Partnerships and Approaches Used for Scaling: An Assessment of the Process for Rice Postharvest Technologies in CORIGAP

Abstract

In agriculture, many technologies are co-produced by research and a variety of other stakeholders, including farmers. Large-scale implementation of such technologies requires not only the distribution of the material components of a technology but also the replication of the social network, typically provided through facilitation of stakeholder involvement. Within the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the now common procedure to enable stakeholder involvement is the creation of innovation platforms. The multi-stakeholder engagement initiated by these platforms enables the use of locally adapted technologies. This implies that the introduced technologies are not merely copied but require unpacking and repacking. In other words, a process of re-establishing the interconnectedness of the technology with varied socioeconomic arrangements and policies that enable its use. Understanding the process of scaling technologies thus requires analysis of the network that effectively catalyzes synergistic change and supports the adoption of technologies. However, the nature of the network, the types of partnerships, and the communication processes are situational and dynamic. It can take many years before newly introduced technologies become integrated into the routines of farming and accepted as a ‘normal’ technology. In this chapter, we provide a qualitative assessment of the partnerships and networks initiated by the Closing Rice Yield Gaps project (CORIGAP). Many of the CORIGAP partnerships were initiated during the predecessor project, the Irrigated Rice Research Consortium (IRRC). CORIGAP facilitated partnerships in different modalities, depending on the context of the countries and partners. This included partnerships with private-sector partners who, for example, provide services or inputs in return for subsidies or other financial arrangements. We reflect on the types of partnerships, how they are conceptualized, and how they created the needed connections and conditions to support the scaling of technologies introduced by CORIGAP. We also present cases of private-sector partnerships as examples of engagements with industries. We then dive into an approach that had been employed in several CORIGAP sites to facilitate the creation of a network for learning, innovation, and scaling of technologies. A case of using this approach in the Lower Ayeyarwady Delta of Myanmar is presented. We close the chapter with insights on the incentives these CORIGAP partnerships have enabled for scaling.

6.1 Conceptual Overview of Networks, Partnerships, and Communication

Historically, the dominant perspective within research for development is that technologies are developed or curated by scientists and then spread across various types of adopters. This perspective is elaborated in Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovation model (Rogers 1983). A major criticism of this model is the division between, at one end, science as an innovation producer and knowledge provider. On the other end, farmers are considered to be information receivers and innovation adopters. The limitations of this model have been repaired by introducing network and system perspectives that perceive innovation and knowledge production as a multi-actor process without predefining the agency of actors and the way knowledge and innovation flow within a network or system (Yang et al. 2022). A knowledge network or innovation system is enmeshed in a complex environment where individuals jointly generate innovations and share knowledge.

Within CGIAR, different concepts have been proposed to characterize the co-production of knowledge and innovation. Besides Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs), these are Learning Alliances (LA) (Lundy et al. 2005), Living Labs (Dutilleul et al. 2010), and Learning and Innovation Hubs (Jiménez and Zheng 2021). These approaches are all based on the idea that an appropriate design requires an arrangement for stakeholder participation that results in an effective innovation process and a conducive environment for a technology to function. The set of actors involved and the institutional environment they create is called an Innovation System (Leeuwis 2004; Oria et al. 2014). The institutional environment consists of formal and informal rules that affect practice, e.g., shared labor agreements between farmers or established payment arrangements. Innovation is not only new technology and knowledge but also the re-design of technical practices and ways to organize them (Leeuwis 2004; Dormon et al. 2007). Thus, a heterogeneous and interdependent network of actors in an innovation system operates at different levels and maneuvers the organizational and institutional structures to enable innovation (Kilelu et al. 2013).

MSPs mostly involve a variety of international and local stakeholders representing various organizations and interests. These stakeholders organize, discuss, and generate joint learning in order to tackle specific technological, organizational, and institutional challenges and increase the adoption of best management practices (Lundy et al. 2005). For example, a Learning Alliance (LA) focuses on communication processes for generating and spreading knowledge and improved practices. In other words, an LA is based on the assumption that the learning of stakeholders enables innovations.

Another variant of MSPs emphasizes the role of the private sector. Known as Public–Private Partnership (PPP), this model assumes that a variety of roles and activities typically provided by the public sector can be taken over by private-sector actors. The underlying assumption is that PPPs create a double win by making services more efficient and providing stakeholders with higher returns on investments (Marbaniang and Kharumnuid 2020). Varied forms of such partnerships are engaged in research for development. Depending on the nature of the technology, the company and the research organization take different roles in the partnership.

A key component of MSPs is a communication process (Fig. 6.1). Implicit in the multi-stakeholder collaboration and co-production arguments of MSPs is a multi-directional communication process. Communication requires appropriate skills, media, activities, and dialogue in order to generate awareness, understanding, interest, and form opinions (Burns et al. 2003; Lewenstein 2003). In all MSP variations, the facilitation of multi-directional communication is given much attention. In the LA model, for example, communication catalyzes learning toward meaningful change. The LA model asserts that actors must be treated equally in the communicative process. Actors encode, interpret, and decode messages and engage in a dialogue that is considered a switchboard that reroutes information. What makes the LA model different from the typical communicative process is the systematized way of monitoring and evaluating research outputs in reflection meetings between stakeholders, forming the basis for the next learning cycle.

