Article 4 VBER: Hardcore Restrictions—Black Clauses

Rohrßen, Benedikt

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-35024-5_4

Benedikt Rohrßen²

Part of the book series: Law for Professionals ((LP))

146 Accesses

Abstract

What must be avoided are hardcore restrictions because they bring severe consequences as already one hardcore restriction excludes the agreement from the benefits of the VBER. Hardcore restrictions are listed conclusively in Article 4 VBER, which lists groups of restrictions as regards at what price, where and whom to sell the goods or services to. Basically, there are three groups of restrictions, the first two of them restrict the distributor, the last one the supplier: (i) Resale price maintenance, (ii) territory and customer group restrictions (including restrictions of internet sales) and (iii) resale of components as spare parts. They are prohibited, regardless of whether this restriction is direct or indirect and whether this restriction works alone or combined with others. Therefore, avoiding hardcore restrictions is easier said than done as indirect obligations require utmost care in contract drafting.

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Notes

1.
Cf. VGL, para. 177.
2.
By the way, hardcore restrictions under the VBER are always “restrictions by object” (cf. the introductory sentence of Article 4 VBER), while restrictions by object are not always hardcore restrictions in terms of the VBER, cf. Wijckmans and Tuytschaever (2018, para. 6.16).
3.
Cf. the title of Article 4 VBER, first given to it under the Regulation 330/2010 (while its predecessor, Regulation 2790/1999, had no official regulatory headings).
4.
ECLI:EU:C:2006:753 (Brünsteiner, Hilgert/BMW) para. 47 et seq.; ECLI:EU:C:1986:502 (VAG France SA) para. 14 et seq.; ECLI:EU:C:1998:181 (Cabour/Peugeot, Citroën), para. 51.
5.
Article 23(2)(a) Regulation 1/2003.
6.
862 words 2022 versus 383 words 2010 (including Article 4’s heading).
7.
And the wording, at least in the respective German translation, could be more consistent, more closely aligned with the English version. Where for example the English version refers to “exceptions”, the German version refers to “Freistellungen” (exemptions) and “Ausnahmen” (exceptions), cf. Article 2(4) and (5) and (6) VBER. Cf. Rohrßen (2021, p. 298 at footnote 96).
8.
Haberer and Fries (2021, p. 428); Maritzen (2022, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 para. 190).
9.
Article 4(b)(i) VBER 2010.
10.
Distribution Law Center Countdown XX – Selective distribution (Reverse protection) (2022).
11.
Exempting “the restriction of … sales by the exclusive distributor … to unauthorised distributors located in … a selective distribution system”.
12.
Because Article 4(b)(iii) exempted only the “restriction of sales by the members of a selective distribution system to unauthorised distributors …”.
13.
Exempting “the restriction of active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group reserved to the supplier or allocated by the supplier to another buyer”, regardless of the type of distributor.
14.
While restrictions by object are not always hardcore restrictions in terms of the VBER, cf. Wijckmans and Tuytschaever (2018, para. 6.16).
15.
Cf. also VGL, para. 179 (where, however, the word “generally” reads suspiciously as if the Commission reserved the possibility of allowing exceptions); European Commission (2014, p. 4).
16.
ECJ ECLI:EU:C:2016:26 (“Toshiba Corporation v Commission”) para. 25.
17.
VGL, para. 195 concretely for RPM.
18.
VGL, para. 180.
19.
VGL, para. 181. The example in para. 183, however, seems hard to follow: When is it impractical to specify promotional activities in the agreement to justify cross-supply restrictions?
20.
This is the only hardcore restriction that has remained unchanged. Article 4(e) VBER on online restrictions is completely new; Article 4(f) VBER is extended so that component suppliers are free to sell spare parts also to independent wholesalers.
