Abstract
This chapter discusses the definite sanction of consensualism in modern French law in the ius commune, especially thanks to canon law, a reinterpreted Roman law, and reflections on the law of nature and reasons (i.e., natural law). It demonstrates that the enshrinement of consensualism and the idea whereby every agreement arising from consent can be a contract were not developed without fits and starts and improved through progressive inherited change in European legal thoughts. By contrast, the development of a general contractual jurisprudence based on consensus relied on an interplay of ideas, chaos of opinions, and an embroilment of political and religious interests clashing with one another emphasising the contingency of consensualism even more.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Cairns and Plessis (du) (2010), p. 1 et seq.
- 5.
Charte de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (818, Autun) n°13, p. 30. [My own translation]: ‘According to the law, by these very circumstances, Nerlongo should retransfer the rod to complete the transaction’.
- 6.
Ibid., n°30, p. 85. [My own translation]: ‘With the sprig…the same things…should be legally transferred…over the altar’.
- 7.
Ibid., (836, Vouneuil) n°20, p. 48. [My own translation]: ‘A donor who conveys something to a donee must solemnly transfer and deliver the subject-matter of the donation to the donee on their own behalf according to our law, the right of ownership, and the power that one has to transfer their property’.
- 8.
Cartulaire de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon (876, Pérard) 152. [My own translation]: ‘The concession of a pledge completes the donation’.
- 9.
Ibid., n°301. [My own translation]: ‘The transfer of the sprig, knife, straw or a handful of dirt over the altar completes the transaction’.
- 10.
Cartulaire de l'évêché de Poitiers ou Grand-Gauthier (839) n°21.
- 11.
Cartulaire de Perrecy (821, Lichey) in Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (Paris: 1900) n°17, p. 38. [My own translation]: On Fredelus’ account, [the requirement of] witnesses to the transaction [was met].
- 12.
Garnier (1849) n°1. [My own translation]: ‘The sprig transforms my giving and transferring of a thing into a binding obligation, thus making up for my sins by the interception of the mother of our Lord the Virgin Mary’.
- 13.
Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Saint-Etienne de Dijon (882, Courtoi), p. 13. [My own translation]: ‘The strict concession of a pledge and the transfer of a handful of dirt by the hand of Ergaudo to David are recognised by law; so much so that the transfer of lock of hair suffices to complete the transaction’.
- 14.
Ibid., n°39, p. 60. [My own translation]: ‘Fraudsters who destroy a pledge conceded in the form of a parchment shall be excommunicated’.
- 15.
[In the translation of Coogan et al. (2010), p. 1754: ‘34 But I say to you, Do not swear at all, either by heaven, for it is the throne of God, 35 or by the earth, for it is his footstool, or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36 And do not swear by your head, for you cannot make one hair white or black. 37 Let your word be ‘Yes, Yes’ or ‘No, No’; anything more than this comes from the evil one’.
- 16.
[In the translation of Coogan et al. (2010), p. 2124]: ‘12 Above all, my beloved, do not swear, either by heaven or by earth or by any other oath, but let your “Yes” be yes and your “No” be no, so that you may not fall under condemnation’.
- 17.
Aquinas (1953) quest 88, 23, quest 111, notes explicatives relatives à la question 88, art. 3, p. 377, quest. 88, art. 3, p. 21; Chrysostom (1879) ad Causa XXII.1.12; Innocent IV (348) ad X.1.35.1: nisi pacta servet, excommunicabitur.
- 18.
Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae, Pars Tertia, Section Secunda, Articulus 2, §2152: ‘Qui, sub iureiurando, promissionem facit, de cuius impletione intentionem non habet, vel qui postquam sub iureiurando promiserit, promissionem non tenet, periurus est. Periurium gravem constituit observantiae culpam erga Dominum omnis verbi. Se ad opus malum iureiurando obligare contrarium est sanctitati Nominis divini’ [A person commits perjury when he makes a promise under oath with no intention of keeping it, or when after promising on oath he does not keep it. Perjury is a grave lack of respect for the Lord of all speech. Pledging oneself by oath to commit an evil deed is contrary to the holiness of the divine name].
- 19.
Decretum Gratiani, Causa XXII, Qu. V, Canon 12. [My own translation]: ‘Fifth, supposing a bishop who has pledged to let an archdeacon go eat perjured themselves, is the archdeacon who has sworn him loyalty entitled to rescind their pledge?’.
