Keywords

Introduction

The period after the full-scale Russian invasion of February 24, 2022, marked a new chapter in EU-Ukraine relations. On February 28, 2022, Ukraine applied for membership of the EU and obtained the status of a candidate country on June 23, 2022. According to the latest opinion polls (Rating 2023), as many as 87% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Ukraine has also become the first country in EU history, for which the Union bought and delivered weapons (Knodt and Wiesner, this volume), together with comprehensive financial support and eleven sanction packages against Russia applied as of the time of writing (July 2023).

Once one zooms in, away from the general picture, things are, as usual, more complicated. While Ukraine received its candidate status through a fast track procedure, the European Commission put forward seven reform conditions before the accession negotiations could be started and declared that even the candidate status itself is conditional based on the fulfilment of those requirements. This was an unprecedented step of “accession negotiations suspension” in EU practice (Sydorenko 2022). While the EU was united in solidarity with Ukraine, the degree of the solidarity varied, for example in arms supply (of which Germany’s consent to provide Leopard-tanks as late as January 2023 is one of the most prominent cases) and readiness to isolate Russia (in this case Hungary’s policy is the most outstanding, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán espousing cooperation with Russia and watering down or blocking the EU sanctions packages against it (Knodt and Wiesner, this volume; Müller and Slominski, this volume).

Appreciating these nuances leads to the posing of various questions in both practical and theoretical realms. On the practical side, what does this Zeitenwende mean for the perception of the EU in Ukraine? Did the EU reaction towards the Russian war against Ukraine live up to the expectations of the Ukrainian elites and general public? More importantly, how did this affect the EU normative power in Ukraine, i.e. the power to define what is normal and set standards in various domains? From a theoretical perspective, one may wonder if the concept of Normative Power Europe is still relevant at all or whether need new concepts are needed to describe the extent of the EU transformative power in its neighbourhood. After all, if normative power stands for “shaping conceptions of “normal” in international relations” (Manners 2002), then is the drastic change in the EU’s external policy not rather a reaction to new (ab)normality, than to its proactive shaping?

This chapter aims to explore the extent to which the EU normative power concept remains valid for Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022. In order to do this the perceptions of Ukraine’s civil society are studied—the opinion leaders who are also experts in EU-Ukraine relations. In this chapter, “perceptions” are defined as the “result of the subjective and psychological cognition of the observer rather than the objective reflection of the object that is being observed” (Shiming 2010, cited in Axyonova and Zubko 2017).

The chapter unfolds as follows. Firstly, I briefly explain the relation between Normative Power Studies and perception literature. Secondly, I provide a brief overview of the existing research on the perception of the EU in Ukraine. Thirdly, I describe the research method and present the data sample. I then present the collected data in “Findings” and relate it to the existing theoretical debates in “Discussion”. Finally, I provide concluding remarks and suggest avenues for further research.

Normative Power Europe and Perception Literature: Theoretical Overview

Ian Manners, the father of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ concept defines it quite simply: “the ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners 2002). According to Manners, the EU normative basis is composed of nine norms: five core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule-of-law and human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, antidiscrimination, sustainable development and good governance). This list prompts that the EU normative power is value-based, since six out of nine norms (freedom, democracy, the rule-of-law, human rights, non-discrimination and solidarity) derive directly from Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union, which defines its values.

In later years the concept “has been redefined by adding the notion of “ethical power”, i.e. “a force for good” (Larsen 2014; Manners 2008). Zielonka (2023) ties EU normative power with “the right moral choices”. Haukkala (2008) is probably right in saying that normative power is a normative device, meaning that it is prescriptive in nature: it tells us not only what the EU is, but rather what the EU should be, or do.

