Skip to main content

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Law ((BRIEFSLAW))

  • 41 Accesses

Abstract

Should we look at the concept of identity through a broader lens for the purpose of s. 76(2)(b) (the impersonation provision) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003? This chapter answers that question in the affirmative. In positing a richer conception of the person, we can reflect selves as they actually are, capture what matters about identity deception, and justify expanding the scope of the impersonation provision. Accordingly, this chapter endorses a socio-relational conception of the person, or self. This foregrounds the alternative analytical-theoretical framework to be presented in Chap. 9, in which the final stage of the equivalence thesis is set out.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
EUR 32.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or Ebook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Lopes and Teresa (2012).

  2. 2.

    This question animates the work of, for example, Schechtman (2018); Gendler (2002), pp. 34–35; Wallace (2019), p. 26.

  3. 3.

    Wallace (2019).

  4. 4.

    Taylor (1994).

  5. 5.

    Haslanger (2012).

  6. 6.

    Ibid., p. 109.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., p. 123.

  8. 8.

    Ritzer and Smart (2000), p. 220.

  9. 9.

    Barnes (2013), p. 70.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Benson (2003).

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    Ibid, p. 64.

  14. 14.

    Donati and Archer (2015), p. 15.

  15. 15.

    This leaves open whether persons are fully constituted by social relations. For Donati and Archer (2015), persons are only partly so constituted.

  16. 16.

    Ricoeur (2015).

  17. 17.

    For example, Honneth (1995); Mead (1934).

  18. 18.

    Brison (2017). See also relational autonomy theorists, such as Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000); Meyers (1989); Nedelsky (2011).

  19. 19.

    Baier (1985).

  20. 20.

    Mackenzie (2009), p. 119. See also Mackenzie (2014).

  21. 21.

    Ritzer and Smart (2000), p. 239.

  22. 22.

    Ibid, p. 226.

  23. 23.

    Calhoun (2008), p. 197.

  24. 24.

    Herring (2013).

  25. 25.

    Brison (2022), p. 222.

  26. 26.

    Lugones (1987), p. 3.

  27. 27.

    Ritzer and Smart (2000), p. 133.

  28. 28.

    Ibid, p. 133.

  29. 29.

    Elias (1991), p. 19.

  30. 30.

    Elias (1997), p. 371.

  31. 31.

    Ritzer and Smart (2000), p. 356.

  32. 32.

    Bourdieu (1990), p. 192.

  33. 33.

    Ritzer and Smart (2000), pp. 219–20.

  34. 34.

    Brison (2022), p. 218; Baier (1985), p. 84.

  35. 35.

    Taylor (1995).

  36. 36.

    Taylor (1992).

  37. 37.

    Wallace (2019).

  38. 38.

    Unger (1990).

  39. 39.

    Hitlin (2003).

  40. 40.

    Tobia (2022); Chen and Urminsky (2022).

  41. 41.

    Parfit (1984).

  42. 42.

    McMahan (2002).

  43. 43.

    Lyreskog (2021).

  44. 44.

    Schechtman (2018); Taylor (1992).

  45. 45.

    Greenwood (1994).

  46. 46.

    Brison (2022); Campbell (2003).

  47. 47.

    Christman (2004), p. 145.

  48. 48.

    Wallace (2019), p. 8.

  49. 49.

    Buchler (1990).

  50. 50.

    Wallace (2019).

  51. 51.

    Ibid, p. 31.

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    Ibid, p. 29.

  54. 54.

    Wallace (2019), p. 666.

  55. 55.

    Ibid, p. 665.

  56. 56.

    Ibid, p. 666.

  57. 57.

    Meyers (2020), p. 629.

  58. 58.

    Some may disagree about this. And as I argue in Chap. 10, this has implications for circumstantial pressure cases, including R v Linekar 1995] QB 250, [1995] s All ER 230.

  59. 59.

    Childs (2001), p. 311.

  60. 60.

    Wallace (2019), p. 195.

  61. 61.

    For discussion, Hunt (1997).

  62. 62.

    Taylor (1994), p. 5.

  63. 63.

    Ibid, pp. 35–36.

  64. 64.

    Taylor (1994), p. 41.

  65. 65.

    Hermans and Gieser (2011), p. 660.

  66. 66.

    For example, Kittay (2009).

  67. 67.

    For example, MacIntyre (1984, 1988); Sandel (1988); Honneth (1995).

  68. 68.

    Herring (2020), p. 9.

  69. 69.

    Ibid, pp. 35–36.

  70. 70.

    Honneth (1995).

  71. 71.

    Taylor (1994), p. 25.

  72. 72.

    Taylor (1992).

  73. 73.

    Ibid, p. 49.

  74. 74.