Fig. 6.1

(Adapted from the Osgood and Schramm communication model; Mcquail and Windahl 2015)

Communicative Process in an LA

6.2 Multiplicity of Partnerships in CORIGAP

CORIGAP constituted a consortium that linked various partners with a shared interest in sustainable agricultural technologies. An example of the types of partners included in CORIGAP work in Indonesia and Vietnam is shown in Fig. 6.2. The partnerships varied across countries. Many partners were involved, including government agencies, various farmer groups, and industry and finance partners (Fig. 6.2). The composition for each type is also context-driven, varying alongside technologies of interest, the stakeholders in the country, policies in place, and how the industry is set up around the technology in the geographic scope. Underlying these are different modes of partnerships.

Fig. 6.2

Stakeholder composition in the networks engaged through CORIGAP in Indonesia and Vietnam

CORIGAP has involved varied modes of partnership with the private sector. Initially, during the IRRC phase, informal public–private cooperation was the only mode of partnership. Except for contracting partnerships, CORIGAP engaged with the private sector in all other forms of partnerships (Table 6.1). Some partnerships, e.g., with the Austrian company APV—Technische Produkte GmbH on direct seeding, had several components.

Table 6.1 Forms of partnerships, characteristics, and examples from CORIGAP

In the following, we will focus on informal commercializing partnerships implemented by CORIGAP to foster developing, adapting, and scaling out CORIGAP research products (Fig. 6.3). Moving from the left to the right in Fig. 6.3, the private partner becomes more engaged in the planning and implementation of activities and might also provide more funding. The partnership aims for a more equal relationship between the private-sector partners and other stakeholders, e.g., joint training events with farmers provided by researchers and company staff. Moving from bottom to top, the responsibilities and mutual benefits are higher and private-sector engagement moves from recipient of research to a partner in innovation. One example is the development of a rice dryer, where the company did the prototyping and the research institutions conducted simulation of the drying process as an input to the prototype design. The rice dryer case is illustrative of several activities.

Fig. 6.3

Different levels of engagement with the private sector and some scaling effects

6.2.1 Market Studies

In 2014, the CORIGAP postharvest and mechanization teams conducted a needs assessment for combine harvesting in Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand, funded by and in cooperation with the international harvesting equipment manufacturer CLAAS. This was complemented by studies in the Philippines and Cambodia in cooperation with the national partners of the IRRC. The study provided complementary funding of US$60k to CORIGAP activities and led to important findings that resulted in the reduction of rice production costs and harvesting losses through the promotion of combine harvesting by the project. For the company, it provided insight into opportunities for selling small rice combine harvesters.

6.2.2 Manufacturing Training

During the IRRC and CORIGAP phases, several training courses were conducted for local manufacturers on the production, testing, and troubleshooting of new technologies. Examples are training on a new semi-automatic downdraft rice-husk furnace for rice dryers, manufacturing a flatbed dryer, and manufacturing components for laser leveling of fields. The flatbed dryer manufacturing training led to the successful and widespread introduction of such dryers in Myanmar, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines through local manufacturers and service providers, who often were also provided with follow-up advisory assistance on the technologies.

6.2.3 Technology Development

With some supplementary funding from the public sector (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ) and the private sector, CORIGAP also engaged in the development of new technologies, e.g., the Solar Bubble Dryer™ (SBD). For this purpose, a public–private consortium consisting of GrainPro for material properties and prototyping, University of Hohenheim, Germany, for fundamental research, including modeling of the drying process and IRRI/CORIGAP for rice expertise, technology verification and adaptation to users’ needs was developed (Gummert et al. 2014). This was funded with US$60k from BMZ, US$200k from GrainPro, and in-kind contributions from CORIGAP in the form of staff time and operating funds. The effective PPP model with clearly defined roles in which the partners could focus on their core expertise had effectively shortened development cycles and resulted in a completely new solar dryer within two years. Market testing was promising and the first commercial version was released on 30 September 2014. By December 2022, 690 SBDs had been sold (Plijter 2022).

6.2.4 Technology Promotion

This was usually done in close cooperation with actors from the private sector. An early example was the cooperation with Trimble Inc., a multinational manufacturer of laser transmitters and receivers, with the objective to adapt laser-leveling technologies to the conditions of small farms in Asia. During the project, Trimble provided three sets of leveling equipment for free to be used in project sites. Additional sets were sold with a price subsidy from the project. Trimble staff also joined technical seminars and field activities. The collaboration was not only with Trimble, and discussions with competing companies took place, but none of the competitors were willing to provide a similar contribution. National importers and distributors of Trimble products became partners, e.g., Pioneer Agribiz Co. Ltd in Myanmar, IdealFarm in Vietnam, and CropTech Asia in Thailand.

Seminars and exhibitions were also co-implemented with companies. This included exhibitions during the International Rice Congress conducted by IRRI every 4 years, in Bangkok in 2014 and in Singapore in 2018. There were several national events in CORIGAP partner countries and from 2017 to 2022 through a partnership with the German Agriculture Society (DLG) for conducting seminars and exhibitions under the AGRIFUTURE and AGRITECHNICA ASIA brands. In 2019, CORIGAP, DLG, and the Agricultural Mechanization Division of the Ministry of Agriculture in Myanmar organized the AGRITECHNICA ASIA Live field days, exhibition and seminar drawing more than 3,000 farmers, contract service providers, and extension workers (IRRI 2019a). In 2022, CORIGAP, DLG, and various departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) in Vietnam organized a similar event with 4,000 visitors (Anonymous 2022) in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The latter was accompanied by national seminars, the CORIGAP Lessons Learned Seminar, and the CORIGAP Science Seminar, which were streamed online, disseminating the CORIGAP learnings to additional national and international audiences.

