Abstract
This chapter is dedicated to the concept of biological organism from a relational perspective. In this sense, this chapter redefines the concepts of causality, necessity etc. that are normally used as in physics. Now, biology can have its own epistemological status.
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Notes
- 1.
Cell can not be considered the biological observable because it and its functions are such within a tissue. More generally, Even if a cell is considered in itself, it always remains within its context.
- 2.
A biological theory, based on a physical invariant such as DNA (Monod, Jacob etc.) or organization, has the task of explaining variation, in addition to the necessity to show an invariant element. This is easy in the first case and very difficult, if not impossible, in the second, unless to stated that hurricanes are alive or to go until chemical bonds, but in this last case it is no longer a question of biology.
- 3.
This topic (Longo 2016) will be deepened when the theoretical place of “organization” is defined in relational biology.
- 4.
In other words, heartbeat is specific, but, as it will be shown talking about “closure of constraints”, contingency of evolution has provided a certain range of heart rates (not binding) for each species. Having a historical-empirical derivation, organization can change.
- 5.
In the next sections, the relationship between enablement and thickness and how biological measurements characterize the letter will be clarified through examples.
- 6.
Longo (2016) argues that the importance of past is fundamental in biology. This does not happen in physics, because all the possible states of a system are known a priori. In this sense, Longo introduces two extremely important concepts: the “historicized invariance” and the fact that “organisms contextually [interpret] phenotypic traces of the past and re-use them” (Longo 2016, p. 16). The references in this article are philosophy of science and theory of biology, however, the way in which they are developed brings Longo’s thought very close to philosophical hermeneutics and intertextuality. It is precisely in this direction that he will deepen these concepts as it is necessary to get out of a logicized epistemology. Therefore, in this book, historicized invariance will be developed starting from Foucault’s “historical a priori” (Foucault 2000). The idea of reinterpreting traces will be analyzed starting from a reinterpretation of Agamben’s concept of “signature” (Agamben 2008), revisited in theory of intertextuality (Marinucci and Crescenzi 2021).
- 7.
It is certainly important to investigate diversities and similarities among biological times within the same species, but for the moment it is necessary to proceed further. This aspect will be developed at the same time as the discussion of structure of relational space.
- 8.
It might seem inadequate to divide the exposition of such an important concept in two, but it was not possible to act otherwise. In fact, in the first part of this book, it was necessary to show that biology deals with constitution of possibilities and with the fact that it is necessary to keep open the possibility of hopefulmonster, since the complete list of possibilities is not given a priori. In this second part, the link between biological times, rhythms and thickness would have been incomprehensible without the clarification of concept of biological time.
- 9.
This issue will be definitively clarified in the section “Enablement and thickness”.
- 10.
As it is easy to guess, introduced concepts lead outside the horizon of physics since, in addition to affirm that it is not always possible to apply probability (mathematical tool) to randomness (philosophical concept), they are characterized by an epistemological indeterminacy: biology is outside determinism that remains at basis of every dynamical approach, in which a purely epistemic uncertainty is conceivable.
- 11.
In the last sections of this chapter, thickness will be characterized completely. Now, it is enough to state that different average values change enablement, but it is necessary to focus on history of each living being (measuring times) in order to understand if variation can strengthen organism or destabilizes it. Such a measure is provided by thickness.
- 12.
In the last sections of this chapter, the possibility to conceive (at least in biology) the concept of “cause” starting from that of thickness will be shown.
- 13.
About cancer Sonnenschein and Soto (2007) consider tissue as the minimum level for description. Of course, in the theoretical context of relational biology, relational space is the observable, which can be characterized as tissue, organ, organism, etc.
- 14.