While the concept of Normative Power has been criticized for a lack of analytical clarity, I would argue that the concept’s analytical potential is defined by the choice of method. Indeed, the profound difference of the normative power over other types of power, e.g. military or economic, is that it is subjective. It cannot only be measured in available countable resources, like weapons or assets. Even if certain qualities should be present, e.g. the above mentioned norms, in the case of normative power it takes two to tango: a norm-setter only can be acknowledged as such if the norm-receiver perceives it to be so. Manners himself acknowledges this by stating that “the EU’s normative power is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who practice and experience it” (Manners 2008). Manners himself refers to Nicolaїdis and Nicolaїdis who formulated the following principle: “Fundamentally, normative power can only be applied credibly under a key condition: consistency between internal policies and external prescriptions and actions” (2006).

Evidence for this point has also been found in research: Larsen (2014) bridged studies on normative power Europe and EU perception studies, finding that the perception of the EU as normative power is far from universal. Rather, there is an apparent correlation between the Eurointegration ambitions of the aspirant countries in Eastern Europe and the strength of the EU Normative Power in these countries. This does not hold true for the rest of the world.

The EU’s normative power in Eastern Europe has mostly been viewed through the mechanisms and tools of EU democracy support (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Börzel and Risse 2012; Zhyznomirska 2019) and their effects on the political regimes in the region at the macro institutional level (Vachudova 2008; Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017). Since 2014, a new strand of literature has appeared, focusing on the EU normative power in the wake of Russian aggression (Veebel 2019; Veebel and Markus 2018). However, these works tend to focus on the norm-setter (the EU) rather than the norm-receivers. It was only recently that normative power studies started orienting themselves towards the norm-receivers perspective (see, e.g., Králiková, 2022). This chapter aims at filling this gap by looking into the perception of the EU as a Normative Power in Ukraine in the wake of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Perceptions of the EU in Ukraine: What Do We Know?

EU Perception Studies as a field, and more specifically EU Perception Studies vis-à-vis Ukraine, are championed by Natalia Chaban and her coauthors (Chaban et al. 2018a; Chaban and Elgström 2021; Chaban and Knodt 2020, to name just a few). Chaban et al. make a number of important theoretical contributions to the field. Firstly, they engage with the EU-centrism of the NPE concept, shifting the focus from the norm-setter (the EU) to norm-receiver (the third countries to which the EU exports its norms). Chaban et al. (2015) underline that they treat the term “norm-receivers” as neutral, acknowledging “the potential for different outcomes in the norm-reception process”. In their seminal book (2021), Chaban and Elgström underline the agency of the perceiver, highlighting that “it is not a passive receiver of information from the EU but an active and complete agent with its own self-vision” (p. 33). They thus link the perception literature to Manners’ notion of a “cultural filter”, i.e. the local context which affects the adoption or contestation of EU norms (Manners 2002). Chaban et al. conclude that a cultural filter is “the key aspect of the productive dialogue between the sender and receiver of norms and values” (Chaban et al. 2015).

The perceptions of the EU in Ukraine have been tracked since approximately the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, based on media analysis (Orlova 2013; Horbyk 2014), public opinion polls (Chaban and Chaban 2018), think tank publications (Axyonova and Zubko 2017) and elite interviews (Chaban and Elgström 2021; Chaban and Knodt 2020; Sabatovych et al. 2019, etc.). The recurrent trend in the studies before Euromaidan, i.e. before 2014, was twofold: firstly, the EU was perceived as a norm-setter, with its values and norms sustainably seen positively; secondly, that Ukraine was “deficiently European” (Horbyk 2014), “fitting Europe” only in historical and geographical but not in cultural, political, social or economic terms (Chaban and Chaban 2018) (a cognitive “blend” between the EU and Europe was also common). The EU was perceived as an ideal, a dream to strive to, as well as the ultimate authority: “the dominant Ukrainian view of Europe are the categories of a successful and advanced society, a symbolic Europe of values Ih imposes “attaining Europe” as both a task of, and a path, to modernization. [….] These values constitute the symbolic Europe and thus empower those who can associate with them to speak from a position of authority” (Horbyk 2014, see also Chaban and Chaban 2018 and Eumagine).

