Abstract
The chapter provides a systematic and full reconstruction of the development of Husserl’s conception of metaphysics. Contrary to what is usually claimed, the chapter rejects the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology as metaphysically neutral and makes the case for considering the foundation of metaphysics as the aim of his philosophy. If at the beginning of his speculation Husserl associates his notion of metaphysics with Aristotle’s first philosophy, he slowly comes to conceive of metaphysics as last philosophy, i.e., as the ultimate interpretation of factual reality. At the end of the chapter the case is also made for identifying a further conception of metaphysics (metaphysics in a new sense), which deals with the irrational nature of human existence. Hence, a new perspective on Husserl’s criticism of Heidegger is offered to the reader: Husserl is presented as a critique of Heidegger’s confusion between first and last philosophy, between the transcendental dimension of the subject and the irrational nature of human existence.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Despite its title (La notion de métaphysique chez Husserl), Sivák, 2015 does not tackle the concept of metaphysics in the way Husserl properly understands it; rather, it proposes an analysis of the many aspects of his ontology and of the relations between ontology and transcendental philosophy. Similar is the case with Vannata, 2007.
- 3.
We are under the impression that, albeit they rightly identify the core meanings of Husserl’s metaphysics, Arnold & D’Angelo, 2020 tend to use the concept of “metaphysics” to cover an array of different themes which have nothing to do with what Husserl means by metaphysics (they include the discussion of ideal objects, the categories, space and time as objects of ontology or also from the standpoint of the theory of constitution, modalities, the mind-body problem and God). Moreover, they end up claiming that “phenomenological metaphysics” is a “metaphysics of the world” (Arnold & D’Angelo, 2020, 21), thus leaving undecided whether by “world” we should mean the world as an idea (= ontology of the real) or as a fact.
- 4.
Let us not forget that in a famous letter to Peter Wust Husserl explains that, “from the very beginning my philosophy was, and did not want to be anything else but the path (Weg) towards a radically authentic metaphysics, that is, a truly justified and radically scientific metaphysics […]. Already in my 1887 inaugural lecture I defended the idea of a new scientific metaphysics” (Wust, 1967, 30). The reference is to the Antrittsvorlesung in Halle on Die Ziele und Aufgaben der Metaphysik held on October 24th, 1887 (Schuhmann, 1977, 22).
- 5.
Hence, nothing could be more distant from the truth than the claim: “Husserl diskutiert die metaphysischen Fragen erstmals in Texten von 1908–1910” (De Palma, 2019, 188).
- 6.
The identification of the subject-matter of Aristotle’s πρώτη φιλοσοφία with the science of the real (Realontologie) characterizes Husserl’s interpretation of the Stagirite still in Formal and Transcendental Logic (Hua XVII, 84).
- 7.
Here is Aristotle’s passage from book Z: “τούτου γὰρ χάριν καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν πειρώμεθα διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ δευτέρας φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας θεωρία: οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ μᾶλλον.”
- 8.
It is therefore quite ambiguous to affirm that, “The Husserl of the Logische Untersuchungen is simply not interested in metaphysics” (Tavuzzi, 1981, 286). Quite the opposite. The Husserl of the Logical Investigations is already pretty much interested in metaphysics and its very possibility: the problem is to understand why the Logical Investigations do not and cannot concern themselves with such issue.
- 9.
For a critical reading of Husserl’s determination of “first philosophy” in the 1923 lectures, see Allen, 1982.
- 10.
Tavuzzi, 1981, 294–297, clarifies correctly the distinction between metaphysics, ontology and first philosophy.
- 11.
As should be evident, since here we are interested only in the overall and general structure of what we would call Husserl’s “system of philosophy,” no specific analyses of the actual transcendental foundation of the sciences will be pursued. A most clear analysis of this problem, with which we would fully agree, can be found in Trizio, 2021a.
- 12.
- 13.
This statement, however, should be taken cum grano salis in order to avoid retro-projecting onto the early conception the account which Husserl develops after 1905. In fact, and even if terminologically speaking the subject-matter of formal metaphysics coincides with that of metaphysics as first philosophy, a major difference must be underlined: if the latter was said to build upon the work of experiential sciences, formal metaphysics is a priori instead.
- 14.
On Lotze’s teleological metaphysics, which cannot be discussed here, see the second part of Beiser, 2013.
- 15.
On this aspect of Husserl’s metaphysics, see Trizio, 2021b, in particular, 524–525.
- 16.
- 17.
