Abstract
In Chap. 5, an elite theoretic perspective on contemporary US politics is presented as an alternative to the prevailing pluralist theoretic perspectives. The first half of the chapter provides some context and background about elite, class, and pluralist theories, including a brief review of the post-World War II “community power debate” between political scientists and sociologists. The ongoing centrality of pluralist theory to political science, mainstream intellectual analysis, and political culture is also emphasized. In the second half of the chapter, I outline an elite cooptation model of US politics depicting a strategic bargaining interaction between political elites and the masses in an unequal democracy.
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Notes
- 1.
This is not to suggest that pluralist theoretic explanations never provide analytical insight about American politics. Pluralist theory is particularly useful when assessing variation across or within policy areas. For example, in the decades following World War II, influence over tobacco regulation arguably shifted from an elite-theoretic iron triangle toward a more pluralistic issue network. More generally, in the latter third of the twentieth century, there was an expansion in the role of public and private actor networks involved in policy formation and implementation (Ansell & Torfing, 2021, p. 52). In this chapter, I focus on the relative influence and explanatory value of elite vs. pluralist theories under different socioeconomic conditions rather than their applicability across more specific issue areas.
- 2.
It may be useful to provide a brief overview of the structure and methods of Part II (Chaps. 5, 6, 7, and 8). On the one hand, Chaps. 5 and 8 rely primarily on insights from a rational choice theoretic perspective (i.e., cost/benefit analysis). Specifically, this chapter will describe an elite-mass bargaining interaction and collective action problems on both the elite and mass sides, while Chap. 8 emphasizes the limits of reformism within such a context. On the other hand, Chaps. 6 and 7 rely primarily on constructivist methods, promoting dialectical progress through moral persuasion and stoking the desire for recognition. Specifically, Chap. 6 demonstrates the injustices of the status quo and the incapacity of the two-party system to rectify the situation, while Chap. 7 envisions how revolutionary objectives in the political, economic, and cultural realms can spur further progress toward equal liberty.
- 3.
Regarding the difference between class and elite theories, Domhoff (2006, p. 18) explains that, while elite and class theories intersect, “elite theory puts far less emphasis on classes or class conflict than a class dominance theory does.” For example, Albertus and Menaldo (2018) argue that the state will most often be used to benefit particular elite interests rather than broad socioeconomic classes. In this chapter, I will distinguish between pluralist-elite theories (which agree with pluralism that partisanship is the primary social divide but view individual parties as elite-controlled) and elite-class theories (which see a cross-cutting elite-mass divide as paramount).
- 4.
Consistent with that view, Robert Reich (2015, p. 172) states plausibly that, as inequality was beginning to increase in the US, “By the 1980s, the vast mosaic of organizations that had given force and meaning to American pluralism was coming apart” and that “The pertinent comparison is not between the career paths of Democratic and Republican officials but between people who served in Washington decades before the big money began pouring in and those who served after the deluge began” (p. 176).
- 5.
Comparative political scientists sometimes emphasize a distinction between pluralist and corporatist interest group systems (e.g., see Magone, 2019, Ch. 8). In contrast to pluralist systems where interest groups are decentralized and rely heavily on lobbying to achieve policy influence, under corporatism, interest groups such as labor and business unions tend to be more centralized and more equally represented in matters of corporate governance as well as public policy decision-making via tripartite bargaining among representatives of labor, business, and government. The comparative political science literature has often associated pluralism with liberal market economies such as the US or the UK, while corporatism is associated with the coordinated market economies of Western Europe, such as Germany and Scandinavia. By contrast, this chapter emphasizes the distinction between pluralist and elite theoretic perspectives and questions the pluralist characterization of the US. Corporatism contrasts with elitism in that the former still achieves a roughly even balance of power among a society’s major interest groups.
- 6.
For example, consider US foreign policy toward Israel Palestine and the high level of influence that the American Israeli Public Action Committee (AIPAC) appears to wield compared to groups advocating Palestinian rights. Other highly influential interest groups in US politics include the gun rights lobby, industrial-scale weapons manufacturers, and the pharmaceutical industry.
- 7.
David Held (1987, p. 188) observed that “relatively few political and social scientists would accept [classical pluralist theory] in unmodified form today (though many politicians, journalists, and others in the mass media still appear to do so).” While this may be true, the overarching theoretical tendency within the field of political science continues to lean toward pluralism (James, 2012).
- 8.
