“Naturism” in Place of Idealism: Henri Ducrotay de Blainville and Auguste Comte on Naturphilosophie

Abstract

This study argues that the most significant impact of German absolute idealism on French positivism is felt via the tradition of philosophy of nature. While the philosophy of nature was inaugurated by Schelling, it is in fact through the work of his successor, Lorenz Oken, that it enters into the positivist corpus. It was out of an attempt to understand Oken’s significance for nineteenth-century biology that Auguste Comte and also Henri-Marie Ducrotay de Blainville took an interest in the idealist tradition out of which Oken emerged. In this study, therefore, I detail Oken’s reception in Blainville’s and Comte’s comments on the scale of beings and on organic life. In the appendix, I give a summary of the chapter on Oken written by Magdeleine de Saint-Agy and included in Georges Cuvier’s Histoire des sciences naturelles.

Appendix: A Note on the Fifth-Complementary Volume of the Histoire des sciences naturelles by Magdeleine de Saint-Agy

One of the sources of knowledge of the biological tradition of Naturphilosophie in France is the last volume of the Histoire des sciences naturelles (1845) begun under the authority of Georges Cuvier and completed by Magdeleine de Saint-Agy. The latter is the author of the volume dedicated to the early nineteenth century, in which Oken’s work is discussed. It was published in 1845, the same year as the Histoire of Blainville and Maupied and so was not consulted by them. It is also almost certain that Comte did not read it. This book is therefore unrelated to the positivist reception of Naturphilosophie.

Nevertheless, it is a very serious and comprehensive work which still deserves to be briefly mentioned. The chapter we are interested in (“On the philosophy of nature in Germany and France” [Cuvier and Saint-Agy 1845: 313]) has three sections: one on Schelling (8 pages), one on Oken (46 pages) and one on “the philosophical study of the bone system” (56 pages). Concerning the first section, Saint-Agy’s originality is to insist on the importance of Goethe and especially Kielmeyer for Schelling’s system. Two ideas of Goethe are seen as particularly relevant: the idea of metamorphosis, successfully applied to plants, and the idea of compensation of the parts, which, according to the author, orients the study of animals less successfully (1845: 315–9).²¹ From Kielmeyer, whom Saint-Agy presents a little inaccurately as one of Schelling’s “masters” (Cuvier and Saint-Agy 1845: 324), two theses are mentioned. The first is the recapitulation theory, according to which the animal, during its embryonic development, passes through states “corresponding to those of the lower classes” (1845: 319). The second thesis is the principle of polarity, which will play an important structural role in both Schelling and Oken.

In the second section, Saint-Agy gives a rather exhaustive account of Oken‘s philosophy. This survey is mainly based on the Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie of 1809 (Oken 1809-11), as well as on the revised version of 1831 (Oken 1831). It also uses the Esquisse for describing Oken’s classification of animals. Saint-Agy follows the development of the system, from the fundamental eq. (0 = +A – A) to Man, the most perfect animal. With some detail, he goes through, without naming them, the fundamental parts of the philosophy of nature: what Oken calls Theosophy and Hylogeny, then Cosmogeny as well as the study of the Elements (Stochiogeny and Stochiology) and the earth (Geology and Geogeny) (1845: 332–48). In comparison, the part corresponding to the general theory of the organism (Organosophy) and plants is relatively short, although the theory of infusoria is noted (1845: 348–55). Finally, the part on the animal kingdom, on which he focuses, is perhaps a little confusing, if only because at the end of the presentation, he refers both to the third section of the third volume of the Lehrbuch (Zoosophy) and to the Esquisse.

The last section, which ends the book, is entirely devoted to osteogeny. Saint-Agy’s thesis is that it is particularly in the field of osteology that Oken‘s philosophy has been fruitful and has given a strong impetus to further investigation (1845: 362, 376, 377). So, this section, in a strictly chronological order and in a very neutral manner (i.e., the debates between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier are barely mentioned) presents the progress of osteology up until 1828, the date of Carus’ book on the bone system (1845: 427–33). The exposition mentions both German biologists (Kielmeyer, Autenrieth, Oken, Spix, Bojanus, and Carus) and French biologists (Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Serres, and Audouin), and the description of Carus’s system, which is the only significant development related to Naturphilosophie in these pages, concludes this relatively technical section.

In presenting the systems of philosophy of nature, Saint Agy insists on the rigorous and repeated application of several structural features: the principle of repetition, the principle of polarity, and the figure of the trinity. The last two traits are present, for example, in the fundamental equation +A - A = 0, and Saint-Agy analyses them with explicit reference to the Christian Trinity (1845: 335–6, 342). The systematic nature of philosophies of nature, whether Schelling’s, Oken’s or Carus’s, is condemned by the author, who repeatedly denounces false reasonings, petitio principii and paralogisms. For example, one of the most frequent paralogisms to be criticised is shifts in meaning and misuse of metaphors.²² Saint-Agy thus states with regard to the orbit of the planets:

I will not refute the author's paralogisms; but I cannot overlook what he calls the elucubrations of his mind without noting that he uses the term sometimes metaphorically and sometimes in the literal sense. We will almost always see philosophers of nature using in a literal sense terms or propositions that should be used in a metaphorical sense, and vice versa. (1845: 342–3)

Despite this negative judgment, Saint-Agy nevertheless acknowledges some positive aspects within Naturphilosophie. Unlike Comte and Blainville, he does not celebrate the scale of beings, for, as Cuvier’s collaborator, he could only defend the embranchement system.²³ Rather, according to Saint-Agy, the first merit of Oken’s work is that it is adapted to the German mentality, and has precipitated a renewal of natural history in Germany:

But this set of singular ideas was designed to arouse the minds of people, especially in Germany, where this kind of speculation is generally sought after, and where it is even in the nature of the people: so, from the first moments when Goethe uncovered the germs of his system, as soon as Schelling applied it to physics and astronomy, and most especially when Oken applied it to physiology, anatomy, pathology and the most detailed phenomena of natural history, this system set all minds in motion. (1845: 375–6)

In addition to its suitability for the German spirit, Naturphilosophie has also engendered insights, revelations and fortunate rapports, “whose truth is independent of the systems that have caused them” (1845: 377). Osteology is not the only field that has been influenced by this philosophy: it is because of Naturphilosophie that progress is again possible in the field of geology, as well as on questions of the unity of composition, of development and on the pertinence of the principle of repetition.