Abstract
The weakening of the constitutional review institutions is the red flag for the appropriate implementation of the principle of the rule of law. Successful renewal of constitutional composition is one of the guaranties of the independence of the Constitutional Court. The wave of constitutional crises related to the renewal of the composition of the constitutional courts that have recently swept through Europe and beyond revealed the importance of this procedure to the preservation of the rule of law in the state. Therefore, taking as the example Lithuanian case, the article analyses the peculiarities of the mechanism for appointing the justices of the Constitutional Court, and the reasons for the increasing incidence of untimely appointments of constitutional justices. Political interference in judicial appointment might be seen as a threat to independence of constitutional judges. However, the necessity to overcome the counter majoritarian difficulty doesn’t permit to eliminate the politicians from the appointment procedure. Therefore, the safeguards to the possible abuse of the powers given to the political actors participating in the appointment of constitutional judges should be determined and some particular criteria to take into account while choosing the appropriate candidacies must be applied. The wisdom of sages around the world is needed to keep the right balance between political interference and judicial independence and to ensure accordingly the respect of the rule of law in every step of the national legislation.
This research was funded by the European Social Fund under the No 09.3.3-LMT-K-712 “Development of Competences of Scientists, other Researchers and Students through Practical Research Activities” measure.
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Notes
- 1.
See, for instance, Sadurski (2019).
- 2.
- 3.
See, for instance, Halmai (2019).
- 4.
Beširević (2014).
- 5.
See Pech and Scheppele (2017).
- 6.
CJEU Judgement of 19 November 2019 A. K. (independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 or Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
- 7.
Konstitucinio Teismo atnaujinimas: teisininkai įžvelgia grėsmes teisinei valstybei. TeisePro. https://www.teise.pro/index.php/2021/01/13/konstitucinio-teismo-atnaujinimas-teisininkai-izvelgia-gresmes-teisinei-valstybei/.
- 8.
Article 103 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.
- 9.
ECHR Judgement of 7 May 2021 in Xero Flor v Poland (Application no. 4907/18).
- 10.
Bartole (2020), p. 94.
- 11.
Ruling of 2 June 2005 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in case 10/05 on the appointment of R. K. Urbaitis as a justice of the Constitutional Court.
- 12.
Kelemen (2015).
- 13.
See more Bassok and Dotan (2013).
- 14.
Article 4 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, Official Gazette, 1993, No 6–120, identification code 0931010ISTA0000I-67.
- 15.
Article 4 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that “The expiry of the term of office of the justices of the Constitutional Court shall be the third Thursday of March of the respective year”.
- 16.
In the history of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, there have been only a few exceptional cases where, after the Parliament rejected a candidate nominated for the position of a constitutional justice, the same nomination was immediately resubmitted and eventually approved for the office of a justice of the Constitutional Court by the Parliament in a secret ballot.
- 17.
Transcript of 21 April 2020 of the morning session of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania. LRS, https://e-parlamentas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAK/34ce5db183cf11eaa51db668f0092944.
- 18.
Ľalík (2016).
- 19.
The shortcomings of the candidates for justices of the Constitutional Court pointed out by the President of the Slovak Republic were the lack of specialisation in constitutional law of the nominated candidates, the absence of significant academic achievements, and the lack of recommendations to the nominated candidates by a committee set up by the President himself.
- 20.
Opinion No 877/2017 of the Venice Commission of 13 March 2017 for the Slovak Republic on Questions Relating to the Appointment of Judges of the Constitutional Court, CDL-AD(2017)001, Venice Commission, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)001-e.
- 21.
Decision No I. ÚS 549/2015 of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of 6 December 2017, https://www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/10182/71853347/I_US_549_2017.pdf/b230aaad-0f70-41ea-9e05-4e948a761f28.
- 22.
Bartole (2020), p. 101.
- 23.
Kelemen (2015).
- 24.
Article 103 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.
- 25.
The last one of the three new justices of the Constitutional Court was appointed and took the oath only on 8 June 2021 instead of March 2020.
- 26.
Miliuvienė (2021).
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Miliuvienė, J. (2023). Preconditions to Avoid Constitutional Rule of Law Crisis: Some Reflections on Appointment Procedure of Constitutional Justices. In: Arnold, R., Cremades, J. (eds) Rule of Law and the Challenges Posed by the Pandemic. WLC 2021. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39804-9_5
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