According to Domhoff (2006, p. 105), the power elite includes leading members of the corporate community and policy-formation organizations. Although politicians tend to be in the top 10% to 15% of the occupational and income ladders, neither political nor military leaders are necessarily included in the power elite (p. 154). Schubert, Dye, and Zeigler (2014, p. 62) distinguish between political elites (found in the various branches of government) and economic elites (heads of large corporations and banks). Similarly, Albertus and Menaldo (2018) distinguish between political elites as well as insider (i.e., politically connected) and outsider economic elites.
- 9.
Consistent with that view, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, the wealthy royal ruler of Dubai, observed that “Today’s leaders are the silent giants who possess the money, not the politicians who make the noise.” Safi, M. (2021, February 19). Sheikh Mohammed: disturbing glimpses beneath a refined public image. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/feb/19/sheikh-mohammed-dark-glimpses-beneath-pristine-public-image-sheikha-latifa
- 10.
One plausible source of this capitalist political advantage is the outside options available to multi-national companies in the context of liberal capitalism. As Albertus and Menaldo (2018, p. 6) explain, “Even if citizens do hold strong preferences for redistribution, and these preferences are reflected by their representatives, globalization can tie the hands of policymakers by enabling asset holders to move easily across borders to avoid redistribution.”
- 11.
In a similar vein, Wetzel (2022, p. 99) writes, “The capitalist elite do not always see eye to eye, but their political views do tend to come together around their class interests.” By contrast, neoclassical author Ludwig von Mises (1963) argued that, “Like everyone else, entrepreneurs do not act as members of a class but as individuals. No entrepreneur bothers a whit about the fate of the totality of the entrepreneurs.”
- 12.
The pluralist theoretic assumption of “the existence of multiple centers of power” (Dahl, 1967, p. 24) can be found in various political science theories, including partisan, distributive, informational, and ideological theories. Sub-constituency politics theory (Bishin, 2009) occupies a sort of middle ground within political science, recognizing the potential for greater political influence from particular interest groups, though not necessarily upper classes or elites.
- 13.
This point is pertinent to the contemporary US, given the high levels of inequality. In the US since WWII, the real incomes of families at the 20th percentile increased by less than $15,000, while those of families at the 95th percentile ascended by about $130,000 (Bartels, 2008, p. 7). Also, in 2004, the top 10% of American wealth holders (together) possessed about 81% of all non-home wealth in the country, of which the top 1% of Americans had about 42%. Meanwhile, the bottom 40% of Americans were, on average, $8700 in debt! (Winters & Page, 2009, p. 736).
- 14.
In my view, a problem with contemporary political science’s attachment to pluralist theory is that this leads the field to collectively miss the forest for the trees. That is, political scientists’ positivist goal of explaining particular political phenomena (amenable to rational choice analysis) without having a broader normative framework (such as libertarian social democracy) to graft those findings onto undermines the relevance of those studies.
- 15.
Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. (2004). American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality. American Political Science Association. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Task%20Force%20Reports/taskforcereport.pdf
- 16.
Viewing the state as an occupying power is also in line with the predatory view of the state, which emphasizes the connection between war-making and state-building. From Charles Tilly’s perspective, “war made states, and states make war.” Even contemporary liberal democratic states seem to rely on foreign and domestic enemies (including citizens who deny the state’s legitimacy) who, in turn, provide a justification for investments in the military and/or policing capabilities. By contrast, the contractarian view emphasizes the consensual (rather than conquest-based) origins of state power (in line with early republican, classic liberal, and pluralist perspectives). See Clark, Golder, and Golder (2013, pp. 100–19) for a discussion of predatory vs. contractarian understandings of state power.
- 17.
Early critiques of modern political science provide some support for this assertion. For instance, Hermann Heller, in 1933, saw political science “as a tool to buttress or undermine entrenched group or class interests” (see Kinna, 2019).
- 18.
For instance, polls have found very high levels of public support for the US military. Lange, J. (2018. January 17). Americans have enormous faith in the military, very little in public schools. The Week. http://theweek.com/speedreads/749184/americans-have-enormous-faith-military-little-public-schools. On the other hand, in recent years, many have viewed the police as an “army of occupation” that should be disbanded and disarmed (Wetzel, 2022, pp. 77–8).
- 19.
