Ethiopia

Abstract

Local government is the oldest and most important political institution in Ethiopia and one that has direct relevance to the conduct of people’s everyday lives. Despite this simple fact, local government does not enjoy the institutional place and status in government that its importance warrants. It has no explicit constitutional recognition and consequently is not endowed with original functions, powers, or sources of finance. It is barely considered in any of the political and legislative reforms taking place in the country. Any democratic and social reform that does take place is, in fact, unlikely to succeed without properly empowering local government and enhancing its democratic mandate. Positive political change ‘requires enhancing the political significance and the democratic pedigree of local governments’. The institutional mechanism for achieving this is ‘the entrenchment in the national constitution of local government as democratic and politically relevant level of government, alongside the transfer of suitable competences and sufficient resources’.

Local government is the oldest and most important political institution in Ethiopia and one that has direct relevance to the conduct of people’s everyday lives. Despite this simple fact, local government does not enjoy the institutional place and status in government that its importance warrants. It has no explicit constitutional recognition and consequently is not endowed with original functions, powers, or sources of finance. It is barely considered in any of the political and legislative reforms taking place in the country. Any democratic and social reform that does take place is, in fact, unlikely to succeed without properly empowering local government and enhancing its democratic mandate. Positive political change ‘requires enhancing the political significance and the democratic pedigree of local governments’. The institutional mechanism for achieving this is ‘the entrenchment in the national constitution of local government as democratic and politically relevant level of government, alongside the transfer of suitable competences and sufficient resources’.

1 Country Overview

Ethiopia is located in the East African region commonly known as the Horn of Africa. It is, after the secession of Eritrea in May 1991, a landlocked country and shares borders with Eritrea in the north, Sudan and South Sudan in the west, Kenya in the south, Somalia in south-west and south-east, and Djibouti in the east. With a territory 1.13 million km² in size, it is the tenth largest country in Africa.¹

The last time Ethiopia conducted a census was in 2007. As per the 1995 Constitution, it was supposed to have conducted a new census in 2018, but this was postponed indefinitely due to the unrest in different parts of the country.² The exact population of the country is thus unknown, though it is estimated at a little under 115 million, making Ethiopia the second most populous country in Africa after Nigeria.³ The population shows remarkable diversity in ethno-linguistic composition, with close to 80 formally recognised ethnic communities. According to the 2007 census, the Oromo, who make up 35 per cent of the population, are the largest ethnic community, followed by the Amhara, who make up 22 per cent of the population.⁴ The Somali, Tigray, Afar, and others comprise the rest of the population. Ethiopia also exhibits religious diversity within the majority, of whom a little more than 60 per cent are adherents of different branches of Christianity (Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic). Muslims constitute the second largest religious group, representing about 35 per cent of the population.⁵

With a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of USD 855, Ethiopia belongs to the category of low-income countries. Its economy is largely dependent on agriculture, which makes up half of the country’s GDP and 84 per cent of its exports, as well as providing 80 per cent of its total employment; coffee is the country’s most significant export item. With a national debt of about USD 40 billion (amounting to 55 per cent of GDP), Ethiopia ranks among the highly indebted countries in the world.⁶ Its aim is to diversify its economy and join the group of low- to middle-income countries in 2025.⁷ Thanks to the double-digit economic growth it achieved for ten consecutive years (2005–2015), this aspiration seemed within reach. However, the impact of a number of factors suggests that it is unlikely, in the immediate future at least, to enter the ranks of middle-income countries. Covid-19, the plague of locusts, and, above all, the outbreak of civil war in the Tigray state and the consequent economic sanctions imposed by Western countries due to alleged human rights violations, have all undermined the achievement of this goal.⁸

Once a monarchy, Ethiopia became a republic with the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974. The triumphant Derg became a military junta that ruled the country for the next 17 years.⁹ Ethiopia remained a unitary state until 1991. Then, after 17 years of civil war, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnic-based rebel groups, overthrew the Derg and initiated formal decentralisation.¹⁰ This culminated in the adoption of the 1995 Constitution that entrenched a federal system of government for Ethiopia.¹¹ Given that the federal system was founded on the right to self-determination by the ethnic communities of the country, the ten subnational units of the federation were established along ethnic lines. The subnational units are the Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, Oromia, Sidama, Somali, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), and Tigray.¹² The Sidama state was formed as the tenth state of the federation in 2020, after it had seceded from the SNNP. In addition, an eleventh state—the South-West Peoples’ State—was also established after a referendum in October 2021. Addis Ababa, the capital of the federation, is a federal city outside the jurisdiction of any of the states.¹³

Government is structured at both federal and state levels.¹⁴ As parts of a dual federal system, the federal and state governments have legislative, executive judicial organs. The federal government has a bicameral parliament composed of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR) and the House of Federations (HoF).¹⁵ The HoPR is composed of directly elected members and exercises legislative functions while the HoF, made up of representatives of the ethnic communities of the country, exercises non-legislative functions, including (importantly) the interpretation of the country’s constitution.¹⁶ The Council of Ministers comprises a prime minister, a deputy prime minister, and several other ministers, and enjoys executive powers at the federal level.¹⁷ Ethiopia has a parliamentary form of government and, hence, the Prime Minister is selected by the Members of Parliament from among their number.¹⁸ Federal courts are structured as first instance courts, high courts, and the Supreme Court, which has the final say on issues arising from the laws.¹⁹ The states have a state council, and a cabinet composed of a chief administrator, a deputy chief administrator, and the heads of the state bureaus.²⁰ All states, save for the Harari and the SNNP, have unicameral state councils.