21.
Commission, Cases 40.465, 40.469, 40.181 and 40.182.
22.
Case 50565-2.
23.
Case 20-D-04.
24.
Case B10-23/20.
25.
Swiss Federal Court, Decision of 4 February 2021, Case No. 2C_149/2018, cf. Stäuber (2022, p. 388 et seq.).
26.
Case 20/040569.
27.
Schultze et al. (2019, para. 567).
28.
Price fixing is one of the examples of Article 101(1) TFEU.
29.
VGL, para. 185.
30.
Rohrßen (2017, p. 281 at footnote 90–92).
31.
Article 4(a) VBER and VGL para. 185 et seq.; cf. also the Draft VGL, para. 152 with regard to franchise agreements as well as para. 180 in general.
32.
US Supreme Court, 551 U.S. 877 (2007). This case overturned the court’s decision in Dr Miles (220 U.S. 373) (1911), which held that RPM was prohibited per se, i.e. without the possibility to show that RPM had a pro-competitive effect.
33.
Wijckmans and Tuytschaever (2018, para. 6.54).
34.
VGL, para. 196.
35.
European Commission (2021, para. II.a).
36.
Including other “disincentives”, cf. VGL, para. 188.
37.
Usually, Article 4(a) VBER is interpreted as prohibiting only determining the buyer’s resale price of contract goods or services—though the provision broadly speaks of the “sale price”, hence allows a much wider interpretation, making it a hardcore restriction when dictating the sale price of any product the buyer sells, cf. Schultze et al. (2019, para. 559).
38.
Cf. the introductory sentence of Article 4 VBER (“vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly …”) and VGL, para. 187.
39.
Bechtold et al. (2023, Art. 4 para. 7); Zöttl (2020, Vertikal-GVO Art. 4 para. 24); Baron (2020, Vert-GVO Art. 4 para. 216).
40.
Bechtold et al. (2023, Vertikal-GVO Art. 4 para. 7); Ellger (2019, Art. 4 Vertikal-GVO para. 13).
41.
Example by Wijckmans and Tuytschaever (2018, para. 6.81).
42.
Wijckmans and Tuytschaever (2018, para. 6.81).
43.
Rohrßen (2020, p. 407).
44.
VGL, para. 185.
45.
VGL, para. 191 (Draft VGL, para. 176).
46.
Lettl (2013, p. 1276 para. 36).
47.
On the fine line between a permissible exchange of views and a prohibited price agreement the case of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, ECLI:DE:OLGD:2020:0708.U.KART3.20.00, cf. Rohrßen (2020, p. 408).
48.
Undertakings have the right to adapt their conduct to the established or expected conduct of competitors, cf. ECLI:EU:C:1998:256 (John Deere) para. 87.
49.
Likely especially if the algorithm was developed by or for each undertaking.
50.
In detail: Ong, IIC (2021), p. 189.
51.
ECLI:EU:C:1998:256 (John Deere) para. 87; ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (Suiker Unie) para. 173; ECLI:EU:C:1981:178 (Züchner) para. 13.
52.
VGL, para. 191.
53.
Bechtold et al. (2023, Art. 4 para. 7).
54.
Bundeskartellamt (2017).
55.
Perfectly pointed out by Wijckmans and Tuytschaever (2018, para. 6.59).
56.
That is also the experience under the VBER 2010 made by Wijckmans and Tuytschaever (2018, para. 6.69–6.70).
57.
Mercedes-Benz and Ford plan to go for “genuine” agency agreements (cf. Plate, Autohaus of 23 May 2022a, p. 12), while others, possibly the majority, consider using non-genuine agency agreement (Plate/Woltermann, Autohaus, 27 June 2022b, p. 12). Some may also consider using agency for new products such as e-vehicles, cf. Autohaus (2022), while others may feel the need to revert to agency agreements as they have market shares beyond 30% and thus cannot rely on the safe harbour of the VBER, e.g. Stellantis on the utility vehicles sector, cf. Plate/Woltermann, Autohaus, 27 June 2022b, p. 12.
58.
In the Draft VGL, para. 182 three examples; the final VGL added MAPs, cf. para. 197.
59.
VGL, para. 223.
60.
While “experience products” as example have been mentioned in the Draft VGL (para. 182(c)), but deleted in the final version (para. 197(d)).
61.
Cf. BKartA, Case B10-26/20 (Fond Of), Case report of 1 October 2021.
62.
BKartA, press release of 1 October 2021 (Manufacturas Alhambra).
