Abstract.
In ancient Greek thought, the final destination of humans’ life journey is eudaimonia, “happiness.” Aristotle follows this tradition in taking eudaimonia as the “goal” (telos) of human life. Eudaimonia, however, is not a momentary achievement or a means for attaining something else, nor is it identified with the chance “goods” of aristocracy, wealth, beauty, or political power. It is tied rather to the specific nature of human beings and depends on their particular function or “work” (ergon) as their proper condition throughout an entire lifetime. There is also a pleasure (hêdonê) which corresponds to this activity as the most essential and highest possible pleasure for human beings according to their nature. What is the proper activity for the human species and its proper pleasure? Which pleasure corresponds to a human being’s true nature? This paper explores the paramount importance of pleasure within the ethical/political framework of Aristotle’s philosophy and its association with the ultimate destination of human life – which is to fully realise our human potential and function according to our nature. As such, Aristotle’s view of pleasure and happiness may provide some key insights for understanding – and perhaps redirecting – the pursuits of the tourist.
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Notes
- 1.
While in Homer, e.g., possessing great political power was the paragon of aretê, the pattern of the best possible way of life (cf. Iliad 6.476–478).
- 2.
NE 1.12, 1102a5–6: ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν. Cf. NE 10.7, 1177a12. On this definition, see e.g. Purinton 1998. Cf. Heinaman 2007. On eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics, see e.g. Hardie 1965; Ackrill 1974; McDowell 1980; Kraut 1989, esp.15–77; Kenny 1991; Lear 2004, esp. 37–71; Irwin 2012.
- 3.
- 4.
NE 1.7, 1098a10–11: προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.
- 5.
NE 1.7, 1098a18–20: ἔτι δ’ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα⋅ οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ’ ὀλίγος χρόνος. Cf. 2.4, 1105a33.
- 6.
Cf. also NE 10.6, 1176b18–19: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ’ ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι.
- 7.
- 8.
Cf. NE 4.1, 1120a24–25: αἱ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.
- 9.
Cf. NE 2.6, 1106b21–23: τὸ δ’ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
- 10.
- 11.
NE 2.4, 1105a32: προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά (scil. τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
Cf. Flannery 2013.
- 15.
On the following views, see Liatsi 2020.
- 16.
Cf. NE 2.9, 1109a28–35.
- 17.
Cf. NE 2.9, 1109b1–7: σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν⋅ ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν⋅ τοῦτο δ’ ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοὐναντίον δ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ⋅ πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.
- 18.
Cf. NE 2.3, 1105a7–9: ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή.
- 19.
That is why Aristotle agrees with Plato that the right education consists of feeling joy or pity towards the right things. This, according to Aristotle, is how we must be raised from childhood onwards. The ἀρετή, appropriate education from an early age can teach people, as Aristotle points out, how important is to be pleased with the right activities and similarly how meaningful it is to be sorry in case they resort to unenviable activities. See NE 2.3, 1104b3–13, esp. 1104b11–13. Cf. Plato, Politeia 401 E – 402 A; Nomoi 653 A – C.
- 20.
Cf. also Wolfsdorf 2013, esp. 130–133.
- 21.
The pleasures of the body are closely related to desires, to epithumiai. Aristotle does not reject them, but he disapproves of pleasures that exceed moderation and lead to excess (hyperbole). These are harmful and thus should be kept at bay since they destroy eudaimonia.
- 22.
See. n. 2.
- 23.
Cf. Met. Λ 9. 1074b16: δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον.
- 24.
On the different aspects of the relation between eudaimonia and theôria in Aristotle’s ethics, see Destrée and Zingano 2014.
- 25.
NE 10.7, 1177a16–18: ἡ τοῦ (scil. τοῦ νοῦ) ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ῾ ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. / Cf. NE 10.8, 1178b32: ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἄν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις. Cf. Protreptikos fr. 87: “Complete and unimpeded activity contains within itself pleasure, so that the activity of theoretical intellect must be the most pleasant of all.”
- 26.
Cf. Long 2011.
- 27.
NE 10.8, 1178b21–23: ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη: καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.
Cf. Met. Λ 7, 1072b14–16: διαγωγὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο: ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου. See Liatsi 2016.
- 28.
NE 10.7, 1177a23–24: ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν.
- 29.
NE 10.7, 1178a5–6: τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν.
- 30.
It is somehow the Aristotelian version of Plato’s “resemblance to God”, (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, Theaitetos 176b1), as the way for human beings to reach eudaimonia in life. Cf. Sedley 2017.
- 31.
NE 10.7, 1177b33–34: ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ.
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Liatsi, M. (2023). Pleasure and “Happiness” in Aristotle: A Key to Understanding the Tourist?. In: Zovko, MÉ., Dillon, J. (eds) Tourism and Culture in Philosophical Perspective. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36659-8_3
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