Abstract
James Buchanan recognized that governing arrangements were certified by a constitutional moment. He also recognized that there existed a continual bargaining over these arrangements. There exists not a single constitutional moment, but an endless series of constitutional moments by which the social contract evolves. This work outlines a framework for interpreting the formation and transformation of the social contract and uses this framework to identify changes in the social fabric that enabled the development of pluralism in pre- and post-Reformation England. Proper framing of this transformation requires consideration of interaction between ideas and institutions across political, economic, legal, and religious spheres. Ideological diversity had enabled the English Reformation, an institutional shift that ultimately diminished the efficacy of cooperation between church and state. The development of a particularly liberal, English worldview reflecting growing autonomy for individuals and communities is evidenced by the growing use of language related to concepts of virtue, commerce, and liberty.
Thank you to Dragan Miljkovic for his encouragement and skepticism. This work greatly benefitted from referee comments. All mistakes are my own.
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Notes
- 1.
For a fruitful and humble discussion of the relationship between economic theory and social science, see Dekker’s (2016) investigations of tensions between methodological individualism, institutional analysis, and culture, tensions that continue to challenge social development and that must be confronted by a sincere student of society.
- 2.
Concerning skepticism toward idealist conceptions, see Wagner (2016, 203; 2017, 157–175; 2018, 22–23). Wagner critiques the idealism presented in Buchanan (1975). Buchanan’s (1981, 1983) presentation of moral community and moral order should be viewed as informing the structure presented in Limits. I have argued that Buchanan allowed for both pre- and post-constitutional stages to occur simultaneously (Caton 2020). Unanimity is always contingent upon voluntary participation. According to Buchanan, exit from a community by a discontented individual or contingent is always an option, as is threat, and even exercise, of violence.
- 3.
Adam Smith would later echo this view:
The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a sort of spiritual army, dispersed in different quarters, indeed, but of which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan … How dangerous it must have been for the sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever. (Smith 1976, 800, 802)
- 4.
The significance of this fact was first pointed out to me by David Levy.
- 5.
“William Tyndale gave us our English Bible. The sages assembled by King James to prepare the Authorised Version of 1611, so often praised for unlikely corporate inspiration, took over Tyndale’s work. Nine-tenths of the Authorized Version’s New Testament is Tyndale’s.” (Daniell 1994 cited in Levy 2002, n72).
- 6.
For a discussion of the relationship of polycentricity to the public reason literature, see Aligica (2014, 24–27).
- 7.
Vertical lines in Fig. 6 in chapter “Duality, Liberty, and Realism in Entangled Political Economy” indicate major institutional and political shifts: Execution of King Charles I (1649), Glorious Revolution (1689), and the American Revolution (1776).
- 8.
For useful consideration of religious motivations and perspective in public discourse, see Gaus and Vallier (2009).
- 9.
Bolingbroke was privately a Deist.
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Caton, J.L. (2023). Community, Pluralism, and Public Reason: An Entangled Analysis of Early Modern England. In: Novak, M., Podemska-Mikluch, M., Wagner, R.E. (eds) Realism, Ideology, and the Convulsions of Democracy. Studies in Public Choice, vol 44. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39458-4_3
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