Abstract
The chapter proposes a new interpretation of Husserl’s relation to Descartes and his Meditationes de prima philosophia, hence, of the opening pages of the Cartesian Meditations. Introducing the notion of Lebensform or form-of-life, the reform of philosophy (imperfectly) accomplished by Socrates, Plato and Descartes is interpreted as grounding a new form-of-life (the form-of-life that Husserl himself will later identify with his transcendental idealism).
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Notes
- 1.
Husserl proposed a sketch of his overall system of the sciences in his Introduction to Philosophy lectures of 1919–1920: “Das führt notwendig auf den Entwurf eines Systems der Gesamtheit wissenschaftstheoretischer Disziplinen, zunächst der ontologischen und noematischen Disziplinen, welche in formaler Allgemeinheit von möglichen Gegenständlichkeiten überhaupt, dann, herabsteigend von möglichen individuellen Gegenständlichkeiten und Welten, von möglichen Naturen und Kulturen handeln, wie wir das ausführliche dargelegt haben. Weiter ist erfordert ein sich diesem formalen Rahmen durch materiale Bestimmung einfügendes System der material-apriorischen Disziplinen wie der Geometrie, der apriorischen Mechanik. Alles zusammen ergibt sich nach dem Leitfaden des Systems der Wissenschaftslehren ein universales System apriorischer und empirischer Wissenschaften natürlicher Blickrichtung. Diese ergeben sich offenbar nicht als bloß geordnetes Nebeneinander, sondern es sind dem Erkenntnisrang nach übergeordnet die apriorischen Wissenschaften als Wissenschaften von den prinzipiellen Allgemeinheiten gegenüber den Tatsachenwissenschaften, deren Faktizitäten unter den Prinzipien stehen. Ferner gründen sich die letzteren, die Tatsachenwissenschaften, auf die ersteren (die Wesensgesetze möglicher Wirklichkeiten gelten natürlich auch für die faktischen Wirklichkeiten und dienen dann zu ihrer theoretischen Bestimmung)” (Hua-Mat IX, 284). On the relations between phenomenology and the Cartesian tradition, see Mehl, 2021.
- 2.
For a quick discussion of the many possible readings of this expression, see Soffer, 1981, 141–143.
- 3.
“No longer am I the human being who, in natural self-experience, finds himself or herself as a human and who, with the abstractive restriction of the pure contents of internal or purely psychological self-experience, finds his or her own pure mens sive animus sive intellectus; nor am I the separately considered psyche itself” (Hua I, 64; Husserl, 1993, 25).
- 4.
- 5.
“Nicht eine Philosophie, sondern eine Vielheit von miteinander streitenden Philosophien erwachsen in rascher Folge und dabei von Philosophien, die zwar weltumspannend, aber inhaltlich sehr arm sind.”
- 6.
For the importance of the notion of “wakefulness” in Husserl, see Jacobs, 2010.
- 7.
As far as we understand Husserl, a proper concept is a concept properly framed on the basis of a direct apprehension of the essence of the object. Given the many different senses of the term “essence” identified in Chap. 3, Sect. 2 of this volume, a proper concept could correspond either to the regional essence or the universal one.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
The idea that Socrates (and Plato) shapes a new form-of-life can be found also in the Plato interpretations proposed by the “George-Kreis,” for example in Singer, 1927, 65 and Hildebrandt, 1933, 105. Unlike Husserl, these interpreters tend to underplay the theoretical import of Plato’s philosophy and the methodological aspects of Socrates’ teaching (see Singer, 1927, 38). For an introduction to Plato and the George-Kreis, see Rebenich, 2018.
- 11.