The second wave of the perception of the EU studies in Ukraine, which starts with Euromaidan and, tentatively concludes with the full-scale Russian invasion, offers more nuances in perception. The EU in the post-Maidan period still carried a very positive image in general (Axyonova and Zubko 2017), with the persisting asymmetry in relations, “where the EU is an agenda setter and Ukraine is a weaker partner with little (if any) ability to change its position” (Sabatovych et al. 2019, also author’s interviews in 2020). Axyonova and Zubko (2017) tracked “the transformative power” and “the model to follow” among the EU perceived images in Ukraine. The positive image was also not shattered by the Brexit referendum of 2016 (Chaban and Knodt 2020).

That said, the EU was not uncriticized in Ukraine. The EU first came under serious public criticism during Euromaidan in winter 2013–2014. The EU’s hesitant stance and inaction were commented on by Getmanchuk and Solodkyy (2014): “Instead of a club of rich and fair we’re having a club of disoriented and perpetually concerned”. Another observer went as far as to say that “Europe is responsible for violence in Kyiv because of its inaction and silent observation” (Sokolenko 2014, quoted in Horbyk 2014). “Neither government nor Europe hear us, people are forced to resort to uprising as the last option. So, we urge Europe to intervene and impose sanctions. If Europe just stands by watching, we can repeat Munich 1938”. As Russia annexed Crimea and started an unproclaimed war in Ukraine’s East, studies on the EU mediation effectiveness appeared, reflecting the expectations towards the EU regarding guaranteeing Ukraine security. Theoretically, these were tied less with the normative power literature and rather aimed at measuring effectiveness, be that at mediation (Elgström et al. 2018; Chaban et al. 2019a) or its CSDP missions in Ukraine (Zarembo 2017). These studies concluded that the EU was a (favourably) biased (towards Ukraine) mediator with inconsistent and weak policies. However, neither these deficiencies nor the perceived oversights in dialogue and cooperation (Chaban and Knodt 2020) seemed to significantly affect the perception of the EU as a “normative hegemon”, with the EU’s (favourably perceived) normative agenda-setting role and the EU’s (more critically perceived) security role existing in parallel. The student–teacher metaphor remained in use, e.g. “The EU was compared to a demanding teacher, while Ukraine was a diligent student who accomplished all assignments, eager to learn and to implement market norms and values” (Chaban and Chaban 2018).

Methodology

This chapter thus poses the following question: How did the perception of the EU change in Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion?

The present study is based on elite interviews with civil society representatives, i.e. in-depth interviews with Ukrainian think tankers, opinion leaders and activists. While the definitions of who the “elites” are and whether they really stand up to the role to which they are attributed are various, one can assume that there is a consensus that these are “people who are chosen because of who they are or what position they occupy” (Hochschild 2009). In the case of the present chapter this stands for Ukrainian “EU professionals”—the individuals who have been dealing with the topic of EU-Ukraine relations and Ukraine’s European integration as experts, think tankers, public intellectuals, journalists, etc.

Civil society representatives, rather than diplomats, government officials or members of the parliament, were chosen on purpose. In contrast to the latter groups, bound by state agenda and/or “party lines”, civil society representatives tend to be more outspoken and less prone to talk “diplomatically”. Furthermore, the study unearths “expert perceptions”, rather than perceptions of not necessarily well-informed “elites at large” or the general public. This allows us to gain insights and nuances of perceptions, which may not be visible to an outside observer but which may affect relations behind closed doors.

The sample was chosen based on the following criteria:

  1. (1)

    Professional engagement with the topic of the EU and Ukraine’s European integration for at least 10 years at the time of the study. This extensive expertise allows for reflection and comparison of perceptions of the EU throughout its holders’ active career; additionally, it allows the perceptions of the EU to be put into perspective, especially against the backdrop of such seminal events in Ukraine’s history as the Revolution of the Dignity in winter 2013–2014, the start of the Russian war in 2014 and especially the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022.