63.
Example added only to the VGL’s final version, cf. VGL, para. 187(d), 189 and 197(c), while the Draft VGL still foresaw that MAPs “may also amount to RPM” (but, implicitly, do not automatically have to), cf. Draft-VGL, para. 174.
64.
CMA, Case CE/9856/14, decision of 24 May 2016.
65.
According to the Draft VGL, MAPs could have been allowed if the supplier (i) did not penalize the buyer for selling below the MAP, (ii) not required the buyer not to discount, and (iii) not prevented the buyer from disclosing that the actual price may differ from the MAP, cf. para. 174 of the Draft VGL.
66.
VGL, para. 187, 189. Before, the UK Competition and Markets Authority had fined for price-fixing companies which operated minimum advertised price policies, cf. Case CE/9856/14 (ITW) and CE/9578/12 (Pride Mobility Products), in the latter called “The Below-RRP Online Price Advertising Prohibition”.
67.
BKartA, B7-35/22 (Orderman), case report of 31 May 2022.
68.
VGL, para. 192.
69.
VGL, para. 192.
70.
Notably, the Commission here specifically refers to the “resale” price, not the “sale” price, as in Article 4(a) VBER.
71.
The guidance on fulfilment scenarios has only been inserted in the final version of the VBER.
72.
VGL, para. 193.
73.
VGL, para. 193.
74.
VGL, para. 193.
75.
Cf. Schultze et al. (2019, para. 586).
76.
ECLI:DE:OLGD:2020:0708.U.KART3.20.00 (Model making and toys), with comment by Rohrßen (2020, p. 408).
77.
ECLI:DE:OLGD:2020:0708.U.KART3.20.00 para. 87.
78.
Considering also that suppliers in a dominant position may face further restrictions before terminating a distributorship agreement, especially where the distributor depends on the supplier, cf. under German law Sections 19, 20 German Competition Act.
79.
Article 1(1)(h) VBER.
80.
This protection against third party intrusion into the exclusive territory is constitutive of exclusive distribution systems, cf. its definition in Article 1(1)(h) VBER.
81.
Except for now explicitly mentioning “active and passive sales”, while Article 4(b(ii)) before simply referred to “sales”; cf. on the details Bortolotti and Bortolotti (2023, p. 51 seq.).
82.
Previously laid down in Article 4(b)(iv) VBER 2010/330.
83.
VGL 2010, para. 51, whereas the concept of active sales was born in Article 2(B) of the Regulation No 67/67/EEC on exclusive dealing agreements.
84.
Article 288(2) TFEU: ”A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”
85.
Article 1(1)(l) VBER. Cf. also VGL, para. 213.
86.
First, the European Commission generally considered “online advertisement specifically addressed to certain customers as a form of active selling to those customers. For instance, territory-based banners on third party websites …”; second, the VGL 2010, para. 53 already allowed restricting “paying a search engine or online advertisement provider to have advertisements displayed specifically to users in a particular territory”.
87.
VGL, para. 213.
88.
Thereby implementing critical remarks from many practitioners, e.g. Rahlmeyer (2015, p. 146); Schultze et al. (2019, para. 860); Rohrßen (2018a, p. 39).
89.
VGL 2010, para. 52: “Offering different language options on the website does not, of itself, change the passive character of such selling.”
90.
Article 1(l) VBER.
91.
Cf. “distributor’s place of establishment” in Article 4(b)(iii), “place of establishment of the members of the selective distribution system” in Article 4(c)(i)(3) or “the buyer’s place of establishment” in Article 4(d)(iii) VBER.
92.
VGL, para. 229, 240.
93.
“…allocated by the supplier to another buyer”, cf. Article 4(b)(i) VBER 2010.
94.
Where, as “another” under the VBER 2010, “other” allows also the supplier itself to sell in the exclusive territory if the agreement provides for such sales.
95.
Article 4(b)(i) Draft VBER: “reserved to the supplier or allocated by the supplier exclusively to one or a limited number of buyers”.
96.