In this respect, Geiger’s position has something in common with another Lotze-inspired conception of metaphysics, that of Stumpf. In line with Lotze, Stumpf understands metaphysics as a “post-science” (Nachwissenschaft), with the prefix post- meaning that metaphysics arises after the already accomplished work of the sciences (notably, physics and psychology) (Stumpf, 1907, 42). Just as Lotze maintains that metaphysics does not demonstrate any of the special laws, and just as Husserl points out that metaphysics “build upon” the work of experiential sciences, Stumpf remarks that it presupposes them in such a way that it can be called “the experiential science in the most pregnant sense of the term” (Stumpf, 1907, 43). While Husserl, however, limits the task of metaphysics to the investigation of the “general assumptions” of the experiential sciences, in line with Lotze, Stumpf ascribes to metaphysics not only the function of addressing “the question as to the common laws” underlying the many sciences of reality, but also that of working out “the unitary inter-connection” of all objects (“the universal law-bound connection of the various facts”). Thus, metaphysics is for him an actual “world-theory” (Stumpf, 1907, 43). Yet, the critical function that, in line with Lotze, the early Husserl ascribes to metaphysics is nowhere to found in Stumpf.
- 18.
Trizio explains as follows Husserl’s claim that the “metaphysical interpretation” is the “final interpretation of the objective being”: “what the theory of constitution rules out is any philosophical doctrine according to which the being investigated by the empirical sciences would only be an aspect or a manifestation of a deeper reality. In other words, no talk of hyperphysical reality is possible, simply because no hyperphysical reality is conceivable. This excludes the unknowable thing in itself à la Kant, but also the slightly less unknowable will of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. Furthermore, a metaphysics such as Spinoza’s, according to which both nature and the mind amount to modes of an infinite substance, is also ruled out, because it implies that beyond nature and mind there lies a deeper reality, an ultimate, self-subsisting substance” (Trizio, 2021a, 84).
- 19.
A most clear text on the topic is the 1914 draft of a letter to K. Joel: “Ich reduziere keineswegs die Philosophie auf Erkenntnistheorie und Vernunftkritik überhaupt, geschweige denn auf transzendentale Phänomenologie. Diese ist in meinen Augen eine eigene Wissenschaft, die eidet<ische> Wissenschaft vom transz<endental> reinen Bewußtsein und seinen Korrelaten, die in gewisser Weise alle anderen eid<etischen> Wissenschaften (das System der formalen und materialen Ontologien) umspannt und doch nicht in sich schließt. Der vollständige Entwurf der Ontol<ogien> und die systematische Ausführung der ihnen entsprechenden und zur höchsten Einheit zurückführenden transzendentalen Phänomenologien ist m. E. die kardinale Bedingung der Möglichkeit einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie, ist ihr vollständiges eidet<isches> Fundament. Des näheren: Sie allein ermöglichen eine wissenschaftliche Metaphysik, die es nicht mehr mit bloß idealen Möglichkeiten, sondern mit der Wirklichkeit zu tun < hat>. Ganz wie Sie sage ich: Die Metaphysik ist die eigentliche Wissenschaft von der Realität” (Hua-Dok III/6, 205–206). The account of the system of philosophy here sketched by Husserl perfectly matches with the one we have been describing thus far (with the only exception of the positive sciences, which are not mentioned in the letter): there is first transcendental phenomenology as the eidetic science of consciousness; what follows are the many other ontologies. The conjunction of “phenomenology” and all the other “ontologies” is the condition of possibility for a scientific metaphysics (as the science of reality) to be at all possible. The fact that, towards the end of the quoted excerpt, Husserl uses “scientific philosophy” and “scientific metaphysics” interchangeably confirms that metaphysics should be regarded as the culmination of philosophy.
- 20.
This is no otiose issue and the difference is not merely terminological. For what is at stake in the determination of the positive sciences as “second philosophies,” namely, as a part of the concrete ontological tree is nothing but the so-called problem of the “crisis of European sciences.” Although the topic cannot be addressed here, for it would take us far beyond the limited scope of this chapter, let us remark the following. For Husserl, the crisis of the sciences means a crisis of both the philosophical sciences or a priori ontologies (which have renounced being part of concrete ontology) and the positive or empirical ones (which have renounced being part of the determination of the totality of being upon the part of concrete ontology). In other words, the crisis of European sciences is the crisis of “reason” (Vernunft) and its ambition to “interpret” factual reality as the telos of its “objective determination” of being. For an interpretation of the concept of “crisis” in Husserl with which we would fully agree, see Trizio, 2016. Contra, see Heffernan, 2017.
- 21.
This is why Husserl writes, “it makes no scientific sense to search for another…(our italics).”
- 22.
