Abstract
The relation between logic and ethics is discussed through the reflections proposed by Corcoran. Although the latter claimed the inseparability of both normative disciplines and their reciprocal virtues, a number of arguments have been advanced for their complete separation by rejecting the alleged validity of mixed inferences, i.e., those inferences including both descriptive and non-descriptive statements. After examining the import of logic into the area of ethics, an isomorphism argument is advocated to validate logical inferences between moral statements. Then such inference rules are introduced into political discourse as a special kind of moral statements, including the famous left–right cleavage and the formal analysis of such an opposition in terms of moral commitments.
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Notes
- 1.
For more details about this isomorphism argument, see [7].
- 2.
See the following link: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-brazil-idUSKCN1RF1QD.
- 3.
Such a logical fallacy corresponds to what Schopenhauer studied under the heading of eristic (dispute another’s argument successfully per fas et nefas, i.e., without searching truth), as witnessed by the Stratagems 1 and 2 of his Art of being right: “1. Take your opponent’s proposal beyond its natural limits; overdo it. The more your opponent’s statement is general, the more objections you can raise. The more his proposals are restricted and narrow, the easier they are to defend by him. 2. Use different meanings of your opponent’s words to refute their argument.”
- 4.
- 5.
Partido dos Trabalhadores, whose builder and leader is the actual president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva a.k.a. Lula.
- 6.
For more information about the arguments and objections to that formal approach to the left–right cleavage, see [12].
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Schang, F. (2024). Mixed Political Inferences. In: Madigan, T.J., Béziau, JY. (eds) Universal Logic, Ethics, and Truth. Studies in Universal Logic. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44461-6_14
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