Ethiopia has been under the sway of what is often described as ‘electoral authoritarianism’: the domination of the entire political space in the country by the EPRDF.²¹ The party has made use of various institutional mechanisms to maintain its dominance, including a favourable electoral system and legislation intended to weaken opposition parties and civil society organisations.²² In the 2015 election, the EPRDF claimed a total victory: not a single seat in either parliament or a state council went to the opposition.²³ A massive public protest arose in Oromia soon after these elections, and similar protests followed in other parts of the country. The protests were accompanied by intercommunal conflicts that led to deaths and the displacement of millions, particularly in Oromia, Somali, and SNNP. The public protests, and the response of the government to them, gradually led to a rift among the four members of the EPRDF. This led in turn to a change in the party’s leadership, and the rise to power of Abiy Ahmed, the current Prime Minister.

Abiy Ahmed initially acted as a reformer. He oversaw the revision of several pieces of legislation regarded as oppressive, but a number of measures introduced since 2019 have been seen by his political opponents as solely intended to consolidate Ahmed’s own power. One of these measures was the merger of members and affiliates of the EPRDF into a new national political party called the Prosperity Party; its formation involved the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the most influential member of the EPRDF.²⁴ A second was the extension of his term of office. This was done in the name of combating the spread of Covid-19 in a controversial process of constitutional adjudication. These measures widened the rift between the federal government and the TPLF. On 4 November 2020, armed forces loyal to the TPLF attacked different bases of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), igniting an armed conflict in Tigray which ended only two years later.²⁵

2 History, Structures, and Institutions of Local Government

Local government institutions are at least as old as Ethiopia itself, which as a state traces its origins to the Axumite Empire that emerged two millennia ago in today’s Tigray region and Eritrea.²⁶ Since then, Ethiopia has had a ‘triple layer’ of authorities, with an emperor at the centre, provincial governors at the meso-level, and local authorities at the lowest level.²⁷ Local government institutions were the level closest to the people and (because of this) the most important level, since the central government had limited visible reach into and influence on their lives. The topography of the country, rugged with chains of mountains and valleys crisscrossed by numerous rivers, did not allow the central government to extend to every part of the empire. Its reach beyond the capital was further hindered by a lack of developed infrastructure (such as the roads necessary to connect the different parts of the country).²⁸ A centralised system of government is a recent phenomenon, beginning only in the second half of the nineteenth century. The limited influence of the central government over the peripheries of the country, coupled with the ethnic and cultural diversity of the people, influenced the emergence of various types of local government institutions. Local authorities enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy from the central government, while accepting responsibility for collecting taxes and tributes and maintaining law and order within their jurisdiction for, and in the name of, the emperor.

In the 1850s, a process of territorial expansion began in Ethiopia, and by the early twentieth century a limited degree of centralisation became possible when different parts of the country were connected with the capital city by means of roads, railways, and other communication systems.²⁹ Road connectivity was enhanced during the five-year occupation by Italy, which paved the way for even further centralisation by Haile Selassie, who regained his throne after the Italians were expelled in the 1940s.³⁰ Centralisation reached its zenith under the Derg, the military regime that overthrew Haile Selassie and introduced a form of socialism into the country.³¹

Local administration was one of the first areas of reform addressed by the Derg.³² It established associations of urban dwellers (UDA) in urban areas. These were structured at three levels: kebeles (a new institution created by the Derg), a kefitegna zone (made up of several kebeles and located in Addis Ababa), and the city level.³³ In the rural areas, peasant associations were established at kebele, woreda, and provincial levels. These local institutions played a crucial role in the implementation of the Derg’s land nationalisation programmes, both urban and rural. They also provided basic services and sought to make certain basic goods (such as food and toiletries) available to the people at an affordable price.³⁴ However, they were later used to implement the Derg’s infamous Red Terror operations and became the basis for the state’s apparatus of oppression and control.³⁵

The Derg was overthrown by the EPRDF in May 1991 after 17 years of armed struggle. The EPRDF then began a process of decentralisation aimed at responding to the age-old ‘question of nationalities’. It was this process that led to the formation of the federal system, with the federal government standing at the centre and the states (regions) occupying the periphery.