There are numerous and interesting works about organism conceived starting from the principle of organization (Montévil and Mossio 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015) which are based on reinterpretation of ideas by Varela, Rosen etc. Although this approach is interesting, it fails to construct a theoretical space proper to biology, because, proposing or presupposing a structural invariant (organization), it remains indissolubly bound to physical models, as differently happens for biology by Monod. In fact, although his linguistic approach presents many aspects that do not follow physics (central dogma, exact Boolean algebra, information, etc.), however, his theoretical construction remains physical: for example, Monod himself talks about the need to a “physical theory of evolution” (Monod 1989). In both cases, it is a matter of a fundamental invariance.
- 15.
- 16.
In this sense, it is not clear whether closure of constraints forces a particular and general closure or not. One thing is certain: in order to maintain a theoretical coherence, where a principle of organization is admitted or presupposed, it is necessary to propose an invariant structure. If this is impossible, then organization can not be considered as a principle: mutatis mutandis, it would be like talking about coding without referring to DNA. From the point of view of relational biology (which does not presuppose any principle of organization) closures of constraints can be reinterpreted as one of the most general and important tools for interpreting and implementing biological theoretical object, the relational space.
- 17.
In fact, a very interesting thematization about relational time and space can be found in the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke (2007).
- 18.
Obviously, this issue can be applied to species, ecosystem etc., because they are relational spaces.
- 19.
Obviously, this new tissue will be very unstable, at least in the beginning of cancer increasing.
- 20.
The aim is to completely abandon every physical process time or, at least, to subordinate it to biological times and rhythms.
- 21.
In this sense, it is essential to emphasize the necessity for the philosophy of science to free itself from the chains of an epistemology too tied to logical-analytical approach and to turn to geometry of Poincaré and symmetries. In fact, the latter and Weil (1952) open a physico-mathematical path hitherto little explored, even if the concept of history is completely missing, from the biological point of view.
- 22.
Obviously, the concepts of these authors have been significantly modified, in order to adapt them to biology.
- 23.
Actually, this idea is already in Nietzsche.
- 24.
Rosen (2005) focuses on metabolic cycles (protein-enzyme-protein), but they are physico-chemical elements, certainly universal, but not rigorously biological, even if present only in organisms: they can be considered as coextensive with biological object. The lack of a properly biological element prevents from constructing imaginary hypotheses beyond biology.
- 25.
From the theoretical point of view, it is very different to consider God, DNA or organization as identities subsuming the diversity of forms of life. On the contrary, from the methodological point of view, the structure of thought always remains the same, considering life starting from God, DNA or organization. As shown, relational biology finally tries to conceive life newly. An example of historicity in which historical forms are expressions of a principle is Hegel’s philosophy of history (according to certain interpretations) (Hegel 2000, 1997).
- 26.
It is interesting to emphasize that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein always try to follow this philosophical path.
- 27.
Here it is easy to understand that the closure of constraints will be reinterpreted and will assume a biological role different from that in the context in which it is born, up to an absolute theoretical incompatibility with organicistic theses.
- 28.
Aristotele (1955, 103b1-19): “Let ‘same’, then, be divided in three as has been said. One proof that arguments are made from and through the things mentioned previously, and are about them, is by means of induction. For if someone were to examine each premiss or problem, then it would be clear that it had arisen either about a definition, or about an unique property, or about genus, or about an accident. Another proof is through deduction. For necessarily, whenever one thing is predicated of another, it either conterpredicates with the subject or it does not. And if it does conterpredicate, then it must be a definition or an unique property (for if it signifies what it is to be something it is a definition, while if it does not it is an unique property - that is what we said an unique property was, something which conterpredicates but does not signify what is to be). But if it does not conterpredicate with the subject, than either it is among the things stated in the definition of the subject or it is not. If it is among the things stated in the definition, then it must be a genus or a differentia, since a definition is composed of a genus and differentia. On the other hand, if it is not among the things stated in the definition, then it is clear that it must be an accident, for an accident was said to be what is neither a definition nor an unique property nor a genus but still belongs to the subject”.
- 29.
