Abstract
While nuclear-armed rivals engage in significant strategic competition for the sake of deterrence, the applicability of Cold War-era nuclear lessons is increasingly subject to scrutiny. The path toward stability is ambiguous at best, and as long-standing political contests remain unresolved, the ability to regulate and constrain the pursuit of nuclear capabilities grows ever more elusive.
In response to these challenges, the landscape of deterrence has been reshaped by structural shifts, occasioned by the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, technological advancements in warhead sophistication and miniaturization, and enhancements in the precision and velocity of delivery vehicles. As the core assumptions of traditional deterrence are challenged by these evolving conditions, the boundaries within which deterrence might foster stability have become increasingly constrained. This chapter conducts an analytical exploration of the changes in deterrence postures in response to these multifaceted developments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Alsharabati, C., & Kugler, J. (2008). War initiation in a changing world. International Interactions, 34(4), 358–381.
Berkowitz, B. D. (1985). Proliferation, deterrence, and the likelihood of nuclear war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(1), 112–136.
Boulding, K. E. (1958). Theoretical systems and political realities: A review of Morton A. Kaplan, system and process in international politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), 329–334.
Brams, S. J. (1975). Newcombs problem and prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19(4), 596–612.
Brodie, B. (1946). The absolute weapon: Atomic power and world order. Ayer Co Pub.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Riker, W. H. (1982). An assessment of the merits of selective nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26(2), 283–306.
Claude, I. L. (1962). Power and international relations. Random House.
Danilovic, V., & Clare, J. (2023). Exogenous factors and the crisis bargaining process. Conflict Management and Peace Science. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231153332
Ellsberg, D. (1968). The theory and practice of blackmail (Working Paper P-3883). RAND Corporation.
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations of war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
Freeman, L. (2015, March 7). The unkicked addiction. The Economist.
Gartzke, E. (1999). War is in the error term. International Organization, 53(3), 567–587.
Gartzke, E., & Jo, D. J. (2009). Bargaining, nuclear proliferation, and interstate disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(2), 209–233.
George, A. L., & Smoke, R. (1974). Deterrence in American foreign policy: Theory and practice. Columbia University Press.
Goodrich, C. S., & Whiting, A. S. (1969). China crosses the Yalu; The decision to enter the Korean war. Stanford University Press.
Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1984). What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics, 36(4), 496–526.
Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1990). Testing deterrence theory: Rigor makes a difference. World Politics, 42(4), 466–501.
Intriligator, M. D., & Brito, D. L. (1981). Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war. Public Choice, 37(2), 247–260.
Intriligator, M. D., & Brito, D. L. (1984). Can arms races lead to the outbreak of war? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(1), 63–84.
Jervis, R. (1988). War and misperception. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4), 675–700.
Kang, K., & Kugler, J. (2023). Beyond deterrence: Uncertain stability in the nuclear era. Conflict Management and Peace Science. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221149670
Kaplan, M. A. (1957). System and process in international politics. Wiley.
Kugler, J., & Zagare, F. C. (Eds.). (1987). Exploring the stability of deterrence. Lynne Rienner.
Kugler, J. (1984). Terror without deterrence: Reassessing the role of nuclear weapons. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(3), 470–506.
Kugler, J., & Zagare, F. C. (1990). The long-term stability of deterrence. International Interactions, 15(3–4), 255–278.
Kugler, T., Kang, K., Kugler, J., Arbetman-Rabinowitz, M., & Thomas, J. (2013). Demographic and economic consequences of conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 57(1), 1–12.
Lebow, R. N., & Stein, J. G. (1989). Rational deterrence theory: I think, therefore I deter. World Politics, 41(2), 208–224.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1984). Nuclear weapons and deterrence in Europe. International Security, 9(3), 19–46.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5–56.
Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1980). War ledger. University of Chicago Press.
Organski, A. F. K. (1958). World politics. Alfred A. Knopf.
Paul, T. V., Morgan, P. M., & Wirtz, J. J. (Eds.). (2009). Complex deterrence: Strategy in the global age. University of Chicago Press.
Powell, R. (1987). Crisis bargaining, escalation, and MAD. American Political Science Review, 81(3), 717–735.
Quackenbush, S. L., & Zagare, F. C. (2015). Modern deterrence theory: Research trends, policy debates, and methodological controversies. In Oxford handbook topics in politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.013.39
Rosecrance, R. N. (1966). Problems of nuclear proliferation: Technology and politics (Security Studies Paper Number 7). UCLA, Security Studies Project.
Rosen, S. J. (1977). A stable system of mutual nuclear deterrence in the Arab Israeli conflict. The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1367–1383.
Sagan, S. D. (1993). The limits of safety: Organizations, accidents, and nuclear weapons. Princeton University Press.
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press.
Smith, A., & Stam, A. C. (2004). Bargaining and the nature of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), 783–813.
Snyder, G. H. (1965). The balance of power and the balance of terror. In P. Seabury (Ed.), Balance of Power. Chandler.
Tepperman, J. (2009, August, 29). Why Obama should learn to love the bomb. Newsweek.
Von Drehle, D. (2009, October 11). Want peace? Give a nuke the Nobel. Time.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. McGraw-Hill.
Waltz, K. N. (1981). The spread of nuclear weapons: More may be better (Adelphi Papers No. 171). International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Waltz, K. N. (1990). Nuclear myths and political realities. American Political Science Review, 84(3), 730–745.
Waltz, K. N. (2003). More may be better. In S. Sagan & K. Waltz (Eds.), The spread of nuclear weapons: A debated renewed. W. W. Norton.
Waltz, K. N. (1993). The emerging world structure of international politics. International Security, 18(2), 44–79.
Waltz, K. N. (2012). Why Iran should get the bomb. Foreign Affairs, 91(4), 2–5.
Wohlstetter, A. (1959). The delicate balance of terror. Foreign Affairs, 37(2), 211–234.
Zagare, F. C. (2004). Reconciling rationality with deterrence: A re-examination of the logical foundations of deterrence theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16(2), 107–141.
Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect deterrence. Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kang, K., Kugler, J. (2023). Deterrence. In: Averting Nuclear War . Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38688-6_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38688-6_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-38687-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-38688-6
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)