Any level of government below state level is generally considered as local government. There are two types of local government in Ethiopia: ordinary or regular local government, and ethnic local government.³⁶ Ordinary local government has both woreda (district) administration for rural areas and city administration in urban zones. A woreda is, as a general rule, established for territorial areas which have populations of about 100,000. However, the states retain the power to create, divide, or amalgamate woredas, and have established woredas with populations of less than 100,000. Thus, in the early 2000s there were some 600 woredas, a number which has seen a significant increase to 1000 woredas.³⁷ There are more than a hundred cities, including Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Woredas and cities (including Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) together administratively cover the entire geographical area of the country.

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, the two largest cities which are within the jurisdiction of the federal government, also fall within the category of city administration despite having a special political and financial status. Addis Ababa has an estimated population of more than 5 million, while Dire Dawa has close to half a million people.³⁸ The two cities are not organised under any of the states. Each of them has a city council, a mayor (selected by and from the members of the city council), and a city manager (Fig. 1).³⁹

Fig. 1

(Source Prepared by the author)

Organisational structure of local government in Ethiopia

The ethnic local governments are established in areas where there are intra-state ethnic minorities. They are established either in the form of a liyu woreda (special district), or as a nationality zone, each being established along ethnic lines. In principle, any of these can choose to secede from the state within which it is found and so become an autonomous state and a separate member of the federation. The Sidama state was, for instance, a nationality zone before becoming a state in 2020.⁴⁰ The kebele is the lowest administrative unit found both in rural woredas and in cities.

3 Constitutional Recognition of Local Government

Local government is not explicitly recognised under the 1995 Constitution as an autonomous order of government. The Constitution does not allocate any function or power to local government, nor does it establish sources of revenue for it. Local government does not enjoy original functions, powers, or sources of revenue provided by the Constitution. However, the Constitution does make some implicit reference to the two types of local government (ethnic local government and the ordinary local government). Article 39(3) of the Constitution provides for the establishment of ethnic local government as an autonomous order of government through its recognition of the right of each ethnic community to establish self-government in the territory it inhabits.

The Constitution also makes passing reference to ordinary local government by requiring the states to establish ‘lower units’ of government and to transfer ‘adequate powers’ to them.⁴¹ This provision was reached during the drafting of the Constitution as a compromise between those who sought the explicit recognition of local government under the Constitution and those who maintained that local government should be left exclusively for the states. The Constitution, while leaving the choice open regarding the number of tiers of local government they can establish, implicitly requires the existence of forms of local government which are democratically constituted and ‘adequately’ empowered.⁴²

While lacking explicit recognition in the national constitution, local government enjoys a much more direct recognition in subnational constitutions, though the matter is complicated by the fact that state constitutions in practice have little more than symbolic power since they appear to have little influence over actual decisions by state authorities. In fact, state officials barely refer to the state constitution when passing decisions or making speeches.⁴³ All in all, the fact of the recognition of local government in state constitutions seems to have little political relevance.

The fact that local government is not recognised in the FDRE Constitution considerably diminishes its political relevance. This is clear from the fact that none of the opposition parties ever took part in the five recent local elections. The sixth local elections—which were supposed to have been held in April 2018—were postponed indefinitely due to the political unrest in the country. In fact, this postponement elicited little response, and no political group or party seems to be concerned about it. This stands in stark contrast with the postponement by almost one year of the general elections for the federal and state governments. This led to a significant outcry and, finally, to an armed confrontation between the federal government and the TPLF.

Addis Ababa is constitutionally designated as the capital of the federation. According to article 49, the residents of Addis Ababa have the right to a ‘full measure of self-government’. Addis Ababa is thus established as a city with substantial political autonomy. The Constitution also guarantees the right of the residents of the city to be represented in the HoPR.⁴⁴ There is no level of state government above Addis Ababa and it thus has a direct relation with the federal government. At the same time, it does not have the status of a state and is not considered a member of the federation. As we will see below (Sect. 10), this situation has led to serious controversy about the status of Addis Ababa and the ‘interest’ of Oromia over the city.

Dire Dawa, the second federal city, is not mentioned in the Constitution and does not stand on an equal footing with Addis Ababa even though both are federal cities. It was placed under federal jurisdiction because both the Oromia and Somali states claimed ownership of the city and could reach no agreement in this regard. The proclamation that established Dire Dawa as a federal city understood this to be a temporary measure only and to last only until the resolution of the dispute between the two states over ‘ownership’ of the city was resolved.⁴⁵ More than 20 years later, the city remains under federal jurisdiction and the dispute between the two states continues.

4 Governance Role of Local Government

As mentioned, the local government does not enjoy original functions and powers under the federal constitution. The powers and functions of local government are those resulting from the functions and powers of the states. The powers enjoyed by Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are those defined by the federal laws adopted by the HoPR, and which are therefore open to change or amendment by it.⁴⁶

4.1 Functions and Powers of Woredas

The states were supposed to use their constitutions (and other legislation) to define the powers and functions of local government. The state constitutions do not, however, list the functions of local government in any clear or concise manner. Instead, in rather general terms, they simply authorise woredas to exercise all powers and functions that they later deem necessary for the purpose of providing social services, while the social services that woredas are expected to provide are not themselves established.⁴⁷ Some states (Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz, for example) have used ordinary state laws to define the functional competences of woredas. Lacking clear definition in the state constitutions, the functions attributed to woredas are most visible in various policy papers, as summarised in Table 1.

