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The Role of the Autonomous Machines at the Conclusion of a Contract: Contractual Responsibility According to Current Rules of Private Law and Prospects

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Artificial Intelligence and Normative Challenges

Part of the book series: Law, Governance and Technology Series ((LGTS,volume 59))

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Abstract

Nowadays, one of the most important applications of autonomous AI systems is the conclusion of contracts. Nonetheless, concerns are raised about the validity of the contracts concluded by autonomous machines and, subsequently, about the contractual responsibility in case of non-performance. Various theories have already been expounded in legal doctrine, with the view to tackling thereon. Some of them suggest that autonomous AI systems are mere communication tools or agents that render their user liable, whilst other legal scholars suggest that autonomous AI systems themselves—not their user—should be held liable. After presenting the arguments of these theories, the chapter concludes that the legal community should absolutely accept the validity of the contracts concluded by intelligent agents, considering their users legally bound to their performance. Users’ liability could be based on the theory of de facto contracts (faktische Verträge) or, alternatively, on the doctrine of reliance liability (Vertrauenshaftung). In both cases, users’ right to invalidate the contract in case of mistake must be guaranteed and the mistake shall be assigned to the intelligent agent.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Although the term “Artificial Intelligence” is widely accepted, the scientific community does not fully agree about its specific content. See Rissland (1990), pp. 1957–1961; Ertel (2017), p. 1 ff.; UNESCO (2019), p. 7–9; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020), pp. 2–3.

  2. 2.

    Eidenmüller (2017), pp. 2–4; Karanasiou and Pinotsis (2017), p. 1; Keßler (2017), pp. 589–590; UNESCO (2019), passim.

  3. 3.

    See more about the fourth Industrial Revolution Braütigam and Klindt (2015), p. 1137.

  4. 4.

    See about the “ages” of Artificial Intelligence as scientific field Smith and Ting (2006), p. 6; Bostrom (2014), para 1.

  5. 5.

    Russell and Norvig (2020), p. 651 ff.; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), pp. 111–135; Denicola (2016), pp. 254–255.

  6. 6.

    Russell and Norvig (2020), p. 789 ff.; Panait and Luke (2005), pp. 387–434.

  7. 7.

    Wettig and Zehendner (2004), pp. 111–135; Borges (2018), p. 978.

  8. 8.

    Karnow (1996), pp. 152 and 155 ff.; Huang (2006), p. 12; UNESCO (2019), pp. 10–11.

  9. 9.

    Susskind and Susskind (2018), p. 125.

  10. 10.

    Karanasiou and Pinotsis (2017), p. 1.

  11. 11.

    The word is derived from the latin word “agere” that meant “act” or “work”. See more about the etymological root of the word Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 111.

  12. 12.

    One can also encounter it as digital agent, autonomous agent, softbot (software robots), knowbot (knowledge robot), etc. See Weitzenboeck (2001), p. 207; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), pp. 111–135.

  13. 13.

    Although the notion of the “Intelligent Agent” is widely used, there is no single universally accepted definition for it. The most prevalent definition is the one mentioned in the text, attributed to Russell and Norvig (2020), p. 37 (see next footnote).

  14. 14.

    Russell and Norvig (2020), p. 37; Panait and Luke (2005), p. 2; Ertel (2017), p. 17; Eidenmüller (2017), pp. 4–5.

  15. 15.

    Wooldridge and Jennings (1995), pp. 41–42; Ertel (2017), pp. 10–11. Cf. on the difference between DAI and MAS Panait and Luke (2005), p. 1.

  16. 16.

    Karnow (1996), p. 165; Panait and Luke (2005), p. 1.

  17. 17.

    Wooldridge and Jennings (1995), p. 4; Kerr (1999), p. 195; Weitzenboeck (2001), p. 5; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 2; van Haentijens (2002); Cornelius (2002), p. 353; Balke (2010), pp. 3–4. See also UNESCO (2019), pp. 11–12.

  18. 18.

    See also about “communication” Panait and Luke (2005), p. 13.

  19. 19.

    See the above-mentioned authors (footnote 17).

  20. 20.

    See also Karnow (1996), pp. 152–153; Kerr (1999), pp. 196–197; Pagallo (2013), p. 57.

  21. 21.

    It can be located either in her PC or in an external server rum by a provider; see van Haentijens (2002), p. 2.

  22. 22.

    See also Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 29; Kerr (1999), p. 197–198; Kerr (2001), pp. 185–187; Grundmann and Hacker (2017), pp. 20–21.

  23. 23.

    See also Cornelius (2002), p. 355.

  24. 24.

    Nevertheless, there are also stationary intelligent agents which are agents not able to leave their original environment; nonetheless, they are called “robots” as well; see Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 112.

  25. 25.

    See Balke (2010), p. 7.

  26. 26.

    Balke (2010), p. 2; Grundmann and Hacker (2017), pp. 16–17.

  27. 27.

    Lerouge (2000), p. 406; Kerr (2001), p. 185.

  28. 28.