See the analyses of Tengelyi’s position offered by Römer, 2017, 120–123.
- 23.
Tengelyi’s interpretation has been recently developed by Breuer, 2020, who writes: “transcendental phenomenology is grounded upon a phenomenological metaphysics. In what follows, I will show how and why Husserl moves from a transcendental philosophy understood as an eidetic science to a phenomenological metaphysics based on originally given primal facts, focusing on the transformation of the concept of the ego” (214). Just like Tengelyi, Breuer explicitly confuses the meaning of the two expressions “the irrationality of the transcendental fact” and “metaphysics in a new sense” from the 1923 lectures with the problem of the factual structures of the transcendental and concrete ego. See for example p. 221: “Already in a supplementary sheet to his First Philosophy of 1923–24, Husserl extends the scope of this problematic to the realm of the ‘irrationality of the transcendental fact’ as the content of a ‘metaphysics in a new sense’ […], a phenomenological metaphysics, on which the transcendental-eidetic phenomenology is grounded and which no longer allows any distinction between ‘static’ and ‘genetic.’” This argument is affected by at least three difficulties. In the first place, nowhere is the expression “phenomenological metaphysics” ever justified. The author introduces the expression, taking for granted that a directly understandable meaning can be attached to it. In the second place, it is not true that the new idea of the transcendental ego “no longer allows any distinction between ‘static’ and ‘genetic.’” The distinction between static and genetic is re-affirmed by Husserl in dozens of texts written after the 1923–24 lectures, for example in the Cartesian Meditations: here, it is precisely the distinction between static and the genetic philosophy that allows for a new, concrete conception of the transcendental ego as a monad. Thirdly, it is far from being true that “transcendental-eidetic phenomenology” would be grounded in “metaphysics in a new sense.” The footnote in question affirms the exact opposite: what Husserl labels “metaphysics in a new sense” follows, and presupposes the already accomplished “transcendental-eidetic phenomenology.” See also the last footnote to the present chapter.
- 24.
If we were to further elaborate upon our argument, the following hypothesis could be advanced. Is it just a coincidence that Husserl uses the adjective “metaphysical” in order to characterize the ego’s structures and the fundamental forms of its transcendence (i.e., towards the other ego, towards the world and as history) immediately he had read once again all of Heidegger’s works? As we briefly saw towards the end of §3 of this chapter, Heidegger calls meta-physics Dasein’s transcendence, which is precisely what Husserl would understand in terms of the many forms of the ego’s transcendence. This would also explain why Husserl uses the adjective “metaphysical” in the 1931 manuscript with inverted commas: the point for him is to avoid confusing the proper meaning of the concept of metaphysics (as the metaphysical interpretation of factually given being) with this new, and more Heideggerian-sounding use of the term. It is interesting to stress that, at the beginning of his argument, Tengelyi refers to Held, 1966, 178 and 147 (see Tengelyi, 2015, 183), to more strongly support his interpretation. However, none of the pages referred to by Tengelyi speaks of metaphysics in his sense of the term. However, Held too seems to confuse “metaphysics in a new sense” with the problem of the human determination of the transcendental inter-subjectivity (Held, 1966, 178; see our analyses in Volume1, Chap. 5, §§9–11). A position similar to Tengelyi’s can be found in Arnold & D’Angelo, 2020, 53–56. The authors include under the label of “metaphysics” questions as diverse as: the transcendental fact of the subject (in Tengelyi’s sense); the supreme and ultimate questions; as well as the problem of the existence of just one real and actual world.
- 25.
On this problem, see the analyses by Ip, 2023.
- 26.
For a critical discussion of death as a possibility for Dasein, see Puc, 2013, 72–75.
- 27.
If our criticism of Tengelyi’s own metaphysics of the Urtatsachen is on the right track, then Husserl’s expression “‘metaphysical’ primordial fact” (die ‘metaphysische’ Urtatsache) (Hua XV, 366) should be read against the backdrop of Heidegger’s decision to characterize as “metaphysical” the event of Dasein’s transcendence. For example, Heidegger speaks of “metaphysical primordial or primal fact” in one of the texts with which Husserl was most familiar, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (§42): “The construction proper to fundamental ontology is distinguished by the fact that it lays bare the internal possibility of that which holds sway over Dasein. This dominating element is not only that which is most familiar to Dasein but is also that which is most indeterminate and self-evident. This construction can be understood as an effort in the part of Dasein to grasp in itself the primordial metaphysical fact (das metaphysische Urfaktum) which consists in this, that the most finite in its finitude is known without being understood” (Heidegger, 1965, 233; 2010a, 241). And such “primordial metaphysical fact” is the comprehension of being proper to Dasein’s finitude, and which alone makes its “transcendence” and being-in-the-world at all possible.