Table 1 Functional competences of woredas in practice

4.2 Functions and Powers of Cities

Proclamations that deal with urban local government describe the functional competences of the cities, while proclamations adopted by the HoPR define those of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.⁴⁸ Functions within the competences of cities are divided into state functions and municipal functions. State functions are those that are directly linked with reducing poverty, and are guided by Ethiopia’s pledge under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Declarations. They can also be linked to the Sustainable Development Goals which followed and replaced the MDGs. These functions include primary school, health, water, and the like. Municipal services are those that are typically provided in urban areas and include responsibilities in regard to cultural, recreational and youth centres, museums, housing, sewerage, streets, street lights, solid waste, fire-fighting, abattoirs, parks, liquor licences, and ambulance services.⁴⁹

Both woredas and cities have political institutions: legislative councils and executive councils. Members of the legislative councils are directly elected by the residents of the relevant local government units. Executive councils are composed of a chief administrator and heads of sectoral offices or (in the case of cities) mayors and members of mayoral committees. The woredas have administrative institutions which are organised in the form of sectoral offices. As a rule, the woredas are entitled to establish their own administrative institutions, based on a state civil service law, and to recruit, hire, and fire their administrative staff, including teachers, nurses, engineers, and the like.⁵⁰ However, in practice, the states are usually involved in at least the recruitment stage.⁵¹

Cities also have city managers who oversee the provision of municipal services. A city manager is accountable to the political institutions of the city, and especially to the mayor. Woredas and cities are authorised to exercise planning, legislative and executive powers over their functional competencies (albeit these often lack clear definition). They thus adopt short-term and medium-term service delivery plans based on the policies and plans of the federal state governments. The Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city councils can issue their own proclamations, which put them on par with state councils’ laws since other local governments could issue only directives, the lowest form of legislation which a ministry or a sectoral office could issue.⁵² Woredas councils are authorised to adopt only directives, the lowest form in the hierarchy of laws in Ethiopia. The plans and laws of the local government council are executed by the executive organs and administrative institutions of local government.

5 Financing Local Government

The federal constitution does not provide local governments with distinct and original revenue-raising power. The revenue-raising and expenditure powers of the two federal cities are regulated by federal laws while the financial powers of the woredas and the cities in the states are regulated by state constitutions and law.

5.1 The Revenue-Raising and Expenditure Autonomy of Woredas

The state constitutions do not allot any revenue-raising power to woredas, although they do authorise them to collect land-use fees, agricultural income tax, and income taxes from their own employees. These sources of revenue are still ones that the Constitution designates as the sources of revenue for the states. The woredas thus collect these taxes and fees on behalf of, and based on the rate determined by, the states. Such revenue is not considered to be the internal revenue of woredas. In some states (such as Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz) woredas are allowed to collect income tax from the employees of enterprises which secure their business licences from the woredas. They are also permitted to collect taxes from small traders and traditional miners⁵³; user fees from libraries, clinics, and community halls; licence fees from irrigation schemes and water-wells; and fees for the registration of births, deaths, marriages, and divorces.⁵⁴ The two states have also introduced a tax-sharing scheme in which a woreda is allowed to take a portion of the revenue collected within its territorial limits in the form of state tax or fee. A woreda is thus entitled to take a percentage of income collected from land leased for, and income tax collected from, commercial agriculture, as determined by the relevant state.⁵⁵

The state constitutions also authorise woredas to identify and utilise sources of revenue that are not being used by the states. The provision seems to have no practical relevance since there is no state tax that the states have not already begun utilising.⁵⁶ The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that a woreda may create new taxes that do not fall under the authority of the federal or the state governments and collect revenue from them, since a woreda may not assume the authority to impose and collect undesignated taxes. An undesignated tax becomes either a federal, regional, or concurrent tax when it is so decided by a joint session of the two federal houses.⁵⁷ In short, the provision allowing woredas to make use of taxes that are not utilised by the states seems to be meaningless.

Woredas collect some revenue in the form of contributions from their residents for specific development projects (such as water-drilling and the building of schools). They are also allowed to receive revenue for similar projects from donors. A woreda is not constitutionally entitled to a revenue transfer from the federal or state government. In practice, though, woredas receive a large amount of revenue in the form of unconditional or block grants and conditional or specific-purpose grants from the states. The revenue transfer to woredas in the form of a block grant was started with the adoption of the poverty-reduction plan in the early 2000s.

