Keywords

The EU engages extensively with states surrounding the Union. Since its inception, the EU has been successful in creating a network of agreements and institutional relationships with other states, whether they are potential new members of the Union or not. Non-members have been invited to participate in the EU’s internal market; to participate in various decentralised agencies; or to enter trade, partnership, or association agreements with the Union. These are all parts of what we have previously referred to as the “broader area” of European foreign and security policy. While Chapter 4 explored EU cooperation with third countriesFootnote 1 in relation to security and defence, this chapter takes a broader perspective on EU foreign and security policy, looking instead at EU-third country cooperation in a wider variety of policy fields. Through agreements and systematised links, the EU has created a web of institutionalised relations expanding far beyond the borders of the Union (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Dür & Gastinger, 2023). Today, almost all European countries and several non-European countries engage in some sort of institutionalised relationship with the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2016, p. 789). However, the degree of integration and cooperation these agreements contain is of varying quality and depth, creating a global network of tighter or looser integrative links. Taken together, the result is increasing regional integration, which in turn serves as an instrument for security-building (Rieker, 2016).

The EU’s relationship with the various countries of the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood has been described as an instance of external differentiation, referring to their varying degrees of acceptance of the EU’s initiatives, policies, and regulations, aiming for approximation to EU law. In addition to the ENP and the newly included candidate countries to the east, there is the multilateral European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries; EU bilateral relations with Switzerland and candidate country Turkey; negotiations with post-Brexit UK; the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the Western Balkans; and the customs unions and adoption of the Euro in Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino. These are all instances of external differentiated European integration. This chapter takes a regional perspective, exploring the degree of integration both within and beyond the borders of EU(rope). Building on the framework presented in Chapter 2, it explores DI beyond the Union, and how the EU and European states together, through a wider network of European cooperation and DI, are contributing to increased European strategic autonomy.

As far as vertical differentiation, also known as “deepening,” is concerned with the formal member states and the transfer of power from the national to the European level of governance, this is of limited relevance to a discussion of deeper integration between the EU core and non-members. Horizontal DI, or “widening,” however, is concerned with the territorial and normative expansion of EU policies, and is therefore of greater relevance. The discussion below looks at both bilateral and multilateral agreements between the EU and various associated non-members, among them the EFTA states, the UK, Turkey, and other candidate countries, as well as institutional frameworks and membership of non-EU members in various decentralised agencies.

5.1 External Differentiated Integration and Regional Security-Building

Earlier chapters have shown that internal differentiation within the EU is a central aspect of DI. However, it is not the only one. Equally important to the study of DI is the involvement of third countries in existing EU structures, without demanding or necessarily offering these states complete accession to the Union. This allows non-members to selectively integrate into certain policy areas. This sort of differentiation has been referred to as “external” or “mixed” DI (Schimmelfennig et al., 2022). The extent and degree to which a third country integrates with the Union depends on the willingness of the EU and the third country to integrate, as well as the state of the free market, quality of democracy and governance, and capacity of the third country (Schimmelfennig, 2016). Examples include inclusion in the Schengen Area, the EEA, EU’s Association Agreements (AA) with a variety of third countries, a variety of bilateral agreements, and involvement in EU’s decentralised agencies (Rabinovych & Pintsch, 2022; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Together, this net of arrangements creates a web of DI spanning far beyond the borders of the Union.

Recent geopolitical developments have led to several changes in the EU’s relationships with its own members as well as its neighbours. Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia were all granted candidate status in 2022, while Georgia was considered eligible for candidacy once certain criteria were met. Denmark, already an EU member, elected to join the CSDP. Finland and Sweden both applied for NATO membership. As a consequence of the new shockwaves spreading across Europe, new intergovernmental forums, such as the EPC were established. With the aim of increasing political, economic, and security coordination between European states, the EPC seeks to integrate European states through cooperation and common values, whether they are EU members or not (Gänzle et al., 2022). Currently, more than 40 states take part in the Community.

Increasing regional integration is a way of enhancing regional security through regional security-building. For the EU, the projection of rules and values beyond the borders of the EU has constituted the basis for the Union’s role as a security actor (Rieker, 2016). The importance of building regional security has become only too clear following the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, military threats are not the only threats with which the EU is concerned. With the world re-emerging from a global pandemic, and with continued perils resulting from cyber-attacks, disinformation, energy security, and global food shortages, European strategic autonomy is challenged in other arenas than on the battlefield. Threats such as these move quickly across state borders; they are hard to predict; and they often carry unforeseen consequences. This is not only true for the EU, but also for states close to the EU’s borders. In an increasingly interdependent world, global instability is felt everywhere.

For the EU and for EU members, security within the Union is dependent upon stability in its neighbouring states, something which again has become only too evident since the invasion of Ukraine. This was the rationale behind the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2004, in which the countries of the EU’s neighbourhoodFootnote 2 would share “everything but institutions” (Prodi, 2002). Through enhanced contact and cooperation with non-member states to the East and South, the EU seeks to enhance its own security indirectly through stabilising the states closest to it. The spreading of EU laws, policies, and institutions to non-members, either by offering possible accession or by allowing access to the EU market or other institutional bodies, are instances of external differentiation based on non-members’ willingness and ability to accept EU laws and norms.