  2. (2)

    Active public profile: a long-term reputation as a public analyst/activist/journalist/etc., therefore “deliberately seeking to impact the policy choices of their government” (Chaban et al. 2018b).

  3. (3)

    While the chosen respondents are, by virtue of their chosen professional path, likely to be positively biased towards the EU, it is specifically the change in the “pro-European core” that is being tested in this study.

The sample was first drafted based on knowledge and networks in the field and then expanded and/or validated by the “snow ball” technique in the course of the interviews. Some potential interviewees refused to participate due to their declared lack of knowledge about the EU. Altogether 11 semi-structured interviews were conducted via Zoom in May–June 2023. The interviewees comprised of three think tankers, two local representatives of the donor community, two independent experts, one journalist, one activist, one human rights defender and one mid-level public official with long-term past engagement with civil society and speaking in their own capacity. The respondents’ affiliations are summarized in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Interview sample
Full size table

The interviews lasted from 40 to 80 minutes. The language of the interviews was Ukrainian.

The respondents were asked to reflect on their perceptions of the EU throughout their active careers and asked very specifically whether and how their perception of the EU changed after the Revolution of the Dignity, the start of the Russian war and the Russian full-scale invasion, respectively (the interview guide is provided in Annex I). The assumption is that EU normative power could decrease in Ukraine if the respondents found the EU’s response to the war inconsistent with its proclaimed values. The perception of EU normative power was operationalized through three categories: affinity (i.e. the extent to which the European choice is still attractive) (Chaban and Knodt 2020); authority (the extent to which Ukraine is ready to implement what the EU tells it to do); and legitimacy (the extent to which the EU policy is perceived as consistent with its declared values (Nicolaїdis and Nicolaїdis 2006). It should be noted that these three categories are interdependent and could partially overlap.

Several limitations of the paper should be acknowledged. Firstly, the sample is admittedly rather limited, due to the limitedness of the “general population”. Secondly, while the paper aims at mid and long-term perception reappraisal, the study itself is not longitudinal and relies on the respondents’ memories, rather than a recorded perception of the past. While memory can be imprecise, I rely on the remembered instances being “key events” (Moore 2014, p. 125, cited in Horbyk 2022), which makes them especially significant when tracing the dynamics of the perceptions.

Findings

Affinity

The respondents demonstrated an absolute and unequivocal consensus about Ukraine’s European choice and European future. All the respondents stated that throughout their professional paths their perception of the EU was consistent and positive. Many of them also observed that with their gaining of more professional expertise their understanding of the EU became more nuanced and mature: the positive perception was constant. When asked what the EU represents for Ukraine, the responses were typically “a roadmap/driver for change”, “a aspirational beacon”, “civilization choice” or simply “future”. Other responses employed the normative power vocabulary, calling the EU “a norm-setter” and “a source of standards” for Ukraine as well as “uncompromisable space for development”. This was rather consistent with the previous findings.

Several important changes have been detected, however. Several respondents remarked that the psychological distance between Ukraine and the EU drastically receded after 2022 due to Ukraine’s acceptance as a candidate country. As one respondent observed, “from a very amorphous concept the EU transformed into specific personalities, politicians, programmes […], a concrete negotiation partner”. In other words, “the EU dream” suddenly became a reality to deal with on a daily basis.

An even more striking finding was the recurrent perception that the EU finally recognized Ukraine as a future member:

The overcoming of the barrier from a neighbourhood – a third country, a neighbour, a partner – to a member of the family happened within months of 2022. […] Ukraine now belongs to their map (highlighted by K.Z.) (Interview D)

The reaction to Ukraine’s application [for the EU membership – K.Z.] confirmed that the statement that we are a part of the European family is not just an internal Ukrainian thing but that in the EU they also think that they are like us (italics K.Z.) (Interview G)

I wrote before that for me the indication of the fact that the EU sees its future with Ukraine would be when the motto “Ukraine is Europe” sounds not only in Kyiv but also in other European capitals. I remembered this when Zelenskyi visited Berlin in May and Olaf Scholz said in Ukrainian “Ukraine is Europe” (Interview J)

The metaphor of a family, as a synonym of recognition, reception and vicinity, was generally recurrent in many interviews. It is also noteworthy that the “us vs them” dichotomy which was observed in the previous studies, mentioned in this chapter, was substituted by a non-dichotomic “we”.

