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(Mis-)Interpretations of the Theory of Relativity – Considerations on How They Arise and How to Analyze Them

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Philosophers and Einstein's Relativity

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 342))

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Abstract

During Einstein’s lifetime, the special and general theories of relativity were quite frequently interpreted by philosophers. Most of these interpretations actually were misinterpretations. Even today interpretative statements about relativity theory are often false or highly misleading. Why is this so? In my Ph.D. dissertation (Hentschel 1990a), I analyzed (mis)interpretations by 10 different philosophical schools active in the early twentieth century which widely differed in their approaches, emphasis and blind spots. Many of these interpreters – including philosophers of high standing such as Ernst Cassirer, Moritz Schlick or Joseph Petzoldt – had studied the theory intensely and many even had close contact with Einstein himself or with one of the members of his “protective belt” of close friends and allies. Rather than declaring all of these (mis)interpreters as either luminaries or idiots (which would be implausible, if not downright silly), I show structurally how these misunderstandings arose and why they were kind of unavoidable, even for highly qualified and often well-informed interpreters. More popular texts about relativity theory were often second-order interpretations of these first-order accounts, thus multiplying the first-order errors of misinterpretations. I will give a few characteristic examples but my focus will rather be on structural characteristics of these misinterpretations. I will discuss how to analyze them historically by means of interpretational frames. A link will also be made to Ludwik Fleck’s thesis that socially and cognitively stabilized “thought collectives” (“Denkkollektive”) exert strong constraints on human thinking and interpretation (“Denkzwang”). My concept of interpretational frames is one method to formalize and analyze the complex interrelations between different assumptions and inferences within such a frame of thinking (“Denkstil”). Semantic frames and word clouds are also discussed as alternative approaches but both are discarded as unsuitable for the purpose of reconstructing interpretative frames.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the early (partly philosophical) reception of relativity theory see, e.g., Goldberg (1984): parts II-III, Maiocchi (1985), Glick (ed.) (1987), Hentschel (1990a, b, c), Biezunski (1992), Ryckman (2005) and Sanchez-Ron (2012).

  2. 2.

    See my book review of three of the most important recent historical studies on these light deflection expeditions and their context: Hentschel (2020).

  3. 3.

    As some so-called „scientific biographies” of Einstein such as Abraham Pais (1982) do.

  4. 4.

    The book is freely available online for download at https://doi.org/10.18419/opus-7182 and at https://elib.uni-stuttgart.de/bitstream/11682/7199/1/hen47.pdf and via research gate;

  5. 5.

    See Hentschel (1990a, b, c) on Bridgman’s operationalism (pp. 425–440), Meyerson’s critical rationalism (pp. 456–472), Vaihinger’s fictionalism (pp. 276–292), and Husserl’s phenomenology (pp. 254–275).

  6. 6.

    My colleagues Olival Freire and Olivier Darrigol are currently editing a volume of studies on the multifarious interpretations of quantum mechanics forthcoming at Oxford Univ. Press in 2022.

  7. 7.

    For exemplary studies on the broad reception of relativity theory in various nations see the texts listed in footnote 1.

    Graham (1972) deals with the reception of both relativity and quantum theory in the former Soviet Union.

  8. 8.

    See Bergson (1922), (1924) and (1972) on “les temps fictifs et le temps réel”.

  9. 9.

    See, e.g., Albert Einstein to Elsa Einstein, May 19, 1920 (in Engl. transl. by Ann M. Hentschel): “I have to study Cassirer’s manuscript, which is less amusing. These philosophers are peculiar birds.” below on the consequences of this withdrawal for the dynamics of the ensuing debates, which were then led by a belt of self-declared Einstein defenders.

  10. 10.

    Reichenbach heard Einstein lectures in the winter term of 1917/18, and Petzoldt invited Einstein to discussions of the Berliner Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Philosophie which he had founded in 1912 and directed until 1921. See Hentschel (1990c) and Danneberg et al. (eds.) 1994.

  11. 11.

    See Fleck (1935/80, 1979, 2011) and Cohen and Schnelle (ed.) 1986.

  12. 12.

    See Collins (1998): 30, 54ff., 81f. on the “law of small numbers”, limiting the overall size of these thought collectives as well as the number of people in their top level of intellectual forebearers and leaders.

  13. 13.

    On the pattern of competing philosophers or philosophical schools of comparable stature and its positive impact on philosophical creativity, see Collins (1998): 6 and 73: “The intellectual world at its most intense has the structure of contending groups meshing together into a conflictual super-community.”

