Abstract
This book reads Marx’s materialism as a dialectical negation of Hegel’s idealism, which cannot be articulated without contrast to Hegel. A preliminary account of Hegel’s idealism is essential for this as the controversy that will unfold between Hegel and Laozi in the next chapter will mainly concern idealism. The chapter surveys recent literature on Hegel’s Idealist conception of philosophy to give a clear explanation of his idealism. It will be argued that Hegel asserted a one-sided dialectical identity between Mind and World. Only by reading Hegel in this way can he be understood as a philosopher in his own understanding of term.
If, as Hegel claims, all philosophy is idealism then defining his philosophy in these terms makes his idealism a metaphilosophy. This obvious fact about his claim is the most overlooked. It is the key to a definitive and comprehensive interpretation of Hegel’s idealism. If Hegel defines all philosophy as idealism and thus his own idealism as a metaphilosophy, then his own idealism must be both the same as the old philosophies in this respect and also different in the sense that it embodies self-conscious awareness. Hegel divides philosophy into pre-reflective, pre-speculative, unconscious idealism and his own reflective, speculative, thus self-conscious, absolute idealism. Missing this obvious fact is the Achilles heel of Robert Stern’s non-mentalistic interpretation in the only other in-depth study of this topic, the object of this chapter’s critique. If Hegel’s idealism is a metaphilosophy then it must be a radical mentalistic ontology of mind and its thoughts.
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Notes
- 1.
I should clarify that the term “supersensible” as opposed to the word “transcendental” is used here under advisement. All transcendental entities are supersensible, but not all supersensible entities are transcendental. Kant’s notion of the real is transcendental for he says there is no way of knowing its nature. It is supersensible because it cannot be sensed but we can gain awareness of its existence through concepts in philosophy. Hegel’s understanding of the infinite is supersensible, not transcendental. This is because for Hegel, the existence and nature of the infinite can be known through conceptual abstraction from experience but it is not sensed in the same way that we might see a finite object before us like an apple for example. But for Hegel conscious sensation involves concepts and intuitions indissolubly linked. Indeed, he sees them as identical and as such only separable through mental abstraction. In this case there is a real sense in which Hegel can say that we can sense the infinite. It is immanent in sensation, which is always conceptual as well as sensuous. But this is only a qualified way of thinking about the word “sensation”. The infinite is not a finite thing we can encounter like an apple, but it is immanent in the apple and knowledge of it can be reached through abstraction, the same abstraction that Hegel thinks is present and necessary when we experience the finite apple. This is part of what Hegel means by the term “mediated immediacy”.
- 2.
Hegel quotes use the translations listed in in the references section below. The page references state page (and when appropriate volume and/or Zusätze) number in the applicable translation followed by volume and page number in Hegel’s Werke—Werke in zwanzig Bänden: Theorie Werkausgabe (1969-1971) (W). The abbreviations used are:
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SL (1969)—Science of Logic;
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Enc (volume 1. 1991, volume 2. 2004, and volume 3. 2012)—Encyclopedia;
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(1988;
I feel I should apologise in advance for the frequent and lengthy Hegel citations in this chapter. The old complaint that Marx misunderstood Hegel arises from a lack of fidelity to Hegel’s own words. The authors of that thesis offer myriad theories as to what and how that misunderstanding occurred but a common theme is that there are swaths of “interpretation” and Hegel’s words are squeezed between the cracks. Their “true” Hegel is given scarcely any opportunities to speak for himself. My reply to those authors is the same: if Hegel meant to say that, why did he actually say this? They don’t discuss his words. They can take an isolated quote and spin out an elaborate series of propositions which completely refutes Hegel’s counter-statements, but they cannot explain why he made those counter-statements in the first place. Ambiguity of the word “Aufheben” is just a dodge. Hegel is not saying that word in most of these citations. (Some, let's call them 'bare-bones' Hegel scholars doubt the authenticity of most of the contents of books of Hegel's lectures. Their thesis can be employed to dismiss many of the controversial quotes of this chapter. However, there are still enough left over after any 'bare-bones' purge to support my thesis.) If Marx fundamentally misunderstood Hegel then, Hegel has said enough to demonstrate he has fundamentally misunderstood himself and this obviates the attempt to salvage the “true” Hegel. This interpretation is based upon what Hegel actually said, and the belief that he meant it. Maybe Hegel had a problematic system, but he still had a system, whence arises a fairly consistent repetition of a set of views.
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- 3.
- 4.
Brady Bowman’s (2013) excellent book-length intervention on the topic draws upon Stern’s work. I would classify Brady Bowman a proponent of a hard-metaphysical reading who avoids the theological element and the charge of mentalism by omission.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
This is an oversimplification. These universals only apply to the infinite insofar as they contribute to the “Concept”; the Concept shares their nature and is disclosed through them.
- 8.
Hegel also talks of it in this context as the True Infinite. This causes confusion when Hegel appears to be saying that the infinite is ideal and the infinite real. He means that the pure infinite (also translated as the Spurious Infinite) is ideal and that the True Infinite is real but the True Infinite is also ideal in the sense that all reality is ideal and the true infinite is the truth of the pure infinite.
- 9.
See Ken Foldes (2002)
- 10.
See Enc.I§37:76–77/W8:106–107 and Enc.I:§41:81–83/W8:113–116.
- 11.