Draft VGL, para. 102. Critical e.g. Haberer and Fries (2021, para. 445 at II.1.a); Rohrßen (2021, p. 298).
97.
Though one might argue that the rationale of the Draft VBER for limiting the number of exclusive distributors (“should be determined in proportion to the allocated territory or customer group in such a way as to secure a certain volume of business that preserves their investment efforts”, Draft VGL, para. 102) continues to apply, neither the VBER nor the VGL provide any hint into that direction.
98.
E.g. § 3.2 of the international agency agreement template by Spenner (2021, 2nd Chapter, § 5.II).
99.
VGL, para. 220.
100.
Cf. VGL, para. 220; see already Draft VGL, para. 206.
101.
Article 4(b)(i) VBER 2010 explicitly prohibited passing on such territory or customer restrictions as territory or customer restrictions were only lawful “where such restriction does not limit sales by the customers of the buyer”.
102.
Schultze et al. (2019, para. 753 et seq.).
103.
Cf. Art. 3(2) VBER as well as Schultze et al. (2019, para. 753 et seq.).
104.
Combining the distributor’s obligation to refrain from active sales into exclusive territories/customer groups with passing the restriction on to the direct customers.
105.
Listed by the Vertical Guidelines as indirect measure, cf. VGL, para. 204(a), though it, even if implicitly, works as direct measure.
106.
VGL, para. 204.
107.
Martel (2022).
108.
VGL, para. 204(c) and (e).
109.
Rohrßen (2020, p. 408).
110.
Ideally, this is read as “… only to such distributors …” as it would otherwise restrict suppliers to sell also to end customers.
111.
Article 1(1)(g) VBER 2022.
112.
Article 1(1) (e) VBER 2010.
113.
Article 1(d) VBER 1999, compared to which the VBER 2010 specified that distributors undertake not to sell to unauthorised distributors “within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system”.
114.
The definition in Article 1(1)(d) VBER 1999 was almost the same; the VBER 2010 added the last part “within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system” to clarify that restricting cross-supplies is only exempt concerning unauthorised buyers within the territory; cf. Bechtold et al. (2014, Vertikal-GVO Art. 1 para. 33; in the subsequent 2023 edition, para. 35 accidentally still called “new”). The clause also confirms that suppliers may operate different distribution systems in parallel in the European market.
115.
Regardless of what the criteria relate to, also sustainability criteria that do not necessarily relate directly to the goods—thus in contrast to the stricter definition of qualitative selective distribution systems in Article 5(2) Swiss VertBek.
116.
VGL, para. 144.
117.
Which continue to refer to the “restriction of … the customers”, while the Draft VBER foresaw to change it—as in the VBER 2010 German version—to “restriction of … the customer groups”.
118.
Actually: shall pass on as the definition of selective distribution systems requires the supplier not to sell directly or indirectly to non-selected distributors.
119.
See above and, specifically on selective distribution and online sales restrictions in the light of the “Coty” case, Rohrßen (2016, p. 279 et seq.); Rohrßen (2018c, p. 306); Rohrßen (2018a, p. 41).
120.
As the Vertical Guidelines reconfirm, VGL, para. 148.
121.
Article 6 VBER.
122.
VGL, para. 155.
123.
A quote often attributed to Warren Buffett, however without a clear source.
124.
Bechtold et al. (2023, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 1 para. 43).
125.
This very protection against active sales intruding into the exclusive territory is constitutive for exclusive distribution systems, cf. its definition in Article 1(1)(h) VBER.
126.
Which per definition must be from another territory; establishing a mixed selective-exclusive distribution system in the same territory/vis-à-vis the same customers covering the same products/services continues to be not block-exempt, cf. VGL, para. 236.
127.
Cf. VGL, para. 223.