  14. 14.

    For interesting examples of such specific blindness induced by training in the style of thinking of a specific microbiological thought collective, see Fleck (1935/80) chapters 1 and 3, and Fleck (2011): 213f.

  15. 15.

    On Becher, Wenzl and the philosophical school of critical realism see Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 240–253.

  16. 16.

    For similar structures in the history of philosophical thought since antiquity see Collins (1998).

  17. 17.

    For a discussion of the subtle differences between Avenarius’s empiriocriticism and Mach’s phenomenalism and for a detailed discussion of Joseph Petzoldt’s interpretation of relativity theory (who was a pupil of Avenarius but became an ardent follower of Ernst Mach), see Dubislav (1929), Krauss (2019, 2021) and her contribution to this volume.

  18. 18.

    Fleck (1935/80, 1979: 84).

  19. 19.

    As the sociologist Collins (1998: 7) writes: “thinking consists in making “coalitions in the mind”, internalized from social networks, motivated by the emotional energies of social interactions”, and – I would add – also by cognitive, epistemic, ontological and methodological core assumptions, some of which define interpretational frames.

  20. 20.

    See Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 390–424 and Hentschel (1991) particularly on Petzoldt; cf. Dubislav (1929) and the paper by Chiara Russo Krauss in this volume, who distinguishes more closely between Mach’s phenomenalism and Avenarius’s empiriocriticism. Petzoldt stood under the influence of both progenitors; Avenarius and Mach vigorously applauded each other’s writings, so it is questionable whether we should look at both groups as a single school of thought or as two such schools, certainly very closely related ones, but perhaps not identical.

  21. 21.

    One is reminded of Einstein’s letter to Solovine, May 7, 1952, in which he drew a diagram on how to obtain these top-level axioms, starting from a base of empirical facts and observations, publ. in Solovine (ed.) 1956: 120f.

  22. 22.

    On the complex relation of Newton, Mach and Einstein see, e.g., Einstein (1916), Petzoldt (1921), Ray (1987), Wolters (2012), Hentschel (2019) and further references cited there.

  23. 23.

    See Einstein (1916): „Ich glaube sogar, dass diejenigen, welche sich für Gegner von Mach halten, kaum wissen, wieviel von Machscher Betrachtungsweise sie sozusagen mit der Muttermilch eingesogen haben.“

    On the young Einstein and his relation to Mach see the classic paper by Holton (1968), Pyenson (1985) as well as Hentschel (2019) and further references given there.

  24. 24.

    This expression was first used by E. Kretschmann, Über den physikalischen Sinn der Relativitätspostulate, A. Einsteins neue und seine ursprüngliche Relativitätstheorie, Annalen der Physik 53 (1917): 576–614 and then rapidly used by Wilhelm Wien and many others, including Einstein himself.

  25. 25.

    Mach (1872): 46: „Das Ziel der Naturwissenschaft ist der Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen. Die Theorien aber sind wie dürre Blätter, welche abfallen, wenn sie den Organismus der Wissenschaft eine Zeit lang in Athem gehalten haben.“

  26. 26.

    Letter by Einstein to Michele Besso 29.4.1917, publ. in Speziali (ed.) 1972: 106 (“Ich erhielt gerade ein in den letzten Tagen fertiggestelltes Manuskript über Relativität von ihm [Adler], in dem er mit der Ueberzeugung des Propheten recht wertlose Spitzfindigkeiten überaus breit darlegt, sodass ich in peinlicher Verlegenheit darüber bin, was ich dazu sagen soll. Ich zerbreche mir unaufhöflich den Kopf darüber. Er reitet den Machschen Klepper bis zur Erschöpfung”); cf also CPAE vol. 8a (1998), Doc. 331.

  27. 27.

    Michele Besso to Albert Einstein, May 5, 1917, in Speziali (ed.) 1972: 110: „Was das Mach’sche Rösslein betrifft, so wollen wir es nicht verschimpfen; hat es nicht die Höllenfahrt durch die Relativitäten betreut? Und wer weiss. ob er nicht auch noch bei den bösen Quanten den Reiter Dom Quixote de la Einsteina durchträgt.“

  28. 28.

    Einstein to Besso, May 1917, in Speziali (ed.) 1972: 114: “Über das Mach'sche Rösslein schimpf ich nicht. Du weißt doch, wie ich darüber denke. Aber es kann nichts Lebendiges gebären, nur schädliches Gewürm ausrotten. Wenn Du A.s langes und breites Elaborat genossen hättest, würdest Du mein Bild vom zu Tode gerittenen Klepper ohne Weiteres begreifen.“

  29. 29.