Patriotism arguably reflects a pluralist-contractarian understanding of the state. After all, if the state was understood as an occupying power serving elite and/or upper-class interests, people would presumably be less patriotic. A YouGov survey taken on July 4, 2018 found that 76% of Americans consider themselves “very” or “somewhat” patriotic, although Republicans were much more patriotic than Democrats. Rakich, N., & Mehta, D. (2018, July 6). We’re Divided on Patriotism Too. FiveThirtyEight. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/were-divided-on-patriotism-too/
- 20.
Support for the death penalty could almost be seen as a litmus test for a pluralist political culture. After all, if the state was viewed as an occupying power (as some elite and/or class theories suggest) rather than a political association “of, by, and for the people” (as pluralist theories portray it), individuals would presumably be more inclined to limit the state’s ability to use violence (especially the ability to execute). Pew Research Center (2021, June 2). Most Americans favor the death penalty, despite concerns about its administration. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/06/02/most-americans-favor-the-death-penalty-despite-concerns-about-its-administration/
- 21.
As was mentioned above, there are different types of elite theories. For example, in contrast to this chapter’s argument, some elite theorists view elite control as essential, given the tyrannical, rights-violating tendencies of the masses. For instance, Schubert, Dye, and Zeigler (2014, p. 97) observe that “Mass political activism can threaten democratic values.” Another distinction between this chapter’s argument and other elite theoretic perspectives concerns views on the sincerity of partisanship exhibited by political elites (discussed below).
- 22.
Making a similar point, James (2012, pp. 62–4) notes that, despite deepening wealth inequality in recent decades, “the social science literature on elites has been in decline” while positivist approaches have become more commonplace.
- 23.
In a similar vein, James (2012, p. 229) observes that “evidence of elite statecraft is difficult to find because it involves trying to get access to politically sensitive information.”
- 24.
Guriev and Treisman (2022) distinguish between older-style “fear dictatorships” (which rely on visible acts of coercion) and “spin dictatorships” (which rely more on the manipulation of public opinion and feigned support for democratic values). A key distinction between unequal democracies (as discussed here) and spin dictatorships (as discussed by Guriev and Treisman) is the former’s use of electoral concessions (discussed below). On the one hand, unequal democracies (or what we might call democratic authoritarian regimes) can allow free and fair competition between political parties, as those parties both ultimately support the ruling class. On the other hand, while spin dictatorships can gain stability by holding semi-competitive elections (ibid, pp. 120–2), because such regimes are still controlled by a single party, they cannot grant electoral concessions (that is, allow opposition parties to win). Instead, to ensure victory, spin dictators must also manipulate the elections (ibid, p. 27). Spin-dictatorships thus lack the legitimacy and stability of unequal democratic regimes.
- 25.
Some studies have found empirical support for elite theoretic arguments. For instance, Gilens and Page (2014) report that Congressional representatives from both parties are more responsive to the preferences of higher-income than average-income citizens. Also, Epp and Borghetto find empirical support for the elite theoretic “second face of power” proposition: a negative relationship between inequality and legislative attention towards downward wealth redistribution proposals. Epp, D. A., & Borghetto, E. (2020, June 11). Does rising economic inequality create a representation gap between rich and poor? Evidence from Europe and the United States. London School of Economics. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/06/11/does-rising-economic-inequality-create-a-representation-gap-between-rich-and-poor-evidence-from-europe-and-the-united-states/
- 26.
In this sense, pluralism can be viewed as the theoretical counterpart to politics in an unequal democracy and a crucial element within its larger propaganda environment.
- 27.
Beyond the basic autocracy/democracy binary, Albertus and Menaldo (2018, p. 49) make a crucial distinction between elite-biased and popular democracy, which is conceptually similar to my distinction between unequal and egalitarian democracy.
- 28.
One can find examples of transitions from one democratic constitution to another in recent history, such as Colombia’s transition to a new constitution in 1991 (replacing its 1886 constitution) and France’s transition to the Fifth Republic in 1958 (Taylor et al., 2014, p. 65).
- 29.
Lyons, M. N. (2020, June 23). Cooptation as ruling class strategy. Three Way Fight Blog. https://threewayfight.blogspot.com/2020/06/cooptation-as-ruling-class-strategy.html
- 30.
For instance, Jared Diamond (1997, pp. 276–7) asks, “What should an elite do to gain popular support while still maintaining a more comfortable lifestyle than the commoners?” One of the ways is to “Make the masses happy by redistributing much of the tribute received in popular ways. This principle was as valid for Hawaiian chiefs as it is for American politicians today.”
- 31.
