Joining the IBE? The Influence of Global Power Relations

Abstract

The IBE was further away from its goal of universality from the point of view of its affiliated members. Clearly, the Latin and Anglo-Saxon clans that existed in UNESCO, and before that in the ICIC, were echoed within the IBE. As a result, the general orientation of the Bureau would be more strongly marked by a tendency to favour the definition of universalisable principles over a more practical and economic approach. As a consequence, the relatively small number of members often had faced a difficult financial situation, which is presented in an insert.

The large discrepancy we have noted in Fig. 14.1 between the number of countries that participated in the IBE’s activities and those that joined it could be a key to reading the IBE’s positioning from a geopolitical point of view. We should contrast both these facts as countries that interacted with the IBE could be considered potential members. We shall study canvassing undertaken by the IBE and confirmed affiliations, in order to understand the reasons that may have discouraged or favoured membership. We shall then describe this same process in terms of its geopolitical distribution. On this basis, a typology of members and non-members can be established and possible explanatory factors outlined.

Lobbying: A Matter of Survival

The importance of membership fees for the financing IBE, and more generally the evolution of its finance is analysed in Insert 15.1.

On 19 December 1930, the Executive Committee of the IBE decided to send a circular letter concerning the existence of the IBE to all the ministries of education in the world. It enclosed documentation on the history, activities and statutes of the IBE to encourage governments to join:

In thus bringing to your knowledge the official existence of the Bureau, the Executive Committee is anxious to intensify the technical and administrative relations existing between your Ministry and or Institution, and an international organisation of universal interest, created in order to carry out technical collaboration in the field of education, while maintaining a completely neutral position with regard to political and religious questions. […] We are at your disposal to give you any information concerning the relations between the International Bureau of Education and the states who desire, by becoming members, to contribute to the development of international collaboration in the field of education.¹

The responses to this circular letter did not live up to expectations: only four reached the IBE (Belgium, China, Romania and Bolivia, the latter being the only one to indicate a wish to join (Director’s Report 1930, p. 21).² A similar approach was undertaken for South American countries, with an equally disappointing result (Loureiro, forthcoming). Another strategy was therefore set in train: “to proceed with individualised steps to obtain the accession of new countries”,³ in other words to contact states and their ministries one by one.

From that point on, lobbying a wide range of governments was continued and intensified. This was done mainly through the personal contacts of the members of the secretariat, initially mainly with Western European countries. As early as 1930, Secretary General Marie Butts made use of her wide network of contacts in Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Norway, with personalities often close to the Ministries of Education.⁴ At the same time, in the course of his own travels and lecture tours, Piaget took the opportunity to engage in discussions with scientists and diplomats who had influence on a relevant ministry (education, foreign relations, finance), notably in France, the UK and Italy. And close links already existed with Central and Oriental Europe, thanks to former students and lecturers of the Institut Rousseau (Hofstetter, 2010, pp. 291, 486). Thus, the ground there was favourable, especially as Poland, close to the other Slavic countries, was a founding member. Iran was also approached through an acquaintance of Butts and Piaget: thanks to a regional argument since Egypt was a member and Turkey (here too the links with the Institut Rousseau were essential) was about to become one,⁵ it seemed easy for Iran to become the “voice of the East”.⁶ In Asia, it was above all Japan that was actively courted, with the Secretary General also activating her networks by evoking other “Asian” alliances, with Persia having promised its participation.

The arguments in favour of membership were always the same. Emphasising that membership allowed participation in the definition of the content covered and the orientations of the Bureau—which suggests additional powers in the organisation and thus on the international scene—its spokespersons insisted first of all on the Bureau’s function of documentation and comparison in the field of education; then they underlined the neutrality of the IBE and even its independence with regard to Geneva’s international organisations, particularly the LoN. But, in addition, the message was also specially adapted to its addressees:

• To powers considered as in the second rank, it was stated that the IBE being based in a neutral country made it possible to avoid the tutelage of great powers.

• The educational tradition of each invited country was shown respect, by appealing to national qualities.

• References to countries that were culturally or ideologically close were intended to be attractive, by suggesting possible alliances.

One of the main obstacles to membership was the fee, which was set at 10,000 Swiss francs for each country, regardless of its size and wealth.⁷ The IBE quickly realised that it had to compromise to allow any country to join. It therefore de facto lowered the amount of the contribution, or proposed that it be paid “in kind” by sending a collaborator who would work simultaneously for the IBE and for the country concerned.⁸ Participating in the International Exhibition of Public Education then became the equivalent of making a contribution in kind.⁹ It is apparent that financial arrangements did not seem to be a problem at first. They were partly compensated by subsidies from foundations. But the habit of paying less, or not paying at all, would eventually lead to an existential crisis.¹⁰

This intense individual lobbying even during the war (e.g. of Japan or Finland¹¹) became rarer and then disappeared after the collaboration agreement with UNESCO in 1947. It is true that the IBE and its officials regularly reminded states of the possibility of joining, on the occasion of the ICPEs, incidentally in letters and by sending material describing the history and activities of the institution, but there was no longer any trace of a systematic and sustained approach. Collaboration with UNESCO and its regular financial participation probably made the question of membership less pressing (Image 15.1).