The amount of money that goes to woredas in this way has shown a significant increase in recent years.⁵⁸ The states transfer to woredas and cities a minimum of 50 per cent of what they receive from the federal government in the form of block grants.⁵⁹ Such revenue transfer is based on a predetermined formula and covers more than 70 per cent of a woreda’s expenditure. Over 80 per cent of the block grant is used to cover the recurrent costs of the woreda, and is used mainly for paying salaries for teachers, health workers, and agricultural extension workers. Block grants cannot be used for financing capital expenditures such as the building of schools or road construction: these are usually financed from the budgets of the relevant ministries.⁶⁰

Woredas also receive specific-purpose grants (conditional grants) which can be understood as a form of equalisation grant. These most often come from the federal government, as they finance certain programmes linked to the SDG goals (such as the food-security programme, production safety-net programme, the road fund, and the HIV/AIDS programme).⁶¹ For instance, in the 2019/20 financial year, the federal government earmarked 1.6 per cent of the total federal budget (amounting to ETB 6 billion) for such purposes.⁶² Some of this revenue went to the woredas, which play a crucial role in the execution of the programmes. In these cases, the federal government does not transfer the money directly to woredas but rather to the states (on the understanding that the states will pass these funds on to the woredas).

Prior to reforms in the 2000s, woredas were required to send their budgets to the state government for approval. This is no longer the case, and the woredas enjoy expenditure autonomy in the sense that they can adopt their own budgets. A woreda council now has the final say on its own budget.

5.2 The Revenue-Raising Powers of the Cities

The main sources of revenue for the cities are urban land lease fees, land-use fees, and fees for municipal services.⁶³ They can also collect revenue in the form of municipal service fees including ‘market fee, sanitary service, slaughterhouses, fire-brigade services, mortuary and burial services, registration of birth and marriage, building-plan approval, property registration and surveying, and use of municipal equipment, transport or employees’.⁶⁴ Some state proclamations authorise cities to borrow money from financial institutions for capital projects.⁶⁵ Given that the states themselves are allowed to borrow only with permission from the federal government, it is debatable whether they can actually authorise cities to borrow. Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have a wider range of revenue sources. These include:

• capital gains tax on properties in the city;

• tax on income earned from rented houses and buildings;

• stamp duties on contracts and agreements, as well as title deed executions;

• user charges on vehicles in the city;

• royalties on the use of forest resources in the city; and

• charges on municipal services.

With authorisation from the federal government, the two federal cities can also borrow from domestic financial institutions for capital projects.⁶⁶ Addis Ababa is able to request that the federal government borrows money on its behalf from external sources, once it has identified such sources.⁶⁷ Cities are expected to use revenue collected as municipal fees for the provision of municipal services: they do not receive grants from the states or the federal government to cover any expenses relating to the provision of municipal services. They are, however, expected to receive grants for the provision of state services such as education, health care, and the like.

Addis Ababa has a particularly rich source of internal revenue and covers up to 97 per cent of its own expenditure (unlike Dire Dawa).⁶⁸ Its annual budget is larger than that of most member states of the federation, with the exceptions of Oromia and Amhara. In 2020–2021, Oromia’s budget totalled ETB 91 billion,⁶⁹ while Addis Ababa adopted a budget of ETB 61 billion⁷⁰; Amhara had a budget of ETB 62 billion, just one billion birrs greater than that of Addis Ababa.⁷¹

Despite the fact that state proclamations list revenue transfer as a source of revenue, cities do not receive block grants as the woredas do.⁷² They receive revenue from the federal government (in case of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) and the states (cities within the states), often in the form of conditional grants. The states transfer revenue to cities that can be used for the provision of state services such as education and health care, but these funds as a rule cannot be used for the provision of municipal services. While Addis Ababa covers up to 97 per cent of its expenditure with its own, self-generated revenues, the federal government does provide additional finance for projects that it deems have a national relevance.⁷³

Cities have full autonomy in expenditure and can adopt their own budget without approval from more senior levels of government.⁷⁴

6 Supervising Local Government

6.1 State Supervision Over Local Government

States can and indeed do regulate local government by using their powers to adopt subnational constitutions and to formulate and implement policies and strategies for matters of state social service provision.⁷⁵ An important aspect of regulation comes through the ways in which the states use constitutions to define the structure of local government (its functions and competences). In addition, the states are responsible for numerous laws aimed at the regulation of local government. Proclamations are used to define the political institutions, powers, and functions of cities, setting up the legislative framework in which cities function. The states also develop annual plans that set the minimum targets woredas and cities in every sector of service delivery must meet. Such plans are expected to be consistent with national social and economic development policies and strategies, such that the planning and implementation of social services and economic development undertaken by a woreda or a city are in line with both national and state policy frameworks.