References
Allen, J. (1982). What is Husserl’s first philosophy? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42, 610–620.
Arnold, T., & D’Angelo, D. (2020). Edmund Husserl. Ein Weg in die Metaphysik? In T. Keiling (Ed.), Phänomenologische Metaphysik (pp. 21–59). Tübingen.
Beiser, F. (2013). Late German idealism. Trendelenburg and Lotze. Oxford University Press.
Benoist, J. (1997). Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie. PUF.
Bergmann, J. (1895). Die Grundprobleme der Logik. Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn.
Bernet, R. (1982). Is the present ever a present? Phenomenology and the metaphysics of presence. Research in Phenomenology, 12, 85–112.
Bernet, R., Iso, K., & Eduard, M. (1996). Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg.
Beyer, C. (1996). Von Bolzano zu Husserl. Eine Untersuchung über den Ursprung der phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre. Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Breuer, I. (2020). Towards a phenomenological metaphysics. The contingent core of the ego and of all eidetic forms. In I. Apostolescu & C. Serban (Eds.), Husserl, Kant and transcendental phenomenology (pp. 213–233). De Gruyter.
Carr, D. (1999). The paradox of subjectivity. Oxford University Press.
De Palma, V. (2019). Deskription oder Konstruktion? Husserl und die Grenzen der Phänomenologie. Husserl Studies, 35, 182–202.
De Santis, D. (2016). Notes on Husserl’s Idealismus in the Logische Untersuchungen (via Lotze’s interpretation of Plato). Research in Phenomenology, 46, 221–256.
De Santis, D. (2018). “Metaphysische Ergebnisse.” Phenomenology and metaphysics in Edmund Husserl’s Cartesianische Meditationen (§60). Attempt at commentary. Husserl Studies, 34, 63–83.
De Santis, D. (2019). The practical reformer: Husserl’s Socrates. Husserl Studies, 35, 131–148.
De Santis, D. (2021). Husserl and the a priori. Phenomenology and rationality. Springer.
De Santis, D. (2021a). The development of Husserl’s concept of metaphysics. In H. Jacobs (Ed.), The Husserlian mind (pp. 481–493). Routledge.
De Santis, D. (2021b). Problemas limite de la fenomenología trascendental: teleología, generatividad, absoluto. In A. Serrano de Haro (Ed.), Guía Comares de Husserl (pp. 237–255). Comares Editorial.
De Santis, D. (2022). Contra Neutralitatem: uma introdução opinativa ao problema da Metafísica na fenomenologia de Husserl (Deborah Moreira Guimarães, Trans.). Ekstasis: Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia, 11(2), 442–464.
De Waelhens, A. (1949). Phénoménologie et métaphysique. Revue philosophique de Leuven, 47, 366–376.
Derrida, J. (1967). La voix et le phénomène. PUF.
Diemer, A. (1954). La phénoménologie de Husserl comme métaphysique. Les Études Philosophiques, 9, 21–49.
Fuchs, W. (1976). Phenomenology and the metaphysics of presence. An essay in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. M. Nijhoff.
Funke, G. (1972). Phänomenologie: Metaphysik oder Methode? Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
Geiger, M. (1966). Die Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaft und die Metaphysik. Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Ghigi, N. (2007). La metafisica in Edmund Husserl. Franco Angeli.
Heffernan, G. (2017). The concept of crisis in Husserl’s the crisis of the European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Husserl Studies, 33, 229–257.
Heidegger, M. (1965). Kant and the problem of metaphysics. Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1967). Sein und Zeit (GA 2). Max Niemeyer.
Heidegger, M. (1976). Wegmarken (GA 9). V. Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1998). Pathways. Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2010). Being and Time. State University of New York Press.
Heidegger, M. (2010a). Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (GA 3). V. Klostermann.
Held, K. (1966). Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1950). Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Hua II). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1956). Erste Philosophie (1923–1924) (Hua VII). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1962). Phänomenologische Psychologie (Hua IX). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Hua I). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973a). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil (1929–1935) (Hua XV). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (Hua XVII). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1975). Prolegomena zu einer reinen Logik (Hua XVIII). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Erstes Band, Hua III/1). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1979). Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910) (Hua XXII). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1984a). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil (Hua XIX/1; XIX/2). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1984b). Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie (Hua XXIV). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1988). Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908–1914) (Hua XXVIII). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1989). Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937) (Hua XXVII). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. (1994). Briefwechsel. Die Philosophenbriefe (Hua-Dok III/6). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1994a). Briefwechsel. Familienbriefe (Hua-Dok III/9). M. Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1994b). Randbemerkungen zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit und Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Husserl Studies, 11, 3–63.