According to Lamarck and Darwin, it is necessary to remember that species are concepts that do not exist in reality. Therefore, everything that generally refers to species must be considered, statistically, as averages on singularities, irreducible to each other. This point has already been clarified regarding the average values of biological rhythms and times; the same argumentation applies to the descriptions of biological organizations.
- 30.
In this sense, the opposition between “somatic mutation theory” and “organization field theory” is very similar (Sonnenschein and Soto 2007).
- 31.
It is no coincidence that there is greater attention to the principle of variation and to contingency (Mossio et al. 2016): “A given biological organization is determined by an accumulation of changes of symmetries both on the evolutionary and the ontogenetic times. These changes correspond to changes in the manner in which functions are performed, or even to the appearance or loss of functions The crucial consequence of this view is that, because of their permanent symmetry changes, biological objects should not be considered as generic objects. Organisms are not well defined as invariant under transformations”. At least from the point of view of relational biology, considering this series of texts, it is incoherent to combine the principle of variation and that of organization.
- 32.
It has been said that this indeterminacy is intrinsic in the sense of quantum mechanics, therefore, it is not an epistemic limit, which can be overcome if all the elements involved were known, as conjectured by Einstein, but it is a matter of an epistemological uncertainty. From this point of view, it is important to remember that it is not theoretically enough to leave radical variation outside the theoretical field of biology, as organicists and biologists, following ideas of Monod, do.
- 33.
Obviously, from the practical point of view, it is possible to consider an external causality, but it has to be considered relationally. From the theoretical point of view, it is necessary to conceive a biological causality.
- 34.
The authors of The Society of Cells insist a lot on the necessity to abandon quiescence and adopt proliferation as default state of life. From the philosophical point of view, assuming a physical invariant, it is impossible to escape quiescence as a starting point for any type of biological investigation (where, clearly, theoretical coherence is considered an important value). Where the principles of proliferation with variation and motility are assumed, it is completely contradictory to assume organization as a principle, since quiescence would be reintroduced.
- 35.
- 36.
Quantum mechanics shows this necessity (Heisenberg 1971), because there are possibilities not liable to enter in the realm of reality (i.e. quantum superposition). In biology, theoretical situation is more complex because the complete list of possibilities is not given a priori, differently from classical and quantum physics.
- 37.
It is not necessary to repeat the arguments of aforementioned organicists to reiterate the importance of closure, even if not strictly causal.
- 38.
As the title of Monod’s famous book summarizes, there are two distinct domains in biology: chance and necessity.
- 39.
It is necessary to express in this way because possibilities are always contingent with respect to a specific biological description and not with respect to an abstract and imaginary “possibility in itself”, not better specifiable.
- 40.
Obviously, one of the two sets contains historically known phenotypes, but they are considered as possibilities and not as realities. Now, one of the most important elements of irreconcilability between physics and biology is proposed: if the domain of the former is reality, the domain of the latter is possibilities.
- 41.
As it has already been shown, this element is extremely important because it is possible to consider two living beings from the same species with the same enablement, but with different thicknesses.
- 42.
Here, “h” means hopefulmonster. In this case, it refers not only to phenotypes, but also to any modification of any relational space. For example, \(P_h\) also indicates the formation of a cancer or the onset of a disease.
- 43.
This example is discussed in Longo (2018).
- 44.
An extreme example certainly helps to understand the differences between thickness and causality. If a very powerful poison is injected into an organism, it dies undoubtedly. This “ necessity ” can be explained by the fact that \(P_h\gg P_p\) and \(P_p\rightarrow 0\). As mentioned, \(P_p\gneqq 0\) means that the possibility of surviving the poison is always present even if minimal. It is a situation similar to that occurring in statistical mechanics when it is possible to state that it is not impossible, but only extremely improbable a spontaneous transition from disorder to order. On the contrary, biological approaches, assuming a fundamental invariant as conservation principle, can not explain cancer without introducing a physical “cause”. As it will be shown, through the analysis of a scheme taken from The society of cells, an endocrine disruptor disrupts the control of reproduction, but does not produce cancer, enables it, because relational biology is deals with the constitution of possibilities through the study of stability of relational space.