The states retain the power to monitor the woredas and the cities to see if they are fulfilling their mandates, but in states where ethnic local governments are in place (such as the SNNP and Amhara), the zonal governments often directly oversee the activities of woredas and cities within them. This reflects the enhanced political status that ethnic local governments have compared to regular local governments.⁷⁶ In states such as Oromia and Somali where no ethnic local government exists, woredas and cities report to the states directly or through zonal administrators which are in any case run by state appointees.⁷⁷ The states seldom establish institutions with exclusive monitoring powers over the woredas and cities. Every sectoral office monitors its counterpart at the woreda level so that education bureaus, health bureaus, and the like monitor the activities of woredas that relate to their respective sectors.⁷⁸ In Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz, ‘an administrative and security affairs bureau’ is charged with the responsibility of monitoring woredas, without, however, excluding other sectoral offices from doing so. Cities are usually overseen and supported by a bureau of urban development, especially in relation to their municipal functions.⁷⁹

The principal method of state monitoring is self-reporting coupled with occasional on-site inspections by state officials. A woreda chief administrator and a mayor send quarterly reports to the relevant state on the overall condition of the woreda and city, respectively.⁸⁰ In addition, each sectoral office of the woreda or the city submits periodic reports on its activities to its state counterpart.⁸¹ The report regarding the municipal functions of a city goes to the state bureau of urban development.⁸²

The constitutions of the states, other than the Tigray constitution, are silent on the conditions for state intervention in local government. The Tigray state constitution authorises state intervention in a woreda or a city administration in several circumstances: if and when a woreda endangers the state constitutional order; if it fails to maintain peace and security; and if it fails to exercise its legal and constitutional functions and powers effectively.⁸³ This intervention clause, commonly known as the ‘Siye Abraha intervention clause’, was inserted into the Tigray state constitution in response to internal political divisions within the TPLF.⁸⁴

The Constitution identifies several grounds for intervention. These include misappropriation of funds or properties; failure of a woreda executive council to convene a meeting for more than six months; and the infringement of any provisions of a state law.⁸⁵ While these grounds of intervention are rather broadly defined and open the door for undue state intervention, they can be useful when a local government malfunctions in the areas of basic service delivery.

The state constitutions and proclamations which work to regulate such state intervention only provide for the harshest forms of intervention: the suspension and (if seen as necessary) the dissolution of offending councils.⁸⁶ Less extreme forms—such as giving warnings and insisting on the proper assumption of responsibilities within a given time frame—are not mentioned in the constitutions.⁸⁷ On the dissolution of a local council, the state council orders the state cabinet or the state chief administrator to establish a transitional woreda administration. This will then be in charge of the relevant woreda or a city for a period of up to one year.⁸⁸ The power of the transitional administrator is limited to the execution of existing laws and policies, and the administrator cannot enact new laws. The only legislative power it can exercise is approving the woreda’s annual plan and budget.⁸⁹

The intervention clause has rarely been used. The EPRDF controlled all levels of government and the party was structured hierarchically, starting from the base of the kebele level. A woreda chief administrator was the head of the party at the woreda level, and a zonal administrator and a state president were the heads of the party at zonal and state levels. There was a system of vertical accountability within the party. In practice, this party structure served as an effective means of supervision and intervention from the top.⁹⁰

6.2 Federal Supervision of Local Government

The federal constitution establishes two orders of government, namely at state and federal levels; local government falls within the exclusive competence of the states. The federal government is implicitly forbidden by the Constitution from any direct supervision of local government, though it does supervise the two federal cities, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, which are under its direct control. Not only does the federal government regulate⁹¹ and monitor these cities, it also intervenes whenever it deems this necessary. It did so in Addis Ababa following disputed elections in 2005. The next election (after the 2005 general election) to the Addis Ababa city council was held in 2013 with the fourth local election. Diriba Kuma was appointed by the city council as the mayor of the city who served until the expiry of his term in 2018. In July 2018 the Prime Minister nominated Takele Uma as the deputy mayor of the city whose nomination was endorsed by the city council. Takele served in this capacity until he was replaced by Adanech Abebe in September 2021 who was also nominated to the position by the prime minister.⁹² Both Takele and Adanech were not members of the city council. The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) decided to have the election to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city councils with the general election which was held in June 2021. Adanech Abebe was elected to the Addis Ababa city council and became the mayor of the city.⁹³

A key question remains as to whether the woredas and cities which are within the territories of the ten states can escape the supervisory authority of the federal government. As mentioned above, the federal government has retained the power to ‘establish and implement national standards and basic policy criteria for public health, education, science and technology, cultural and historical legacies to directly or indirectly regulate local government’. This provision seems to allow at least the indirect regulation of local government by the federal government.

A related constitutional issue has recently emerged in connection with the dispute between the federal government and the Tigray state. The question here is whether the federal government can initiate direct contact with a local government that has a problematic relationship with the state government. As the relationship between the federal government and the TPLF deteriorated (following the postponement of the sixth general elections in April 2020), the TPLF declared that it would no longer recognise the federal government under the leadership of Abiy Ahmed as legitimate. The state established its own electoral board and held its own elections in September 2020 in defiance of the federal government’s warning not to do this. After these disputed elections, the federal government declared that it would not recognise the new Tigray state government. As a result, the HoF ordered the Ministry of Finance not to transfer revenue to the newly established Tigray state government. It stopped short, however, of the forceful removal of the newly established state government of Tigray, which it deemed unconstitutional. Instead, the HoF ordered the federal government to make direct contact with governments of woredas and cities for the purpose of ensuring the delivery of basic services to the public.