The tendency to speak of “Sokrates-Platon” and their joint attempt at “re-shaping” and “reforming” (zu reformieren) humanity can be found for example in Hildebrandt, 1933, 28 (Sokrates-Platon will der Gestalter des neuen Menschen), 29, 33 and many other passages. See also page 193, where an almost explicit reference to Husserl is made: Hildebrandt mentions die neue Philosophie that relies on the Wesenschau. Since a systematic confrontation between Husserl and Hildebrandt, and the former’s possible influence on the latter, cannot be proposed here, let us simply refer the reader to Vegetti, 2016, 69–87; Kim, 2018 and Bonazzi, 2020 for a wider discussion of the context of Hildebrandt’s interpretation.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
The “unitary” character of this account of the history of philosophy, in particular the thesis that the sophists, Socrates, Plato and Descartes belong all together to the same history, us contributing to it in different manners, is what sets Husserl’s position apart from the mainstream interpretations in Germany in the 20 s and 30 s. With a few exceptions (see the already quoted Hildebrandt, 1933, 65 and passim) in fact, “Plato” is constantly opposed to both the sophists and Socrates on the one hand, and Descartes on the other. Plato is opposed to Socrates because he embodies the northern and Arian race, while the son of Sophroniscus is said to represent the oriental type (Chapoutot, 2012, 313–317). On the other hand, Plato is opposed to the sophists because they too embody the “Asian” race and endorse abstract intellectualism and individualism (Günther, 1966, 17 and ff.). This is the reason why Plato was also opposed to Descartes and modern philosophy in general because of their intellectualism and scientism (see Hildebrandt, 1933, 172–173).
- 15.
la révolution… la plus décisive, en bien ou en mal, qui se soit produite entre Aristote et Kant (Gilson, 2017, 200). For what concerns the relation-difference between Descartes and Agustin, see what Husserl says right at the outset of his lectures on First Philosophy: “The modern period begins with Descartes because he was the first to attempt to do justice at a theoretical level to what is indubitably true about the skeptical arguments. He was the first to take possession theoretically of the most general ground of being, a ground that even the most extreme skeptical negations presuppose
and to which in their arguments they all refer back, viz., self-certain, cognizing subjectivity. In a certain sense, to be sure, Augustine had already claimed this ground as his own; he had already pointed out the indubitability of the Ego Cogito. But the new turn emerges in Descartes through the way he takes an anti-skeptical point made in the context of a mere counterargument and makes it into a theoretical determination” (Hua VII, 61; Husserl, 2019, 64). That Husserl is here following Descartes’ own opinion on the difference between his cogito and Augustine’s, can be confirmed by Gilson, 2017, 191–201 (Le cogito et la tradition augustinienne); 259–268 (Descartes, Saint Augustin et Campanella). See also Rodis-Lewis, 1990, 101–125 (Augustinisme et cartésianisme), who argues for a stronger thesis: “Descartes, loin d’avoir recueillir l’écho d’un augustinisme philosophique ambiant, aurait permis à ses contemporaines de retrouver l’originalité métaphysique du penseur d’Hippone, dans ses affinités avec la démarche cartésienne.”
- 16.
For a recent analysis of Descartes’ position and role within the crisis of modern sciences, which cannot be followed here, see Djian, 2021, 162 and ff. See also Rodis-Lewis, 1990, 127–148 (Le dualisme platonisant au début du XVII siècle et la révolution cartésienne) for a general discussion of Descartes’ dualism.
- 17.
- 18.
“I have particular reason for being glad that I may talk about transcendental phenomenology in this, the most venerable abode of French science” (Hua I, 43; Husserl, 1993, 1).
- 19.
Let us add that although the language of the “reform” characterizes Husserl’s jargon systematically and can be found in many of his lectures from the 20 s, the expression “reform of philosophy” is applied to Descartes on only a few occasions: in Hua XXXV, 247 and in the Cartesian Meditations.
- 20.
This crucial fact has been understood, we believe, only by Majolino, 2023, §2.4: “The fact that the Meditationes are a book, the only philosophical book ever explicitly discussed qua book by Husserl, is all but irrelevant for our purpose. As Husserl explains in the Origin of geometry, it is only insofar as they are delivered in a written form that the intentional achievements of a truth-oriented conscious activity are set to be historically transmitted, handed over from one generation to another, replicated, discussed, used as a basis for further demonstrations or meditations and give rise to a ‘tradition.’ The same applies to Descartes’s Meditationes which appear as the factual inscription in the history of humanity of both a distinctive variety of meditation and the theory it gives rise to.”
- 21.