In line with this observation, President Barack Obama once observed that the partisan divisions between Democratic and Republican Party representatives were mostly “theater,” and that, in reality, they were both “fighting inside the 40 yard line” together. Greenwald, G. (2021, January 19). The New Domestic War on Terror is Coming. https://greenwald.substack.com/p/the-new-domestic-war-on-terror-is
- 32.
As will be explained in Chap. 8, revolutionary strategy is understood here as avoiding participation with state-based political institutions and not settling for specific policy reforms. By contrast, reformist strategy seeks changes via establishment political institutions (including the two-party system in the US) and strives for specific policy reforms.
- 33.
As was explained in Chap. 2, in an unequal context, states become unwitting promoters of equal liberty when social progress is achieved via concessions offered by pseudo-democratic representatives as a result of the elite-mass bargaining interaction. By contrast, in an egalitarian (post-class) context, I have argued that states can potentially become conscious promoters of equal liberty where social progress is advanced by true democratic representatives or by the people directly.
- 34.
As a local-level example, when municipalities renovate sidewalks, curbs, streetlights, and planters, all classes from that area benefit (although the costs of the renovation can be distributed in various ways, of course).
- 35.
While elite-mass divides appear less common than elite-mass preference alignments, cases of elite-mass division provide an opportunity to evaluate the merits of pluralist versus elite theories of representation by assessing which groups – elites or average citizens – representatives are more responsive to (Gilens & Page, 2014).
- 36.
Lyons, M. N. (2020, June 23). Cooptation as ruling class strategy. Three Way Fight Blog. https://threewayfight.blogspot.com/2020/06/cooptation-as-ruling-class-strategy.html
- 37.
In both equal and unequal democratic settings, political parties can provide a source of cohesion among elected representatives from the same party (though this will be weaker under an electoral system [such as single-member district plurality] that incentivizes responsiveness to particularistic local interests). However, in an unequal democracy, because political representatives will tend to be from the upper classes, there should be a stronger sense of bipartisan (or inter-party) solidarity among them.
- 38.
For instance, Wetzel (2022, p. 121) mentions that most members of the US Congress are multimillionaires whose “style of life and privileged circumstances are far removed from the problems faced by working-class people.”
- 39.
This is not a perfect example of an elite-mass divide, which, in its more ideal form, would pit a more-or-less evenly balanced coalition of Democratic and Republican Party voters at the mass level against a similarly composed coalition of legislators at the elite level. However, the example used here also reflects the fact that elite-mass divides are seldom “perfect” in that sense (in the hypothetical example used here, for instance, the elite-mass divide is primarily on the Democratic Party side).
- 40.
For example, in early March 2021, seven Democratic Party US senators – generally from more conservative states than the average Democratic Party senator – joined Republicans in voting against Bernie Sanders’s proposed COVID-19 relief bill amendment to raise the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $15 an hour. CBS3 Staff. (2021, March 5). Delaware Sens. Tom Carper, Chris Coons Join 6 Other Democrats to Vote Against $15 Minimum Wage. CBS Philadelphia. https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2021/03/05/tom-carper-chris-coons-eight-democrats-vote-against-minimum-wage-increase/
- 41.
True democrats are understood here as those motivated by a good-faith desire to serve the public good. By contrast, pseudo-democrats are understood as those who lack such a desire or, at best, aim to serve the public good on occasion for an ulterior purpose such as maintaining systemic legitimacy.
- 42.
Beekman, D., & Brunner, J. (2019, November 10). Amazon lost the Seattle City Council elections after a $1 million power play. Will it see a new head tax? Seattle Times. https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/amazon-lost-the-seattle-city-council-elections-after-a-1-million-power-play-will-it-see-a-new-head-tax/
- 43.
Democracy Now. (2019, November 12). Vowing to end cash bail & reform justice system, Chesa Boudin wins San Francisco DA race. https://www.democracynow.org/2019/11/12/chesa_boudin_san_francisco_district_attorney
- 44.
As Wetzel (2022, p. 120) explains, “The corporations and their wealthy owners and CEOs have vast resources they can use to game the electoral process, influence public opinion, and influence what the politicians do after they are elected.”
- 45.
For instance, in a conversation I had with a young African American woman in May of 2017 in Southern California, she had stated sincerely that before Trump was elected, “everything was fine” under Obama. As another example, Doug Henwood observed that, after Bill Clinton’s election, “The left, such as it is, has partly silenced itself in the name of giving Clinton a chance” (Solomon, 1994, p. 21).