6.2.5 Technology Verification and Adaptation

The cooperation with GrainPro Inc. Philippines on the verification of hermetic storage systems is an example. It started with the CORIGAP team working with commercially available GrainPro Cocoons™ with a 5- to 20-ton capacity, and led, once farmers’ feedback was collected, to the joint development of the 50-kg Super Bag (Ben et al. 2006). Similar to the Cocoons™, the Super Bags have been highly effective for safely storing seeds and grains and other commodities, such as cocoa and coffee for up to one year and have been included in the national activities of all CORIGAP countries. From 2013 to 2022, 32 million Super Bags have been sold worldwide by GrainPro (Plijter 2022), while local competitors from India and China are also selling similar bags, but often with lower quality than the original.

Through a collaboration among Grain Pro, Loc Troi Group in Vietnam, and IRRI, a technology verification of a 150-ton hermetic storage Cocoon™ for paddy grain was conducted in 2022. With a promising result and the advantages of private-research institution partnerships, the technology can be rapidly adopted on an industrial scale.

6.3 Insights from Collaboration with the Private Sector

6.3.1 History of Collaboration with the Private Sector in CORIGAP

The first collaboration involving international agricultural research scientists (IRRI’s Agricultural Engineering Division, AED) and the private sector goes back more than 50 years. In 1977, IRRI released the IRRI Axial Flow Thresher (AFT) to several manufacturers in the Philippines (Chandler 1979). This addressed problems emerging from double-cropping rice systems, such as labor shortages, short turnaround times between harvesting and the next planting season, and rainy harvests, which complicate manual threshing. The mechanical thresher was quickly picked up by farmers in the Philippines from 1972, Pakistan from 1976 to 1978, Thailand from 1977 to 1980, Indonesia from 1980 to 1982, Vietnam in the 1980s, and in Laos from 1997 to 1998 (Gummert et al. 2013). Local manufacturers came up with different versions of threshers with capacities ranging from 0.6 to 3 tons. In Thailand, a combine harvester was developed in 1988 (Gummert and Phan 2013). All this was promoted by the USAID-funded Small Farm Machinery Development Program (SFMDP) implemented by IRRI (Khan 1985). After the program came to an end, AED anticipated that national research institutions would continue the dissemination of these machines. But this really did not happen and, in the 1990s, there were frequent proposals to close down the AED.

During the IRRC from 2000 to 2010 and the first phase of CORIGAP (2011–2015), IRRI had no longer had any significant cooperation with the private sector, except for one AED project that worked informally with local manufacturers by providing them machinery designs of a stripper harvester and training for local manufacturing (Douthwaite 2002). Only in 2008, during the time of the IRRC, the Hybrid Rice Research Consortium (HRRC) was established as an IRRI-managed public–private research platform with 38 public and private organizations (Rijsberman 2014). In 2003, the IRRC established the Postharvest Workgroup that, besides conducting research on loss reduction, was also tasked to assess how the consortium could better leverage the private sector to help scale out research outputs.

One CGIAR, which was formally launched in January 2022, has the ambition to ‘deepen engagement with the private sector’ as a key pathway to achieve greater impact at scale toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Cummings and Dentoni 2021). Since the IRRC and CORIGAP have successfully piloted different types of private–public partnerships, there are valuable lessons for One CGIAR, but also for other projects and programs.

6.3.2 Facilitating Evolving Roles in Collaboration with the Private Sector

In CORIGAP, partnerships include local small- and medium-sized enterprises and not only large companies seeking to bring their products to the market. This could start, e.g., by inviting a private stakeholder to join in a training session and develop into joint activities for dissemination of new machinery. This was the case with GrainPro Inc. Philippines, a company producing hermetic storage Cocoons™, a type of sealed bag for rice that was already commercially available. By participating in the IRRC, a hermetic Super Bag was developed, and after that, a Solar Bubble Dryer™. The latter was developed by a consortium consisting of IRRI, GrainPro, and the University of Hohenheim (Salvatierra-Rojas et al. 2017).

Another example is the rice trader Dr. Myo Aung Kyaw in Myanmar. In 2004, IRRI worked with him in a postharvest training after which he started promoting improved postharvest management in Myanmar. In 2005, Dr. Myo participated in a flatbed dryer manufacturing training conducted by the IRRC in partnership with Nong Lam University in Vietnam. He then started manufacturing and installing these dryers in Myanmar. Dr. Myo became a CORIGAP collaborator by joining the training of farmers and extension workers in postharvest loss reduction, for which he founded the Pioneer Postharvest Development Group (PPHDG). In 2013, he established Pioneer Agrobiz Co., Ltd, for dryer manufacturing and service provision for postharvest technology, including other CORIGAP technologies like hermetic storage, laser-leveling equipment, and the Solar Bubble Dryer (SBD). He also became an importer of other postharvest equipment such as re-circulating batch dryers from Taiwan and quality assessment and laboratory equipment. He is now a national distributor of Suncue, Kett, GrainPro, and Trimble. Through August 2022, he had installed more than 1,200 flatbed dryers across the country.

