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Preserving Possibility

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Theoretical Principles of Relational Biology

Part of the book series: Human Perspectives in Health Sciences and Technology ((HPHST,volume 6))

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Abstract

This chapter exposes the philosophical elements of relational biology, related to the concept of space. In particular, the concepts of singularity of living being, of creation of possibilities and of contingency are shown. New concepts, indispensable to this new approach, are also introduced, such as enablement (Longo et al., GECCO Companion ’12. AMC, New York, 2012) and thickness.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Compared to what stated by Kant, this distinction is used quite differently, but it is important explicit sources (Tagliagambe 1991).

  2. 2.

    In this context, it is possible to talk about object and knowledge, because the reference is just classical physics. Dealing with quantum mechanics and biology, it is more correct to speak about relations or interactions among systems. About a relational point of view applied to quantum physic, see Rovelli (1996).

  3. 3.

    It is quite evident that in this context the word “coupuling” highlights the crucial importance of relations.

  4. 4.

    the “multiple worlds” interpretation will not embraced, as it tries to keep a strong concept of reality, but without providing elements to retrieve other realities.

  5. 5.

    The indeterminacy of totality of biological possibility forces to conceive the experience of a failure, which implies to investigate life in depth.

  6. 6.

    For example, all kinds of willow tree are mutually fertile (interfertile).

  7. 7.

    Every conceptual generalization is necessary and useful in biology in order to understand life, however it fails to capture its essence.

  8. 8.

    One could clearly replace the pair possible reality-actual reality with the one virtuality-reality, but the argument should not change.

  9. 9.

    “Historical contingency” is the set of data collected over multiple iterations of the same biological process, starting from well-fixed conditions. Considering reproduction, historical contingency canalizes the production of phenotypes.

  10. 10.

    It should be pointed that any biological process has its own measurements in order to determine the stability of its environment, or better of relations characterizing a specific and relational biological space.

  11. 11.

    A good example is the specialization of cells during embryonic development (Villoutreix 2015).

  12. 12.

    At this regards, see the next part of this book.

  13. 13.

    This is a rephrase of an excerpt from Wittgenstein, although he refers to a different context (Wittgenstein 1986, §183).

  14. 14.

    It has been shown that quantum mechanics explains how the elements of a system interact among each other and, consequently, how it is possible to talk about reality only within and starting from relations. In biology, relations are important not only with respect to reality, but to possibility as well.

  15. 15.

    It is important to stress that all general or univocal concept of anything does not capture an essence, but it does not consider the singularity of each living being.

  16. 16.

    “Similar” does not mean almost equal, but essentially different.

  17. 17.

    Even though it was possible to reach identity, quantum physics and mechanics after Poincaré have shown that one must go beyond the epistemology of eighteenth and nineteenth century.

  18. 18.

    The role and function of constraints should be better elaborated, however in this text it will be enough to show their topological place within the domain of relational biology (about constraints, see the next part of this book).

  19. 19.

    The history of science has clearly shown that “résultats négatifs” (“negative result” as Poincaré named his non-solution of the problem of three bodies) can open new domains for knowledge (Longo and Montévil 2013).

  20. 20.

    In this respect, they show breaking of symmetries.

  21. 21.

    The connection between “restricted genericity” and “universal limited validity” is really evident.

  22. 22.

    It is important to remind that it can find this idea by Noble’s works. He always emphasizes that relations are on the basis of biology.

  23. 23.

    These are not identical iterations. In fact, if the same phenotypes are generated, percentages are different.

  24. 24.

    In this respect, the biological possibility is different from possible reality of classical physics. Biological relation between randomness and probability is configured differently in physics and the biological one is irreducible to this latter.

  25. 25.

    It is important to say that essence and history can be conciliated starting from the idea of an identity (invariant), showing itself in different forms during time. This option is not so interesting because it remains in a metaphysical framework. On the contrary, relational biology is characterized by radical variation.

  26. 26.

    It has been shown that radical variation occurs in traditional framework, staying out from theory.

  27. 27.

    It is clear that the problem of Dilthey is not biology but, from the philosophical perspective, his ideas are very interesting. He opens his essay, entitled “Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik” (The rise of hermeneutics), by posing the following question: “is it possible a scientific knowledge of singularity?”. Obviously, it is impossible to follow his arguments, but it should be interesting to deepen further on the concept of “universal limited validity”.

  28. 28.

    “But here we must be on guard against thinking that there is some totality of conditions corresponding to the nature of each case (e.g. for a person’s walking) so that, as it were, he could not but walk if they were all fulfilled” (Wittgenstein 1986, § 183).

  29. 29.

    In this sense, is has been shown sensitivity to initial conditions, the epistemological problems posed by quantum mechanics, non-linear causality, etc.

  30. 30.

    Kantian analogy is clearly only an image to simplify this argument. However, it is very interesting because, in a completely different context, Kant claims that original aperception constitutes an unity, not derived from categories. Conversely these latter ones presuppose the unity of aperception. His aperception allows the “I” to not be “multi-colored” (Kant 1996, §§15–17). On the contrary, biology does not need any original or transcendental unity. Relational approach attempts to place radical variation at the core of theoretical framework.

  31. 31.

    Wittgenstein expresses this idea by saying that “There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems” (Wittgenstein 1978, I §53).

  32. 32.

    It is difficult to conceive mitosis or radical variation starting from this latter approach. In biology, it is possible to talk about well contextualized functionalities, but not about finality nor about intentionality. Moreover, evolution does not assumes any goal. The history of life is a possible history, not a necessary one. Past does not allow to predict future because it is a question of making/letting biological relations “to act” at every level. In this sens, relational framework and the idea of breakings of symmetry are sufficient for providing a consistent gnoseological approach. Shortly, if relations have a fundamental epistemological role, certain radical and theoretical changes are necessary.

  33. 33.

    The problem of “origin” or “originary”, in a metaphysical or phenomenological sense, has no quoteizenship in the domain of biology. Actually, the concept of relation and symmetry breakings dissolve it: it returns to be inconsistent.

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Marinucci, A. (2023). Preserving Possibility. In: Theoretical Principles of Relational Biology. Human Perspectives in Health Sciences and Technology, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39374-7_3

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