- 46.
In a similar vein, journalist Caitlin Johnstone argues that US electoral politics is “a fake, decoy revolution staged for the public every few years so that they don’t have a real one.” Johnstone, C. (2021, June 7). Mainstream Politics Offer Pretend Revolutions to a Discontented Public. Caitlin’s Newsletter. https://caitlinjohnstone.substack.com/p/mainstream-politics-offer-pretend
- 47.
For instance, elite theorists Schubert, Dye, and Zeigler (2014, ch. 13) view civil rights movements as part of a process of “diversifying the elite.” Faced with a civil rights protest, elites can either accommodate – “coopting them through programs that bring protest leaders into the system” – or limit the protests through repression.
- 48.
By contrast, in a “spin dictatorship,” the ruling party benefits from having a large (though not unanimous) margin of electoral victory, as this demoralizes the opposition (Guriev & Treisman, 2022, pp. 122–3).
- 49.
Palast, G. (2020, December 7). Black Voters Matter Sues Georgia for Purging 200,000 Voters Ahead of 2020 Election. Greg Palast Investigative Journalism. https://www.gregpalast.com/black-voters-matter-sues-georgia-for-purging-200000-voters-ahead-of-2020-election/
- 50.
Palast, G. (2019, April 3). Interstate Crosscheck on the Verge of Collapse: Key States Withdraw from the Program. Greg Palast Investigative Journalism. https://www.gregpalast.com/interstate-crosscheck-on-the-verge-of-collapse/
- 51.
Grunwald, M. (2009, April 2). How Obama is Using the Science of Change. Time. https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1889153,00.html
- 52.
For instance, I would describe James’ (2012) perspective, as presented in Elite Statecraft and Election Administration, as a pluralist-elite hybrid theory. On the one hand, his perspective is elitist in that he sees political elites holding on to power by manipulating electoral administration rules in a top-down fashion. On the other hand, he accepts the pluralist assumption that, in so doing, party leaders are primarily motivated by their own self-interest in holding onto public office.
- 53.
By contrast, during the first wave of democratization and socialist uprisings (in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), conservative politicians were the main concession granters. At that time, one solution to the “conservative dilemma” (i.e., how to maintain popular support while serving the wealthy) was to address the material needs of the newly enfranchised, and “[m]ost conservative parties took at least halting steps in this direction” (Hacker & Pierson, 2020, p. 22).
- 54.
From a pluralist perspective, this media support for Trump’s 2016 campaign can be attributed simply to the media company’s desire to maximize viewers and make money for the corporation. From the elite theoretic perspective described here, by contrast, the media’s overwhelming support for Trump was part of an unspoken elite response to the increasingly threatening populist right-wing in the context of the Obama administration – to stabilize the system, those groups had to be coopted by selecting Trump, a relatively extreme Republican candidate (and potent symbolic concession).
- 55.
Frizell, S. (2016, October 26). FBI Director James Comey Under Fire After Hillary Clinton Email Investigation Announcement. Time. https://time.com/4550453/hillary-clinton-james-comey-fbi-emails/
- 56.
Goodwin, J. (2021, April 13). The Influence of Money in Politics: Why it Must End Now. Grow ensemble. https://growensemble.com/influence-of-money-in-politics/
- 57.
Horras, T. (2018, May 15). “Wild, Unprecedented” Reformism: The Case of Larry Krasner. Black Rose Federation. https://blackrosefed.org/reformism-larry-krasner/
- 58.
Igielnik, R., Keeter, S., & Hartig, H. (2021, June 30). Behind Biden’s 2020 Victory. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/06/30/behind-bidens-2020-victory/
- 59.
Doyle, W. (2021, October 13). Mark Zuckerberg spent $419M on nonprofits ahead of 2020 election – and got out the Dem vote. New York Post. https://nypost.com/2021/10/13/mark-zuckerberg-spent-419m-on-nonprofits-ahead-of-2020-election-and-got-out-the-dem-vote/
- 60.
Kelety, J. (2022, May 3). Posts misrepresent Mark Zuckerberg’s election spending. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/fact-checking-mark-zuckerberg-election-donations-188810437774
- 61.
Ludwig, H. (2021, February 5). Megadonors Pour Record Amount of Money into “Get Out the Vote” Effort for Dems. Capital Research Center. https://capitalresearch.org/article/megadonors-pour-record-amount-of-money-into-get-out-the-vote-effort-for-dems/
- 62.
