Abstract
In the twenty-first century, the multidimensional peace operations of the United Nations have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of attack, with the usual caveat of “within mission capabilities and areas of deployment.” Too often, however, UN operations do not have sufficient capabilities to respond to threats and impending attacks. In particular, stopping an attack that is imminent or underway requires robust forces and special equipment, as well as a means for rapid transit and precise movement. In theory, air power provides such capacities but it is under-used and under-evaluated, especially systems like attack helicopters. This chapter presents a case study from the mission in the Central African Republic to highlight the actual use of attack helicopters. In 2017, these UN helicopters from Senegal stopped armed attacks on Bambari and, in an impartial manner, helped defuse a threatening situation within the town. The chapter demonstrates how attack helicopters have proven very useful, while also identifying key shortcomings and pitfalls. It draws upon interviews with UN leaders and field visits, in addition to UN documents and the academic/practitioner literature. This case shows how air power can help future UN peace operations apply force effectively to achieve the appropriate balance between peacekeeping and peace enforcement for the protection of civilians.
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Notes
- 1.
Armed force was first used by UN peacekeepers serving in the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) when Norwegian soldiers returned fire after Egyptian forces opened fire and threw hand grenades at them in Port Said on 14 December 1956. Findlay (2002, p. 27).
- 2.
At times, the local population saw that UNPROFOR was much more concerned about protecting itself rather than the locals, so they dubbed the mission “UNSPROFOR” for UN Self-Protection Force (Findlay 2002, p. 230). There were times when UNPROFOR did use force, including a Canadian unit against Croats committing ethnic cleansing in the Medak Pocket (Off 2004). In Rwanda, locals critiqued the UN mission by distorting its French acronym “MINUAR” to “MINUA,” apparently meaning “moving the mouth” in the Kinyarwanda language, saying that “UNAMIR talked big, but didn’t act” (Dorn et al. 2000). Later, in Haiti in 2004 to 2007, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) became known as “TOURISTAH,” because its forces were perceived to be acting more as tourists than protectors.
- 3.
The NATO operations in Bosnia—Implementation Force (IFOR 1995–1996) and Stabilization Force (SFOR 1996–2004)—utilized a strategy of projecting overwhelming force and information dominance. Attack helicopters played a key role, including Apache, Cobra, and Kiowa helicopters from the United States. The NATO-led force in Kosovo (KFOR 1999–) also employed Apache attack helicopters.
- 4.
Multidimensional missions differ from traditional (Cold War) missions in that they include mandates for activities well beyond military functions. They include human rights work, nation-building, security sector reform, etc.
- 5.
This definition of peace enforcement is suggested by the author. Other definitions include: “A peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force” (NATO 2017); and “Coercive action undertaken with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (United Nations 2008). The UN definition does not sufficiently distinguish peace enforcement done during a peace operation and “enforcement” done by coalitions (e.g. in Korea 1950, Gulf War 1991, and Libya 2011).
- 6.
Attack helicopters, including the Cobra AH-1, were deployed by the United States in 1993 to assist the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) but they were under United States, not UN control. The Black Hawk utility helicopters (UH-60 and MH-60) in the famous “Black Hawk Down” incidents of October 1993 were engaged in ambitious US operations that were not cleared or coordinated with the United Nations mission. Attack helicopters were first deployed by the United Nations in Eastern Slovenia: Mi-24 from Ukraine in the UNTEAS mission in 1996–1997. At the time NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) was already using attack helicopters (Apache AH-64 and Kiowa OH-58) in Bosnia.
- 7.
Other categories do exist: CH (Cargo Helicopter); HH (Heavy Helicopter); MH (Special Operations Helicopter); OH (Observation Helicopter); RH (Minesweeping Helicopter); SH (Anti-submarine Warfare Helicopter); and TH (Training Helicopter). The term “helicopter gunship” is often used synonymously with attack helicopters but that category also includes less robust helicopters having rockets and/or machine guns. Some helicopters, like the Griffons used by the Canadian Armed Forces in Mali, do not qualify as attack helicopters though they are equipped with machine guns in the doors.
- 8.
UNTAES stands for United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (1996–1998). Ukraine provided two squadrons of Mi-24 for a total of 10 helicopters.
- 9.
In Sierra Leone and the D.R. Congo, the Indian contingent flew the Mi-35 helicopter, the export versions of the Mi-24 helicopter.
- 10.