5.2 Differentiated Integration Beyond the EU’s Borders

Building on the understanding of integration presented previously, we understand integration to be a result of a certain level of (i) economic and political interdependency; (ii) consistency regarding norms, rules, and values; (iii) structural connectedness, referring to the level of contacts and meetings and common institutions and resources that exists in the relationship; and (iv) decision-making capacity, which depends on the ability to transform political will into action, either through QMV or delegating capacity. It should be recalled that, while these dimensions are crucial for integration, they are not necessarily strongly correlated. Consequently, we might find high levels of integration in some aspects, but low in others. There is also a distinction to be made between having common norms, values, and structures on the one hand and acting on them and utilising them on the other hand.

DI, seen from a regional perspective, functions as a middle ground between full accession to the EU and limited to no contact. Third countries can either refuse or be refused membership in the Union, and instead opt for a lower grade of association by, for instance, participating in a select variety of policies or agencies in a limited manner (Schimmelfennig, 2016, p. 781). For EU members opposed to further widening of the Union, such limited participation functions as a compromise. TEU Art. 8 allows for the EU to establish “special relationships” with neighbouring countries, and Art. 218 gives the Union the right to formulate association agreements with non-members. Due to the broadness of the terms “special relationship” and “association agreements,” external differentiation may take many forms and be of varied depth and intensity. As a result, EU relations with its closest neighbours range from narrow, bilateral agreements to broad, multilateral frameworks of cooperation (Gstöhl, 2015).

Regarding membership of the Union, and following TEU Art. 49, any European state may apply to become a member of the Union, provided the state respects the values of liberal democracy. This, combined with the accession criteria, also known as the Copenhagen criteria—which includes a requirement for candidate states to respect the norms and values of liberal democracy and of the Union—provides the baseline for accession. In sum, one could argue that “good governance” is at the core of the accession process and a necessary requirement for potential new members. Following the argument proposed by Schimmelfennig, the more a third country’s governance capacity aligns with that of the EU, the more integrated the state is likely to be. Other explanations for varying degrees of integration include wealth; cultural, religious, and political legacies; identity; geography; or various policy-based explanations (see for instance Kölliker, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2016; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014).

EU contact with non-EU European states comes in a wide variety of forms, ranging from large, formalised structures such as the EEA to bilateral agreements focused on a narrow policy area. However, the availability of these sorts of arrangements can sometimes be limited for third countries, because of a lack of willingness or ability to integrate or adopt the EU acquis. As an alternative, third countries can collaborate with the various transgovernmental decentralised agencies that have beens proliferating since the mid-1990. These structures are decentralised in the sense that they are distinct from the EU institutions. They contribute to the implementation of EU policies, and are limited to specific tasks and jurisdictions, and may be more willing to open participation to third countries than the more complex and “wide-spanning” EU institutions (Lavenex, 2022; Lavenex & Lutz, 2023). They therefore serve as an alternative and/or complement to other integration initiatives. In other words, third-country participation in decentralised agencies does not act as an obstacle to simultaneous engagement in other policies and programmes. Third-country participation in EU agencies are mainly a result of attempts to formalise cooperation or a result of EU foreign policy, which has developed circles of association beyond the borders of the EU (Lavenex, 2022).

The number of such EU agencies has expanded drastically over the last 15 years, covering a diverse set of policy areas ranging from medicine, air safety, border control, external security, environment, and food safety (Egeberg & Trondal, 2015; Lavenex, 2022). Concrete examples include the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Environment Agency, and the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA). Mainly, these bodies have emerged from pre-existing networks open to third-country participation, with the result that they are mainly concerned with policy areas which have traditionally been under the control of EU supranational authorities (Eckert, 2022). Evidence suggests that these decentralised agencies are not only increasing in number, but also in terms of power and quality (Trondal et al., 2022). While most of these decentralised agencies allow for non-member third-country cooperation in their founding acts, not all of them do (Lavenex, 2022). For instance, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) only accepts EU members.

Such transgovernmental structures are an example of horizontal integration, whereby national administrations are linked together through common regulatory activities (Lavenex, 2022). Integration can happen both formally and informally, either through having formally been granted decision-making authority, or informally sharing information or cooperating in policy implementation (Lavenex, 2022). The focus on informal ways of integrating makes it easier to participate in said structures, as they will be more independent from states’ national governments. In turn, this allows for webs of foreign relations to be created, blurring the line between outsiders and insiders (Lavenex, 2022). Applying the definition of integration as proposed in this volume, participation in decentralised agencies can “increase the ‘density’ of interaction among national executives, deepen the ‘intensity’ of these interactions based on commonly defined curricula, data, practices and regulations and modify the ‘character’ of the relations among the participating countries by establishing a densely connected layer of transgovernmental cooperation” (Lavenex, 2022, p. 250). In short, it can increase integration.