In 2019, the Austrian company APV demonstrated its direct seeding equipment at the AGRITECHNICA ASIA Live in Myanmar. After some discussions with the CORIGAP team, APV became a member of IRRI’s direct seeded rice consortium (DSRC) and donated two machines, one for trials at the IRRI’s Zeigler Experiment Station in Los Baños, Philippines, and one for CORIGAP field demonstrations in Vietnam. APV then got involved in the design of direct seeding equipment for the CGIAR Mechanization of Rice Breeding Program, with the cost of the development covered by the company. Furthermore, the mechanized APV seeding demonstrations in Vietnam got high interest from farmers and private and public sectors. By April 2022, a new direct seeder for rice was commercially released.

In 2021–2022, a cooperation between Loc Troi Group and IRRI aimed at getting the EasyHarvest APP (IRRI 2019b) for wet paddy logistics optimization piloted and tested. It is ongoing with a promising adoption at an industrial scale.

Innovation and knowledge are essential for fostering sustainable mechanization and postharvest. But technology generation is, in itself, not sufficient. It needs to be accompanied by commercialization and dissemination of the technologies, which is not the mandate and strength of research institutions and other public sector actors. Developing and implementing partnerships with the private-sector stakeholders that are active along the rice value chain is, therefore, essential to ensure that farmers can benefit from the new technologies and management options. In addition, synergies and efficiency gains can be created when the different stakeholders can focus on their core competencies and mandates.

6.3.3 Contract Service Provision

One of the CORIGAP partnership aims is to stimulate private companies and individuals to provide services to farmers. Typically, machines purchased by smallholder farmers through subsidized credit schemes end up abandoned when broken. In 2004, the IRRC and CORIGAP teams started with private-sector-driven contract service provision. Usually, when a technology is new and unknown, the project team and cooperating national institutions conduct demonstrations. Once benefits are observed, the service providers start to invest. There are five different business models observed for this:

• Farmer-ownership models are based on service provision on demand by individual farmers. This has the advantage of easy access although this model appears costly to the service provider. Moreover, farmer-operators are usually less skilled and more time-constrained than contract service providers focused on their business. In CORIGAP, this model was not promoted, except for the Super Bag.

• Collective ownership models involve farmer groups or cooperatives. IRRC/CORIGAP proposed this model for flatbed dryers, using existing cooperative structures in Balat village in Battambang province, Cambodia, and Bukidnon in the Philippines (IRRI 2011, 2012). The dryer in Balat was still used 10 years after the installation but not on a cooperative basis. The leader of the cooperative had appropriated the dryer, managed its maintenance and use, and charged a higher price to members and non-members. This allowed for coordinated use as well as for covering material costs and labor.

• Another business model combines the first and second models in that a single farmer invests in a new technology and hires it out to a group of farmers on a contract basis. As with the sole farmer ownership, this requires high upfront investment and, therefore, access to finance. An example for this model is Ms. Truong Thị Thanh Nhan from Vietnam, who bought the first laser-leveling set as a farmer and used it initially in her own 70-ha family farm. She then started providing a service to neighboring farmers (Gummert and Rickman 2013). The business model for her service provision was developed with assistance from the Vietnamese CORIGAP team.

• Two more models are specialized service agencies, fully public or fully private. Fully public services for agricultural machinery can be used for piloting new equipment where private-sector stakeholders are not existent. These require a clear pathway for commercialization. CORIGAP did not support the public model; however, it supported fully private services. Examples of the private specialized service agencies supported by CORIGAP are individuals and small- and medium-scale enterprises for land-laser leveling in Thailand supported by the Thai Rice NAMA (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action) Project (Nguyen et al. 2022). CORIGAP also promoted combine harvesting in Vietnam, which was taken up by private contractors (Gummert and Phan 2013). More than 90% of the rice fields in Vietnam are now harvested with combine harvesters.

The business models for machinery usage usually follow similar trajectories of development, as outlined below using laser leveling as an example. Usually, when a technology is new and unknown, service provision starts under a public-sector contract service provision model, as it did in the project through many demonstrations of laser leveling in farmers’ fields conducted by the project team and cooperating national institutions. This is then often complemented by a government institution establishing a service like the Agricultural Engineering Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) did in Cambodia. Once benefits for farmers and for machinery owners become more visible and demand for the operation is established, large-scale farmers such as Ms. Truong Thị Thanh Nhan in Vietnam, and private contractors start investing in the equipment. In order to speed up the introduction of a new technology, projects should include support to potential service providers from the beginning, as CORIGAP did.

6.3.4 Developing Equipment Supply Chains

Once farmers buy machines, supply chains, and after-sales services need to be established. Some equipment can be locally produced, such as flatbed dryers. Locally produced equipment has the advantage that it can be easily repaired in the area. These can be adapted to the location-specific needs of the farmers. For example, the flatbed dryer can be built for capacities ranging from 4 to more than 20 tons per batch and with different air-heating systems. Local production generates employment and R&D capacity among local manufacturers. Equipment produced by external manufacturers, often large multinational companies, requires locally established service providers. Components or spare parts can be locally produced, for example, the drag bucket for laser-leveling systems. CORIGAP assisted with the establishment of (service) supply chains for machinery through the following.

• Manufacturer training on new technologies such as the flatbed dryer and rice-husk furnace. This included developing training modules on maintenance and troubleshooting and piloting business models for use of the equipment and was followed up by technical advice on a need basis.

• Provision of design drawings, e.g., for the drag bucket for laser leveling to local manufacturers in Myanmar and technical advice during the manufacturing of the first prototype.

• Linking of international companies to potential importers and distributors in Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines.