Husserl, E. (1997). Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931). Springer.
Husserl, E. (2001). Logical investigations. Volumes I, II. Routledge.
Husserl, E. (2001a). Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre 1902/03 (Hua-Mat III). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2001b). Logik: Vorlesung 1902/03 (Hua-Mat II). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2001c). Logik: Vorlesung 1896 (Hua-Mat I). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2002). Urteilstheorie. Vorlesungen 1905 (Hua-Mat V). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2003). Alte und neue Logik. Vorlesung 1908–1909 (Hua-Mat VI). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2005). Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis (Hua-Mat VII). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2008). Introduction to logic and theory of knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2012). Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1916–1920 (Hua-Mat IX). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2014). Ideas I. Hackett Publisher.
Husserl, E. (2019). First philosophy. Lectures 1923/24 and related texts from the manuscripts (1920–1925). Springer.
Ip, L. (2023). From “second philosophy” to “last philosophy”: Husserl’s idea of metaphysics as the absolute science of factual reality. In D. De Santis (Ed.), Husserl, the Cartesian meditations. Commentary, interpretations, discussions. Herder, forthcoming.
Kern, I. (2021). Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität und metaphysische Monadologie. Schwabe Verlag.
Lotze, H. (1841). Metaphysik. Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung.
Lotze, H. (1879). Metaphysik. Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie, und Psychologie. Hirzel.
Lotze, H. (1883). Metaphysik. Dictate aus den Vorlesungen. Hirzel.
Lotze, H. (1885). Grundzüge der Logik und Encyklopädie der Philosophie. Dictate aus den Vorlesungen. Hirzel.
Nietzsche, F. (1921). Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Nietzsche’s Werke (Band VII). Kröner Verlag.
Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In T. Keiling (Hrsg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen (pp. 71–81). V. Klostermann.
Römer, I. (2017). Was ist phänomenologische Metaphysik. In M. Gabriel, C. Olay, & S. Ostritsch (Eds.), Welt und Unendlichkeit. Ein deutsch-ungarischer Dialog im memoriam László Tengelyi (pp. 115–130). Karl Alber.
Schuhmann, K. (1977). Husserl-Chronik. M. Nijhoff.
Simmel, G. (1900–1911). Zur Metaphysik des Todes. Logos: Zeitschrift für systematische Philosophie, 1, 57–70.
Sivák, J. (2015). La notion de métaphysique chez Husserl. VEDA.
Stumpf, C. (1907). Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften. Verlag der König. Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Tavuzzi, M. (1981). On Husserl’s conception of metaphysics. Angelicum, 58, 285–311.
Tengelyi, L. (2015). Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik. Karl Alber.
Trendelenburg, A. (1862). Logische Untersuchungen. Verlag von S. Hirzel.
Trizio, E. (2016). What is the crisis of European sciences? Husserl Studies, 32, 191–211.
Trizio, E. (2018). The telos of consciousness and the telos of the world. Humana-Mente, 11: https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/214
Trizio, E. (2019). Husserl’s early concept of metaphysics as the ultimate science of reality. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 17, 309–329.
Trizio, E. (2020). Husserl’s Timaeus. Plato’s Creation Myth and the Phenomenological Concept of Metaphysics as the Teleological Science of the World. Studia Phaenomenologica, XX, 77–100.
Trizio, E. (2021a). Philosophy’s nature: Husserl’s phenomenology, natural science and metaphysics. Routledge.
Trizio, E. (2021b). Phenomenology, teleology, theology. In H. Jacobs (Ed.), The Husserlian mind (pp. 521–531). Routledge.
Ueberweg, F. (1865). System der Logik und Geschichte der logischen Ideen. Adolf Marchus Verlag.
Vannata, S. (2007). Radical empiricism and Husserlian metaphysics. The Pluralist, 3, 17–37.
Varga, P. A. (2013). The missing chapter from the logical investigations: Husserl on Lotze’s formal and real significance of logical Laws. Husserl Studies, 29, 181–209.
Wust, P. (1963). Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik. Felix Meiner.
Wust, P. (1967). Leben und Werk. Verlag Regensberg.
Zahavi, D. (2003). Phenomenology and metaphysics. In S. Heinamaa, H. Ruin, & D. Zahavi (Eds.), Metaphysics, facticity, interpretation. Phenomenology in the Nordic countries (pp. 3–22). Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
De Santis, D. (2023). Husserl Metaphysicus. In: Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-39589-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-39590-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)