Authority

The increased perception of affinity is also linked to the perceptions of authority. Many respondents directly or indirectly mentioned the principle of equality and/or equal partnership, upon which the EU-Ukraine relations are now being realized, in contrast to the asymmetry of the past. Not only Ukraine is perceived as shaping the EU policy towards itself but also even as shaping the EU’s internal policies. As one Brussels-based respondent commented, “Ukraine is not only a recipient of all the decisions but also their contributor. We offer our vision and no one asks “Hey, why are you commenting on the EU agenda at all?” (Interview I).

While the EU norms and rules which Ukraine has to adopt in order to join the club were not contested by any respondent, many of them remarked that the EU is no longer “the ultimate judge” on what is right and what is wrong or “the golden standard”. Several experts remarked on the shortcomings within the EU—of expertise, personnel or contextual background: “Let’s take the reform of the Constitutional court, for example. Not all Member States which give Ukraine advice have a Constitutional court. So they don’t know how it works. Or anti-oligarchic reform. They don’t have oligarchs, they don’t have such experience” (Interview J). Another respondent formulated it as follows: “The picture has changed. It is not so simple any more as twenty years ago, when there were teachers, better students, worse students and the preparation group. Now the teachers are not the carriers of the absolute truth any more. It also turned out that the best students are not the best after all. Or maybe they were the best at some point but then the history showed that completing one’s studies fast doesn’t necessarily translate into good results in the end. Hungary is a case in point”. (Interview D) Overall, many respondents shared the view that EU norm adaptation should take place in negotiations with the EU in view of Ukraine’s interests, rather than being uncritically accepted.

Several respondents also remarked on the downside of such parity—that Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly tried to contest the EU norms in order to make them less painful for the domestic stakeholders and/or vested interests. According to them, this could lead to grave consequences if Ukraine’s further integration process is more politically than achievement motivated. One of the experts shared their surprise at the unexpectedly positive evaluation of Ukraine’s reform progress by the EU at the end of 2022, which did not match the perception of Ukraine’s civil society. They suspected that the EU did this as a political support gesture for Ukraine but, if continued, could bring negative consequences once Ukraine is in the club.

Legitimacy

Since the respondents often mentioned the EU’s values in the interviews (calling the EU a community of values, recalling that Ukraine is fighting for European values, etc.Footnote 1), it was important to find out whether, in their view, the EU adhered to its own values.

The respondents mentioned multiple instances of disappointment with the EU’s policies towards Ukraine. Several interviewees mentioned the process of the introduction of the visa-free regime for Ukraine, when Ukraine had to wait many months after implementing all the requirements while the EU was developing a suspension mechanism. To them it looked like the EU was not keeping its word. The human rights activist opined that the EU did not prioritize human rights in its reform leverage with Ukraine. As an example she mentioned the Rome statute which Ukraine signed in 2000 but still has not ratified. She perceived that the EU chose not to push human rights related reforms in contrast to, for example, anticorruption agenda, nor did the EU tie its financial conditionality to progress in this sphere.

However, the case most mentioned by every interviewee was the reaction of the European Union to the Russian annexation of the Crimea and hybrid war in the East, which, according to them, was too weak and too late. Several respondents shared the perception that fragmented sanctions towards Russia and continued trade with it, as well the construction of the Nord Stream II which the EU did nothing to prevent, could have sent the signal to the Kremlin that the costs of a full-scale invasion would not be too high.