5.3 Varieties of External Differentiation

Following the logic of DI, the level and depth of EU involvement with neighbouring countries varies. Common for all of them is that they extend EU rules and norms beyond EU borders (Lavenex, 2011). Formally, external differentiation is based on a set of legally binding agreements between the EU and the non-member state. This provides a variety of models of external DI, which has been referred to as “concentric circles” of integration (Lavenex, 2011) or as “privileged partnerships” (Gstöhl & Phinnemore, 2019). These partnerships range from close cooperation to more peripheral collaboration. This section will look at some of the alternative ways in which the EU integrates with different non-member third countries in the Union’s close neighbourhood. As the previous chapters have largely explored the CFSP and CSDP as well as the various bilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives that exist between the EU and third countries, we will now explore the non-militarised areas of what we have referred to as the “broader area” of EU foreign and security policy. This includes, among others, the EU’s relationship with the four EFTA countries; the customs union with Turkey; the special agreements made with post-Brexit UK; and the varying degrees of cooperation found in the ENP and in the Western Balkans. While the EU additionally maintains contact and both Trade and Partnership Agreements with countries even further removed from the borders of the Union, such as Canada, these fall outside the scope of this chapter.

While these frameworks differ in institutional set-up and level of intensity, they all come with a web of institutionalised relations, sometimes referred to as “joint bodies,” and cover a wide array of EU legislation (Dür & Gastinger, 2023; Lavenex, 2011). For instance, Norway and Switzerland are both granted near-complete organisational inclusion through Schengen. Organisational inclusion may also take the shape of inclusion in EU committees and agencies, where third countries are given the power to influence decision-making while legislation is excluded. Alternatively, EU rules can be promoted through EU-initiated non-EU bodies, such as regional fora. Looser relations are found in intergovernmental contacts, administrative connections, and diplomatic relations, where the acquis is promoted in parts and cooperation mainly occurs through agencies (Lavenex, 2011). Note that these are all ideal models, and actual rule adoption in third countries may differ. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the higher the level of interdependence between the EU and the third party, the higher the benefits to both (Dür & Gastinger, 2023).

5.3.1 Economic and Political Cooperation: EEA and Schengen

Close cooperation between the EU and non-members Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway was secured by the EEA Agreement in 1992. The premise for the creation of the EEA was offering market integration to non-members without providing full membership of the Union. Covering the free movement of goods, services, capital, persons, and competition rules, the EEA is considered the “most prominent case of acquis export outside the enlargement paradigm” (Magen, 2007). Non-EU members of the EEA are required to apply the whole acquis related to the “four freedoms,” based on the notion of legal homogeneity, which means that the inclusion of non-EU states to the EEA is currently the most extensive and deepest form of external differentiation (European Commission, 2021a). The inclusion of these states in the internal market is a pillar for the economic interdependency between the EU and EEA EFTA states.

The level and scope of the EEA Agreement has granted the three EEA EFTA states—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—the designation of “quasi-EU members.” EU relations with the EFTA states are based on a vision of free trade and economic integration both within Europe and globally. In 1989, Commission President Jacques Delors offered the then seven ETFA countries the opportunity to “look for a new, more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions” (Delors, 1989). This shows how external differentiation beyond the borders of the EU has been part of the Union’s set-up for decades. Except for Switzerland, all EFTA states have also become members of the EEA.

Special provisions were also given to all EEA/EFTA countries apart from Switzerland, which were granted participation in the Administrative Boards of EU agencies, with the same rights and obligations as EU members, except the right to vote (Lavenex, 2022, p. 252; Official Journal of European Union, 2014).Footnote 3 EEA EFTA states are at times given formal and informal access to EU policymaking bodies. Participation is especially pronounced in committees and agencies at the transgovernmental level (Lavenex, 2011). Considering our four dimensions of DI, this form of cooperation strengthens the dimension concerned with structural connectedness, i.e. common meetings and institutions. EEA states also take part in select decentralised agencies, which can give non-EU member influence in surprising ways, such as transferring national interests to common rules. For instance, through participation in ACER, Norway was able to avoid oil regulations being considered relevant to the EEA. Had they been considered appropriate for the EEA Agreement, they would have been binding on Norway (Lavenex & Lutz, 2023).

Schengen is an example of internal DI as well as external DI, as some EU members are not part of the Schengen area. Additionally, all four EFTA states are part of Schengen, as well as the Dublin asylum system (Lavenex & Križić, 2022). In areas related to Schengen, discussions take place in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in a mixed committee format, comprised of all EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland—again strengthening the structural connectedness of the EU and the EFTA states. Additionally, this applies to Frontex (the European border and coast guard agency) and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) (Lavenex & Križić, 2022).

The two pillar structure of the EEA sometimes serves as a hindrance to our second dimension, that of consistency or common rules, norms, and values. This is ironic, given that homogeneity is the leading principle of the EEA Agreement (Baur, 2019). New EU Internal Market legislation is continually incorporated into the Agreement. However, new legislation does not have to be implemented verbatim, which leaves room for manoeuvre. As the EU increasingly adopts packages of internal market legislation rather than individual acts, the legislation often contains elements which are not part of the EEA Agreement, including new forms of governance. This blurs the lines between what is and what is not internal market legislation (Gstöhl, 2015; Tobler et al., 2010).

The Schengen Area increases interdependencies between signatories to the Agreement, as it more or less abolishes internal border checks, bringing the countries of the Area closer together. Given the nature of the Schengen Agreement—which is often concerned with politically sensitive and sometimes pressing matters, such as terrorism—identical legislation is adopted by all states (Baur, 2019). This not only increases political interdependence, but also consistency in this area. Additionally, as EFTA members fully participate in meetings, consistency is strengthened. However, EU members exclusively maintain the right to vote.