    Foster and Herring (2017).

  75. 75.

    Taylor (1992), p. 35. Emphasis added.

  76. 76.

    Ibid, p. 51.

  77. 77.

    Ibid, p. 33. Emphasis added.

  78. 78.

    Ibid, p. 42.

  79. 79.

    Christman (2004), p. 104. Emphasis added.

  80. 80.

    Taylor (1992), p. 21.

  81. 81.

    Communitarian theorists, such as MacIntyre (1984, 1988) and Sandel (1988) address this question.

  82. 82.

    Madden Dempsey and Herring (2007).

  83. 83.

    I use this word deliberately to invoke the idea of sexual penetration as a pro tanto wrong that requires justification. See Madden Dempsey and Herring (2007). See Chap. 4 for further discussion.

  84. 84.

    Christman (2009).

  85. 85.

    [2020] EWCA Crim 971.

  86. 86.

    Sandel (1988), p. 179.

  87. 87.

    Wallace (2019), p. 119.

  88. 88.

    For example, Mead (1934).

  89. 89.

    See Mead (1934); Royce (2001); Buchler (1990). This relates to dialogical self theory, which brings Wallace and Taylor’s work together neatly.

  90. 90.

    Wallace (2019), p. 117.

  91. 91.

    ibid, p. 118.

  92. 92.

    Ibid, p. 35.

  93. 93.

    Ibid, p. 35.

  94. 94.

    [1995] 3 All ER 69 73.

  95. 95.

    [2013] EWCA Crim 823.

  96. 96.

    [2007] EWCA Crim 1699.

  97. 97.

    [2008] EWCA Crim 527.

  98. 98.

    Wallace (2019), p. 69.

  99. 99.

    Ibid, p. 69.

  100. 100.

    Benson (2003), p. 61.

  101. 101.

    Similarly, Battersby (2006), pp. 40–41, observes that the self is not identifiable either with a single trait or all taken collectively. Instead, the self both encompasses and transcends them all.

  102. 102.

    Christman (2009), p. 202.

  103. 103.

    Ibid, p. 10.

  104. 104.

    Ibid, p. 202.

  105. 105.

    We might propose, in addition, a cultural-linguistic hub, a class hub, and perhaps also an intimate-sexual hub.

  106. 106.

    Akerlof and Kranton (2000), p. 720.

  107. 107.

    Mavor and Ysseldyk (2020), p. 191.

  108. 108.

    Ibid.

  109. 109.

    Ibid, p. 187.

  110. 110.

    Per Herring (2005); Also, Dougherty (2013).

  111. 111.

    Per Gardner (1996).

  112. 112.

    Wallace (2019).

  113. 113.

    Lindemann (2014).

  114. 114.

    Herring (2021), Abstract.

  115. 115.

    I am grateful to Professor Jonathan Herring for pointing out this distinction.

  116. 116.

    Lindemann (2014).

  117. 117.

    Carr (2021).

References

  • Akerlof G, Kranton R (2000) Economics and identity. Q J Econ 105(3):715–753

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baier A (1985) Theory and reflective practices. In: Postures of the mind: essays on mind and morals, NED - New edn. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 207–228

    Google Scholar 

  • Barnes B (2013) The elements of social theory. Routledge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Battersby JL (2006) Narrativity, self, and self-representation. Narrative 14(1):27–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benson C (2003) The unthinkable boundaries of self: the role of negative emotional boundaries in the formation maintenance and transformation of identities. In: Harre R, Moghaddam FM (eds) The self and others: positioning individuals in personal, political and social contexts. Praegger/Greenwood

    Google Scholar 

  • Bourdieu P (1990) In other words. Polity, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brison SJ (2017) Personal identity and relational selves. In: The Routledge companion to feminist philosophy. Routledge, pp 218–230

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Brison SJ (2022) Outliving oneself: trauma, memory, and personal identity. In: Feminist philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchler J (1990) Metaphysics of natural complexes, 2nd edn. SUNY Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Calhoun C (2008) Losing one’s self. In: Atkins K, Mackenzie C (eds) Practical identity and narrative agency. Routledge, New York, pp 193–211

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell S (2003) Relational remembering: rethinking the memory wars. Rowman & Littlefield

    Google Scholar 

  • Carr D (2021) Personal identity is social identity. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 20:341–351

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen S, Urminsky O (2022) What’s left of me? In: Tobia K (ed) Experimental philosophy of identity and the self, 1st edn. London, Bloomsbury Academic

    Google Scholar 

  • Childs M (2001) Sexual autonomy and law. MLR 64:309

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christman J (2004) Narrative unity as a condition of personhood. Metaphilosophy 35(5):695–713