• Including the private-sector players in the LAs, which facilitated networking.

6.4 Communication Process Within a Network: The CORIGAP LA as a Discursive Space

Here, we focus more on the communicative aspects of a multi-stakeholder platform of CORIGAP, the LA. The LA approach was initiated at IRRI for a postharvest project funded by the Asian Development Bank. It was successively incorporated into the IRRC and CORIGAP projects. This was started by conducting Participatory Impact Pathway Analysis (PIPA) workshops. PIPA is a method in which rice value chain actors collectively reflect on innovation-based problems, determine actionable points, and identify appropriate actors who can drive their desired impact. The LA was formed with network stakeholders relevant to specific technologies. The dynamic and flexible membership nature of an LA allows members to enter a discourse which, most of the time, entails and results in collaboration with other actors (Quilloy et al. 2015; Quilloy 2016; Flor et al. 2017; Gummert et al. 2022). At the end of each learning cycle, members share their reflections on the actions taken. These collective reflections build upon previous cycles, taking on new topics as they progress.

Communication within the CORIGAP LA cuts across varied stakeholder groups and, in many ways, is different from common outreach approaches used in research (Table 6.2). Linear models are those that are one-way outreaches that researchers often use to inform end users or farmers about technologies (Leeuwis and Aarts 2011). Other approaches have increased feedback loops, such as the two-way transactional model (Leeuwis and Aarts 2011). In terms of the stakeholders engaged, the LA differed between the two in terms of the increased number and type of stakeholders as well as the temporary or emergent nature of their involvement (only when relevant to the topic). There is, however, a facilitator that enables sharing across these stakeholders. The LA also differed in the meaning-making process in that as different dialogues/learning are happening, these are brought to a broader group and, thus, the meaning is negotiated collectively (Table 6.2). A concrete example is when farmers test a technology on their farms and then the LA also discusses the timing and need for services. The service providers re-examine the costs and price of their service and the researchers share about the yield from the on-farm trial. Collectively, the LA members create meaning around what this technology entails. Although the same tools can be deployed in the LA, having a broad network entails other group learning and coordination tools.

Table 6.2 Communication within the LA compared with common outreach models used in research (linear and transactional)

6.4.1 Intermediary Outcomes from Using the PIPA and LA Approach in CORIGAP

For researchers, conducting a PIPA when starting activities in a country became common. It was implemented in Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam. As an impact at the intermediary level, the facilitation of PIPAs by the CORIGAP team was then also requested from other IRRI projects in Bangladesh and Thailand. Conducting a PIPA to initiate activities proved highly beneficial for the project because, in addition to the intended output, the documented impact pathways, it produced three major outcomes:

• Understanding of the actor-specific impact pathways: The participatory process brings about a much more detailed understanding of the actor-specific impact pathways and measures for the project to support them than traditional planning processes.

• Ownership: Since all key stakeholders take part in this participatory process that usually takes at least 2 or 3 days, they develop through their contributions and participation a deep ownership of the project, even if the project does not have specific resources allocated to it. This constitutes a huge asset in the implementation of activities.

• Co-funding: The last point often leads to various partners co-funding activities that were jointly developed. In Vietnam, for example, after a PIPA was conducted in An Giang province, the An Giang Extension Service, and Loc Troi, both contributed 33% each of the cost of the proposed activities to verify CORIGAP technologies in the Small-Farmer, Large-Field Program.

The LA approach has been used by CORIGAP in Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar because it is a working methodology for facilitating the dynamic process of scaling out technologies using an impact pathway with different actors, which might require different partnership compositions at different times. Flor et al. (2017) concluded that including LA in adaptive research trials in Myanmar expanded the number of stakeholders with whom farmers interact. This broadened the learning agenda beyond the initial objectives of the project, which is often needed when scaling out mechanization and postharvest technologies.

6.5 Case Study: Socio-Technical Analysis of an LA for Adaptation of Flatbed Dryers in the Lower Delta, Myanmar

In what follows, we present results from a study addressing the question of how an LA supports self-organization in relation to the adaptation of flatbed dryers in Myanmar. The case study was based on participant observation during the activities of LA members, wherein monitoring of discussions was conducted. Observational data, exchanges with manufacturers, and project documents were the basis for the analysis of the technical and organizational re-design process. These were combined with focus group discussions and interviews with participants and non-participants in LA, covering laborers, traders, threshers, and reaper service providers, boatmen, NGO staff, researchers, and millers. In addition, 30 farmers from Kyee Chaung village, Mawlamyinegyun Township, Ayeyarwaddy Division, Myanmar, were individually interviewed on their involvement, practices, and management decisions as well as farming conditions within which they operate.

The initial concept of the flatbed dryer emerged in the 1960s in response to increased volumes of rice paddy from IR8 harvested during rainy periods (Douthwaite 2002). The yield increase created a bottleneck in the amount of paddy farmers could handle with sun drying (Ragudo 2011). In 2005, three representatives from Myanmar joined a training course on manufacturing dryers in Vietnam. From there, private-sector representatives built a large commercial dryer and a 1-ton IRRI dryer. They also started to locally produce Vietnamese-designed, 4-ton dryers. A private company, the Pioneer Postharvest Development Group (PPHDG), promoted these in Myanmar (see Sect. 6.3.2). This resulted in the installation of 47 dryers in the country by 2008 and 135 by 2011 (Kyaw and Gummert 2010). In 2013, IRRI, PPHDG, and NGO partners planned to introduce flatbed dryers of similar design through a project in the Lower Delta, Myanmar. The LA approach was taken on board to engage private, public, and civil-sector actors in an innovation network to jointly identify, share, and adapt suitable practices (Lundy et al. 2005; Stelling et al. 2009). Thus, a village-level LA was established with a focus on flatbed dryer technology.