Regarding our dimension of decision-making capacity, the EEA Agreement does not give the EFTA countries full rights of co-decision. While the Agreement gives EFTA states participation rights in EU programmes and representation in EU agencies, it does not give them voting rights. Seeking to safeguard its own decision-making autonomy, the EU has never given EEA EFTA states the right to vote (Frommelt, 2020). Consequently, the score on the fourth dimension, decision-making capacity, will be low in relation to non-EU EEA states. However, EFTA states participate closely in many committees and consult in the preparation of new acts, giving them the power to shape decisions, but not make them (Gstöhl, 2015). This sort of participation will increase the score of integration on our third dimension, structural connectedness.

5.3.2 Increased Cohesion Due to Bilateral Agreements

EU–Swiss relations are complex, covering more than 120 agreements. Despite sharing values and ideals, agreements have been made bilaterally rather than multilaterally, and Switzerland has largely forged its own set of associations (Kaddous, 2019). While the first Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1972, EU–Swiss relations today are based on two packages of agreements, signed in 1999 and 2004. The first package covered areas such as the free movement of people, barriers to trade, and public procurement. The second package integrated Switzerland into the Schengen and Dublin systems, as well as covering, among others, environmental policy and arrangements to combat fraud (Eckert, 2022). Most agreements are based on the idea of equivalence of laws between the EU and Switzerland (Gstöhl, 2015). Economic relations are not controlled by a monitoring clause, as with the EEA—rather, joint bodies are considered capable to administer the agreements and adopt the necessary decisions (Rabinovych & Pintch, 2022).

EU relations with Switzerland has been characterised as “pragmatic bilateralism.” Despite being part of EFTA, Swiss citizens rejected the EEA ratification in 1992. Since then, cooperation with the Union has been based on a series of bilateral, sectoral agreements (Gstöhl, 2015). While these bilateral agreements are more limited when viewed independently, when taken together they construct a solid framework for EU–Swiss cooperation, despite lacking the global character of the EEA Agreement. Through this plethora of agreements, Switzerland is close to the status of quasi-membership, on equal footing with members of the EEA (Lavenex et al., 2009).

As with Norway, through the Schengen association agreements, Switzerland is granted near-complete access to EU decision-making structures but not given the right to vote (Lavenex, 2011). Additionally, after the signing in 2004 of the second bilateral package, agreements have been reached in a variety of other fields, such as policing, the fight against international terrorism, security cooperation, legal assistance, satellite navigation, immigration, and company taxation (Kaddous, 2019). Taken together, these agreements serve to increase both interdependencies between the EU and Switzerland, as well as consistency. However, in 2021 the Swiss government decided to terminate negotiations over a proposed EU–Swiss Institutional Framework Agreement intended to enhance bilateral relations and govern Swiss participation in the EU’s internal market. As several of the EU–Swiss bilateral agreements are ageing they might no longer be fit for purpose. Consequently, there is a growing fear that the full potential of the relationship will not be reached (European Commission, 2021b).

The UK’s decision to leave the EU in 2016 prompted a revival of the literature on DI, as it plunged the EU into unknown territory. While Brexit has been conceptualised as a case of differentiated disintegration (Leruth et al., 2019), it does not entail the end of cooperation. The UK government’s ambition was to create a relationship with the EU that was “broader in scope than any other that exists between the EU and a third country” (UK Government, 2018, p. 7). Consequently, since the UK’s exit, several joint committees, sub-committees, and working groups have been established through agreements, and their decisions will shape EU–UK relations in the future (Dür & Gastinger, 2023). In the absence of overarching institutions, such transgovernmental committees are also the main fora through which EU–Swiss dialogue occurs, opening channels for stable communication between experts and higher-ranking officials (Lavenex, 2011).

With its withdrawal from the Union in January 2020, the UK ceased to be a party to the EEA Agreement, and with it the UK’s commitment to the four freedoms ended. The EU was quick to insist on the indivisibility of the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people, asserting that the UK could not “cherry-pick” which freedoms to keep and which to discard (European Council, 2018). The first round of EU–UK negotiations on their future partnership took place in March 2020 and resulted in an agreement that set the terms for future cooperation, as well as the signing of three agreements covering Trade and Cooperation (TCA), security of information, and cooperation on nuclear energy (European Council, 2022). The TCA established several joint sub-committees and working groups, as well as a “partnership council,” all with the aim of increasing cooperation and making EU–UK relations accessible (Dür & Gastinger, 2023). Regarding DI, this sort of arrangement increased both structural connectedness and consistency, although the full impact of the TCA is yet to be seen. Finally, there is the Windsor framework, proposed in 2023 as part of the Northern Ireland Protocol, which addresses practical difficulties regarding Brexit, especially concerning the Single Market.

The UK and Switzerland are both members of the European Political Community (EPC). Part of the rationale behind the creation of the EPC was that it was regarded as a way of bringing the UK back to the table to discuss security issues, as well as to function as a “platform for political cooperation” (European Parliament, 2022). It also allowed the UK and Switzerland to “redraw their relationships with their EU neighbours” (Gänzle et al., 2022), at a time when their associations have loosened. As the EPC is still in its infancy, it is too early to assess the results of the Community. However, the signal sent by the inclusion of countries such as Ukraine and Moldova is that the future of Europe is not to be decided by the EU alone.

