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Abstract

This chapter introduces the subject of the book and the central thesis. It includes an overview of the personal identity problem, a detailed outline of the book’s structure, definitions of key terms, assumptions, and methodological approach.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For discussion, Perry (1972).

  2. 2.

    Schechtman (2018).

  3. 3.

    Foster and Herring (2017), p. 44.

  4. 4.

    Gligorov and Vitrano (2011), p. 154.

  5. 5.

    Reid (1865).

  6. 6.

    Schechtman (2018), p. 1.

  7. 7.

    Foster and Herring (2017), p. 3.

  8. 8.

    Tadros (2008), p. 91.

  9. 9.

    Moore (2013), p. 183.

  10. 10.

    Shoemaker (2021).

  11. 11.

    Naffine (2019). See also Norrie (2014).

  12. 12.

    S 76(2)(b).

  13. 13.

    This requirement is discussed in Part III, Chap. 7.

  14. 14.

    Whether the deception must cause V to consent is unclear, but it plausibly should.

  15. 15.

    More is said about this in Chap. 4.

  16. 16.

    This argumentative structure is inspired by Otsuka’s (1994) moral equivalence thesis.

  17. 17.

    Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 76(2)(b).

  18. 18.

    Parfit (1984); Locke and Nidditch (1979).

  19. 19.

    [2008] EWCA Crim 527.

  20. 20.

    Taylor (1992).

  21. 21.

    This premise is argued for by means of a Substantial Difference Argument.

  22. 22.

    Shoemaker (2021).

  23. 23.

    Schechtman (2014, 2018); Korsgaard (2003).

  24. 24.

    Christman (2004).

  25. 25.

    Gallagher and Marcel (1999).

  26. 26.

    Wallace (2019).

  27. 27.

    Olson (1997).

  28. 28.

    Velleman (2002).

  29. 29.

    Olson (1997).

  30. 30.

    Strawson (2004).

  31. 31.

    Wallace (2019).

  32. 32.

    Gallagher and Marcel (1999); Dennett (1976).

  33. 33.

    Eklund (2004), pp. 503–505.

  34. 34.

    I borrow this expository structure from Eklund (2015).

  35. 35.

    [2019] EWCA Crim 557, [2019] QB 1063.

  36. 36.

    Thomasson (2016).

  37. 37.

    Haslanger (2012).

  38. 38.

    Dennett in Rorty (1976), p. 176.

  39. 39.

    See Plunkett (2015).

  40. 40.

    Thomasson (2016).

  41. 41.

    Moore (1985), p. 29, drawing on Stone’s distinction between intelligibility and usefulness.

  42. 42.

    Ibid, 29.

  43. 43.

    Ibid, 30.

  44. 44.

    Wallace (2019).

  45. 45.

    West (2009), p. 90.

  46. 46.

    Sider (2001).

  47. 47.

    Tobia (2022).

  48. 48.

    Moore (1985), p. 25.

  49. 49.

    Ibid, 80.

  50. 50.

    Schechtman (2018).

  51. 51.

    For more on this distinction, see Schechtman (2018).

  52. 52.

    [2008] EWCA Crim 527.

  53. 53.

    This is particularly the case with deceptive sex. For example, Kennedy (2021); Williams (2008). A major

    concern is over-criminalisation. Of course, the idea of ‘over’ is somewhat question-begging. If deceptive sex is, in an important sense, as bad as paradigmatic rape, the question of excessiveness does not arise.

  54. 54.

    Hogg et al. (1995), p. 255.

  55. 55.

    Greenwood (1994).

  56. 56.

    Gligorov and Vitrano (2011), p. 148.

  57. 57.

    Parfit (1986).

  58. 58.

    Ibid.

  59. 59.

    Lane (2011).

  60. 60.

    Ibid, 103.

  61. 61.

    Schechtman (1994).

  62. 62.

    At a minimum, per Parfit (1984), this criterion includes ‘memories, attitudes and/or values.

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  • R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527

  • R v Melin [2019] EWCA Crim 557, [2019] QB 1063

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Farah, R. (2023). Introduction. In: Rereading Identity Deception in the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44475-3_1

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