6.5.1 Starting the Process: Network Building, Agreements, Shared Agenda

The starting group for the LA was a partnership involved in promoting agricultural technologies to benefit farmers in the Lower Delta (Table 6.3). They implemented activities with limited coordination. From the private sector, PPHDG, and Tin Oo Engineering, which had been producing dryers in other parts of Myanmar, were involved. Previously, Tin Oo Engineering made the components, while PPHDG promoted mechanical drying to government policymakers, rice millers, government staff, and farmers. By 2011, they had installed 135 dryers in the country. PPHDG, which represented the two companies in the LA, was operated as a business with an interest in corporate social responsibility (interview with PPHDG 2015). IRRI also collaborated with several NGOs in the Lower Delta that implemented community and livelihood support strategies for farmers. The organizations GRET (Professionals for Fair Development) and Welthungerhilfe were also involved in the LA. Both organizations had existing programs in the villages, including credit systems based on communally stored paddy.

Table 6.3 Stakeholders involved at the start and through 2 years of activities compared with actors perceived by farmers to be part of the Learning Alliance network in Kyee Chaung, Mawlamyinegyun, Myanmar

One initiative emerging from the LA was to complement dryer operations with an existing credit system coordinated by the NGOs. Credit was provided to farmers when they stored part of their produce in communal storage. The collected grains were stored and managed by a committee of farmers for sale when prices were higher. The LA had an underlying objective to support farmers to obtain quality grains through timely drying and then storing communally to wait for a higher price. The set-up of the dryer, therefore, aligned with the interests of the NGOs and farmer groups involved in communal storage.

Farmers were aware of the organizational complexity of a shared dryer. This was not only with respect to the functioning of the device but also to changes in their relationship with millers. These concerns, listed in Table 6.4, influenced the agenda of the LA. Millers were part of the initial concerns of farmers because at that point farmers only had options to sell to traders or millers in Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships. If these millers controlled the price, the farmers would lose profit if they had to pay for drying services. The traders either lived in the village or came with their own laborers and transportation.

Table 6.4 Concerns discussed by farmer representatives^a at an LA meeting in December 2013 on the establishment of a flatbed dryer

While convenient for farmers, traders coming to the village would pay low prices or have inequitable buying practices. The risk came from high reductions in price or weight as a penalty for wet grains, mixtures, dark grain color, or less-preferred varieties (interview with farmers, 2014). Millers could give better prices but were from 30 to 45 min away by boat, so farmers had to transport their rice when they wanted to sell. Road access was difficult between villages and town centers. Some roads were passable only by motorbike.

Many of the millers did not have dryers. Those who did have re-circulating batch dryers that were not suitable for drying small amounts of rice. Some had started to invest in parboiling machines (interview with millers 2014). The Myanmar Rice Federation (MRF), which regulates rice trade in the country, supported the increase of parboiled rice exports (interview notes, 2014). With parboiled rice, millers were not strict about the color of the grains they bought. Farmers also said that millers around Bogale would buy any type of rice and would not provide a premium for good-quality rice grains (LA meeting notes, 2013).

There were actors influential in activities for drying rice whom facilitators of the LA had not considered but were flagged by farmers from the beginning. These were fertilizer sellers, micro-financiers, and private lenders. Farmers interacted with them at the start of the season to get a loan. These actors could impose repayment immediately after harvest, thereby limiting the selling options of farmers (FGD notes, 2014). The exchange was based on trust. Therefore, farmers were strongly pressured to meet payment deadlines if they wanted to get loans for succeeding seasons.

6.5.2 Outcomes from Interactions

Interactions with market actors in Yangon continued in 2015 with farmers starting a small group that sold bulk grain there. Farmers also explored the difference if they sold in Mawlamyinegyun rather than Bogale. The dryer management committee explored boat rental, hauling labor, and warehouse services as additional services they could offer to increase the incentive for farmers to dry or to address observed constraints. Farmers also developed an interest in some varieties from an IRRI trial that they observed to be preferred at the wholesale market in Yangon. The LA continued to facilitate visits to seed farms to encourage farmers to find better sources of seed. PPHDG then linked the farmers to seed sources in other provinces in Myanmar.

Although the LA had an explicit agenda, members developed other linkages with synergistic effects that allowed actors to invest more in collaborative activities. IRRI and PPHDG introduced other postharvest technologies, including small threshers, solar bubble dryers, and hermetic storage options. IRRI, the NGOs, and farmers tried different varieties and crop production technologies (crop establishment, fertilizer, pest management). NGOs supported activities on credit and other livelihood improvements, for example, organizing and training landless women for rice harvesting. PPHDG and key farmers were involved in fertilizer retail. Interactions on fertilizer retail led to links with sources of pure seeds, although it also resulted in competing fertilizer recommendations.