Turkey’s involvement with European integration includes the 1963 Ankara Association Agreement and the establishment of a Customs Union in 1995. Although accession negotiations with Turkey began as far back as 2005, EU-Turkey relations have been stuck at an impasse for a long period. This has led to discussions of allowing Turkey to enter through a more flexible agreement, or for integration to happen incrementally through gradual membership (Turhan, 2018). However, with the democratic backsliding under Erdogan’s rule, Turkey’s prospects for membership have been diminishing, as evidenced by a call from the European Parliament following the failed military coup of 2016 for the European Commission and the European Council to initiate a temporary freeze on accession negotiations (European Parliament, 2016). Still, the Germany-initiated negotiations which resulted in the 2016 EU–Turkey deal on migration shows that the parties are capable of cooperation when necessary. Turkey’s attempt to trade Sweden’s NATO bid for EU membership created headlines in July 2023 created headlines. In an unexpected turn of events, the then newly re-elected Turkish President Erdoğan tried to link future Turkish EU membership prospects to the country’s ratification of Sweden’s historical bid to join NATO. Ever since May 2022, when Sweden applied for membership in the military alliance, Turkey has been hesitant to ratify Swedish accession. In the end, Erdoğan asked Europe to “open the way” for Turkey to the European Union in exchange for its support for Swedish membership in NATO. Exactly what this entails is uncertain—nevertheless, it shows a continued wish for increased integration and cooperation from the Turkish side.

Turkey’s geographical position, as well as its status as a NATO member and part of the G20, makes Turkey a strategic partner for the EU. Despite Turkey’s current stance on ratifying Sweden’s accession to NATO, it remains an important member of the alliance. As the chances of Turkey becoming a member of the EU have been slim, other opportunities for closer, external DI have opened. The customs union of the 1990s was “forged in an environment of slow but committed bonding” (Terzi, 2019, p. 121). While the customs union has certain institutional and functional issues, such as not including the service sector and the lack of an effective consultation mechanism, there is an inherent understanding from both actors of the need for cooperation and opportunities closer relations entails. Additionally, Turkey has joined the European Environmental Agency (EEA) and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), albeit without voting rights (Lavenex, 2022, p. 254), strengthening EU–Turkey relations areas outside the customs union.

As the chances for Turkish membership to the EU any time soon continue to be slim, opportunities for closer cooperation arrangements have arisen. In 2000 it was suggested that Turkey should have a “privileged partnership” with the EU, going beyond association with EU institutions and including integration in the internal market and the CFSP. However, this status has routinely been rejected by Turkey (Gstöhl & Phinnemore, 2019). Despite this, cooperation is again on the table, both due to Erdoğan’s recent comments, as well as the inclusion of Turkey in the EPC. Regarding the dimensions of DI, Turkey will continue to score relatively low on all dimensions, as there are several hurdles that need to be addressed before EU-Turkey relations will be marked by a high level of interdependency and consistency.

5.3.3 A Widening and Expanding Union

Historically, the EU has refused membership and close association with several states whose governance capacity, democracy, or economy has been deemed unsatisfactory. After the 2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement, EU accession cooled down. However, the new borders of the Union necessitated a new relationship with its near abroad. An alternative to accession came in 2004 in the shape of the ENP, where Eastern and Southern neighbours were offered “the prospect of a stake in the EU Internal Market based on legislative and regulatory approximation, the participation in a number of EU programmes and improved interconnection and physical links with the EU” (European Commission, 2004). There is an expectation of alignment between the domestic legislation of the ENP country and the acquis, strengthening cohesion (Lavenex & Lutz, 2023). In short, the policy sought to reduce pressure on the EU’s external borders through the creation of a “ring of friends,” resulting in a buffer zone for EU influence (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2021).

While the ENP was modelled on the EU’s pre-accession policy, the ENP was still regarded as an alternative to accession. In other words, the EU has offered willing non-members regulatory approximation to the EU acquis without demanding or offering membership (Lavenex, 2011). However, the promise of sharing “everything but institutions” (Prodi, 2002) with ENP countries changed following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as both Ukraine and Moldova were granted the status of candidates to the Union, while Georgia’s application to join was put on hold (Crombois, 2023).

Despite having several states up for EU membership, the focus has shifted to neighbouring countries that have not been offered candidacy status, particularly those covered by the ENP and Western Balkan states. While not granting access to EU core institutions, the ENP foresaw increased cooperation and contact in EU secondary bodies, such as agencies (Lavenex, 2022, p. 255). As stated by Art. 8 TEU, regarding neighbouring states, “the Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly,” suggesting increased interdependence. According to a communication from the Commission, ENP country involvement in EU policies could take the form of either “ENP country participation, or observer status in, or cooperation with specific agencies or other bodies that are involved in the management of Community policies” or “inclusion of ENP partners in the implementation of Community policies (e.g. research & development, consumer protection, information society, competitiveness and innovation, etc.)” (European Commission, 2006). The EU continues to have relations with countries beyond its neighbourhood as well. However, cooperation is mainly limited to issue-specific norm transfer, diplomatic intergovernmental relations, and transgovernmental networks, and involves less institutionalisation (Lavenex, 2011).