- 45.
From the theoretical point of view, it is not enough to point out that modifications can increase robustness in biological systems, it is necessary to derive it theoretically, as happens in relational biology. This element is crucial because if Newton takes up Kepler’s laws in his Principia, in Kepler it is a matter of observational laws, on the contrary, Newton derives them from theoretical body of Principia, exposed especially in the first book.
- 46.
It is well known that increase or decrease of gravity affects leavening process.
- 47.
this element is partially present in organicism approach, but it is not clear how to conceive the fact that, even when speaking of causes, there is no necessity in biology. There is no a theoretical space that allowing it.
- 48.
Naturally, from this point of view, it is possible to replace the theoretical terms “stability” and “instability” of relational space with “health” and “disease”. Obviously, from the point of view of cancer formation, this perspective would be different.
- 49.
Considering the theoretical character of this text, it is not necessary to re-propose experimental data of the research group of Soto and Sonnenschein, duly referred to in the bibliographies of The society of cells.
- 50.
Regarding biological elements, conceived as “distinct and separated” or as “distinct and inseparable”, please refer to what has been said in the first part and to what Noble affirms in the quoted passage on the lack of an oscillator for heart rhythm. For a philosophical explanation: Marinucci and Crescenzi (2021).
- 51.
- 52.
This does not prevent new diseases from occurring, because biological processes are not characterized by necessity, but by contingency.
- 53.
It is very important to stress that “thickness” and “measurement” are not part of biological possibility or reality, but allow the transition from one level to another.
- 54.
It is important to remember that there is no necessity and, therefore, it is impossible to use necessity and/or physical causality uncritically and dogmatically.
- 55.
It should be remembered that physical causality can be introduced in biology as a borderline case for which there is always \(P_h \gneqq 0\) and \(P_p \gneqq 0\), with \(P_p \rightarrow 0\).
- 56.
The use of this verb (“to can”) means that there is no physical necessity or causality. As mentioned, in biology there are at most the extreme situations in which \(P_p\gg P_h\) with \(P_h\rightarrow 0\) or in which \(P_h\gg P_p\) with \(P_p\rightarrow 0\).
- 57.
Obviously, it makes no sense to talk about “more possible” or “more enabled” (qualitative elements), but it makes sense to talk about thickness (quantitative element), because the latter is measurable. Furthermore, if enablement refers to the level of constitution of possibilities, thickness refers to the transition from contingent possibility to potential reality, focusing on singularity of each biological process.
- 58.
In this case too, it is possible to talk about necessary and sufficient conditions (not rigorously) only for \(P_p\rightarrow 0\). It is important to stress that it is precisely the general theoretical context of relational biology that opens spaces to conceive a new biology, that were previously relegated to simple practical but extra-theoretical elements, such as variation.
- 59.
The theoretical core of the differences between biology and physics is shown in Bailly and Longo (2006).
- 60.
It could still be objected that asbestos, as a disruptor of the tissue structure, can be considered the cause affecting cellular connections that canalizes reproduction with variation. Actually, disruptors do not act on level of reality, but on that of possibility; for this reason, enablement and thickness are necessary to explain their action. Disruptors do not cause cancer, they enable cancer. In fact, it may not manifest itself. Furthermore, as the diagram from The Society of Cells shows, the possibility of cancer regression is always enabled. In this sense, it is necessary to follow the development of stability of relational space through thickness.
- 61.
It is important to stress that in relational biology it is possible to talk about necessity when \(P_p\rightarrow 0\) with \(P_h\gneqq 0\) or \(P_h\rightarrow 0\) with \(P_p\gneqq 0\). Obviously, it is not about physical necessity.
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Marinucci, A. (2023). Times, Thickness and Relational Space. In: Theoretical Principles of Relational Biology. Human Perspectives in Health Sciences and Technology, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39374-7_6
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