There was interest from farmers to try the dryer. Mechanical drying is an option when the weather after the harvest does not allow sun drying. The tools and techniques farmers planned to implement in relation to LA topics are italicized in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5 List of technical changes and percentage of farmers from Kyee Chaung who planned to implement them

The reasons farmers mentioned for these choices related to the costs of mechanized drying. With a mean yield of 2.6 t ha⁻¹ (S.E. Mean 152) sold at $0.21 kg⁻¹, farmers obtained gross proceeds of US$557 ha⁻¹ (data from 47 parcels, assuming field-dry conditions, n = 30). They paid on average US$70 ha⁻¹ in total for post-production activities. Broken down, this was US$27 ha⁻¹ for harvesting, US$22 ha⁻¹ for threshing, US$17 ha⁻¹ for hauling, and US$4 ha⁻¹ for sun drying labor. With the use of the flatbed dryer, farmers said they had to pay an additional US$20 ha⁻¹, based on $11 ha⁻¹ for drying service fee, US$3 ha⁻¹ for hauling labor, and US$5 ha⁻¹ for boat rentals. These were costs that had to be paid in cash when the service was provided.

Mechanically dried rice had no significant selling price difference from sun-dried rice. Price differences emerge over time and storage is a way to gain higher prices. One farmer noted a US$15 t⁻¹ increase in price after drying and storage. This translates to about US$40/ha higher gross proceeds. Storing and waiting for a higher price, however, becomes difficult or even impossible if a farmer had debts to repay. The NGO initiative to buy grains, store communally with inventory credit, and then divide profit from a higher selling price was not implemented by the farmers interviewed. They said the warehouse was still at its trial stage and organizing for storage had just begun.

6.5.3 Outcomes on the LA Network and Its Activities

The LA network was formed with key organizations interested in the flatbed dryer. It included some actors at the village level, but not all the influential actors. A network with a specific scope, it expanded the rice postharvest network at the village through links with PPHDG, IRRI, DOA extension, millers and traders from Yangon, and other seed sources (Table 6.3). It also made use of already existing linkages, such as linkages between farmers and GRET, boatmen, or laborers (landless farmers and women).

Various activities targeted technical and social adaptation over time (Fig. 6.4). Notably, these activities happened simultaneously with some technical activities requiring a follow-up activity on the social aspects and vice versa. Moreover, while many in the networks were involved in these activities, various actors coordinated them (Fig. 6.4). They also put in their resources and engaged their own contacts external to the initial network. Some interactions around the dryer led to other activities that were synergistic and unplanned. These can be considered spin-off effects in that they were not controlled by LA facilitators. They also broadened the scope of the LA into other topics beyond the initial agenda. Bulk selling, additional services as a package with the drying service, sourcing of pure seeds, fertilizer retail, and new varieties are examples. These highlight the adaptive capacity of various actors in the network.

Fig. 6.4

Timeline with agenda around adapting a dryer: activities targeted for technical (top) and social (bottom) adjustments, and actors coordinating them (numbers), 2012–2015

The LA encountered conflicting interests. One is the linkages with wholesale markets that target higher prices for quality grains but also required producing only one variety in bulk. This contrasted with the interests of farmers to cultivate varieties suited to varying agro-ecological conditions of different parcels of land. Differences could be in elevation, location, duration of water flooding the fields (waterlogging), ownership, water level, and capacity to control water coming into the field from tidal effect or saline intrusion. Due to these, a farmer could plant rice in up to six different parcels in one season. This had implications for rice post-production.

Having different varieties required managing different grains at once in an effort to keep them separate. Possibilities for mixtures of grains were risks at different stages of post-production, particularly in drying. Moreover, farmers could not easily attain a bulk amount for a particular variety. Therefore, it required coordination with other farmers when using a 3-ton dryer. It also posed difficulties for marketing in bulk conditions. All these affected the socio-technical re-design process toward drying using flatbed dryers.

One effect of the LA observed by the project was its empowering nature. In the first LA meeting, the farmers had only participated quietly, mostly listening and only rarely providing an answer to a question when directly addressed. In succeeding meetings, they realized that their opinions were valued and that they could use the LA platform to start improving their conditions. They became very outspoken and started requesting information and activities, e.g., for learning from other villages or institutions.

The LA was on a good track to tackle the above-mentioned issues that were planned to be addressed in further LA learning cycles, but then unfortunately in some re-structuring of the project it was required to have a dedicated site for the project and not a site shared with other projects (e.g., LIFT and GRET) and CORIGAP project activities in Mawlamyinegyun Township came to an end by 2015. This was a pity because one batch of milled rice that had been dried in the flatbed dryer and was sold directly to the wholesale market in Yangon by the farmer group at a US$120 ha⁻¹ rice produced a price premium after deducting the costs for milling and transport. This just demonstrated how farmers’ returns could be increased by improving postharvest and market linkages. The CORIGAP team is convinced that two more years of assisting the LA would have solved the remaining problems.

6.6 Discussion and Conclusions

The experiences from CORIGAP highlight various lessons for scaling technologies. There is a perception that scaling through partnerships is a linear process that can be planned and meticulously steered. Through the examples in this chapter, we can draw out some pillars that are useful for scaling. We can also see there are limits and boundaries that the context of the partnership creates.