Whereas the opportunity to be granted candidate status has been given to countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, candidacy is off the table for neighbourhood countries in the MENA region. This does not mean, however, that the EU does not extend its external differentiation to these countries as well. The EU enjoys Association Agreements with several countries of the Southern Neighbourhood such as Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. Typically, these Agreements are concerned with liberalising trade and investment relations. For some states, such as Egypt, negotiations have begun for the development of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Through the ENP, the EU also engages in financial support and development assistance to associated countries. A new financial cooperation instrument, the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), was launched in 2021 and will channel €79.5 billion to programmes that aim to strengthen thematic areas such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Alignment with the Schengen and Dublin acquis is part of the accession process of candidate countries to the EU. Additionally, several countries of the ENP have specific agreements and commitments in line with Schengen legal acts. Both ENP and candidate countries participate on an occurring basis in the JHA agencies Frontex and EUAA (Lavenex & Križić, 2022). Frontex in particular has been mentioned as an example of far-reaching DI in operational activities, and it has concluded far-reaching agreements with ENP countries on operational cooperation in border management. Frontex has concluded 18 working arrangements, including among others with the authorities of various ENP countries (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus), Western Balkan states (such as Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro), as well as candidate countries to the EU (such as Moldova, Turkey, and Ukraine). This not only increases structural connectedness, but also interdependencies between the members.

While EEA EFTA countries enjoy automatic access to EU decentralised agencies, the same cannot be said for others. While Switzerland has not been granted the same level of access, cooperation agreements have ensured Swiss access to 18 agencies as of 2023 (Lavenex & Lutz, 2023). As the decentralised agencies are believed to serve the EU’s overarching goal of “encouraging and supporting regulatory and administrative reform and institution building in neighbouring countries” (European Commission, 2006, p. 3), they have the potential to serve as a platform for further integration with the ENP. Consequently, participation by ENP countries has been initiated by more than 20 agencies. This would be in line with our second dimension of integration, consistency, while also enhancing structural connectedness. The decision of whether or not to involve a neighbourhood country in an EU decentralised agency rests on the agency in question, however, not on EU foreign policy in general, and is determined on a case-by-case basis. As a result, most neighbouring countries have ad hoc ties with EU agencies rather than full participation (Lavenex, 2022). In other words, third-country participation is still an underused form of external differentiation, as ENP third-country participation remains relatively low.

Participation in decentralised EU agencies is not the only method of increasing communication and connections between the EU and its neighbours, however. The EU AAs, for instance—which the EU has with several countries in the Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans—established a framework of cooperation between the Union and the third country in question. We can distinguish between two different types of AAs: free trade agreements (FTAs) and Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). While FTAs do not necessarily aim for integration, they do increase interdependence and, consequently, DI. FTAs also increase consistency, in that they are used as a mechanism to export EU rules to the EEA Agreement; FTAs lower or remove tariffs and remove restrictions on movement of capital. SAAs have accession as an end goal, and are, as a consequence, prime opportunities for increased interdependency, consistency, and connectedness.

Regarding third countries which have been granted the status of “candidate country,” the EU has created something resembling a “waiting room” for future EU members. The formal status of “candidate country” was invented in 1997, when the EU started looking East for new members. There are currently eight candidate members of the EU. In December 2022, Bosnia was given candidate status, joining Albania, Moldova, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. What this means is that, with the exception of Kosovo, all of the countries of the Western Balkans are now EU candidate countries. For the Balkans, the association process is preceded by the Stabilisation and Association Process, designed to enhance cooperation and prepare the respective countries for potential EU membership (Pippan, 1994).

While the status of pre-accession could be considered the most obvious form of external DI, it contrasts with other forms of arrangement the EU has with neighbours in that it is, in theory, temporally limited. As the candidate country is expected to take on the full EU acquis, the opportunities for formal DI are limited (Baur, 2019). On the other hand, informal DI, in the form of opt-outs once the candidate has become a member state, remains an opportunity. Although accession erodes the opportunity for external DI, it opens up the possibility of internal DI. As several states have been waiting for EU membership for several years, however, candidacy serves as a category in its own right.

Candidate countries to the EU have been given access to the same programmes as EFTA states, in an attempt to familiarise candidates with EU policies and make adoption of the EU acquis more straightforward. However, this strategy has not been as efficient or widespread as intended, and candidate countries to the EU rarely enjoy access to EU agencies’ management boards or secondary bodies. Instead, contact is more focused on capacity-building programmes and concrete operational activities (Lavenex, 2022, p. 254). Nevertheless, the possibility of this sort of cooperation suggests a willingness for cooperation.

Concerning the recent development of the EPC and the inclusion of several neighbourhood states, the Community represents a new opportunity for increasing integration. There is a worry among non-EU members that the EPC will serve as a “holding place,” where candidate countries will become stuck, preventing membership. Rather, the EPC should be seen as an alternative to accession that in no way diminishes the status of the candidates. Rather than threatening accession, “the initiative serves as a twofold stepping-stone by allowing countries such as those in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova to complement their ambitions for accession” (Gänzle et al., 2022). However, as already argued, it is still too early to consider the impact of the Community beyond the signalling effect.