There was indeed zero chance that the local authorities within the Tigray state would be willing or able to directly interact with the federal government and bypass their bosses at the state level. Even if that were in practice possible, the order of the HoF to make direct contact with woredas and cities was constitutionally suspect.⁹⁴ In the event, following the 4 November 2021 attack (by forces loyal to the TPLF) on various bases belonging to the Northern Division of the ENDF, the federal government initiated an armed intervention into the Tigray state.

7 Intergovernmental Relations

7.1 Local–Federal Relations

Intergovernmental relations (IGR) in the Ethiopian federal system is a topic that has received little attention in the past 30 years. There were no formally established IGR fora until recently. Different federal and state agencies with parallel mandates have maintained informal and unstructured interactions with each other.⁹⁵ Federal and state legislatures have held ad hoc meetings once or twice a year, while federal sectoral offices (such as ministries of education, agriculture, finance, and economic development) have interacted with their counterparts at the state level. The principal forum for dealing with issues common to the federal and state governments was provided by structures within the EPRDF. As the party was structured around the idea of democratic centralism, relations between the central, state, and local structures of the party were inevitably hierarchical in nature. This meant that state and local governments (under the control of the state and local level structures of the party) had no choice but to implement the policies and decisions adopted by the party’s central structures. When the party was faced with major internal division soon after the 2015 elections, interactions between the states and the federal government almost collapsed. In the absence of a functioning IGR forum, the tensions between the federal government and the TPLF-led Tigray state grew worse, ultimately leading to armed conflict.⁹⁶

In the past two years, some efforts have been made to formalise the intergovernmental relations between the federal and state governments. To this effect a policy on IGR was prepared by the HoF, was endorsed by the HoPR, and resulted in a proclamation in 2021.⁹⁷ The Proclamation established several fora for IGR, with these including fora for federal and state legislatures and heads of the executive organs. However, local government has been given no place in these. The proclamation is completely silent on the place and role of local government (including ethnic local government) in these fora. This seems to be a result of the dual nature of an Ethiopian federal system which leaves local government within the exclusive competence of the state, and inhibits any interaction between the federal and local government, except indirectly through the states.

7.2 Local–State Relations

There are no institutional fora to accommodate local-state interactions within any of the ten states. A nationality zone council (composed of members of a state council who are elected from within the zone and representatives of woredas within the zone) does bring three levels of government (woreda, zonal, and state governments) together and this can, in some sense, be viewed as a forum for cooperation between the three levels of governments. Some state proclamations provide for the establishment of an association of woredas and cities that exist within their respective jurisdiction. These will then act to represent ‘cities collectively, express their views on matters of their common interest [and] lobby [the regional] government for revision of laws’.⁹⁸ The Oromia, the Amhara, and the SNNP states have all made such proclamations. These provide that an association of cities can be established within the respective states, and that these associations can represent cities collectively, and express their views on matters of common interest to state governments.⁹⁹ For the moment, no such associations have come into being.

The most frequent, regular, and important interactions between state and local government take place through the agency of the sectoral offices.¹⁰⁰ State bureaus of education, health, agriculture, water and sanitation, tourism, and the like regularly interact with their woreda counterparts. In areas where there are ethnic local zones, the interactions between woredas and state sectoral offices take place through the zonal sectoral offices which ‘serve as immediate points of referral for local governments’ dealings with [a state]’.¹⁰¹ The interactions between state bureaus of finance and woreda or city offices of finance are perhaps the most important and the most frequent.¹⁰² Revenues (including unconditional and conditional grants) are transferred from a state bureau of finance to the woreda office of finance, which receives and administers the transferred revenue.¹⁰³ Smooth and regular interactions between the agencies are vital for the functioning of the woredas.

7.3 Local-to-Local Interactions

While some state laws provide for cooperation between the woredas and the cities, there is no clear regulation governing cooperation between local government units within a state. A case in point is Proclamation 86 (2010) of Benishangul-Gumuz. This provides that woreda-to-woreda and woreda-to-city cooperation within the region may be conducted through joint committees that these local government units can establish to deal with common issues.¹⁰⁴ As mentioned, some city proclamations provide for the establishment of woreda associations and city associations. Were these to be established, they could serve as a forum of cooperation among local government units as well as lobbying for the interests of the cities at the state level. This remains a possibility only, as no city association has as yet been established.

Cooperation between local government units of two or more states is also left unregulated. It is not difficult to imagine the kind of common issues that are likely to require cooperation, particularly when borders are shared. Service delivery, boundary disputes, intercommunal conflicts (especially regarding the pastoralist communities who move across state boundaries): all of these require cooperation between woredas of two or more states if they are to be successfully resolved. There is, however, no federal law which regulates interactions between local government units of two or more states, and (as previously mentioned) the IGR proclamation is entirely silent about local government. The city proclamations of Amhara, Oromia, and the SNNP allow the cities to form an association of cities with cities in other states and in other countries.¹⁰⁵ It seems that such an association would be established in accordance with the federal Organisations of Civil Societies Proclamation 1113(2019) and would have the status of a civil society organisation, one which lobbies state and federal governments on behalf of the cities. But, once again, no association of woredas or cities has been established to which woredas and cities of two or more states are members.