128.
Cf. Bechtold et al. (2023, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 para. 27) as regards cross-supplies; the same argument applies to the passing on of customer restrictions.
129.
Schultze et al. (2019, para. 273) (in relation to Article 1(e) VBER 2010).
130.
VGL, para. 8.
131.
VGL, para. 8.
132.
VGL, para. 144.
133.
VGL, para. 316.
134.
Cf. the “Metro” criteria in ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (Metro) para. 27 (“To be effective, any marketing system based on the selection of outlets necessarily entails the obligation upon wholesalers forming part of the network to supply only appointed resellers … .”), respectively the definition of “selective distribution system” in Article 1(1)(g) VBER.
135.
Article 4(c)(ii) VBER.
136.
Cf. Dohrn (2022, Art. 4 para. 116).
137.
Article 4(d) VBER 2010.
138.
VGL, para. 227.
139.
The clause may be preceded by a clarification on the non-exclusive character of the distribution system, e.g. “The Supplier grants the Distributor the non-exclusive right to distribute the contract goods in the Territory. Non-exclusive means that the Supplier remains entitled to sell the contract goods through other authorized distributors or, in the Supplier’s own name, through other sales intermediaries in the Territory.”
140.
Where required to be combined with single branding, e.g. “… will purchase contract goods from the Supplier and/or another Authorised Distributor in the EEA, the UK and Switzerland, …”.
141.
Regulation (EU) 2018/302.
142.
Bernhard (2019, p. 472).
143.
Cf. the definition of “customer” in Article 2(13) Geo-blocking Regulation.
144.
E.g. European Commission (2020, IP/20/156).
145.
VGL 2010, para. 51: “responding to unsolicited requests from individual customers including delivery of goods or services to such customers”, including, according to the Commission, the situation “where a distributor uses a website to sell products” (para. 52), which under the VBER 2022 also the Commission considers active selling where the website uses languages foreign to the distributor’s country.
146.
Siegert and Schneider (2022, Art. 6 Geoblocking-VO para. 1).
147.
Geo-blocking Regulation, Recital no. 34.
148.
Cf. Article 4(b)(ii), (c)(i)(2) and (d)(ii) VBER.
149.
VGL, para. 184 – where, however, the Commission sees genuine testing as falling outside Article 101(1) if the distributor’s active sales outside the territory are restricted.
150.
Geo-blocking Regulation, Recital no. 34.
151.
Siegert and Schneider (2022, Art. 6 Geoblocking-VO para. 2); Maritzen (2022, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 par. 69).
152.
VGL, para. 116; see also Article 4(d) VBER (“where the supplier operates neither an exclusive distribution system nor a selective distribution system”).
153.
VGL, para. 115.
154.
Cf. Rohrßen (2019, p. 345 at footnote 88 et seq.).
155.
VGL, para. 208 footnote 133; para. 332 et seq.
156.
VBER, Recital 15.
157.
VGL, para. 203.
158.
Cf. ECJ, ECLI:EU:C:2011:649 (Pierre Fabre) para. 14, 37, 38, 42, 54, 58, 59.
159.
VGL, para. 202, which sums up the territory and customer restrictions of Article 4(b), (c) and (d) VBER.
160.
ECJ, ECLI:EU:C:2011:649 (Pierre Fabre) para. 12.
161.
Examples from VGL, para. 206. Further examples in the overview by Bortolotti and Bortolotti (2023, p. 85 et seq.).
162.
Cf. VGL, para. 206, listing seven examples of obligations that indirectly have the object of preventing the effective use of the internet.
163.
European Commission, Case AT.40428 (Guess), 17 December 2018, para. 45: Guess Europe systematically banned its authorised retailers, both mono-brand and multi-brand retailers, from using or bidding on Guess brand names and trademarks as keywords in Google AdWords in the EEA, thus restricting the distribution intermediary’s findability, maximizing traffic on the supplier’s website(s) and minimizing its advertising costs.
164.
Cf. Rohrßen (2019, p. 343); Rohrßen (2018b, p. 282); Rohrßen (2017, p. 281); Rohrßen (2016, p. 284).