After many embarrassments in 1999–2000, the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) brought in three Indian attack helicopters. They helped successfully rescue over 200 UN peacekeepers held hostage by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The Mi-35 used its rockets and guns to provide fire support for advancing UN columns and Mi-8 transport helicopters and neutralised RUF rebels who had ambushed UNAMSIL forces, engaged them in entrenched positions, carried out dissuading attacks, and prevented RUF reinforcements from arriving. In a separate UK-controlled operation in September 2000, independent British forces used Lynx helicopters to assist a rescue operation of five British soldiers in UNAMSIL who were held by the West Side Boys militia group.
- 11.
The use of force in peace operations is the subject of at least two books. The classic work of Findlay (2002) covers use of force in the twentieth century. Peter Nadin (2018) has edited a volume on the subject, which includes a chapter on protection of civilians in Haiti. For case studies of Mi-35 in MONUC, see Dorn (2014b, pp. 241–253). Mi-35 was also used in the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), including to remove President Gbagbo who refused to cede power after losing the 2010 election.
- 12.
The title “anti-balaka” is slang for “anti-machete,” “anti-bullets,” or “anti-AK-47,” arising from the belief of some of Anti-balaka adherents that the grigris they wore could stop Kalashnikov bullets.
- 13.
The FPRC formed a coalition with the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) as well as Le Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ), and RPRC forces. In a general sense, the UPC is also an ex-Séléka group (majority Muslim forces). It split off from FPRC in September 2014. Though they fight each other, they also often fight against anti-Balaka (majority Christina) forces. Human rights violations are committed by all armed groups, though not equally.
- 14.
“On 25 January, in Bambari, Ouaka prefecture, DSRSG-P Corner met with anti-Balaka and Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) leaders to urge the two groups to avoid clashes in the Bambari area and stop abuses against civilians. She reiterated MINUSCA’s priority to protect civilians and its robust response, including if red lines are not respected. Lastly, she warned UPC leader Ali Darassa of alleged human rights violations committed by UPC elements near Bambari in recent weeks” (MINUSCA Sage, 2017).
- 15.
Information on this case study is from UN staff involved in the use of force, including conversations with the Senegalese Aviation detachment on 27 March 2018, email exchanges subsequently, and documentation from MINUSCA (10 February 2017).
- 16.
Dorn, A. Walter. Conversation with MINUSCA Force Commander Lieutenant General Balla Keita, Montreal, 12 June 2019; also United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic,” S/2017/473 of 2 June 2017, pp. 3–6.
- 17.
The Mi-35 system has a Controp DSP-1 pod, which contains a high-definition visible light camera and an infra-red (IR) cameras, along with a Laser Range Finder to determine the distance to targeted objects.
- 18.
Comment to the author by Robert Owen, Professor in the Department of Aeronautical Science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 14 August 2018.
- 19.
The United Nations made good use of jets in the United Nations Operation in the Congo. Ethiopian Sabre jets, Indian Canberra bombers and Swedish J-29s (“flying barrel” bombers) were used effectively to deal with mercenaries and rebel forces in the break-away Katanga province. See Dorn (2014).
- 20.
The benefit of air power to the UN’s Mali mission is demonstrated by the experience of Major General Michael Lollesgaard in Mali, who observed that no ground forces were attacked during his term Force Commander of MINUSMA (2015–2017) when they had air cover. Furthermore, no shots were fired against UN helicopters. (Insight shared with the author, Oslo, 31 August 2018.).
- 21.
In Mali, the Netherlands rotated out its Apache attack helicopter unit in 2017 and the German Tiger AH unit that replaced it departed in 2018. The Canadian replacement for the German contribution is not providing an AH capability, just armed utility helicopters (Griffons) for escort of the Canadian Chinook heavy transport aircraft. However, El Salvador has been providing the small Defender (MD-500) multirole helicopter to support Mali. It is equipped with missiles and a machine gun. In D.R. Congo, the Rooivalk AH from South Africa might be in 2018, which would leave only the Mi-24 unit from Ukraine.
- 22.
The UN call to its Member States, titled “Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping” (quarterly), almost always lists attack helicopters as a priority, including the requirements reports issued before Peacekeeping Ministerial.
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Dorn, A.W. (2023). Attack Helicopters: Key Enablers for Peace Enforcement and the Protection of Civilians. In: Gilder, A., Curran, D., Holmes, G., Edu-Afful, F. (eds) Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_4
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