    Gadamer (1960/85), part two, II: 236 never formalized or schematized this insight. On the classical hermeneutic stance with regard to interpretations, see Gadamer (1960/85, 1974, 1995) and the extensive literature on hermeneutics. A good survey of this in English can be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/, consecutively written by Theodore George (2020), best in the third and last version.

  30. 30.

    The same metaphor is also used by Gadamer (1960/85), Giere (2006, 2009) and Brown (2009): 215. Hasok Chang (in Massimi and McCoy, ed. (2019): 21) warns his readers about “the very seductive and deeply misleading aspect” of the two metaphors of “projection” and “perspective”.

  31. 31.

    or none of them, but their own self-esteem prevented them from believing that!

  32. 32.

    This, again, is a feature well-known from the history and sociology of philosophy, with endemic and endless quarrels about who holds the ‘right’ interpretation of Plato, Kant, Hegel, etc.: see Collins (1998).

  33. 33.

    For a survey of the philosophical interpretations of relativity theory in chronological order, see the contribution by Don Howard in this volume.

  34. 34.

    Some traces of these shifting allegations are found in Einstein’s Autobiographical Notes (1949).

  35. 35.

    See Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 163–195 and Hentschel (2006).

  36. 36.

    Collins (1998): 76.

  37. 37.

    For a survey of the front of often right-wing and anti-Semitic opponents of relativity theory, see Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 131–149 and Wazeck (2014) and further references given there.

  38. 38.

    See Feyerabend (1962), Kuhn (1962), (2000), Giere (2016) and Oberheim (2018) for further references.

  39. 39.

    Fleck (1935/80, 1979: 109–11, 126f). and Patrick A. Heelan in Cohen and Schnelle (eds.) (1986).

  40. 40.

    For an exemplary analysis of one of these discussions between the critical realist Oskar Kraus, the logical empiricist Philipp Frank and the Neo-Kantian Benno Urbach, see Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 541–549.

  41. 41.

    Ludwik Fleck 2011, in German transl. by Werner and Zittel (Ed.): 263, 265f., originally published in Polish in 1936, transl. into English by Cohen and Schnelle (eds.) (1986): 81.

  42. 42.

    Ludwik Fleck (2011), originally published in Polish in 1936, transl. into English by Cohen and Schnelle (eds.) (1986): 83.

  43. 43.

    For details about Bergson’s misinterpretation, see Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 441–455.

  44. 44.

    To borrow an article title by Jimena Canales (2005) whose book on Bergson and Einstein, Canales (2015), is an example of such a failed attempt at reconciliation.

  45. 45.

    Ludwik Fleck (2011), originally published in Polish in 1936, transl. into English by Cohen and Schnelle (ed.) (1986): 84.

  46. 46.

    Ludwik Fleck (2011), originally published in Polish in 1936, transl. into English by Cohen and Schnelle (ed.) (1986): 84f.

  47. 47.

    See Kuhn’s foreword to Fleck (1935/79), a source text which he had allegedly “simply forgotten” to mention in his famous book about the “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” in 1961. Compare the literature listed in Oberheim (2018) on this hotly disputed issue.

  48. 48.

    One Ph.D. prize from the Hamburger Wissenschaftliche Stiftung, and a Heinz Maier-Leibnitz Förderpreis from the German Federal Ministry of Science and Education. Book reviews appeared in Isis 84,2 (1993): 404–5, British Journal for the History of Science 28 (1995): 482–3, Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Sciences 1996: 83–4, Gesnerus 49 (1992): 99–101, Annals of Science 49 (1992): 577–583, Foundations of Physics 22,12 (1992): 1517–1520, Physik in unserer Zeit 23,4: 183, Physikalische Blätter 48,2 (1992): 123–4, and in the Berlin newspaper: Der Morgen, April 4, 1991: 21.

  49. 49.

    See the essay review by Ferrari (1992).

  50. 50.

    See, e.g., Brown (2009), Morrison (2011), Massimi (2012), (2018a, b), Rueger (2020), as well as van Fraassen (2008), Wimsatt (2007).

  51. 51.

    The introduction to Massimi and McCoy (2019) offers a good survey of the movement in its “kaleidoscopic” character and a clear positioning of “scientific perspectivism” with respect to pragmatism, pluralism and realism.

  52. 52.