    Köhler (1982), p. 129; Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 29; Lerouge (2000), pp. 404–434; Kerr (2001), p. 184. A reason why an intelligent agent can act so rapidly in comparison with other kinds of software systems lies in the fact that its function is not based on an inter-server connection, in order to collect the necessary information. Instead, the intelligent agent can “migrate” from site to site, working even though the user’s PC is offline. Therefore, it is able to select faster the necessary information, leading to reduction of “network traffic”, see Karnow (1996), p. 164; Kotz and Gray (1999); van Haentijens (2002), p. 3; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 112.

  29. 29.

    See Cornelius (2002), p. 353. See for more advantages (and disadvantages) arising by the application of intelligent (shopping) agents in the transactions van Haentijens (2002), p. 1.

  30. 30.

    See also Katz (2008), p. 2.

  31. 31.

    See Mehrings (1998), p. 31; Balke (2010), p. 2.

  32. 32.

    See also the classification of approaches according to Pagallo (2013), p. 49.

  33. 33.

    Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 44; Mehrings (1998), p. 31; Kerr (2001), p. 232; Cornelius (2002), p. 355; Boden et al. (2017), passim.

  34. 34.

    Mehrings (1998), p. 31; Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 43 ff.; Brożek and Jakubiec (2017), pp. 293 and 303.

  35. 35.

    Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 46. See also Kerr (2001), pp. 219 and 232; Weitzenboeck (2001), p. 207; Chopra and White (2009), p. 372; Balke (2010), p. 5.

  36. 36.

    Mehrings (1998), p. 31; Balke (2010), p. 5.

  37. 37.

    Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 45; Kerr (2001), p. 232.

  38. 38.

    Köhler (1982), p. 132; Kerr (2001), p. 188; Cornelius (2002), p. 354; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 121; Chopra and White (2009), pp. 372–373.

  39. 39.

    Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 437; Bork (2016), p. 282; Brox and Walker (2018), p. 85. Cf. also Medicus and Petersen (2016), p. 159.

  40. 40.

    Cf. Köhler (1982), p. 134, regarding the automated DOI; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), pp. 121–122.

  41. 41.

    Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 125; Keßler (2017), p. 592.

  42. 42.

    Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 602; Medicus and Petersen (2016), pp. 385–386.

  43. 43.

    See about §120 BGB Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 379; Medicus and Petersen (2016), p. 328.

  44. 44.

    See more about the so-called black box problem or black box effect Zednik (2019); Adadi and Berrada (2018).

  45. 45.

    See more about this problem Furubotn and Richter (2005), pp. 206–222; Veljanovski (2007), pp. 40–41; Cooter and Ulen (2008), p. 53; Voigt (2009), pp. 84–85.

  46. 46.

    Firstly, the concept of moral hazard appeared in assurances, but today one can encounter it in many other fields as well, see Dembe and Boden (2000), p. 257; Bannier (2005), pp. 69–71.

  47. 47.

    Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 46. See also Cornelius (2002), p. 355.

  48. 48.

    Andrade et al. (2007b), p. 219.

  49. 49.

    Kerr (2001), p. 188.

  50. 50.

    Allen and Widdison (1996), p. 25; Andrade et al. (2007a), p. 369; Chopra and White (2009), p. 371.

  51. 51.

    See van Haentijens (2002), p. 5.

  52. 52.

    Wettig and Zehendner (2004), pp. 125–126.

  53. 53.

    Cornelius (2002), p. 355.

  54. 54.

    Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 123; Chopra and White (2009), p. 372; Braütigam and Klindt (2015), p. 1137; Karanasiou and Pinotsis (2017), p. 4.

  55. 55.

    Fisher (1997), p. 545; Chopra and White (2009), pp. 369–370 and 384.

  56. 56.

    See in German law Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 599; Bork (2016), pp. 513 and 649. See in common law Beatson et al. (2020), p. 680.

  57. 57.

    Cf. for the Romanic jurisdictions, where authority is conferred by contract, Bénabent (2017), p. 61. In Germanic jurisdictions it suffices for the agent to have restricted contractual capacity (e.g. the agent can be a minor), cf. on §165 BGB Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 601; Bork (2016), p. 539; for Switzerland cf. Watter (2011), Art. 32, N. 21; for Austria cf. Bydlinski (2005), Art. 1018, Rn. 1.

  58. 58.

    See about §177 I BGB Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 653; Medicus and Petersen (2016), p. 426.

  59. 59.

    Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 652 ff.; Bork (2016), p. 627 ff.

  60. 60.

    Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 620; Bork (2016), p. 615.

  61. 61.

    Pagallo (2013), p. 58.

  62. 62.

    Kerr (2001), pp. 243–244; Bellia (2001), pp. 1060–1061.

  63. 63.

    Cornelius (2002), p. 355. For the same reason it cannot be held that it is similar to the legal role of children. Contra Chopra and White (2009), p. 378.

  64. 64.

    Wettig and Zehendner (2004), 124.

  65. 65.

    For §164 Abs. 1 BGB (Offenlegungsgrundsatz) see, Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 608; Bork (2016), p. 543. See about common law Beatson et al. (2020), p. 685.