165.
As the position taken by the German Bundeskartellamt after the Coty case, cf. Rohrßen (2018b, p. 278); Wegner et al. (2022, p. 273).
166.
VGL, para. 208, 335.
167.
Article 4(e)(ii) VBER, see below.
168.
VGL, para. 336.
169.
VGL 2010, para. 52(c) and para. 54.
170.
VGL, para. 209.
171.
VGL, para. 209.
172.
As to the legal quality of influencer marketing in terms of German distribution law cf. Höving (2023).
173.
Any kind of suppliers, both manufacturers and resellers, cf. Ellger (2019, Art. 4 para. 114 on the VBER 2010).
174.
Independent because “not entrusted by the buyer”.
175.
Bechtold et al. (2023, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 para. 49).
176.
“The exemption provided for in Article 4 shall not apply to vertical agreements which, … have as their object: … (b) the restriction, agreed between a supplier of spare parts, repair tools or diagnostic or other equipment and a manufacturer of motor vehicles, of the supplier’s ability to sell those goods to authorised or independent distributors or to authorised or independent repairers or end users; …”.
177.
Cf. Article 2(7) last sentence VBER together with Article 4(1) MVBER.
178.
Recital 13 MVBER.
179.
While a restriction on the sale of components to mere resellers was not covered by the hardcore restriction under VBER 2010, cf. Siegert (2022, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 para. 221 with further references).
180.
Insofar, Article 5(b) MVBER still reaches further as it (i) covers all kinds of distributors (wholesalers and retailers) and (ii) also prohibits restrictions of sales to the buyer (OEM)’s authorized distributors.
181.
“The exemption … in Article 2 shall not apply to vertical agreements which … have as their object: … (e) the restriction agreed between a supplier of components and a buyer who incorporates those components, which limits the supplier to selling the components as spare parts to end-users or to repairers or other service providers not entrusted by the buyer with the repair or servicing of its goods”.
182.
Schultze (2019, Art. 4 para. 956).
183.
VGL, para. 245.
184.
Nolte (2022, Nach Art. 101 para. 580).
185.
VGL, para. 245.
186.
VGL, para. 380.
187.
Kerber and Schwalbe (2020, para. 494).
188.
Subcontracting Notice, para. 2.
189.
Ellger (2019, Art. 4 para. 114 on VBER 2010).
190.
VGL, para. 244.
191.
VGL, para. 244.
192.
As Article 4(f) VBER now blacklists also restricting the supplier’s sales to wholesalers.
193.
Nolte (2022, Nach Art. 101 para. 585).
194.
VGL, para. 245.
195.
Because (i) Article 4(f) VBER does not cover restrictions of spare part sales to the customers’ authorised service partners and (ii) it anyway only covers wholesalers, not retailers, compared to the wording of Article 5(b) MVBER, see above.
196.
Cf. e.g. Communication from the Commission—The Future Competition Law Framework applicable to the motor vehicle sector (Text with EEA relevance) {SEC(2009) 1052} {SEC(2009) 1053} /* COM/2009/0388 final, para. 37.
197.
Bechtold et al. (2023, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 para. 48); Siegert (2022, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 para. 220).
198.
Zöttl (2020, Vertikal-GVO, Art. 4 para. 150 (on Article 4(e) VBER 2010)).

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Taylor Wessing, Munich, Germany
Benedikt Rohrßen

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Rohrßen, B. (2023). Article 4 VBER: Hardcore Restrictions—Black Clauses. In: VBER 2022: EU Competition Law for Vertical Agreements. Law for Professionals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35024-5_4

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35024-5_4
Published: 31 August 2023
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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Online ISBN: 978-3-031-35024-5
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