Bicks, E. (2020, November 10). Fact Check: Did Pfizer Purposely Wait to Announce Covid-19 Vaccine? Heavy. https://heavy.com/news/did-pfizer-wait-covid19-vaccine-true-false/
- 63.
The Jimmy Dore Show. (2021, January 14). America has the Tinder to IGNITE Social Uprising – Chris Hedges [Video; 4:30–4:40]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olBU619Dlsc
- 64.
Golding, B. (2020, December 10). Greenwald: Post’s Hunter Biden reports “suppressed” from public by media. New York Post. https://nypost.com/2020/12/10/greenwald-posts-hunter-biden-reports-suppressed-by-media/
- 65.
Fram, A. (2020, September 1). Chamber of Commerce backs freshman House Dems, marking shift. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/senate-elections-politics-business-16f74b9d0bb3f1a6eb84891280672e95
- 66.
Schwartz, B. (2020, August 11). Wall Street executives are glad Joe Biden picked Kamala Harris to be his VP running mate. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/11/joe-biden-vp-pick-wall-street-executives-are-happy-about-kamala-harris.html
- 67.
Leonhardt, D. (2021, January 12). A Corporate Backlash. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/briefing/trump-mob-impeachment-gorillas-san-diego-zoo.html
- 68.
Novet, J. (2021, January 6). U.S. trade group asks VP Pence to “seriously consider” invoking 25th Amendment to remove Trump. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/06/national-association-of-manufacturers-calls-dc-protests-sedition.html
- 69.
Chomsky, N., & Barsamian, D. (2021, April 8). Marx’s Old Mole is Right Beneath the Surface. Boston Review. https://bostonreview.net/class-inequality-politics/noam-chomsky-david-barsamian-mole
- 70.
Similar to major party leaders in an unequal democracy, spin dictators are primarily interested in maintaining the regime and tend to “have no official doctrine” (Guriev & Treisman, 2022, p. 75). However, as was previously noted, a key difference is that while unequal democracies promote peaceful transitions in power between government and opposition parties, spin dictators cannot allow opposition parties to win and thus lack the stability and legitimacy of unequal democratic regimes.
- 71.
A plausible conjecture is that the Trump presidency – from the 2016 election to his (probably feigned) attempt to overturn the 2020 election – was a concession to the far-right, which had become increasingly threatening to the democratic order during the Obama presidency. From that perspective, Trump was a pseudo-populist, part of the longer-term bipartisan elites’ balancing act, intended to contain rather than propel right-wing revolutionary momentum.
- 72.
Caldwell, L. A., & Shabad, R. (2020, June 8). Congressional Democrats unveil sweeping police reform bill that would ban chokeholds, no-knock warrants in drug cases. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/pelosi-top-democrats-unveil-police-reform-bill-n1227376
- 73.
Kelly, A. (2020, June 16). Trump, Hailing Law Enforcement, Signs Executive Order Calling for Police Reform. WRVO public media. https://www.wrvo.org/post/watch-live-trump-sign-executive-order-police-reform
- 74.
Democracy Now. (2020, June 16). Cities and States Adopt New Police Rules Amid Mass Uprising. https://www.democracynow.org/2020/6/16/headlines/cities_and_states_adopt_new_police_rules_amid_mass_uprising
- 75.
Although my focus here is on reforms advanced by elected representatives, cooptation can also be advanced by private foundations and corporations, as was seen in the upper-class response to the civil rights uprisings in the late 1960s as well as more recently in response to the George Floyd protests. Lyons, M. N. (2020, June 23). Cooptation as ruling class strategy. Three Way Fight Blog. https://threewayfight.blogspot.com/2020/06/cooptation-as-ruling-class-strategy.html
- 76.
The major New Deal legislation was passed during an unprecedented period of working class solidary, and insurgency, including “hundreds of thousands of workers forming unions from scratch, huge waves of strikes, plant seizures, and city-wide general strikes” (Wetzel, 2022, p. 66).
- 77.
Consistent with this idea that polarization is a top-down phenomenon, Achen and Bartels (2016, Fig. 2.1) provide evidence that political elites are more polarized than the masses in the US. However, given US political parties’ “bottom-up” structure (i.e., reliance on party primaries for candidate selection), polarization may be driven more by interest groups than party elites per se (Taylor et al., 2014, pp. 184–9; see also Hacker & Pierson, 2020).
- 78.