  66. 66.

    Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 609 ff.; Bork (2016), p. 543.

  67. 67.

    Medicus and Petersen (2016), p. 402 ff.; Bork (2016), p. 548 ff. See also about common law Beatson et al. (2020), p. 683.

  68. 68.

    See also Kerr’s approach (2001), pp. 197–198.

  69. 69.

    Wolf and Neuner (2016), pp. 606 and 630; Bork (2016), p. 564.

  70. 70.

    Bellia (2001), p. 1060; Andrade et al. (2007b), p. 360.

  71. 71.

    However, it is argued that in these cases there is an apparent authority since the user has already expressed her will to conclude a contract through an intelligent agent by “employing” it. See Kerr (2001), pp. 241–243; Bellia (2001), pp. 1059.

  72. 72.

    See Beatson et al. (2020), p. 681.

  73. 73.

    Weitzenboeck (2001), p. 18.

  74. 74.

    Lerouge (2000), pp. 408–409; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 125; Cornelius (2002), p. 355.

  75. 75.

    Braütigam and Klindt (2015), p. 1138.

  76. 76.

    Kerr (2001), p. 244; Bellia (2001), p. 1061.

  77. 77.

    Fisher (1997), pp. 558 and 561; Kerr (2001), p. 239.

  78. 78.

    Lerouge (2000), pp. 408–409; Bellia (2001), p. 1063; van Haentijens (2002), p. 5; Balke (2010), p. 12.

  79. 79.

    Solum (1992), passim.

  80. 80.

    Kerr (2001), pp. 236–238.

  81. 81.

    Katz (2008), p. 5; Pagallo (2011), pp. 5–6; Pagallo (2013), pp. 59–60.

  82. 82.

    Wettig and Zehendner (2004), p. 128 ff.; Wettig and Zehendner (2003), p. 9; Andrade et al. (2007b), p. 371.

  83. 83.

    Karnow (1996), p. 193 ff. (“Turing Register”). See also Weitzenboeck (2001), pp. 36–37; Balke (2010), pp. 18–19.

  84. 84.

    Bellia (2001), p. 1067. Contra Lerouge (2000), p. 411.

  85. 85.

    Karnow (1996), pp. 193–194; Wettig and Zehendner (2004), pp. 127–129; Pagallo (2011), p. 6.

  86. 86.

    See also the recent proposal of the European Financial and Social Commission Com (2020) 65 final, which strongly recommends that no legal personhood should be attributed to AI.

  87. 87.

    It is noteworthy that according to Art. 60 of Proposal of European Commission for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding harmonized rules on AI (COM (2021) 206 final), a database for stand-alone high-risk AI systems is to be established.

  88. 88.

    See also Cornelius (2002), p. 355.

  89. 89.

    Wolf (1999), Bd. 2, Vor para 145 Rn. 106; Fikentscher and Heinemann (2017), pp. 58–62.

  90. 90.

    Canaris (1971), p. 411 ff.; Fikentscher and Heinemann (2017), p. 57.

  91. 91.

    Cf. Busche (2021), Vor para 145, Rn. 40.

  92. 92.

    See Schubert (2021), para 167 Rn. 122 ff.

  93. 93.

    Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 641 ff.; Bork (2016), p. 601 ff.; Schubert (2021), para 167 Rn. 112 ff. See also about ostensible/apparent authority in common law Beatson et al. (2020), pp. 685–687.

  94. 94.

    See also Kerr (2001), pp. 241–243; Bellia (2001), p. 1059.

  95. 95.

    See about §166 BGB Bork (2016), p. 540.

  96. 96.

    See about §119 Abs. 1 Alt. 1, 2 BGB (Inhaltsirrtum, Erklärungsirrtümer) Bork (2016), pp. 324–325 and 329–330.

  97. 97.

    See Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 484 et seq.

  98. 98.

    This happened in case of Amazon’s electronic assistant Alexa, which ordered a dollhouse and tons of cookies because it heart this order on TV. See Wulf and Seizov (2020), p. 632.

  99. 99.

    European Commission, Proposal of Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (COM (2022) 496 final).

  100. 100.

    See about §122 BGB Wolf and Neuner (2016), p. 507 ff.; Medicus and Petersen (2016), p. 340 ff.

  101. 101.

    Uni global union (2017), p. 7.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Faculty of Law & Criminology, Brussels, Belgium

    Vasiliki Papadouli

  2. Research Team “Digital Economy and Private Law”, School of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Vasiliki Papadouli

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  1. Vasiliki Papadouli
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  1. Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Angelos Kornilakis

  2. Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Georgios Nouskalis

  3. Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Vassilis Pergantis

  4. School of Economics and Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Themistoklis Tzimas

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Papadouli, V. (2023). The Role of the Autonomous Machines at the Conclusion of a Contract: Contractual Responsibility According to Current Rules of Private Law and Prospects. In: Kornilakis, A., Nouskalis, G., Pergantis, V., Tzimas, T. (eds) Artificial Intelligence and Normative Challenges. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 59. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41081-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41081-9_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-41080-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-41081-9

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

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