In Hua XXXV, 59, Husserl himself quotes from the Regula VIII: qui serio student ad bonam mentem. Here is the full passage from the Cartesian text: “Si quis pro quaestione sibi proponat, examinare veritates omnes, ad quarum cognirionem humana ratio sufficiat (quod mihi videtur semel in vita faciendum esse ad ijs omnibus, qui ferio student ad bonam mentem pervenire), ille profecto per regulas datas inveniet nihil prius cognosci posse quam intellectum, cum ab hoc caeterum omnium cognitio dependeat, & non contra” (Descartes, 1965, 71; AT 395).
- 22.
See Sacrini, 2018, 268–275, for a series of interesting observations on the role and function of “science” as a cultural formation in these opening pages of the text.
- 23.
Also Descartes, in his Discours de la méthode admits that: La seule résolution de se défaire de toutes les opinions qu’on a reçues auparavant en sa créance, n’est pas un exemple que chacun doive suivre (Descartes, 1970, 64). See Leroy, 1929, 195 and ff. on the importance of Descartes’ own decision to write the Discours de la méthode in French. Let us add that Husserl’s invitation to imitate what he has already imitated semel in vita is addressed to the philosopher, and it has here nothing to do with the problem of the beginning of philosophy (precisely because it presupposes the reality of the philosophical community). This is a problem which cannot be discussed in the present context.
- 24.
See Moran, 2012, 122, on the de-humanization of the transcendental subject.
- 25.
For an important text in which an argument very similar to ours is developed, yet not in connection to the Cartesian Meditations but to the general method of transcendental reduction, see Jacobs, 2017.
- 26.
Let us simply recall here these famous Wittgensteinian passages “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life (eine Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §19, 8–8e); “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (einer Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §23, 11–11e); “It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not an agreement in opinions but in form of life (Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §241, 88–88e); “Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life (komplizierten Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 174–174e); “What has to be accepted, the given is, so one could say, forms of life (Lebensformen)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 226–226e). See Kolman, 2017, 58–59 and ff. for a pragmatic reading of Wittgenstein’s Lebensformen.
- 27.
Husserl might have borrowed the expression from the 1921 book on Lebensformen by Eduard Sprenger. See Padilla Gálvez, 2015, 257–258 for a brief discussion of the many origins of the expression Lebensform.
- 28.
On this, see also González-Castán, 2015, 283–289, who argues for the identification of Lebensform with Lebenswelt.
- 29.
See for example also Hua XXXIX, 429, where Husserl speaks of konventionelle Lebensformen, Sitte, Getue. On the possible different characterizations of the “norm” in connection with the notion of Lebensform, see Jaeggi, 2014, 152–182.
- 30.
See Carella, 2021 for a most recent discussion of Husserl’s position on animals.
- 31.
- 32.
Let us note only in passing that it is in this context that Husserl’s (otherwise vague) notion of the philosopher as a “functionary of humanity” could be properly and consistently understood. A crucial text in the history of the term officium as “profession” is The Fundamental Issue by E. Kantorowicz. The text was written by the great historian against The Levering Act, a law introduced in 1949 by the State of California that required all state employees to take an anti-communism loyalty oath. In his test, Kantorowicz first makes the distinction between “profession” as officium and “employee,” and then explains: “A profession, as the word itself would suggest, is based upon conscience, and not upon working hours as in the case of modern trades, or on Time in general. In this respect the scholar resembles the judge whose duties are not disposed of by sitting in court, or the clergyman whose duties are not exhaustively described by the mention of ritual performances and sermons on Sundays. The conscience is actually the essence of the scholars ‘office’ (officium) which he is entrusted with and through which he becomes truly a ‘public trust.’ From whatever angle one may look at the academic profession, it is always, in addition to passion and love, the conscience which makes the scholar a scholar. And it is through the fact that his whole being depends on his conscience that he manifests his connection with the legal profession as well as with the clergy from which, in the high Middle Ages, the academic profession descended and the scholar borrowed his gown. Unlike the employee, the professor dedicates, in the way of research, even most of his private life to the body corporate of the University of which he is the integral part. His impetus is his conscience” (Kantorowicz, 1950).
- 33.
This is why Husserl can remark, Im Leben beurteilt man die Anderen nach dem Kathekon (zunächst) (Hua XV, 145). It is a pity that in his archeology of the officium, Agamben (2011), probably because of his suspicion towards Husserlian phenomenology, does not even mention his appropriation of the Stoic kathekon or his use of the expression Lebensform. For a discussion of the Stoic kathekon, see Bracegirdle, 1974, Ch. 1 on Cicero, and Ch. 4 on Digenes and Stobeaus.
