Abstract
Rationality is set among two different, broad kinds of concepts: One is rationality in the contexts of related, although not etymological related, cases. These include reasoning, assessing probability, intelligence, and wisdom. The other category is less severe, arising in the context of its morphological cognates, such as irrational or nonrational. Along with other ways of positioning rationality within the world at large, we start to see further hopeful means of sharpening it so the term’s many facets cohere.
Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
—Keats, Lamia
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Notes
- 1.
Before coming to the section on terminology, I want to clarify the usages herein of “act” and “action.” The distinctions between the two terms are so fine as to render them synonymous. A moral (or immoral) act would be an action assessable as moral (or not). However, in this essay, a (moral) act is more abstract or hypothetical than an action: the action being the material execution of the act. The act of theft involves the general consideration of theft, whereas the action that is assessed as an act of theft is the material operations as executed that can be morally assessed as theft. (Even a singled-out act of theft, say performed by Sally on October 28, 2017, at 48, 13th Street in Bell Harbor, can be considered as an abstraction of the action of her fleeing the burglarized house with the bullets in her pocket, which action is morally accessible.)
- 2.
I cannot delve into what a judgment is but must let the term go as a basic term, for otherwise the discussion could continue digressing further and further into meanings and ontologies of mental phenomena, diverting the discussion from the main theses.
- 3.
Certainly, in a multiple-choice exam, one may be given four or five options, say “1,” “2,” “3,” and “4,” and therefore has a choice, but these, of course, are always small finite and not the entire set of real numbers.
- 4.
In theory, I could have used any of the other concepts of “rational,” to be discussed later, instead of the one I chose, as a working definition of the term just to carry the discussion to that point. The idea is to be as clear and precise as possible for the time being, to help ensure the drift of discussions becomes apparent. Another aim is to bring out early the idea I present—that “rational” and “rationality” represent conglomerate concepts and the terms need dissecting for the purposes of this essay. However, the working definition I chose is not only close to everyday usage of the term and concept, but key to the fuller examination of the term to come and its interrelated concepts.
- 5.
There is a systematic shortcoming in this plan, as the common instrumental use of the term “rationality” is itself a theory Tj of rationality as the next two chapters discuss. I will have to say that, if context requires that I append that usage or theory with the asterisk, for clarification or consistency, I will do so, but otherwise leave the “rationality” without the asterisk. I beg the reader’s patience for all this symbology, but it is needed in the effort to introduce precision into the complexity of the term “rationality.”
- 6.
I thank the late Jonathan Alder for the suggestion that I somehow clarify the use of the common usage (or sense or “theory,” as the next chapter discusses) of rationality from the various other usages. I thereby introduced the asterisk.
- 7.
Furthermore, looking back to the emphasis Cappelen (2018) places on continuity of lexical item as an important marker of topic continuity (21), I hope this use of the asterisk will not only help to signify how these different senses of rationality* reflects on continuity of lexical item (“rationality”) but also help preserve topic continuity over the centuries.
- 8.
There are, of course, at least two decisions involved in this action. One is whether it is rational to respond to the question; the other is the decision that the answer is four. I am referring to the second type of decision.
- 9.
Rationality* as normative principles for action proves to be candidate for what rationality* consists in, later in the essay.
- 10.
The “should” may not imply a moral concern, as in a hypothetical imperative, thus possibly rendering the second and third sentences non-equivalent with the first. I discuss this problem below.
- 11.
This sentence could be interpreted as imperative, with an explanation for the imperative, but I am taking it to be an indicative or declarative sentence because it is an explanation, so it could represent a proposition. By this interpretation, “One should not murder because it is against the law” could be a proposition.
- 12.
Compare Kant’s definition of rationality discussed in Chap. 2.
- 13.
Some modes of an agent’s carrying out reproduction may be morally questionable, such as a family’s forcing a son or daughter to reproduce.
- 14.
Perhaps it is as difficult to find support for rationality* in other approaches to rational* justification besides rational* moral systems.
- 15.
Another may argue, “Well, if there is a marauding extraterrestrial, and if your car is a weapon, then ….” But by this point, the objecting argument becomes tendentious.
- 16.
Note that I refer to the broader rationality* than to the simpler rationality I established earlier. The broader concept at least includes the latter and, I believe will, in the end, situate it among other concepts of rationality*.
- 17.
Except, of course, when one is inadvisably and dangerously holding one’s breath.
- 18.
A further note on formalistic notation applied to theories of rationaliy*. A “TR,” as stated in this paragraph, is one of the 21 theories of rationality* offered here as derivations from the usages of the term “rationality” found in the literature. Then “rationalityX” refers to one unnamed of those 21. The text may also sometimes refer to a “Tj,” which may refer to just any theory of rationality, whether one of the 21 TR in the text or any other. “Tj” is then like a variable in mathematics. The term “TX” of “TY” serves like constants for some specific but unnamed rationality theory. The “TME,” then, is a constant, being the “most explanatory theory” in the group, as defined.
- 19.
The amount of 21 terms in total has nothing meaningful itself but represents merely the amount of usages of “rationalityX” plausibly distinguishable one from the other, as I could find in the literature. There may be more, but I let these 21 suffice for this essay.
- 20.
Since the rest of Chap. 3 consists in summaries of chapters in which the asterisk in rationality* has been dropped (because the argument reached that point where it could drop the asterisk), the asterisk in these remaining pages of Chap. 3 will also be dropped (only to be resumed again at the opening of Chap. 4).
- 21.
“Cognate” in this essay’s context refers to very closely related terms all with the same base. Thus, “rationality” is a cognate of “rational,” which both have the same root, yet so do “irrational,” “arational,” and so on have that same root.
References
Anscombe, G. E. N. (1989). Why Have Children? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 63, 48–53.
Audi, R. (2001). The Architecture of Rationality: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, H. (2018). Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering.Oxford University Press.
Miller, L. F. (2018). How Ecology Can Edify Ethics: The Scope of Morality. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 31, 443–454.
Miller, L. F. (2021). Kantian Approaches to Human Reproduction: Both Favorable and Unfavorable. Kantian Journal, 40(1), 51–96.
Miller, L. F. (2023). ‘Twenty-one Theories of Rationality Assessed for Which Is the Best’: Draft in PhilPeople. https://philpapers.org/rec/MILTTO-33
Nozick, R. (1993). The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press.
Quine, W. V. O., & Ullian, J. (1970). The Web of Belief. Random House.
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Miller, L. (2024). Positioning the Argument: Goals, Terminologies, Assumptions, Directions. In: The Rationality Project. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39920-6_2
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