Abstract
Now that we have established a viable, workable explanation of what rationality consists in, we can consider some of the related precepts and cognate notions within the proposal. To recap: The theory to the best explanation has successfully built upon the notion that an anthropological approach is critical in developing the hierarchical, multi-leveled theory of rationality as a longstanding cultural project. “In the field” (everyday life) one gathers potential precepts and assesses one against the other in terms of how one may pursue rationality as a cultural practice. Thus, rationality as a cultural project, the inquiry into rationality shifts from the philosophical to the anthropological. This project thereby involves a series of precepts in an empirical inquiry: What are these precepts needed in this project? In this kind of “ethnography,” 12 precepts for rationality are gathered—such as empirical epistemology, scientific skepticism, and autonomy of belief. These are offered for assessment of whether, via our intuitions as empirical researchers often do, they are appropriate for rationality in the sense derived in this essay. They remain open for further determination as to whether, given such precepts, they remain cogent. Given this firmer groundwork that the precepts provide, we can turn to the cognate terms of rationality and, given this stronger context for rationality, more sharply test just how it fits into our supposedly rational historic development and deployment of the concept.
It is the nature of an hypothesis, when once a man has conceived it, that it assimilates every thing to itself, as proper nourishment; and, from the first moment of our begetting it, it generally grows the stronger by every thing you see, hear, read, or understand. This is of great use.
—Sterne, Tristram Shandy (Bk. II, Ch. 19)
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Notes
- 1.
There has been some concern and debate about the use of electronic devices among indigenous cultures so that they may record their lives within their daily cultural practices and thereby have means to communicate to the world at large the dignity of their lifestyle and why they should be allowed the right to retain their life modes (Miller, 2014). This situation is complicated, and unfortunately I cannot detour into its depths here with the detail it merits. There are at least two vital concerns at stake: (1) Does bringing such technologies into a culture indeed not alter it so greatly as to threaten the culture that the techniques are to aid? (2) What are the motivations of the industrial-society members who propose such a method? (3) Are there just as effective, or more effective, means by which to save such cultures whose members widely express a desire to retain their traditional ways? (4) Are the desires of such peoples (who have made it as clearly as possible that they do not want interference) carefully respected? (Miller, 2013).
- 2.
Unless, perhaps, unless they were dangerously violent.
- 3.
Similarly may an adjective such as “loveable” refer to a person’s actually experiencing emotions of love toward others, or refer to a person who has no such experience but acts in such a way so as to appear experiencing those emotions. One can readily think of many such adjectives, such as “happy,” “dour,” “pious.”
- 4.
There is an important issue as to the degree of abiding by or breaking the rationality precepts to remain rational or become irrational. If one’s decision to act abides by all the precepts but one, is it then irrevocably irrational? If it breaks all but one, can it be rational at all? I tend to suspect that, since the precepts are so interconnected, one building upon the others, that little breakage could be allowed for a decision to act to remain rational. But, I believe, in keeping with the summary precept of “Minimal belief, maximal openness,” one should fairly consider whether certain breakages are allowed to a degree.
- 5.
This issue of rights and the moral status of such a human patient are exceedingly important and deserve further exploration elsewhere. A human being need not be rational to deserve full human rights. This proposition would task the definition of humans as “rational beings” for being too exclusive. Kant and others who figure the human as a “rational being” should be corrected by declaring humans “potentially rational beings.” Some readers may be uncomfortable with the adverb “potentially” here because, say, elephants or bonobos, being sociocultural beings, may potentially become rational, so the adverb weakens the definition. I believe that these concerns only corroborate the strength of understanding rationality as primarily a cultural project, as it does not dictate that all humans or any human must exhibit rationality in order to qualify as a human.
- 6.
There may be some conceivable exceptions in a recently new branch of chemistry called “systems chemistry,” by which practitioners attempt to describe the origin and nature of life as organizations of systems. If this subfield’s development, it is conceivable that one day it may explain rationality as a phenomenon arising from living chemical systems. See Pross 2012.
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Miller, L. (2024). Rationality’s Precepts and Cognates (Irrational, Nonrational, Arational, etc.). In: The Rationality Project. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39920-6_6
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