Nevertheless, the equally widely shared perception was that, in 2022, the EU started “correcting its mistakes”. Many respondents said that they were “impressed” by the EU and its unity in support towards Ukraine, from opening the borders for the Ukrainian refugees to granting Ukraine the candidate status while sacrificing some bureaucratic steps in the process (“not acting by the book”) to stronger sanctions against Russia. If the dominant perception of EU policy in 2014 was disappointment, then the EU reaction in 2022 was evaluated by the experts as exceeding their expectations. It is important to note that the disappointment of 2014 did not undermine the perception of the EU as a norm-setter among the respondents—rather, the EU confirmed itself as a “toothless benevolent actor”.

Discussion

The presented data allows the following observations.

Firstly, the initial assumption has been disproved. The EU continues to be perceived by the Ukrainian expert elites as a legitimate norm-setter. Moreover, in comparison with the perception of the EU policy in 2014, one can say that the EU reinstated itself in the eyes of Ukraine’s civil society, exceeding their expectations. No euroscepticism of any kind was found among the respondents—vice versa, the EU is still reviewed as a roadmap for positive change. However, what has changed is the perception of the quality of this roadmap. The EU’s requirements are no longer perceived uncritically. Hence, one can rather talk about euromaturity in Ukraine. After Ukraine became a candidate country, EU-Ukraine relations were perceived as being more equal and less as hierarchical, according to the sample. Interestingly, the “teacher-student” comparison gave way to a “family” metaphor, in which “family” stands for “equality” and “vicinity”.

Moreover, Ukraine’s affinity towards the EU has actually grown through the perception that the EU finally accepts Ukraine as being equal and, to continue the family metaphor, “native”. This may mark the end of “self-orientalism” in Ukraine (drawing on the “orientalism” term introduced by Edward Said to denote the representation of “progressive” Europe with the “backward” Orient (East)), a kind of geopolitical inferiority complex, which characterized Ukraine’s perception of the EU for decades.

Thirdly, even if some refer to the EU as a “regional normative hegemon” (Haukkala 2008), for Ukraine the EU is a decolonization tool to be used both against its Soviet legacy and, even more so, the Russian war, which negates Ukraine’s right of sovereignty (Noutcheva and Zarembo, forthcoming). As one respondent remarked, the EU allows Ukraine “to exit several centuries of anticolonial struggle”.

Finally, one cannot dismiss the securitization of EU normative power—meaning that the EU’s consistency with its values and principles is evaluated in Ukraine, inter alia, based on how the EU responds to security challenges. Again, in the words of one respondent, in Ukraine’s case “Eurointegration [i.e. the candidate status – K.Z.] has become a side effect of the war”. On the one hand, this outcome is not surprising, since the primary objective of the Union is to promote peace. On the other hand, currently the studies of the EU as a mediator/peacemaker/conflict preventer and its normative power have, so far, run in parallel, which signals another possible avenue for further academic pursuit.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed at reappraising the perception of EU normative power in Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022. Based on elite semi-structured interviews with the civil society representatives, the study found that EU normative power has remained intact and to some extent has even been bolstered by the unexpected unity of the Member States and the strong response of the EU to the Russian war. It also found important shifts of Ukraine’s perception of the EU as an equal partner, rather than a superior. This will affect the cultural filter of Ukraine as being a norm-receiver.

Thus, from a theoretical angle within European studies, the validity of EU normative power has been confirmed. It can be perceived as a normative power “in a new capacity”, as the balance of power between the norm-setter (the EU) and the norm-perceiver (Ukraine) has shifted towards a more balanced partnership, at least from Ukraine’s perspective. However, its strength, relevance and potency have not been called into question by the interviewed sample.

The present findings open many avenues for further research. Primarily, further endeavours could collect new data samples, e.g. the perspectives of other stakeholders in Ukraine and/or mapping the perceptions of the EU elites for comparative analysis. Theoretically numerous approaches are also promising. As a starting point, bridging the literature on the EU as a security actor and the EU as a normative power could yield interesting results. Further into perception studies, the theoretical approach of geopolitical othering (Diez 2004) could be employed to further explore the “us vs them” dichotomy in the Ukraine’s perception of the EU.