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christman J (2009) The politics of persons: Individual autonomy and socio-historical selves. Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Donati P, Archer MS (2015) The relational subject. Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dougherty T (2013) Sex, lies, and consent. Ethics 123(4):717–744

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elias N (1991) The society of individuals. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Elias N (1997) Towards a theory of social processes. Br J Sociol 48(3):355–383

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foster C, Herring J (2017) Identity, personhood and the law. Springer, Cham

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gardner S (1996) Appreciating Olugboja. Leg Stud 16(3):275–297

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gendler TS (2002) Personal identity and thought-experiments. Philos Q 52(206):34–54

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenwood JD (1994) A sense of identity: prolegomena to a social theory of personal identity. J Theory Soc Behav 24(1):25–46

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haslanger S (2012) Resisting reality: social construction and social critique. Oxford University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hermans HJM, Gieser T (eds) (2011) Handbook of dialogical self theory. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Herring J (2005) Mistaken sex. Criminal Law Review, pp 511–524

    Google Scholar 

  • Herring J (2013) Forging a relational approach: best interests or human rights? Med Law Int 13(1):32–54

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Herring J (2020) Law and the relational self. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Law in context)

    Google Scholar 

  • Herring J (2021) Children care. In: Clough B, Herring J (eds) Disability, care and family law. Routledge, pp 51–66

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hitlin S (2003) Values as the core of personal identity: Drawing links between two theories of self. Soc Psychol Q 66:118–137

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Honneth A (1995) The struggle for recognition—the moral grammar of social conflicts. Polity Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hunt D (1997) Two problems with knowing the future. The importance of time: proceedings of the philosophy of time society, 1995–2000, pp 207–223. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands

    Google Scholar 

  • Kittay EF (2009) The personal is philosophical is political: a philosopher and mother of a cognitively disabled person sends notes from the battlefield. Metaphilosophy 40(3–4):606–627

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindemann H (2014) Holding and letting go: the social practice of personal identities. Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Lopes H, Teresa C (2012) The relational dimension of identity – theoretical and empirical exploration. Rev Soc Econ 70(1):81–107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lugones M (1987) Playfulness, “world”-travelling, and loving perception. Hypatia 2:3–19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lyreskog DM (2021) Withering minds: towards a unified embodied mind theory of personal identity for understanding dementia. J Med Ethics 49(10):699–706

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre A (1984) After virtue. A study in moral theory. Duckworth, London

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre A (1988) Whose justice? Which rationality? Duckworth, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackenzie C (2009) Personal identity, narrative integration and embodiment. In: Campbell S, Meynell L, Sherwin S (eds) Embodiment and agency. The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, pp 100–125

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackenzie C (2014) Embodied agents, narrative selves. Philos Explor 17(2):154–171

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackenzie C, Stoljar N (eds) (2000) Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Madden Dempsey M, Herring J (2007) Why sexual penetration requires justification. Oxf J Leg Stud 27(3):467–491

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mavor KI, Ysseldyk R (2020) A social identity approach to religion: religiosity at the nexus of personal and collective self. In: The science of religion, spirituality, and existentialism. Academic Press, pp 187–205

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • McMahan J (2002) The ethics of killing: problems at the margins of life. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mead GH (1934) Mind, self and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyers DT (1989) Self, society, and personal choice. Columbia University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyers DT (2020) Reflexive communication and the whole self: Kathleen Wallace’s the network self. Metaphilosophy 51(5):628–634

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nedelsky J (2011) Law’s relations: a relational theory of self, autonomy, and law. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricoeur P (2015) Soi-même comme un autre. Média Diffusion

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritzer G, Smart B (eds) (2000) Handbook of social theory. Sage

    Google Scholar 

  • Royce J (2001) The problem of Christianity. CUA Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandel M (1988) Liberalism and the limits of justice, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Schechtman M (2018) The Constitution of selves. Cornell University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor C (1992) Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor C (1994) The politics of recognition. In: Gutmann A (ed) Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor C (1995) The dialogical self. In: Goodman RF, Fisher WR (eds) Rethinking knowledge: reflections across the disciplines. State University of New York Press, Albany, pp 57–66

    Google Scholar 

  • Tobia K (ed) (2022) Experimental philosophy of identity and the self, 1st edn. Bloomsbury Academic, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Unger P (1990) Identity, consciousness and value. Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallace K (2019) The network self: relation, process, and personal identity. Routledge

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Cases

Cases

  • R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527

  • R v B [2013] EWCA Crim 823

  • R v Linekar [1995] 3 All ER 69 73

  • R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971

  • R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Farah, R. (2023). The Social-Relational Self. In: Rereading Identity Deception in the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44475-3_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44475-3_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-44474-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-44475-3

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics