Keywords

Introduction

In recent decades we have seen significant changes in states’ approaches towards civil society in countries all around the globe (Alizada et al., 2021). These changes include increased efforts to control civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), closing communication channels between the state and citizens, and redirecting financial support towards organisations co-opted by or loyal to the ruling party (Dawson & Hanley, 2016; Roggeband & Krizsán 2021). Politicians target specific groups within civil society based on their demographic characteristics and/or ideological positions, seeing these groups as either contenders for power or as a danger to social cohesion and the homogeneity of the nation (Bill, 2020; Graff & Korolczuk, 2022). As shown by Conny Roggeband and Andrea Krizsán (2021) in Central and Eastern Europe, we see the process of reconfiguring civil society space, and this process is gendered: women and sexual minorities are targeted as the enemies of the right-wing populist parties, while nationalist and socially conservative organisations become the privileged allies of the state (see also Krizsán & Roggeband, 2019). The degree of autonomy of civil society actors, the possibility to voice critiques and concerns vis-à-vis the state, and the degree of support for independent organisations can be interpreted as a litmus test of democracy. Thus, the changes introduced by the state in countries such as Poland, which result in curtailing the civil rights of a substantial portion of the population, should be seen as part and parcel of the process of transformation of a liberal democracy into an autocratic regime.

To justify the restrictions in the civil society sphere, right-wing politicians give different explanations, claiming that they are ‘protecting state sovereignty; promoting transparency and accountability in the civil society sector; enhancing aid effectiveness; or pursuing national security’ Roggeband & Krizsán, 2021, p. 24). In countries where right-wing populist parties are in power, it is the notion of ‘elite’ that serves to legitimise the need for sweeping reforms. The charge of being an elite—as corrupted and alienated from the people and financed by foreign powers—is routinely used by the right-wing populists in Poland in relation to liberal and left-leaning civil society actors. In 2015, the representatives of the ruling coalition led by PiS (the Law and Justice party) started to change the infrastructure regulating the relations between state and civil society in order to facilitate the emergence of a new elite group within civil society (Bill, 2020; Korolczuk, 2022). Thus, the Polish context is suitable for analysing the ways in which the state becomes civil society’s biggest challenger in autocratising countries.

This chapter examines the changes in state–civil society relations in contemporary Poland, focusing on the increased pressure on the liberal and left-leaning actors exerted by the state from 2015 onwards. The aim is to analyse key strategies employed by the ruling party to marginalise the position of some civil society actors, especially those who are publicly accused of being detached from the people and ‘elitist’, which usually means being disloyal to or opposing the Law and Justice party and its coalition partners. Previous studies have identified several strategies of pressure and promotion employed by the Polish state to promote elite change in the field of civil society, including smear campaigns and channelling of financial support towards socially conservative organisations (Bill, 2020; Bill & Stanley, 2020; Pospieszna & Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2022; Szuleka, 2017). This chapter focuses specifically on the patterns of cooperation and communication between the state and civil society actors. The analysis suggests that the state has limited tools to promote elite change within civil society, but challenging independent civil society organisations (hereafter CSO) by state actors effectively contributes to the process of democratic erosion, which undermines democratic values and practices not only in Poland, but globally (Bormeo, 2016; Carothers, 2016; Haggard & Kaufman, 2021).

Data and Methods

This chapter employs a process-tracing method to examine the ways in which the relations between CSOs and the Polish state have developed between 2015 and 2022. I focus on the patterns of cooperation and collaboration between state institutions and civil society by examining (a) the functioning of the institutions or bodies, which were set up before 2015 to facilitate such cooperation; (b) the inclusion/exclusion of CSOs in decision-making processes (the process of preparing and consulting the bill on the National Freedom Institute introduced in 2017); and (c) the existing (post-2015) patterns of cooperation or the lack of thereof between state representatives and civil society actors on a day-to-day basis.

The study is based on a qualitative textual analysis of the content published between 2015 and 2022 in the media (both mainstream media, e.g., Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, and online media, including specialised online portals such as Ngo.pl), opinions and reports published by civil society actors on their social media, and documents published on official governmental sites in relation to the process of preparing and debating the 2017 Act on the National Freedom Institute—Centre for the Development of Civil Society (henceforth: the Act) in the parliament. Data set included also 15 interviews conducted between 2019 and 2022 with representatives of Polish CSOs. Interviewees included representatives of foundations or associations that belonged to the cluster of 31 most resource-rich and influential Polish CSOs, some of which were liberal/left while others were conservative/right leaning. This cluster was identified based on the results of a survey conducted in 2021, and the elite position of specific entities was identified based on factors such as material and human resources, voice vis-à-vis the state, and internal recognition within civil society (Altermark et al., 2022; Korolczuk, 2022). The data were gathered within the research programme ‘Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies’, which aimed to develop the first systematic and cross-country comparative analysis of civil society elites in four countries (Poland, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and in the European Union (for more details on the method, see Appendix to this book).

The Shifting Relations between the State and Civil Society in Poland

Historically, civil society emerged as an intermediary between the polity and the private sphere of citizens’ lives, in other words, as a sphere of autonomy from absolutist rule. As observed by Michael Bernhard, a critical component of this process was ‘the establishment of legal boundaries that protected the existence of an independent public space from the exercise of state power, and then the ability of organizations within it to influence the exercise of power’ (2020, p. 308). Following this historical development, the contemporary ideal of a liberal democracy rests on the assumption that civil society and the state occupy separate spheres, but the relation between them should be more or less harmonious: the state supports civil society actors, and the latter sometimes act as service providers for the state, while simultaneously monitoring the state’s actions (Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2016).

In the post-socialist countries, a shift occurred from a ‘civil society against the state’ model towards a view of CSOs as partners of public institutions that the state should support both financially and organisationally (Chimiak, 2016; Cohen & Arato, 1992; Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017). In the newly regained liberal democracy, the ‘rebellious civil society’ (Ekiert & Kubik, 2001) was to be replaced by apolitical service providers, self-help groups, and organisations specialising in advocacy and lobbying that are able and willing to negotiate with state institutions and political elites. In the first decade of the twenty-first century the view of civil society as organisations providing social services has become widespread among Polish think-tanks, effectively overshadowing other frames such as civil society as a moral blueprint or a check against power (Jezierska, 2020).

Researchers and practitioners alike have observed that such a close collaboration between the state and civil society may result in the latter losing autonomy, value orientation, and the capability to respond to the authentic needs of local populations (Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017; Jezierska & Sörbom, 2021; Toje, 2013). When the state budget becomes the main source of financial support for civil society, CSOs are expected to work towards politically defined policy objectives, which may significantly limit their ability to control power holders and set their own agenda. Critics of civil society’s dependence on state funds and the subsequent bureaucratisation and alienation of CSOs do not undermine the central assumption that collaboration between the state and civil society is conducive to civic engagement and effectively strengthens democracy, but highlight the eminent imbalance of power inscribed in the relations between power holders and civil society actors.

Ideally, resource-rich CSOs should be able to influence politics, for example, by lobbying for specific solutions, advising the authorities, or offering expert knowledge on specific issues. In practice, the level of participation depends on the good will of political elites and the existence and relative openness/closeness of communication and cooperation channels. These channels may include consultative bodies placed at the level of ministries and other state institutions, deliberative spaces such as conferences or meetings of different stakeholders, and platforms that can be used for information sharing and advice (Arnstein, 1969; Roggeband & Krizsán, 2021). The analysis of the Polish context shows that between 2015 and 2022 significant changes occurred regarding the functioning of the existing cooperation and communication channels with CSOs, the possibilities for participation of civil society actors in the process of social consultations, and the level of state control over CSOs. The present analysis focuses on these three key areas of participation, highlighting changes in discourses, regulations, and practices that took place between 2015 and 2022: (a) closing the existing cooperation and communication channels between the state and civil society; (b) closing space for social consultations; (c) centralisation of power over civil society organisations.

Closing the Existing Cooperation and Communication Channels between the State and Civil Society

In its electoral programme in 2015, the Law and Justice party claimed that major reform was needed because many CSOs lacked access to decision-making processes and were financially over-dependent on the state. Allegedly, at the heart of the problem was the lack of inclusive consultative bodies, the low level of autonomy of civil society actors, and insufficient state funding. The analysis of the patterns of cooperation between the state and civil society prior to 2015 and after the elections suggests that while the amount of money available to civil society is indeed bigger, the patterns of cooperation shifted significantly.

Polish regulations included provisions that enabled CSOs to cooperate with the state and with local authorities over issues regarding civil society, such as tax provisions, planned reforms, and state supervision over public welfare work. The 2003 Act on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work (with a 2010 amendment) established the Public Benefit Works Council, an advisory and consultative body, consisting mainly of the leaders of big and influential organisations, whose role was to express opinions about how the government’s plans might affect civil society and to propose reforms or changes on behalf of the Polish third sector (Gumkowska et al., 2006, p. 49). The council included representatives of umbrella bodies such as the Polish Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations (OFOP) and the Non-Governmental Organizations Supporting Network (SPLOT), large religious organisations (e.g. Caritas), and resource-rich foundations and associations, including the Stocznia Foundation, the Voluntary Fire Brigades Associations, and the Polish Scouting Association. Local authorities were also encouraged to set up social consultation bodies, and according to reports published annually by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy by 2015 most local governments had submitted plans of cooperation with the leaders of CSOs. Not all organisations had the material resources, skills, and personnel that such cooperation requires, but quite a few had participated in efforts to influence the state on matters regarding the third sector during the previous two decades (e.g. Charycka et al., 2021; Domaradzka, 2016; Garpiel, 2014; Klon Jawor Association, 2017, 2020).

Resource-rich CSOs promoted greater cooperation between different CSOs as well as between the third sector and the state. To facilitate such cooperation, work on the Strategic Roadmap for the Development of Civil Society (Strategiczna Mapa Drogowa Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego) was initiated in 2014 under the lead of nationwide umbrella organisations OFOP and SPLOT. The goal was to map Polish civil society, to discuss and address the main obstacles to the development of the Polish third sector, and to enable closer collaboration between organisations, which would strengthen their voice vis-à-vis the state. Intense debates, meetings, and consultations continued over the period of three years and included over 2500 individuals representing a wide range of CSOs, including large national and local federations and those focused on single issues such as civic education, voluntary work, advocacy, rural development, and more. The initiators of the roadmap continuously discussed the project with politicians, hoping to integrate the conclusions and goals into policies and institutional practices concerning civil society in Poland. This group included well-known civil society leaders, such as Jakub Wygnański, Piotr Frączak, and Tomasz Schimanek, who were often mentioned in my interviews as key representatives of civil society elites and as people who have significant influence also within the political sphere:

Wygnański is an icon … he is ‘the pope of civil society’, and indeed, he has fought for this position. Piotr Frączak also … I think that such people can certainly be found in every big city, a group that sometimes is able to put pressure on power, these people are known for operating in this field and have enough authority … There is this group of people at the national level, so when someone wants to talk to civil society, they will call Wygnański, for example. (Warsaw, 28.10.2021)

After Law and Justice came to power, the collaboration over the roadmap came to an end. The representatives of state institutions were no longer interested in or able to continue consultations, and the ruling party had its own plan to redefine the relations between the state and the third sector. In the eyes of Law and Justice, people representing existing umbrella networks and influential organisations, which engaged in dialogue with the previous regime, represented contenders to power rather than potential collaborators. In 2016, the public television news (TVP) initiated a smear campaign targeting Jakub Wygnański and the people who sat on the Stocznia advisory council, suggesting that they illegally received financial support from the then Mayor of Warsaw Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, an oppositional politician from the liberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) (Orzechowski, 2016). Similarly to attacks on Jurek Owsiak, the head of the well-known charitable organisation WOŚP, the smear campaign targeting Wygnański portrayed civil society leaders as shady characters seeking financial gains and political influence under the pretence that they work for the common good (Bill, 2020).

CSOs enjoy the trust of Polish society, and in 2021, 56% of respondents declared that they trust them, compared to a mere 28% of people who trust public media and 26% who trust the government (Poniatowski, 2021). Because trust is a form of social capital, the question of legitimacy is of key importance for civil society actors (Altermark et al., 2022). The strategy of the ruling coalition in Poland, which included closing the channels for cooperation and engaging in attacks on specific organisations and people active in the public sphere should be seen as an attempt to challenge the influence of elite civil society actors and to undercut their social standing and legitimacy.

Closing Space for Social Consultations

The shift in state–civil society relations initiated in 2015 included institutional and legal initiatives as well as changes in institutional practices that negatively affected the degree of openness of state institutions in regard to some civil society actors. Initially, the representatives of the ruling coalition promised to strengthen the collaboration with civil society and its influence on decision-making processes by replacing existing institutions with new, more effective, and inclusive ones. To facilitate this process, the role of overseeing the state’s relations with the third sector was assigned to the newly established office of the Plenipotentiary for Civil Society and Equal Treatment, positioned at the Chancellery of the President of the Council of Ministers.Footnote 1 A close analysis of the activities undertaken by the three consecutive Plenipotentiaries shows however, that all Plenipotentiaries kept a relatively low profile and ceased to engage in wide social consultations or broad cooperation with CSOs, except for those with close ties to the ruling parties.

By mid-2016 then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced a new plan that included establishing an administrative body fully in control of communication and cooperation between the state and the third sector. A key element of the reform was the act on the National Freedom Institute—Centre for the Development of Civil Society (e.g. wPolityce, 2017). The leaders of liberal CSOs interviewed for this project were unanimous in their view that the reform led to the closing of existing communication and cooperation channels between the state and many civil society actors. The trend to exclude organisations seen as representing the ‘liberal elite’ from social consultations and to dismiss their attempts to communicate with the authorities emerged already in 2016 and continues today. As observed by one of the interviewees, the tendency to exclude some actors is part of a broader strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ applied by the right-wing coalition against CSOs:

The previous authorities left this environment aside and sometimes when someone jumped the line, they would show you your place. The current authorities say that ‘everything is political’, but only they represent the right way of doing politics, and you are supposed to support them …. The intensity of the involvement of politicians in what we do has changed. And they are very destructive now as they divide [civil society], incite hatred against one another, attempt to destroy the image [of civil society organisations] and trust between organisations. (Warszawa, 11.02.2019)

The ways in which new legislation was introduced is illustrative of the process of a selective closure of civil society space (McMahon & Niparko, 2022). The speed of introducing change is indicative of the key role attributed by the new regime to reforming civil society sphere. The act on the National Freedom Institute passed in the Sejm and Senate with very limited time for consultations and with no public hearings, and President Andrzej Duda signed the bill on October 12, 2017 (ISAP, 2017). Such haste was not uncommon also in the case of other bills. According to the report published by the Batory Foundation in 2019 over a quarter of all legislative proposals were debated for less than two weeks in Polish parliament, which is against the regulations requiring at least two weeks for parliamentary proceedings (Fundacja…, 2019).

Key umbrella organisations and the influential actors of liberal orientation were not invited to consult on the project. Two main umbrella bodies representing thousands of Polish CSOs—OFOP and SPLOT—as well as thinks-tanks such as the Klon/Jawor Association submitted their opinions to the ministry, but their critiques and suggestions were left unaddressed. The government officials and minister Gliński, who were responsible for the project, also did not respond to the concerns of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Adam Bodnar, who pointed to the fact that the lack of wide social consultations suggests the undemocratic nature of the procedures leading to the establishment of the National Freedom Institute.

In a series of texts and open letters, civil society actors expressed their concerns (e.g. Batko-Tołuć, 2017; OFOP, 2017). In mid-2017, an open letter of CSOs was sent to the Polish president asking him to veto the new law. The authors of the letter pointed to the fact that most organisations that submitted their opinions on the draft of the new bill were very critical of the new provisions: ‘Out of 48 opinions that were submitted, 33 were against creating the National Freedom Institute, 15 assessed the current project critically, and only 2 were overtly positive’ (List do prezydenta RP 2017). They warned the public that the National Freedom Institute would be controlled solely by the state, not civil society representatives. The reform was a move towards centralisation of power, leaving control over activities and financial resources of CSOs in the hands of the state officials and civil society leaders loyal to the ruling party, thus seriously diminishing the autonomy of the third sector.

As shown by Roggeband and Krizsán (2021), the process of closing civil society space was uneven and selective. While liberal and left-oriented CSOs especially the ones that focused on women’s rights, sexual minorities, and migrants, were marginalised or subjected to smear campaigns and harassment by right-wing actors, the conservative and patriotic CSOs enjoyed a privileged position vis-à-vis the state. The representatives of the latter see it as an obvious consequence of a regime change:

First of all, we must make it clear, of course, with the currently ruling coalition it is certainly easier for us and our supporters now than it was when the previous [liberal coalition] was in power. On the other hand, we experienced an opposite situation before the [current] coalition was in power, when other NGOs had greater support and influence on what was happening in national politics. (Warsaw, 8.06.2021)

Within this new context, liberal and left-oriented organisations seek new ways to use cultural capital such as trust and other resources to strengthen their organisational capacity and to mobilise wider audiences. Interviewees mentioned that they use international contacts and informal channels to inform their partners in other countries and at the EU level about the changes taking place in Poland and the people who are taking over positions in various international bodies:

I was at this meeting with EU Commissioner, who … said, ‘Listen, we at the Commission level can’t do anything. We need to engage in dialogue with all representatives who meet the definition of NGOs. We can’t treat various organisations different in any way … but you can tell us who is who … knowing the context, we know who is who, and that is a lot’. (Warsaw, 22.12.2020)

Undercutting the influence of CSOs on the international arena turned out to be difficult also because between 2015 and 2022 Poland had become a widely discussed case of de-democratisation due to reforms concerning the judicial system and the media (Alizada et al., 2021). Thus, civic activism in Poland is shifting as people focus on new issues and employ new mobilisation tactics, and it is strengthening as various networks and groups join forces (McMahon & Niparko, 2022).

Centralisation of Power over Civil Society Organisations

Despite the reservations and negative opinions, the Act on the National Freedom Institute—Centre for the Development of Civil Society (NIW) was submitted to the Polish parliament on June 5, 2017 as a governmental project, and it was accepted by the Parliament by mid-September (Sejm, 2017). The people responsible for creating the National Freedom Institute were handpicked by the representatives of the ruling right-wing coalition with no significant input from civil society. The Institute’s Director and the majority of the Director’s Council were appointed by Minister Gliński in his role as the Chair of the Committee for Public Benefit Activity, a new body established by the bill. Gliński himself argued that creating such an institution should be seen as just a minor change that shifted some responsibilities and tasks from the Ministry for Work, Family and Social Affairs to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (PAP, 2017). In light of the new provisions, however, the Committee, whose 22 members are recruited solely from ministries and state departments, has become a key institution tasked with overseeing and coordinating the relations between civil society and the state (Narodowy…, 2017).

The Act stipulates that the members of the Committee are responsible for preparing programmes to support civil society development, which serve as a key source of funding, and they are to draft new regulations in this field and coordinate the process of public consultations. Furthermore, the Chair—Minister Gliński—has full control over appointing the director of the National Institute and monitoring its activities, he approves the budget of the institution, and he controls all public benefit activities. While the Public Benefit Council—an institution facilitating cooperation between civil society and the state—has continued to exist, it is no longer seen by civil society actors as influential and open to all organisations. As one of the interviewees representing liberal-leaning organisations explained:

The Council has no meaning now, no real influence. The signal that comes from the Committee is decisive. And the Council can discuss the matter, it can submit dissenting opinions, whatever, it doesn’t matter anyway, because if there is a specific order, it has to be carried out. … It is just a fig leaf. …. So they can always say ‘After all, we consulted with you, with your representatives, so if you have any complaints, it’s not against us, but against them, right?’ … If all bodies, such as the Council, were to be liquidated, then everyone would recognise it as a power grab … but now it looks ok, sort of. …. After a while, no one remembers. (Warsaw, 22.12.2020)

Leaving some of the institutional infrastructure intact supports the ruling party’s claim that the reform was oriented towards enhancing the effectiveness of the existing institutions, rather than aimed at overhauling the whole structure. As explained by one of the interviewees, Law and Justice wanted to have full control over decisions made by bodies such as the Public Benefit Council or Council of the National Institute of Freedom, and thus they invited leaders sharing socially conservative and patriotic views and assigned key roles to people from small towns and less influential organisations:

In order to have a majority in the Council you need to have enough votes to be able to vote in accordance with such a need, so … suddenly people appeared there, who were never seen in the civil society space. … the narrative was that we need to include these people from small towns to speak, which is cool. But later, when we checked who they are, well… there is this guy, a local regionalist … who publishes … all kinds of nationalistic, unpleasant stuff. (Warsaw, 22.12.2020)

The representatives of the Law and Justice party claim that the reform was introduced in a fair and balanced manner, even if its effectiveness was sometimes achieved at the expense of inclusiveness. When asked in an interview about the controversial provisions included in the new bill and the lack of extended social consultations, Minister Gliński, the architect of the reform, dismissed the critiques:

Perhaps an immature democracy, and this is still Poland, this is what it looks like - one government comes and the system is bent in one way, there comes the other, and it can be bent in the other. We will try to build a fair system, maintaining the right proportions, and the sector will monitor the process. (in: Dudkiewicz, 2017, translated by the author)

Gliński dismissed the critiques and shunned the process of democratic deliberation as an obstacle in implementing changes that in his view were both urgently needed and normatively justified. This interview as well as public utterances of the ruling party politicians suggest that the democratic procedures, such as wide social consultations, close collaboration with various civil society actors, and achieving consensus, were not seen as needed when introducing major reforms. To the contrary, they were perceived as a hindrance in the process of building a new, authentic civil society and promoting its new elite.

Law and Justice perceive the existing civil society elite as a contender to power, potentially willing and able to challenge the right-wing regime. This view was expressed in the opening speech by Gliński, delivered during the annual conference of the National Freedom Institute in November 2020. The minister claimed that there were two types of civil society: one that supports democracy and one that endangers it. The people who took to the streets to oppose the government ‘are of populist and anarchist nature, they lack some core features that are constitutive for civil society. Thus, this is not the type of civil society that should be functioning in a democracy’ (19.11.2020, author’s notes and translation). In other words, in the eyes of the right-wing politicians, civil society is vital for democracy, but only if its activities meet specific criteria, such as loyalty towards the government, thus the mass resistance against the reforms introduced by the populist coalition was neither truly grassroots nor democratic by definition. The protests are presented as inauthentic, for example, initiated and staged by politicians from oppositional parties, who transformed CSOs into pawns in the political game. The quote is illustrative of the logic that drives the changes regarding civil society in contemporary Poland. Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party, went on record claiming that his ultimate goal is ‘the establishment of a “new social hierarchy” that would reach deep into civil society [because] only a total reconstruction of Poland’s social elites can complete the country’s “unfinished” post-1989 transition’ (Bill, 2020, p. 2). Under the rule of the Law and Justice coalition the state emerges not only as the rightful challenger to the civil society actors who allegedly strayed away from their mission and were manipulated by the opposition, but also as an institution that is bestowed with the mission of moulding new elites.

This mission legitimises not only the exclusion of specific CSOs from social consultations and public debate, but also the use of direct violence. Centralisation of power includes a range of different strategies, many of which aim to limit citizen’s participation. These strategies range from withholding information, to handpicking members of the bodies designed to facilitate cooperation between the state and civil society, to violence. In recent years researchers and practitioners have noted an increase in discursive and physical violence against protesters and activists. The sweeping reforms introduced by the Law and Justice-led government, such as the reform of judiciary, seizing control over the media, and attempting to further limit access to abortion, indeed led to an awakening of Polish civil society and the rise of contentious activism (Korolczuk et al., 2019; Majewska, 2017; McMahon & Niparko, 2022). On the October 30, 2020 an unprecedented number of over 400,000 demonstrators protested in the streets of over 600 cities, towns, and villages to protest against the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, which decided that abortions for foetal abnormalities violate the Polish Constitution. These were the biggest protests in the country since 1989, and reports published by various organisations and media outlets, including Amnesty International and Szpila Collective (an informal network of lawyers helping the people who have been arrested during demonstrations), show that physical violence, detention, and legal harassment were used by the state during protests, significantly limiting freedom of assembly and freedom of speech (Kolektyw Szpila & Sukiennik, 2021). During protests against the abortion ban and against the homophobic rhetoric of the government and the Catholic Church, the police have used excessive violence, detaining dozens of participants, including minors (Amnesty International, 2022; Jędrzejczyk, 2021). The media also reported on police harassment, for example, when police officers were visiting people in their homes for ‘offences’ such as posting their support for protests online, as in the case of a 14-year-old boy who posted words of solidarity with the women’s march on his Facebook page only to find police officers at his doorstep (Ambroziak, 2020). Analysis of the charges brought against the protesters published by the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights shows that at least 60% of the charges against the protesters were later dismissed by the courts, which confirms the view that the use of violence was excessive and politically motivated (Jędrzejczyk, 2021). In the hands of the ruling elite, state violence has become a powerful tool to limit citizen’s rights and freedoms, effectively limiting space for participation in peaceful demonstrations and other forms of contentious politics.

Conclusions

The circulation of elites is often conceptualised as a natural consequence of social mobility, political developments, and socio-cultural change. The change of elites often occurs in the sphere of politics, but can be also observed in other areas including culture and civil society when different groups compete and clash. In contemporary Poland, it is the state that has become the biggest challenger to the civil society elite. There are several key strategies of state-sponsored elite change in the civil society sphere. These include: (i) the (dis)continuation of existing forms of collaboration between the state and civil society, (ii) the closing of existing channels for communication and social consultations or limiting access to these channels for some groups, (iii) the tendency to privilege civil society actors loyal to the ruling party as state partners, (iv) redirecting funds towards this privileged group, and (v) using smear campaigns or political violence against civil society actors seen as potential challengers to the new political elite. Each of these strategies can be analysed regarding the degree of openness/closeness of the political system for civil society actors and the degree of pressure/promotion of specific CSOs vis-à-vis the state. Illiberal states tend to reconfigure rather than close civil society space, and the core mechanism that steers the selective dynamics of inclusion and exclusion is ‘the convergence or divergence between the ideology of civil society organizations and governments or political elites’ (Roggeband & Krizsán, 2021, p. 24). In autocratising contexts, such as Poland, the closure affects mostly those organisations that are identified as liberal or left-leaning, of cosmopolitan orientation, and which promote liberal values such as equality, pluralism, and minority rights.

The present analysis shows that the regulations and practices aimed to foster elite change in the sphere of civil society are often intertwined with processes of democratic backsliding. Politicians who want to centralise power treat representatives of civil society elites (experts, leaders of influential CSOs, and umbrella organisations) as contenders who should be kept in check and de-legitimised in the eyes of a broader public. While the process of privileging certain civil society actors by the state can be interpreted as part of a process of elite circulation, not uncommon to healthy democracies, in autocratising countries it is accompanied by exerting pressure on lay citizens engaged in different forms of contentious politics who are seen as disloyal to the power holders and thus are subjected to state violence.

When autocrats gain power, they need to find ways to continue to be seen as outsiders in the system of power, and to this end they need to redirect people’s anger and frustration towards groups that can be presented as foreign and potentially dangerous. Existing civil society elites, which consist of people representing relatively privileged organisations, cooperating with transnational and global actors, and mostly of liberal persuasion, are the ideal target of the right-wing populist anti-elitist resentment. Simultaneously, the anti-elitist discourse is employed to legitimise violence against minority groups and oppressed individuals, including women, youth, and LGBTQ people. Despite the fact that protesters often represent marginalised communities and groups lacking substantial resources, they are also vilified as members of or the pawns of global elites. Consequently, their right to political participation is limited, indicating the anti-democratic nature of the anti-elitist discourses and politics introduced by the right-wing coalition in Poland.