- 34.
See Heinämaa, 2013, on the concept of “normality” in Husserl.
- 35.
See Meacham, 2013, in particular, 14–18 (General and Individual Style).
- 36.
See Jaeggi, 2014, 70–77, for a different perspective on the relation/difference between Lebensform and Lebensstil. It is a pity that, as far as we can tell, Husserl does not even appear once in her book.
- 37.
I owe this observation to Majolino, 2023.
- 38.
For a very different assessment of Descartes’ “reform,” see Maritain, 1925, 75–128, where Descartes is famously accused of un péché d’angélisme due to his conception of the human mind on the model of the angelic one. As Maritain writes at the outset of his essay: Disons que Descartes a dévoilé le visage du monstre que l’idéalisme moderne adore sous le nom de Pensée (77). The reference is not without importance since Maritain will soon be very critical also of the Husserlian idealism as is presented in the Cartesian Meditations in his quasi review of the book in Maritain, 1932.
- 39.
Descartes speaks of un long exercice, et d’une méditation souvent réitérée (Descartes, 1970, 81, Règles de la morale).
- 40.
This would be the proper sense of Husserl’s cartesianismo de la vida (Serrano de Haro, 2016, 211).
- 41.
Although the problem goes far beyond the present context of discussion, a few remarks could be proposed as to the long-standing question of the different ways to the phenomenological reduction, in particular the “Cartesian way” (Kern, 1962). Husserl’s mode of working in the Meditations perfectly matches the 4 characteristics of the Cartesian way listed by Kern, 1962, 304–30: (1) the idea of an absolute science at the beginning of the reflection; (2) the search for absolute evidence; (3) the ego cogito as what remains after the bracketing of the world; (4) the recognition of the world as an intentional phenomenon. However, there is one point in particular which does not correspond to the Cartesian idea of the reduction: the idea of the ego cogito as an empty consciousness (which is what Husserl himself retrospectively criticizes in §43 of the Crisis). For as we have already seen in Volume 1, Chapters 1 and 4, the result of the phenomenological reduction is a concrete subjectivity that is completely irreducible to the region “pure consciousness” of Ideas I. Let us also add that the peculiarity of Husserl’s own Cartesianism in the Cartesian Meditations, namely, that of resulting in a peculiar “form-of-life” is not even mentioned by Kern. The point is not only that of re-thinking the distinction between the ways to the reduction; the problem is rather to start recognizing the true nature of Husserl’s own phenomenological Cartesianism.
- 42.
It would be interesting to better understand what Husserl means by keine Unterscheidung in this case. For if the term is taken at face value, he would seem to be saying that the theoretical, the practical and the aesthetic forms of reason are just one and the same form: the unity of reason (whatever this expression could mean) would not tolerate any internal differentiation (as for example Giovanni Gentile would argue). If, by contrast, Husserl means that they cannot be detached from one another, in such a way that each form implies the others, then Husserl would be proposing a position worth being compared with Croce’s dialectics of the distincts (Croce, 1927, 53–66).
- 43.
Here is the passage from the beginning of Being and Time (see Volume 1, Chap. 2, §2): “Historically, the intention of the existential analytics can be clarified by considering Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the cogito sum as the point of departure for all modern philosophical questioning. He investigates the cogitare of the ego, within certain limits. But the sum he leaves completely undiscussed, even though it is just as primordial as the cogito. Our analytics raises the ontological question of the being of the sum. Only when the sum is defined does the manner of the cogitationes become comprehensible” (Heidegger, 1967, 45–46; Heidegger, 2010, 45).
- 44.
Majolino pointed out to me the crucial importance of Husserl always referring to the Latin title of Descartes’ work (Meditationes de prima philosophia) and not to the French one (Méditations métaphysiques): in fact, as we already know from our analyses in the last two chapters, it is crucial for Husserl to avoid making any confusion between “first philosophy” and what goes by the name of “metaphysics” (as last philosophy).
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De Santis, D. (2023). Forms-of-Life and the Reform(s) of Philosophy. In: Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_6
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