    On the genesis and dynamics of antisemitic arguments against Einstein and his theories, as well as against “Jewishly tainted” (allegedly “jüdisch versippte”) defenders of Einstein, see Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 131–149, Hentschel (ed.) (1996) and Wazeck (2014) as well as further primary and secondary sources cited there.

  53. 53.

    This list uses the brief summary which Brown (2009, 214) gave for Giere’s “scientific perspectivism” and extends it to philosophical interpretations which also yield such “perspectives” of the theory under interpretation.

  54. 54.

    Massimi and McCoy (2019): 3.

  55. 55.

    Oberheim (2018):2 emphasizes that Kuhn himself always stressed “that incommensurability neither means nor implies incomparability”; cf., e.g., the intense discussion about this point, documented in Kuhn (2000).

  56. 56.

    In traditional hermeneutics, this leads to the idea of the “hermeneutical circle”; cf. George (2020) sect. 1.3.and further references given there.

  57. 57.

    On Adler’s failed efforts at philosophical interpretation and physical critique of relativity theory see here note 26; on Einstein’s refusal to take up discussion with Bergson, cf. Canales (2005), (2015). On Einstein’s behalf, the former general and Meyersonian André Metz then heavily criticized Bergson in France and claimed him guilty of having transformed a beautiful child into a monster.” In the Spanish-speaking world, Masriera Rubio, a professor of physical chemistry in Barcelona, became a defender of Einstein

  58. 58.

    Einstein an Solovine, May 20, 1923, in Solovine 1956: “Bergson hat in seinem Buch schwere Böcke geschossen. Möge Gott ihm vergeben.”

  59. 59.

    See, e.g., Einstein (1949) for reflective considerations about this lifelong goal which he thought to have met in relativity theory but never achieved in quantum theory or unified field theory.

  60. 60.

    For statistics on the reception of relativity theory see Eisenstaedt (1989), Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 67–73, Goenner (1992), (2017) and Hu (2005). For comparative studies of the reception in various national contexts, see here footnote 1. Faster media will maybe reduce, this time lag a bit in the future.

  61. 61.

    This proximity of perspectivism to pragmatism and to a historized view of science which goes hand in hand with an integrated history and philosophy of science is emphasized in H. Chang’s contribution to Massimi and McCory (2019).

  62. 62.

    E.g. in writings by Adolf Grünbaum, Michael Friedman or Chistopher Ray (to name just a few).

  63. 63.

    Passmore (1966): 334. He admitted a few exceptions, though, including the Hegelian interpreter R.B. Haldane, as well as those interpreters who had transformed into philosophers after receiving a physical or mathematical training, such as Hans Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, Alfred A. Robb or Alfred North Whitehead.

  64. 64.

    Hence in Hentschel (1990a, b, c): 196–239, I distinguished between immunization and revision strategies within (Neo)Kantian interpretations of relativity, with Ernst Cassirer, Josef Winternitz and Karl Bollert as main examples of the revisionists whereas dozens of other Neo-Kantians excelled in immunization strategies, usually of the type: <Einstein speaks about physical time, whereas Kant and we Neo-Kantians deal with philosophical time, hence Einstein’s theory is not on the same plane of meaning as our discourse and either irrelevant or perfunctory for us.>.

  65. 65.

    Gadamer (1960/85): 253: “Wer verstehen will, wird sich von vornherein nicht der Zufälligkeit der eigenen Vormeinung überlassen dürfen, um an der Meinung des Textes so konsequent und hartnäckig wie möglich vorbeizuhören – bis etwa diese unüberhörbar wird und das vermeintliche Verständnis umstößt. Wer einen Text verstehen will, ist vielmehr bereit, sich von ihm etwas sagen zu lassen.“ Additions in square brackets are made by the author.

  66. 66.

    See footnote 5 above on Freire’s and Darrigol’s anthology of papers about these strongly differing interpretations.

  67. 67.

    Schleiermacher in his Hermeneutik (1838), § 15 & 16, Werke Abt. I, vol. 7: 20f., quoted in Gadamer (1960/85): 173.

  68. 68.

    See Petzoldt (1908, 1920) as well as Petzoldt (1921) and Graßhoff (ed.) (2006) for further comments and reprints of some of these earlier texts on the foundations of mechanics.

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Hentschel, K. (2023). (Mis-)Interpretations of the Theory of Relativity – Considerations on How They Arise and How to Analyze Them. In: Russo Krauss, C., Laino, L. (eds) Philosophers and Einstein's Relativity. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 342. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36498-3_1

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