). These statements reflect that the Russian Federation refuses to see Kosovo as an independent state and its determinion to advance in its democratic path. This view was also reflected in a statement in 2020 when the Russian Federation referred to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, underlining that “because of the obstruction by the Kosovans, meaningful dialogue is once again impossible” (OSCE, 2020a).

4 Kosovo’s Domestic Developments

While during the war on Kosovo under Milosevic’s regime, it was highlighted that the lack of a multilateral securitization approach leads towards escalation of the conflict, on the contrary, when all actors chose to work together and cooperate, it led towards de-escalation. The quantitative analysis in this study, as illustrated in Chart 13.1, show that during the period from 1995 until 2001 the USA took a leading role in the debate opposing Milosevic’s war on Kosovo. In the period of Kosovo’s democratization illustrated in Chart 13.2, there was an equal interest in Kosovo developments between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, highlighting, however counter-arguments in their position on democracy.

Chart 13.1
A bar graph plots the total number of statements by regional actors on Kosovo from 1995 to 2001. The values are as follows. Unites States of America, 70. European Union, 18. Russian federation, 5. Values are estimated.

Source Author’s calculations based on the total number of statements found at the OSCE Documentation Center in Prague (DCiP)

The total number of statements by regional actors on Kosovo from 1995 to 2001.

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Chart 13.2
A bar graph plots the total number of statements by regional actors on Kosovo from 2015 to 2020. The values are as follows. Unites States of America, 14.7. European Union, 12.7. Russian federation, 14.7. Values are estimated.

Source Author’s calculations based on the total number of statements found at the OSCE Documentation Center in Prague (DCiP)

The total number of statements by regional actors on Kosovo from 2015 to 2020.

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Therefore, it is important to stress that considering the positive transformation in Kosovo’s democratization during the second timeframe analyzed in this research, Kosovo’s seat at the OSCE should be viewed as a benefit for all. First, it would allow Kosovo to directly hear and address the concerns of the regional actors regarding its domestic developments. Secondly, it enables the OSCE to handle all the security aspects concerning the South-Eastern European sub-region inclusively and comprehensively by facilitating direct dialogue between Kosovar and Serbian representatives and all actors involved. It is important to remember that, in democracy, one’s voice is a fundamental right; therefore, a democratic Kosovo voice in the halls of Hofburg should be seen as such. Thirdly, and equally important, a seat at the table enables Kosovo to become a security provider along with its South-Eastern Europe neighbors (Table 13.1).

Table 13.1 South-Eastern Europe' seats in International Organizations
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5 Conclusion

When comparing both the securitization and de-securitization eras, the empirical evidence clearly shows that the role of regional actors in Kosovo-Serbia relations does not reflect a common approach but rather a deep polarization in the perceptions of democracy. This polarization of perceptions and subsequent approaches does not positively impact establishing lasting peace, stability, and prosperity in the South-Eastern Europe sub-region. Instead, it deepens further the existing disagreements. The Austrian Political Scientist Univ. Prof. Dr. Heinz Gaertner refers to the OSCE founding document, the Helsinki Final Act, as a document which “... does not identify enemies, nor even opponents or adversaries. OSCE (2019b, p. 51) it calls for cooperative security and concludes that security is indivisible.” As Kosovo suffers most from a lack of integration in the international community, including in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, its actors need to realize that, while they continue to be divided in perceptions, there have been times when South-Eastern European countries became more united in solidarity with regards to improving each other’s security. These endeavors were particularly evident in the efforts of the Serbian OSCE Chairmanship in 2015 and Albania’s OSCE Chairmanship in 2020, where these countries pledged to provide security from a regional and international perspective.