- 20.
ibid. [My own translation]: ‘Suppose a bishop pledged something he knew to be untrue merely to compel respect from his archdeacon, and the disgruntled archdeacon decides to break their fealty by oath. At this stage, the bishop will accuse the archdeacon of double perjury. First, for breaking his pledge. Second, because archdeacons are required to pledge a meal when taking office. (Qu. I.) The first question to answer is whether the pledge of fealty took place between distant parties or not. (Qu. II.) The second question is whether the archdeacon perjured themselves by making an oath contravening his initial pledge. (Qu. III.) The third question is whether the bishop is entitled to the respect of his archdeacon if it is determined that the archdeacon is permitted to denounce the pledge he made initially. (Qu. IV) The fourth question is how the unlawfulness of the archdeacon’s oath to disobey the bishop who affirmed something he knew to be untrue can be established. (Qu. V.) Provided the bishop is guilty of perjury, the fifth question is whether there are reasons that may excuse the contravention of his pledge to let the archdeacon eat?’.
- 21.
Rufinus (1902), p. 388. [My own translation]: ‘The very last question of the previous case study questioned the hubris of clergymen who, abandoning their bishop, seek the succour of secular judges. Given that, in all truth, some clergymen dare reach such a level of hubris to the detriment of their bishop, even to the point of not fearing to swear an oath of disobedience, it is only proper to complement the previous developments with a treatise on oath demonstrating how the archdeacon is guilty of perjury in that he swore an oath to disobey his bishop’.
- 22.
Paucapalea (1890), p. 96. [My own translation]: ‘A higher norm commands that a clergyman cannot abandon their bishop and seek refuge with the secular courts. Some accounts relate the wrongheadedness that some clergymen show in disobeying their bishop out of sheer malice in spite of their pledge of allegiance. (The [previous] case study illustrates so much). It is discussed in the following works: Episc. quid. iur. fals. etc’.
- 23.
Decretum Gratiani, Causa XXII, Qu. I, Canon 1. [My own translation]: ‘It is one thing to swear spontaneously [to undertake something]. It is another to swear an oath to affirm one’s innocence, peace treaties, or convince one’s audience when one is wary of [protecting what is] profitable to them’.
- 24.
Maître Roland (1874), p. 81.
- 25.
Rufinus, op. cit, 389 compare to Lex Salica, 58.21, 65.1.
- 26.
See also Decretales Gregorii IX, 2.24; Liber Sextus Decretalium Bonifatius, 2.2.
- 27.
Decretales Gregorii IX, 1.35.1.2 (Edict de pactis, 35).
- 28.
- 29.
Innocent IV (348) ad X.1.35.1 in Fieschi (1570): nisi pacta servet, excommunicabitur. [My own translation]: ‘The non-performance of an agreement shall lead to excommunication’.
- 30.
- 31.
Olivier-Martin (1948) n°324, pp. 428–430.
- 32.
Nanz (1985), p. 35.
- 33.
Karsten (1967), pp. 113, 135.
- 34.
Forray (2007), pp. 56 et seq.
- 35.
Bologna (da) (1557, Reprinted 1968) C.2.3.1.15. [My own translation]: ‘Pacts take on their vestments in six ways: by way of a thing, by words, by writing, by consent, by conjunction, [or] by the transfer of a thing’.
- 36.
Aquinas (1952) II-II, qu. 110, a.3, ad.5, pp. 725–726. [My own translation]: ‘It is a lie not to fulfil what one has promised. Albeit one is not bound to keep all their promises: for Isidore says that he who ill-promised can rescind his promise. Therefore, not every lie is a sin’.
- 37.
Cicero (1990) 1.7.23 and 3.15.61, pp. 24, 330. [My own translation]: ‘The fundament of law and justice is the scrupulous and sincere observance of the promises that parties make for themselves’.
- 38.
Accursius (1627), p. 178. [My own translation]: ‘An agreement made without consideration is not legally enforceable. The consent of the parties cannot be bare and requires a vestment. Consent takes on its vestment by way of a response, and elegant and refined add-ons that clothe and make it enforceable unless otherwise provided for. Consent is by nature sensitive to cold and supposes a beautiful, light, and warm garment to be actionable. By contrast, some obligations, are lush and warm by nature and do not require the intercession of anything to arise and be enforceable. This jurisprudence contrasts with the contention in the Book of Job by which obligation arise from the knitting together of skin and flesh with bones and sinews’.