The other forum which brings together cities of different states is what is called ‘cities’ day’ or ‘cities’ forum’. This is a special event that takes place in a host city and goes on for several days, with more than a hundred cities taking part and each being represented by their mayors and other officials. The events, though, are festive in nature, and are intended in part to showcase the cultures of the host city and its economic strengths rather than serve as occasions for serious discussion of common policy issues. This initiative started in 2009 and seven cities (so far), including Addis Ababa, have acted as hosts. The last cities’ forum was held in Jigjiga in Somali state.

Another new forum is the ‘Mayors’ Forum’. The first of these was held in Addis Ababa in October 2020. Mayors from various cities in the country took part.¹⁰⁶ The formation of the Forum was initiated by the Ministry of Urban Development and Construction (MoUDC) with the aim of creating a national forum in which mayors can meet regularly to discuss common issues. The forum has formed a coordinating board. This is composed of seven members, with Adanech Abebe, the deputy mayor of Addis Ababa, selected as the first chairperson of the board.¹⁰⁷

8 Political Culture of Local Governance

The state constitutions provide that woredas and cities must be run by democratically elected officials, while electoral law provides that local elections must be conducted on a multiparty basis.¹⁰⁸ Neither the state constitution nor the election law states any clear principles with regard to ensuring equitable gender representation. The election law does provide financial incentives for political parties who field female candidates, but these incentives are only for political parties contesting in general elections (elections for parliament and state councils) and not for those taking part in local elections.¹⁰⁹ Five local elections have been held since the establishment of the federal system. The elections were held separately from the general elections in which the federal and state legislatures are elected. In contrast, the election to the Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa councils were held at the same time as the general elections.¹¹⁰

The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) put the number of voters who are registered to vote in the local elections at about 30 million. The NEBE’s reports also claim that voter turnout in these elections stands in excess of 90 per cent of registered voters.¹¹¹ However, these figures do not seem accurate and there are few signs of activity or canvassing around the local elections. They come and go without any fanfare and there is little campaigning on social or public media or in any other form of publicity. Each of the five recent local elections took place without the participation of any opposition parties (surely a key indicator of open, free, and fair elections). Indeed, the opposition political parties made it known, long before election day, that they would not participate. Consequently, the only runners were the EPRDF and its affiliate parties and these then ran in uncontested local elections which they easily won. The fifth local election was supposed to take place in 2018 but it was indefinitely postponed. Thus, at the present moment, four years have passed since the formal end of the term of office of the local councillors elected in 2013; but this has passed without notice or demur.

Why is it that the local government appears to have little relevance to Ethiopian political life? As mentioned above, the central government sees local government institutions simply as the instruments of centralised control at the local level. At the same time, opposition parties and groupings do not seem to consider local governments as worth their attention: their focus is on the control of the federal government. Control of the federal state government means control over local government.¹¹²

While opposition parties paid no attention to local government and local elections, those who led the public protests from 2015 to 2018 did. They adopted a strategy of dismantling local government institutions and attacking local officials as a means of putting pressure on the federal government. According to Østebø, the targeting of local administrative structures by protesters had the effect of ‘temporarily limiting the state’s presence in every corner of the Oromia region’.¹¹³

9 Covid-19’s Impact on the Role of Local Government

The emergence of Covid-19 and the measures taken to combat it neither enhanced nor diminished the role and place of local government.¹¹⁴ Everyone seemed in agreement that the federal government had to play a leading role in the fight against Covid-19. The reaction of the states and local government to the pandemic has been to wait and see what the federal government would do. This stance might be the result of the general public perception that Covid-19 virus started outside Ethiopia, could only get into the country through the passage of international travellers, and the federal government alone controls the country’s ports of entry and exit. Indeed, the initial public demand was for the federal government to restrict international travel and immediately suspend international flights by the country’s main carrier, Ethiopian Airlines. The role of local government in seeking to contain the Covid-19 pandemic was limited to enforcing the measures announced by the federal and (to a lesser extent) by state governments. Such measures included enforcing lockdowns in cities in the Oromia and Amhara states and enforcing the rules that prohibit public meetings.¹¹⁵

10 Emerging Issues and Trends

Local government is the oldest and most important political institution in Ethiopia and one that has direct relevance to the conduct of people’s everyday lives. Despite this simple fact, local government does not enjoy the institutional place and status in government that its importance warrants. It has no explicit constitutional recognition and consequently is not endowed with original functions, powers, or sources of finance. It is barely considered in any of the political and legislative reforms taking place in the country. As has been argued elsewhere, any democratic and social reform that does take place is, in fact, unlikely to succeed without properly empowering local government and enhancing its democratic mandate. Positive political change ‘requires enhancing the political significance and the democratic pedigree of local governments’. The institutional mechanism for achieving this is ‘the entrenchment in the national constitution of local government as democratic and politically relevant level of government, alongside the transfer of suitable competences and sufficient resources’.¹¹⁶