As Hacker and Pierson (2020, p. 150) observe, “As political scientists, we were trained to see [support for unpopular legislation] as unicorns. Politicians just aren’t supposed to act […] in such blatant opposition to the clearly expressed views of voters.”
- 79.
The appearance of partisan division can be reinforced in a variety of ways: partisan legislative roll call votes; inflammatory partisan rhetoric expressed by candidates, elected representatives, or other prominent figures in the mass media; vigilante attacks against members of the opposite party; as well as intellectuals adhering to pluralist theoretic frameworks. Today, there also appears to be a sort of tacit cooperation at the mass level, with Republicans vilifying even moderate Democratic Party leaders (such as Joe Biden) and, in defiance of those critics, Democrats defending their party leaders while withholding any criticism of them.
- 80.
Horras, T. (2018, May 15). “Wild, Unprecedented” Reformism: The Case of Larry Krasner. Black Rose Federation. https://blackrosefed.org/reformism-larry-krasner/
- 81.
Campbell, A. (2019, February 19). West Virginia teachers are on strike again. Here’s why. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2019/2/19/18231486/west-virginia-teacher-strike-2019
- 82.
As an example of lip service, although President Biden announced that his administration was ending US support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen in February 2021, the US continued to provide service to Saudi aircraft used to carry out the bombings. Ward, A. (2021, April 27). The US may still be helping Saudi Arabia in the Yemen war after all. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2021/4/27/22403579/biden-saudi-yemen-war-pentagon. As another example, Robert Reich (2015, p. 131) recounts that “A succession of Democratic presidents promised legislation streamlining the process for forming unions and increasing penalties on employers who violated the law, but nothing came of these promises.”
- 83.
Kaplan, T., & Pear, R. (2017, July 25). Senate Votes Down Broad Obamacare Repeal. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/us/politics/senate-health-care.html
- 84.
Emmons, A. (2018, September 26). House Resolution Directs Trump to End U.S. Support for Yemen War. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2018/09/26/yemen-us-military-house-resolution/
- 85.
Despite the outward pluralist appearance of differences between the Democratic and Republican Party administrations on this issue, the elite theoretic perspective views the administrations as sharing a tacit consensus in favor of completing the Keystone XL pipeline and its eventual defeat as a concession in response to pressures from mass-level opposition to the pipeline. In that case, the policy cost of allowing the pipeline to be defeated was outweighed by the expected electoral and legitimacy costs of allowing the pipeline to be completed.
- 86.
Pladson, K. (2021, January 21). With a pen stroke, President Joe Biden cancels Keystone XL pipeline project. DW News. https://www.dw.com/en/with-a-pen-stroke-president-joe-biden-cancels-keystone-xl-pipeline-project/a-56285371
- 87.
Democracy Now. (2021, June 10). TC Energy cancels Keystone XL Pipeline as Water Defenders Continue to fight Enbridge Line 3. https://www.democracynow.org/2021/6/10/headlines/tc_energy_cancels_keystone_xl_pipeline_as_water_defenders_continue_to_fight_enbridge_line_3
- 88.
Wolff, R. (2018, Aug. 20). Politics is Propping Up Our Capitalist System. Truth Dig. https://www.truthdig.com/articles/american-politics-are-propping-up-our-capitalist-system/
- 89.
Urie, R. (2018, September 10). Elections and the Illusion of Political Control. Counter Punch. https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/09/10/elections-and-the-illusion-of-political-control/
- 90.
Highlighting the independence of these two factors, Przeworski (1991, p. 68) observes that “Moderates and Radicals may but need not represent different interests. They may be distinguished only by risk aversion. Moderates may be those who fear [regime] hardliners, not necessarily those who have less radical goals.”
- 91.
For instance, Wendy Brown (2019, pp. 169–70) refers to a right-wing interviewee who desired to be free from “the strictures of liberal philosophy and its rules of feeling.” Those interviewees felt that they were being asked “to feel compassion for the downtrodden” when “they didn’t really want to.”
- 92.
In line with this economic interest-based argument, according to the Meltzer-Richards model, because the average voter (on the left-right ideological dimension) tends to be from a lower income bracket (given the positively skewed distribution of wealth), democratic majority rule should lead to a downward wealth redistribution (see Clark et al., 2013, p. 772). However, evidence of public support for progressive wealth redistribution appears to be mixed. On the one hand, according to a Gallup poll from 2011, only 47% thought that “our government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.” Saad, L. (2011, June 2). Americans Divided on Taxing the Rich to Redistribute Wealth. Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/147881/americans-divided-taxing-rich-redistribute-wealth.aspx. On the other hand, Piston (2018) provides evidence that support for downward wealth redistribution crosses partisan, ideological, and even class lines.