6.6.1 The Private Sector and Its Role in Scaling

An important pillar is thinking systemically. There are various components that comprise a system, including technology, the network of relevant stakeholders, as well as policy or funding landscape. This automatically entails a diversity of partners. Moreover, it also entails that partnerships are selected to address change within the system. In this thinking, private-sector partnerships have varied roles to play. This is an aspect that should be systematically planned at the design phase of any research for development project looking to scale adapted solutions. While large multinationals are often targeted because of their financial capacity to co-fund projects, the experience of CORIGAP shows that there are many smaller companies that are often very innovative and local actors who can be essential for scaling out research results. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to public–private cooperation, and these smaller actors need to be included, possibly through facilitating a multi-stakeholder platform like an LA. To further the thinking, business accelerators can be a potential entry point to support private-sector stakeholders in scaling. These are recommendations for private-sector partnerships:

• Start early: Collaboration with the private sector should already be planned for in the project conceptualization phase and a budget needs to be allocated for facilitating the partnerships, e.g., through an LA and the initial activities during which the private-sector actors and the value proposition for the private sector might not yet be very clear. Partnerships need an understanding of the different partners. Therefore, a flexible budget that can be adjusted to needs and additional requirements that are identified once the project develops is of advantage.

• Seek win–win: Aim at a true partnership with the private-sector players in which they understand a clearly spelled out value proposition for them. This will result in co-funding from the private sector and ownership that will lead to sustainable scaling. Checkbook partnerships do not produce sustainable impact.

• Seek synergies by defining collaboration models in which each partner brings its strengths in terms of capacity, know-how, networks, and resources to the table and avoid duplication and competition. The development commercialization of the Solar Bubble Dryer by a public–private consortium as part of CORIGAP within a timeframe of less than 3 years demonstrates the potential of synergistic effects from such a partnership.

• Understand partners’ needs and capabilities: Compared to the traditional partners of research projects like agricultural extension systems, e.g., are quite similar across countries and can work with similar approaches and messages. The private sector is very diverse ranging from a one-person business as a contract service provider to multinational companies. Each entity needs a different approach. Hence, time needs to be spent on understanding who the key potential private partners are, how they operate, and what their needs are. Involving private partners in an LA can facilitate this understanding.

• Be quick in cooperation, but allow for sufficient time for scaling: Private entities usually require quick actions and need a roadmap with a realistic medium-term outlook toward profitable sales of new products. With respect to dealing with private partners, urgency is usually required. However, in IRRC/CORIGAP, as well as previous projects of IRRI, it usually took a minimum of 10 years from the initial technology generation to broad, self-sustained uptake of mechanization, or postharvest technologies. The SBD was an exception, but in that case, the research and development relationships with GrainPro had long been established and the partners were already cooperating on other technologies. Nowadays projects are designed for three years or even shorter times, which is just not sufficient. If widespread adoption and impact are the aims of the project, plan for a phased project with a clear roadmap for the second phase for verification and scaling of technologies that have been developed and tested in the first phase and actively seek funding for the second phase. We appreciate because of the long-term commitment of SDC to fund first the IRRC and then CORIGAP for a total of 22 years scaling through the private sector could be conceptualized and successfully piloted.

• Monitor and communicate successes: This was a weak point in CORIGAP, and therefore, the impact of the successful public–private partnerships of the project was only documented on an anecdotal basis. As part of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system of the project and possibly initiated by a PIPA, design impact pathways and indicators for successful public–private cooperation and collect the information on a regular basis. New methods for measuring impact at the intermediary level might have to be developed.

6.6.2 Insights from Networks and Communication Within LA

Networks and communication among partners, as well as across varied levels, are another pillar. Consortia, platforms, and hubs are ways in which research engages varied partnerships. This has varied modes and purposes as seen in the CORIGAP experience. This could be the synergistic push for technology development, leveraging resources and capacities, enabling the spread of knowledge and access to technologies or services, or understanding business models that are working or can be adopted. Underpinning and often assumed or hidden behind partnerships is the communication that needs to happen in various forms, at different levels, and through different partners and groups. This is the social learning and negotiation aspect (Leeuwis 2004). Timing of actions is linked to the level of communication and thereby affects the sustained interest of different partners. Employing approaches, such as the LA, can support a learning process to align various social and technical adjustments.

CORIGAP piloted the PIPA and LA approaches for rice research for development and adapted it for use with different LA members, just researchers, and researchers and national extension agents and in Myanmar on the village level with farmers, local private-sector actors, such as traders and millers, NGO staff implementing complementary activities, and government extension workers. Besides the benefits outlined above, the two approaches also had significant benefits for project management.

6.6.3 Intermediaries and Finding Incentive Mechanisms for Change

Another important pillar for partnerships and scaling is the identification of important intermediaries. This could be related to extension or outreach but can also be services, equipment value chain partners, or even enablers of financial access. Thus, appropriate methodologies for engagement and exploring varied modes of collaboration could support scaling. The actions from this type of partner support farmers to deviate from their normal practices and try different options, such as new technologies, services, or markets (Pant and Odame 2009).

At the end of the day, the partnerships have to be seen as a niche within a broader system. It is often brought together through a shared interest in technology or practice. Partners that create or derive value from new technologies, processes, and linkages help the niche influence the broader system. Thus, the network is not the whole system. The technical adaptation is one thing that starts the formation of this niche, but for it to generate change and scaling, it also needs to extend toward social, organizational, and institutional re-design processes. Ensuring inclusivity and gender responsiveness is often assumed in the partnerships and networks being facilitated. This, however, needs to be emphasized to achieve equitable benefits for all stakeholders. Furthermore, incentive mechanisms are generated by different partners. It is important to identify who can create these incentives and how they can be harnessed to benefit farmers. Lastly, sustainable finance and accelerating business development or growth are important for various types of partnerships to flourish.