Image 15.1

IBE revenues and expenditures in 1939. The incomes from membership fees were not very high (64,460.- CHF), if one takes into account that the fee was fixed at 10,000.- CHF: there were sixteen state members and few of them paid their duty in this period of crisis. The total income (142,577.- CHF) nonetheless exceeded the expenditures (95,534.- CHF). (© IBE)

Three Waves of Membership

Analysis of summary Figure 14.1 in the preceding chapter shows that only a quarter of the countries that participated in IBE activities were members in 1934. This difference diminished over time, to half in 1968, but the gap between participation and membership remained significant.

We can distinguish three waves of membership. The first, not very intense, corresponded to the inter-war period and included only European (11) and Latin American (3) countries, plus Egypt and Iran. A second wave, which began tentatively just after the Second World War, continued until the mid-1950s and led to the accession of communist countries, France’s former Arab colonies and the first two Asian countries to free themselves from French domination, Vietnam and Cambodia: during this period, the IBE grew from sixteen to thirty-three members by 1957. Then the third wave, which took place over a decade, was by far the most impressive, with the arrival of thirty-five new countries, Pakistan being the last to join during the period under review.

Regions of the World Unevenly Represented

In order to analyse the IBE’s presence in the world from the point of view of membership, the best indicator seems to be to calculate, by region, the percentage of members in relation to the countries that participated in the institution’s activities and were therefore eligible for membership. The three regions that reached a membership rate between 70% and 75% comprised Europe, Latin America and, what is sometimes classified as WENA,¹² namely West Asia and North Africa. These regions included all the founding countries, including Ecuador for Latin America and Egypt for WENA, along with Geneva. In Europe, a clear pattern emerges from the analysis: northern European countries, including the Netherlands and Luxembourg, were not members.¹³ Despite being the most regular participants in IBE surveys and ICPEs and despite the IBE’s strong lobbying before the Second World War, these states resisted joining. The same was true of Oceania and Canada, which participated in almost all the Bureau’s activities. The United States and the UK, also very assiduous, became members relatively late, in 1958 and 1960.

To understand this phenomenon, let us look at other regions. Among the Latin American countries (Loureiro, forthcoming), the three Central American neighbours (Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador) and two southern countries (Paraguay and Uruguay) were not members, nor was the former British colony Jamaica. It is difficult to detect a common reason for this. However, we should not overlook the Anglo-Saxon influence: apart from the proximity of the first three, Nicaragua and Honduras were long subject to the dictatorship of the dollar, under the influence of the United States, while the impact of the British Empire—whose reluctance we have already pointed out—was very durable in Jamaica.

As far as WENA is concerned, there was a high membership rate, attributable to two factors: on the one hand, countries colonised by France tended to join more quickly and readily (we will come back to this); on the other hand, the fact that Egypt was a founding country certainly facilitated the membership of Arab countries, particularly from the Persian Gulf. It should be remembered that Egypt had already had a close relationship with the founders of the IBE before 1929, in particular with Édouard Claparède.¹⁴

Fifty percent of the countries in the East of WENA (including Afghanistan) became members. The first to join as soon as they gained independence, as we have seen, were Cambodia and Vietnam (1952¹⁵): perhaps significantly, both had been French colonies. Japan followed, courted by the IBE from the time of its foundation, which had been supported by the Japanese diplomat Tamon Mayeda, vice-president of the first IBE’s board of directors. The other countries, including India, the Philippines and Thailand¹⁶ became members only in the 1960s, during the large wave of new membership.

Following their independence, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa showed a real enthusiasm for the IBE’s activities, which curiously was only modestly reflected in membership: only nine of the thirty-five countries participating in the IBE’s surveys and ICPEs joined. The countries that did join were mainly in West Africa (Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone), with Cameroon close by and Burundi, a former Belgian colony, further away. It is difficult to draw a clear conclusion, but it is not impossible that the strong French, or even French-speaking, presence in this region, even though it also included former British colonies, may have facilitated the affiliation.¹⁷

The phenomenon of three waves of membership and the geographical distribution of members highlighted here allow an interpretation from the point of view of the universality which the IBE aimed for. The first wave was characterised by a strong Latin orientation at the European and American level, by an obvious presence in Oriental Europe and by an opening towards the WENA countries. This can be explained by the close links that the Institut Rousseau—founder of the IBE—already had with representatives of these countries and from which the Bureau would be able to benefit. The English-speaking countries, including Australia, New Zealand and Canada (despite Quebec being Francophone), did not affiliate with it, although constantly participating in the IBE’s activities; this was also the case for the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, whose closeness to the Anglo-Saxon countries is well known.