- 93.
As an example of linkage (where action for the public good is incentivized by private interest), from my own experience, I would benefit from a revolution that succeeded in abolishing the secret police. This particular benefit, in addition to the virtues associated with social revolution, has probably contributed to my motivation to write this book. This shows that particular interests in revolution can be a force for good. However, most will probably lack a strong incentive to promote revolution, drawing our attention to the importance of diffuse benefits. Even in the case of radical reformist movements, many may be too preoccupied with their day-to-day affairs to take an interest. For example, during the early stages of the women’s suffrage movement, “the masses of working women were far too concerned about their immediate problems – wages, hours, working conditions – to fight for a cause that seemed terribly abstract” (Davis, 1981, p. 140).
- 94.
Reich, R. (2014, January 27). Why There’s No Outcry for a Revolution in America. Truth Dig. http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/why_theres_no_outcry_for_a_revolution_in_america_20140127
- 95.
An important nuance to this point is that, while the affluent may be more risk-averse (as they have more to lose), they also have a greater capacity to resist (i.e., access to resources) and may be harder to buy off than the poor (Guriev & Treisman, 2022, p. 23).
- 96.
As was discussed in Chap. 1, Fukuyama (1992, p. 180) argues that revolutionary action is driven both by people’s desire for material goods (that is, rational choice) as well as by thymos, or the quest for recognition. As Fukuyama explains, “Revolutionary situations cannot occur unless at least some people are willing to risk their lives and their comfort for a cause. The courage to do so cannot arise out of the desiring [rational] part of the soul but must come from the thymotic [recognition-seeking] part.” Thus, individuals with a stronger thymotic desire to be recognized as virtuous should be less risk-averse and have a lower revolutionary threshold overall.
- 97.
This illustration is adopted from Clark, Golder, and Golder (2013, p. 285).
- 98.
Even in autocratic countries, there is some combination of concessions and repression. For example, the social order in Egypt was “secured through a combination of state-led development and redistribution. However, under Sadat and Mubarak, this legitimacy was eroded as the state became constructed more through repression than by popular mandate” (Lawson, 2019, p. 209). Discussing a similar dimension, Haggard and Kaufman (2016, pp. 61–62) observe that authoritarian regimes rely more on repression, while competitive authoritarian (“hybrid”) regimes rely more on cooptation. Similarly, according to Guriev and Treisman (2022), while the traditional “fear dictator” relied on publicly visible acts of repression, “spin dictators” rely more on the manipulation of public opinion to remain in power. For example, an innovator of spin dictatorship, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, developed a model of “calibrated coercion,” which aimed to minimize visible repression (ibid, p. 35). Spin dictatorships such as Putin’s Russia, Lee’s Singapore, and Orban’s Hungary, can also achieve high levels of public support (ibid, pp. 12–13) although it is hard to gauge how much of that is falsified, even in a spin dictatorship.
- 99.
This point also requires some nuance, as many autocratic leaders also gather information about public opinion. As Guriev and Treisman (2022, p. 125) explain, “The power of spin dictators depends on their popularity. So they monitor it closely. Unlike old-school autocrats, who at most dabbled in sociology, the new ones pore over polling data.” For example, each week, “Putin’s Kremlin commissions broad-ranging, national surveys from two firms. It periodically adds regionally representative surveys and secret polls on particular topics” (ibid). However, such information may be more prone to preference falsification, making it less reliable than polling in a democracy.
- 100.
Solidarity unions in Poland provide a more specific example of a revolutionary cascade during the fall of the Soviet Union: “In hopes of defusing the movement, the regime initially recognized the Solidarity unions with the Gdansk Agreement, but this unleashed a flood. Within months, membership in Solidarity swelled to over ten million, and strikes and protests swept the country.” In the midst of the revolutionary transition, Solidarity also swept all the parliamentary seats it was permitted to contest (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016, pp. 117–8).
- 101.
As Lawson (2019, p. 217) explains, internet technologies (including social media) are a double-edged sword: they can help coordinate revolutionary protests, but they can also be used by the government to disrupt those same protests.
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Williams, B. (2023). An Elite-Class Theory of US Politics. In: Anarchism and Social Revolution . Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39462-1_5
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