5.3.4 Leaders, Laggards, and Disruptors—(Dis)agreement in External Differentiated Integration

We have stressed the importance of agency regarding the various initiatives that result in DI, and the situation is no different in the case of external DI. Regarding the ENP, the Commission has historically taken the role of leader. They are joined in this endeavour by the HR/VP and the EEAS, and together they are responsible for the implementation of the policy (Sobol, 2015). Regarding the Neighbourhood policy, the member states themselves have acted as laggards and disruptors in the process towards a more effective Neighbourhood policy because of their diverging interests. EU members have not been able to agree on the long-term objectives of the policy, resulting in a series of vague compromises and informal differentiation (Chapter 1). However, this is not necessarily a result of the EU lacking actorness, as the message behind the ENP is the same across member states. Rather, it is a result of the conflicting interests. In other words, the normative basis is the same, but the objectives are different. As argued by Börzel and van Hüllen (2014, p. 1034), “the ENP suffers from substantive inconsistency rather than a lack of internal cohesiveness.” This shows how the dimensions of DI can affect the efficiency of EU policies.

In other instances, the countries of the Neighbourhood may act as laggards and/or disruptors themselves, since much of the relations between EU and third countries are based on willingness to cooperate. For instance, while the EU signed a Cooperation Agreement with Syria in 1977 and while the EU is still Syria’s largest trade partner, all bilateral cooperation between the EU and the Government of Syria has been suspended since the outbreak of war in 2011. While this does not hinder EU cooperation with other members of the ENP, it does impact the overall functioning of the Policy, as well as decrease EU legitimacy as an effective foreign policy institution. Through the NDICI, however, Syria continues to receive humanitarian and financial aid.

Regarding further enlargement of the Union, EU members disagree on the extent to which this should occur. After years of enlargement fatigue following the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargement, the changes in the geopolitical climate have brought new resolve in bringing candidates into the fold. For instance, Germany has generally remained a firm supporter of the enlargement policy, calling for the inclusion of the Western Balkans on the basis of conditionality and the fulfilment of the needed criteria (Töglhofer & Adebahr, 2017). The Commission has also pushed for further enlargement of the EU, especially as a consequence of the invasion of Ukraine, by calling for the status of candidate to be given to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, once the criteria set up by the Commission were fulfilled.

Regarding laggards and disruptors, who has this role is not as evident when it comes to external differentiation as it is for internal DI. As most external differentiation is based on the willingness of both partners to cooperate and integrate, laggards and disruptors become increasingly unlikely. Of course, there are instances, such as Syria, where bilateral cooperation is virtually non-existent, or cases such as Turkey, where cooperation is made hard because of differing objectives. However, overall, the policies and institutional frameworks continue to function for those who are willing, leaving the unwilling behind. Non-cooperating participants among the non-EU thus do not necessarily slow the process down—they just increase differentiation beyond the EU’s borders (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 EU(ropean) regional actorness as a function of levels of integration and uniformity
Full size table

Based on the discussion above, we give both the EEA EFTA states and members of the Schengen Agreement a high score of both integration and uniformity, as these agreements result in high levels of interdependency, both economic (EEA) and political (Schengen), as well as high levels of consistency and structural connectedness. Regarding the candidate countries, there is an expectation of a high level of uniformity through the adoption of the EU acquis, as well as the Dublin and Schengen arrangements, which is required in order to become a member. Although not all candidate countries can boast this level of harmonisation yet, we follow the argumentation of Baur (2019), whereby the opportunities for formal DI for the candidate countries are limited. As they are still formally outside the EU institutional framework, however, they are awarded a medium score on our integration dimension. While this score differs from the one given in Chapter 3, we explain this by arguing that, as Chapter 3 was concerned with both internal and external differentiation, the relative integration of the EEA and Schengen Area is lower when compared to internal differentiation. In this chapter, however, we have only focused on external differentiation, where the EEA and Schengen are more integrated and display a higher level of uniformity relative to the other initiatives.

As expected, most of these arrangements and initiatives fall in the category of low levels of integration. However, there are variations regarding the level of uniformity, which creates what Lavenex (2011) has referred to as “concentric circles” of EU integration. Regarding the ENP, we have distinguished between the East and the South. As there is a possibility for candidacy for countries in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Neighbourhood, especially Georgia, as well as a number of Association Agreements, these areas scored a high level of uniformity, but a low level of integration. As EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood are mainly concerned with trade and/or development aid, these states collectively, together with Turkey, have some level of cooperation with the EU. As the Windsor Framework has worked out some of the main obstacles challenging EU–UK cooperation, we can distinguish between uniformity pre- and post-Windsor. The UK post-Windsor joins Switzerland in being given a high degree of cooperation and a low level of integration. Following from this, we see that EU external differentiation often results in low levels of integration, but that higher levels of association with the EU usually lead to higher levels of uniformity.

5.4 Differentiated Integration Beyond the Borders of the EU

Through this discussion, it is evident that the EU had created a network of relations that expand well beyond the borders of the Union. External differentiation is not a new feature of Europe and has been a part of the Union’s external policy even before foreign policy was formalised in the Maastricht Treaty. This is part of what we have earlier referred to as the “broader” area of foreign and security policy, which includes the areas of trade and humanitarian assistance, areas which external differentiation is mainly involved with. EU involvement with non-EU European states has led to closer and mutually beneficial ties between the EU and its neighbours. While the depth and institutional extent of these networks vary, they all serve the same purpose—increasing European strategic autonomy. Through increasing interdependency, both political but mainly economic, consistency, and structural connectedness, these initiatives help bring about strengthened EU actorness in a wide variety of policy fields.