This cultural and geographical orientation was reflected in the second wave, which saw an expansion mainly to Oriental Europe and Asia. It was not until the third wave that we see a broader universality, with the accession of the United States in 1958 and the UK in 1960, India in the same year and many other Asian and African countries. We should also stress that the time lag between independence and accession is relatively large for the Philippines, South Korea and Pakistan, all of which were under Anglo-Saxon influence. Curiously, the states of Northern Europe did not follow this trend (even though the Council of Europe—anxious to consolidate its entity—strongly recommended it in 1957¹⁸); nor did those of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa: cultural gaps seemed to persist.¹⁹

Insert 15.1 Evolution of the IBE Finances

The IBE’s finances evolved substantially during the forty-three years of its existence as an independent institution (1925–1968). Analysis of expenditure and income and the structure of budgets and financial statements²⁰ offers a striking perspective on the evolution of its operations, and leads to a better understanding both of its dissolution and integration with a new structure into UNESCO and of the gap between ideals and reality.

Analysis of revenues (see Table 15.1) reflects the structural evolution of the Institution. From a balance sheet by decade, we see that revenues consistently grew (by a factor of 20).

Table 15.1 The revenue of the IBE in Swiss francs from 1929 to 1967 by decade

Figure 15.1 shows that at the outset the IBE depended mainly on private resources: those of the Institut Rousseau which became the Institut universitaire des sciences de l’éducation in 1929, and various donations and contributions, including those of members. Indeed, major US foundations like Rockefeller, Carnegie and Payne donated important sums for IBE projects; the Nobel Committee also allocated a significant grant. Although the direct subsidy from the Institute (12,000 Swiss francs initially) later decreased substantially, that was compensated by contributions in cash (provision of trainees, collaborators, secretaries, premises, sharing of the library). The share of donations decreased but still played a considerable role, not least in theorientation of surveys. From the 1930s onwards, government contributions were the main source of income, including the contributions from the Swiss Confederation and the Canton of Geneva, which covered the costs of the premises.

Fig. 15.1

Structure of revenue from 1929 to 1967 by percentage

The financial structure changed fundamentally with the collaboration with UNESCO (initiated in 1947 and then formalised permanently), whose contribution stabilised at around 20% (especially for the ICPEs and translations). The leaps between 1949 and 1959, on the one hand, and in the 1960s, on the other hand, were the direct effects of a massive increase in the number of members each contributing, in principle, CHF 10,000 per year. The Swiss Confederation, on the other hand, contributed 50,000 Swiss francs from 1946 onwards (when it also became a member of UNESCO; this translated into a much higher annualcontribution of CHF 600,000 for this UN organisation). Sales of publications and subscriptions yielded an average of 5%, with no significant change. The line “Other” includes, among other things, contributions from stamps, exceptional contributions for the permanent exhibition and services in kind in the form of interns.

As for expenditure, the structure remained relatively stable over time. “Salaries” was still the most important item, even if it tended to decrease in favour of “publications”, which accounted for a quarter of the expenditure following the collaboration with UNESCO, which contributed mainly to translations. General expenses (mailings, office equipment, etc.) fluctuated around 15%. A more detailed analysis of salaries shows that in 1967, not including the directors and their secretariat, two-thirds of the salaries were allocated to posts in charge of the development of educational documentation collections and the permanent public education exhibition, and one-third to paying people who organised the ICPEs and conducting surveys. This proportion was relatively stable from the middle of the century onwards. It precisely mirrored the IBE’s mission to document the world educational movement, to conduct scientific research in comparative education and to promote intergovernmental co-operation in order to solve the world’s most crucial educational problems.

By 1966, alarm bells were ringing. The Director announced that, in view of the major expansion of the Bureau, it was no longer possible to continue without a substantial and lasting increase in the budget, which was already in deficit: the secretariat had to recruit more staff, who had to be both better qualified and better paid so that the IBE could fully carry out its mandate. The financial crisis also stemmed from the fact that although the membership fee had remained the same for forty years, many countries did not pay it, even though the poorest were allowed to pay only half (i.e. CHF 5000; only nine countries were concerned). In 1966, nineteen member countries (out of 66) did not pay their dues. The resultingshortfall was enormous. Appeals to these countries went unheeded. The Director was fully aware of the depth of the crisis and the difficulty in surmounting it:

If the Bureau has overcome various crises, it is in part due to the spirit of service of its founders and their successors, which they instilled into all their collaborators, whose dedication has made it possible to maintain the activities of the Bureau.²¹

The catastrophic financial situation was in fact only one aspect of a deeper crisis that required a complete overhaul of the institution: this was achieved through the dissolution of the IBE in December 1968 and its incorporation with a new structure into UNESCO in 1969.²²