- 39.
Bologna (da) (1557, Reprinted 1968) C.2.3, n°14. [My own translation]: ‘Naked pactions are frail and frigid. They cannot, therefore, give rise to an action’.
- 40.
Bologna (da) (1627). [My own translation]: ‘A naked paction can give rise to an action in exactly the same way as parthenogenesis in a neutered mule’.
- 41.
Cumano (il) (1554) D.45.1, rubr., n. 2-4 in Nanz (1985), p. 42. [My own translation]: ‘According to the law of nations, agreement, pact, the utterance of words, or other means of consenting suffice to create an obligation…These are generally known as natural obligations. Hence the common expression: agreements, whether express or tacit, follow naturally all the consequences that natural law imposes upon them’.
- 42.
Digest, 19.5.5.
- 43.
- 44.
Ibid., II.1.4, n.8, p. 66. [In the translation of Blackwell et al. (1963) §173]: ‘From this, then, we can conclude that matter is related to form as form is related to use. But use is that for the sake of which the artifact comes to be. Therefore, form also is that for the sake of which matter is in artificial things. And so as in those things which are according to art we make matter for the sake of the work of art, which is the artifact itself, likewise matter is in natural things from nature, and not made by us; nevertheless, it has the same ordination to form, i.e., it is for the sake of form. Hence it follows that it belongs to the same natural science to consider the matter and the form’.
- 45.
- 46.
Sirach, 8:13; Matthew, 5:34-37; James, 5:12.
- 47.
- 48.
Aquinas (1953) I. Qu.5, a.4.
- 49.
[My own translation]: ‘Justice underpins this Edict. It relies on natural equity, that is, everything consistent with good faith for what is more normal than a party observing those things upon which they have agreed? 1.1. The term pact is derived from pactio. Ditto for the word pax (peace). 1.2. An agreement denotes the consent of two or more persons to the same effect. 1.3. The term “conventio” is a general one. It refers to everything to which persons who have transactions with one another agree on to undertake or to settle a dispute. The same word applies to those who, in spite of their differences, reach an agreement on the same thing, in the same terms. Pedius defined “conventio” as a requirement for agreement so general that there is no undertaking that does not include it whether it has a name of its own or lacks any specific denomination; whether the agreement arises from the delivery of a thing or by word. Indeed, even stipulatio, which is verbally formed, is void if consent was not conveyed. 2. Labeo asserts that an agreement can arise from the delivery of a thing, the delivery of a letter, or by messenger. It can also be concluded between absent parties, and it is accepted that an agreement can arise from tacit consent. 3. However, after a pledge has been returned to a debtor, it is accepted that what is owed can be claimed if the money has not been paid. It is different if there is evidence to the contrary.4. […] even tacit agreements are valid’.
- 50.
[My own translation]: ‘Likewise, given that tacit agreements are valid, it is settled that the presence of the personal movable properties of a tenant in a rented property are to be regarded as a pledge to the property owner even though nothing is expressly agreed’.
- 51.
[My own translation]: ‘Sometimes, it gives rise to an action, as in the case of good faith actions’.
- 52.
[My own translation]: ‘The praetor says that he will not enforce agreements arising from malice or fraud. Scheming and deceit are constitutive of malice or fraud. As Pedius says, a contract is vitiated whenever there is an intended attempt to disguise the true nature of the undertaking and cheat another’.
- 53.
[My own translation]: ‘The praetor adds nothing regarding agreements entered into for the purpose of defrauding. Albeit Labeo aptly ascertains that this would be either unjust or superfluous. It is unjust if the creditor who has given a prior release of good faith to his debtor should later be able to renege. It is superfluous if the creditor was deceived when he made the release for fraud entails deceit’.
- 54.
[My own translation]: ‘Where a contract has been concluded out of malice or deceit ab initio, including where a fraudulent act has been committed after its formation, such a contract can be denounced according to the following formula contained in the Edict: “neque fiat” (nor let anything be done)’.
- 55.
Accursius (1627) 1, p. 224. [My own translation]: ‘Causa denotes a counterpart or a circumstance that clothes an innominate contract and makes it enforceable such as doing something in exchange for something else […however] a promise with a false cause cannot have any effect’.
- 56.
Decretales Gregorii IX, 1.35.1.2 (Edict de pactis 35).
- 57.
- 58.
- 59.
- 60.
Aquinas (1953) II. Qu. 6, a1.