Hegel refers to the “intrinsically infinite mind” as synonymous with “the creative eternal Idea” (Enc.II§448:198/W10:253).
- 12.
Some translate Geist as “mind/Mind,” others prefer “spirit/Spirit.” I use “spirit” for consistency with Stern. Incidentally, I suspect the only reason why Brady Bowman’s admirable study on Hegel does not go so far as to attribute mentalistic idealism to Hegel is out of a distaste for the theological question.
- 13.
Perhaps Stern might construe secular spirit, the self-conscious community, in this way (Hyppolite 1974, 29–31), but this spirit cannot play the ontological role of creator necessary for self-consciousness (where absolute knowing knows itself as absolute) to work, without deifying spirit.
- 14.
Hegel talks of absolute spirit (der absolute Geist) as equivalent to God. All the connotations of Hegel’s discussions of God are linked to discussions of absolute spirit. Stern ignores this.
- 15.
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin 1827/1828.
- 16.
It is upon this same level that Hegel claims Hume is correct to note the non-existence of the necessity of causation, for all that is sensed is a succession of events; of course, Hegel and the absolute standpoint ultimately deny this.
- 17.
Hegel can still be valuable for secular philosophy, of course, as interpreting Hegel and applying his ideas are not necessarily the same.
- 18.
Stern proves Hegel had no reason to adopt mentalism because of certain Kantian doubts.
- 19.
Again, this is the True Infinite. The pure/Spurious infinite is being-in-itself, like the finite/pure finite.
- 20.
Imaginary things exist as ideas in minds only. We can imagine Escher’s Cube with Magic Ribbons existing in three-dimensional space, but it is only an idea. The pure finite is ideal, not real, in this sense. Of course, Hegel makes only qualified contrasts between the real and the ideal, as ultimately, he sees that reality is ideal.
- 21.
See Stern (2009, 345–370).
- 22.
It should be noted that this example is not meant to be an employment of Hegel’s terminology the way he would use it, but rather the way it would fit into common speech. Hegel himself exercised radical skepticism on the question of the reality of the finite, see Bowman (2013, 126). The finite is real in the qualified sense that an appearance can be said to be real, but not real in the sense that judgements of finite experience of finite objects are apt for the criteria of truth.
- 23.
See Karin de Boer (2010, 88–95) for another excellent recapitulation of the being-for-itself relation of finite and infinite along these same lines.
- 24.
By “idols” I mean fictitious entities that have been in spirit’s lifeworld and have shaped history. Ideological entities like Gods, money, mythological creatures, Titles, icons, ghosts, laws, omens, and the like. A Marxist inspired by Alfred Sohn-Rethel might call these “real abstractions”. I think “idols” encapsulates those connotations best. For example, insofar as the Viking belief in Thor influenced their historical escapades like their invasions then this fictitious entity “Thor” obtained a reality in social praxis and in fact still does obtain a kind of reality in the myriad ways we are all living with the effects of the Vikings’ contribution to history. I don’t want to use the expression “fictitious entity” because I am not discussing the extraneous question of to what extent Hegel would grant one particular product of one finite mind’s imagination this status of thought-determination-level-universal reality. Insofar as a fictitious entity is embodied in the Volksgeist—that is, insofar as it is an Idol—I think it is uncontroversial to say the interpretation of Hegel I am proposing would grant that entity exists in the ideal.
- 25.
Evading the difficulties of this criticism for Hegel probably underlies Stern’s wish to stop short of the mentalistic reading. I believe this criticism succeeded but do not thereby wish to denigrate Hegel’s idealism. Mentalistic idealism is the most accurate interpretation of Hegel’s writings, more respectable the other candidates. There is a substantial body of literature (see footnote 3 above) situating this idealism into the most respectable theaters of contemporary analytic philosophy (see Fritzman and Parvizian 2012).
- 26.
Stern argued that the British idealists recognized problems with the identity thesis and addressed them. The arguments from the school he reconstructs are at best incomplete. Stern himself notes that several notable British idealists abandoned Hegel on these grounds (2009, 293–321).
- 27.
See Wright (1983) on identity and non-identity.
- 28.
Kangal (2020, 201).
- 29.
Stern (2009) cites many examples.
- 30.
In his brilliant exposition, Bowman goes so far as to characterize Hegel’s position as “an unmitigated skepticism toward the objects of finite cognition that is perhaps more radical than any variety of skepticism before it” (2013, 103). The contingency of the empirical finite is proof of its utter superficiality. The finite qua being-for-itself is ideal: the finite qua finite does not exist.
- 31.
Theodor W. Adorno made a compelling case that as the completion of idealism Hegel’s thesis of the primacy of the concept goes unnoticed in discursive ontologies submerged in their foundations. According to Adorno, Hegel is far from being an isolated figure; he is in the company of mainstream philosophers and is praised for an awareness of the meaning of philosophy they lack (2004).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the Armen T. Marsoobian at the journal Metaphilosophy for allowing me to reproduce a modified version of my article “Hegel’s metaphilosophy of idealism” in this chapter. I am grateful to Ulrich Schlösser, Andy Blunden, and Cheng Zhihua for reading earlier versions of this article. Metaphilosophy’s anonymous reader’s insightful comments were indispensable.
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Chambers, J. (2023). Hegel’s Metaphilosophy of Idealism. In: Marx and Laozi. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40981-3_3
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