EU relations with neighbouring countries are largely based on the ability and willingness of these countries to integrate. In some cases, as with the EFTA countries, they are generally considered able but not willing to join the EU, while certain countries in the Neighbourhood, like Georgia, are willing but not able (Gstöhl & Phinnemore, 2019). In other words, external differentiation hinges not only on the actorness of the EU, but of its neighbouring countries as well. This is also the case regarding agency, where the laggards and disruptors are usually just left behind rather than working to disrupt the process of external integration.

External DI, as shown above, takes many forms, either through extensive multilateral and highly formalised arrangements, such as the EEA, or through narrow bilateral agreements, such as free trade agreements. Overall, most external differentiation is concerned with strengthening the consistency between the EU and the various third countries. This should not come as a surprise as further integration requires a baseline of agreement on common rules, values, and objectives. In cases such as the EEA where there already is a high level of consistency, interdependency in the form of strong economic cooperation can occur more steadily. As one of the main principles of the EEA Agreement is homogeneity, shared rules, and the existence of equal conditions, EEA countries get a high score on the dimension of consistency. The general success of the EEA Agreement has strengthened the EU Single Market, making the EU a more desirable trading partner with other neighbouring countries. Regarding non-EEA EFTA states, Switzerland can be considered a case of Europeanisation without institutionalisation, meaning that they are normatively largely integrated while still remaining institutionally on the outside (Linder, 2013). The UK, neither an EEA nor an EFTA state, has been on the inside but has elected to return to the outside. However, the following negotiations that followed Brexit have been largely focused on maintaining EU–UK trade, continuing the process of regional economic integration.

Gstöhl (2015) defines regional economic integration as being located somewhere between a free trade area and an internal market, with the ability to execute a level of collective decision-making capacity. This entails the creation of common standards and competition rules. The expansion of the EU economic community can therefore be seen as a form of external integration in the economic area. This, in turn, enhances European strategic autonomy by making the states of Europe more economically dependent on each other. As effective decision-making in this area requires the members to speak with “one voice” in order to agree on common rules and objectives, this form of cooperation also increases consistency and structural connectedness.

External differentiation may also take the form of involvement in EU decentralised agencies, especially for third countries with limited availability to cooperate in some of the more extensive initiatives. Mainly, EU agencies act as agents of EU governance in that they project EU rules beyond EU borders (Lavenex, 2004; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009), representing a potential, though underused, arena for further cooperation and integration. For the EEA EFTA states, who are granted automatic access, these agencies serve to increase cohesion and structural connectedness. Additionally, increasing transgovernmental cooperation with public administrations in countries in the Neighbourhood—albeit through ad hoc agreements rather than full-fledged participation for the ENP countries—points to a limited but heightened level of consistency, as common rules, values, and objectives serve as the baseline for cooperation. However, such transgovernmental cooperation requires bureaucratic structures equipped with enough capacity to handle such cooperation (Lavenex, 2022, p. 256).

Regarding decision-making capacity, none of the arrangements score high on either QMV or delegating capacity. As for the EEA, relevant legislation is first presented by the Commission and then adopted by the Council and the Parliament. It then becomes the job of the EEA Joint Committee to implement the corresponding amendment however they see fit. As the EU has been adamant about protecting its autonomy in this area, EEA EFTA states have never been given the right to vote. However, EEA EFTA states still have considerable influence through their ability to delay or adapt legislation (Frommelt, 2020). Nevertheless, the lack of a common decision-making arena for EEA-relevant legislature gives the EEA a low score on the dimension concerned with decision-making. Regarding the ENP and candidate countries, there is a high level of power asymmetry, as ENP countries and candidates are subjected to EU policies with limited influence on the contents of said policy. This could partly explain why the ENP has faced criticisms for not being as effective as initially predicted, as the bargaining power is in the EU’s favour (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).

As applicant states need to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria concerning democracy, free markets, and the ability to take on the EU acquis, candidate countries work towards aligning themselves with the common rules, values, and objectives of the EU. When only the candidates to the EU are considered, they are given a high score on the dimension concerned with consistency. However, because of the variety found in the Neighbourhood, where some countries are still far away from aligning themselves with EU rules and values, the ENP in total can only be given a middle score on the dimension of consistency. This is enhanced by the fact that, in general, the ENP has been unsuccessful in promoting good governance and democracy to the neighbourhood, as the promise of accession has largely been absent.

Through closer cooperation with the countries of the neighbourhood—whether through the EEA Agreement, bilateral agreements, decentralised agencies, the ENP, or through granting candidacy—the EU has created a network of cooperation and external differentiation through increased interdependency, consistency, and connectedness. These processes have helped blur the line between the EU and non-EU third countries, as they become increasingly connected to EU policies and initiatives. With the EU at the core, these initiatives serve to build regional security through the projection of common rules and values beyond the borders of the Union, making the entire region more capable of working together to handle obstacles regarding economy, migration, trade, visa, and further enlargement.