- 61.
- 62.
Sirach, 8:13; Aquinas (1953) 5.110.
- 63.
Dumoulin (1562) rubr. n°42 and Loi 1, § si quis ita, n°7.
- 64.
In Loyseau (1701) 2.4.32, 110. [My own translation]: ‘Nevertheless, it must be noted that a seal is not absolutely necessary for judgments or contracts to have effect, especially since…a contract is perfect as soon as the parties and notary public [witnessing the act] sign it: even writing is not absolutely necessary for judgments and contracts to have effect. It is merely required for an evidentiary purpose in the instances where the law imposes it as per vulg, 2. Contrahitur, D., de pignoribus’.
- 65.
Loysel (1679) §357. [My own translation]: ‘One binds oxen by the horns, and men by words. The same applies as much to simple promises of convenience as to stipulations under Roman law’.
- 66.
Loysel (1679) §357. [My own translation]: ‘One binds oxen by the horns, and men by words’.
- 67.
Molière (1656) Acte IV, Scene 1. [My own translation]: Gros-René: ‘The straw must be broken; for a broken straw - Between people of honour, seals the deal; Make not sheep’s eyes at me; upset I wish to be’.
- 68.
Molière (1665) Acte III, Scene 3. [My own translation]: ‘Sganarelle: Aye, Sir, a contract must be drawn between these two people. Write (the notary writes). Here are the terms of the agreement. I give her twenty thousand crowns in marriage. Lucinde: Nay, nay, I want to have the contract in my hands’.
- 69.
Molière (1668) Acte III, Scene 4. [My own translation]: ‘Frosine. You are jesting, are you not? You will only marry him provided he makes you a widow soon; and this shall be a term of the contract. It would be much impertinent of him not to die in the next three months! There he is in the flesh’.
- 70.
Cartulaire de Lerins, 8; Cartulaire de Marculfe, 2.5.3 (stipulatione subnixa): ‘Verum truncata et mutilata iis locis verba, notariorum more, constat, qui prœcipua etmagis solemnia adhibere solili, cœ- tera quœ subaudiri debent ultro prœtereunt, tanquam minus necessaria, cum brevilati nimium quant par est student’; Feudrix de Bréquigny (1791), p. 386: ‘haec chartula donationis omni tempore maneat roboratione subnixa’.
- 71.
Alciati (1560), pp. 71 et seq, especially ad rubricam, nos 4, 6, 10 et 11.
- 72.
Douaren (Le) (1544) Cap. VI. De effectus, & potestate pactorum, In tit. De Pactis, 75. [My own translation]: ‘A naked pact cannot give grounds for an action unless the terms of the stipulation are complemented with the transfer of a thing or supported by another lawful cause. Neither can the failure of the condition whereunder a benefit was conferred, including the failure of a legal or factual situation, give grounds for an action; unless the agreement is supplemented with updated terms in good faith. It is so also of contracts that are rightfully terminated following the performance of all the obligations due under them. There would be no appropriate action. Albeit an exception may arise from a contractual action’.
- 73.
Ibid., pp. 16 et seq.
- 74.
Prévost (2015), pp. 140–150.
- 75.
Cujas (1837) ad titulum de pactis, in Lib. X. Quest, Papin, 936. [My own translation]: ‘No action arises from a naked paction’.
- 76.
Cujas (1587) ad Digesta, 2.14, p. 25. [My own translation]: ‘Naked pactions give grounds for an exception against the wrongdoer, as opposed to an action, as provided by law’.
- 77.
Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, p. 121. [My own translation]: ‘Conventions are those undertakings that are formed by the mutual consent of two or more persons who create between them a law by which they will fulfil their promises’.
- 78.
Loysel (1679) §690.
- 79.
Grotius (1773) Liber I and III.
- 80.
Grotius (1773) Libri III, Caput XVII, 952.
- 81.
Institutes of Gaius, 1.1.
- 82.
Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, 394. [My own translation]: ‘Likewise, it is said that there is nothing more consistent with human faith than performing what one has pledged to undertake. As stated by the Edictum perpetuum under the rubric De pecunia constituta, where no cause precedes the obligation of the debtor, it is appropriate for the praetor to favour and decide according to natural equity’.
- 83.
Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, p. 393. [In the translation of Campbell (2001), p. 115]: ‘For in the first place, it immediately follows from thence, that there is no force in treaties between kings and different nations, till some part of them be carried into execution, especially in those places, where no certain form of treaties or compacts has been established. But no just reason can be found, why laws, which are a kind of general agreement among a people, and indeed are called so by Aristotle, and Demosthenes, should be able to give the force of obligation to compacts, and why the will of an individual, doing everything to bind himself, should not have the same power; especially where the civil law creates no impediment to it’.
- 84.
Grotius (1773), pp. 9, 12–13, 17, 19, 21, 23, et seq. 62 references to ‘divine law’ overall.
- 85.
Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput. XI, §1, p. 393.
- 86.
Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, p. 394.
- 87.
Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, p. 394.
- 88.
Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec I, §10, p. 126.
- 89.
Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, p. 121.
- 90.
Pufendorf (von) (1759) 3.4.2 and 3.5.9. [My own translation]: ‘Human nature and sociability requires from men that they observe the agreements that they make between them’.
- 91.
- 92.
Pufendorf (von) (1759) 3.4.2 and 3.5.9 with reference to Cicero, op. cit., 1.7.
- 93.
Pothier (2011) §3, p. 5. [My own translation]: ‘A contract is a kind of convention. To know what a contract is, it is necessary to determine what a convention is in the first place. A convention or a paction (for they are synonyms) is the consent of two or more persons purporting either to create, terminate, or modify an obligation’.
- 94.
Pothier (2011) §3 in fine, p. 5.
- 95.
Pothier (2011) §4, p. 6.
- 96.
Grotius (1773) XI.4, p. 394. [In the transalation of Campbell (2001), pp. 115–116]: ‘4. This is an opinion confirmed by the wisdom of all ages. For as it is said by legal authorities, that since nothing is so consonant to natural justice, as for the will of an owner, freely transferring his property to another, to be confirmed, so nothing is more conducive to good faith among men, than a strict adherence to the engagements they have made with each other. Thus, a legal decision for the payment of money, where no debt has been incurred, except by the verbal consent of the party promising, is thought conformable to natural justice. Paulus the Lawyer also says that the law of nature and the law of nations agree in compelling a person, who has received credit, to payment. In this place the word, compelling, signifies a moral obligation. Nor can what Connanus says be admitted, which is, that we are supposed to have credit for a full performance of a promise, where the engagement has been in part fulfilled. For Paulus in this place is treating of an action where nothing is due; which action is entirely void, if money has been paid, in any way, whether according to the manner expressly stipulated, or any other. For the civil law, in order to discourage frequent causes of litigation, does not interfere with those agreements which are enforced by the law of nature and of nations. 5.Tully, in the first book of his Offices, assigns such force to the obligation of promises, that he calls fidelity the foundation of justice, which Horace also styles the sister of justice, and the Platonists often call justice, truth, which Apuleius has translated fidelity, and Simonides has defined justice to be not only returning what one has received, but also speaking the truth’.
- 97.
Ibidem., p. 394.
- 98.
By preterition means that causa was mentioned in passing while Grotius professed to omit it.
- 99.
Ibidem., p. 394.
- 100.
Grotius (1773) XI.5, p. 394.
- 101.
Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, p. 217 [emphasis added]. [My own translation]: ‘We come now to treat of those contracts relating to property and price. Hobbes defines contract generally as the action of two, or more, persons who mutually transfer something to one another. But he adds that in every contract, each party performs their part of the obligation according to what is agreed and relies on the good faith of the other; or that neither party performs anything immediately but only pledges to do something in future. To the first of these situations, Hobbes gives the name of contract. But if one of the parties or both are compelled to rely on the word of the other and rely simultaneously on the good faith of the other to oblige themselves in turn, then, according to Hobbes, we are dealing with a simple promise. This distinction, as can be seen, does not concern the intrinsic nature of simple promises or contracts but only regards their execution. Besides, common sense prevents us from giving the name of contract to the sale that is completed by the immediate delivery of the goods and payment of the price. Likewise, common sense only allows us to consider credit sales as simple promises’.
- 102.
Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, para 1, p. 220.
- 103.
Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, para 9, p. 223.
- 104.
Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, para 8, p. 223.
- 105.
Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.3, p. 227 and 5.7, pp. 316–317.
- 106.
Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, p. 121. [My own translation]: ‘The making of conventions follows from the natural order of civil society and the connections that God creates between men’.
- 107.
Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec II, §1, p. 128. [My own translation]: ‘Conventions must be proportionate between the parties whatever their subject-matter. They are arbitrary and can relate to anything the parties want granted each of them is capable of contracting and the convention is not contrary to good mores and the law’.
- 108.
Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec II, §1, p. 129. [My own translation]: ‘Conventions are voluntary obligations arising from consent. They must be created intently and freely. Should they lack either/or, or arise from defects in consent such as error and duress, they are void according to the rules laid down under section V…agreements must be proportionate between the parties whatever their subject-matter…and…require capacity to contract as well as consistency with the law and good mores’.
- 109.
Domat (1828) ibidem., §7, p. 130. [My own translation]: ‘Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those who have made them. They may be revoked only by mutual consent or for causes discussed under section VI’.
- 110.
Pothier (2011), pp. 21–22 [emphasis added]. [My own translation]: ‘Every undertaking must have an honest cause [and] in pecuniary contracts, the cause of the obligation of one of the parties is that the other pledges to give to or do something for them [whereas] in gratuitous contracts, the [intended] benevolence of one of the parties is a sufficient cause for the obligation [otherwise] the obligation is void [including where the cause of the obligation is false]’.
- 111.
Pothier (2011), p. 5. [My own translation]: ‘…in our law, contract must not be defined as the interpreters of Roman law did; that is, Conventio nomen habeans à jure civili, vel causam; but it must be defined as an agreement by which two parties mutually promise, or merely of them, to undertake something for the other consisting in giving, doing or forbearing…Only promises that are made intently can be contracts…according to good faith and an intention to be bound’.
- 112.
Pothier (2011), p. 10. [My own translation]: ‘It is necessary that something other than consent intervenes’.
- 113.
Pothier (2011) §11, p. 10.
- 114.
Pothier (2011) §785, pp. 385–386; Ordonnances de Moulins, Article 54.
- 115.
Pothier (2011) §42, p. 21.
- 116.
R Pothier (2011) §21, p. 15. [My own translation]: ‘The consent underpinning the obligation must be free. If the consent of any of the party was extorted by duress, the contract is vitiated; albeit consent extorted by duress is a form of consent consistent with the adage voluntas, coacta est voluntas (gloss. Ad. L. 21. §5. ff. quod met. caus.). It cannot be said, as in the case of error, that there has not been any contract at all; there is one, but it is vitiated and the party whose consent has been extorted by duress, or their heirs or assignees can request its rescission and obtain, to these effects, rescission orders’.
- 117.
Kant (1993), pp. 30, 36.
- 118.
Digest, 2.14.7.7.
- 119.
Aquinas, T (1953) 5.110.
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Authors and Affiliations
Appendices
Statutory Provisions
Lex Salica
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58.21.
-
65.1.
Roman Law
Digest
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2.14.7.7.
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19.5.5.
Institutes of Gaius, 1.1.
Canon Law
Cartulaire de l'évêché de Poitiers ou Grand-Gauthier (839) n°21.
Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Saint-Etienne de Dijon (882, Courtoi).
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13.
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n°39, 60.
Cartulaire de Lerins, 8.
Cartulaire de Marculfe, 2.5.3 (stipulatione subnixa).
Cartulaire de Perrecy (821, Lichey) in Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (Paris: 1900) n°17, 38.
Cartulaire de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon (876, Pérard).
-
152.
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n°301.
Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae, Pars Tertia, Section Secunda, Articulus 2, § 2152. Accessed on 12 August 2020, available at https://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism_lt/p3s2c1a2_lt.htm#ARTICULUS%202%C2%A0%20SECUNDUM%20PRAECEPTUM (LA) and http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c1a2.htm(EN).
Charte de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire
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(818, Autun) n°13, 30.
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(818, Autun) n°30, 85.
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(836, Vouneuil) n°20, 48.
Decretales Gregorii IX
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1.35.1.2 (Edict de pactis 35).
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2.24.
Decretum Gratiani
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Causa XXII, Qu. I, Canon 1.
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Causa XXII, Qu. V, Canon 12.
Innocent IV., ‘Canon XII of the Council of Carthage’ (348) ad X.1.35.1 in Fieschi, S (1570) Apparatus in quinque libros decretalium. Moenum, Frankfurt.
James, 5:12.
Liber Sextus Decretalium Bonifatius, 2.2.
Matthew, 5:34-37.
Sirach, 8:13Footnote 119
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Abry, K. (2023). Consensualism in Modern Law. In: The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract. Studies in the History of Law and Justice, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_4
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