Abstract
One of the most controversial claims of Husserl’s phenomenology is that consciousness “has” (or “is”) an absolute being, i.e., something that in Ideas I is described by means of a rather famous Cartesian quote: “nulla ‘re’ indiget ad existendum.” Consciousness “has” (or “is”) an absolute being insofar as it has no need of any “thing” in order to exist.
It’s the end of the world as we know it. | It’s the end of the world as we know it, | and I feel fine.
R.E.M.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
“The immanent being is, therefore, without doubt absolute being in the sense that, in principle, nulla ‘re’ indiget ad existendum” (Hua III/1, p. 104/89).
- 2.
Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae existit, ut nulla alia re indiget ad existendum” (Descartes, 1644, p. 24).
- 3.
“The philosophical ἐποχή that we adopt should, to put it formally, consist in the fact that we completely withhold judgment regarding the doctrinal content of all previous philosophy and carry out all our demonstrations within the framework of withholding such judgment” (Hua III/1, pp. 39–40/33). On this point see Chap. 12 in this volume.
- 4.
Or, at least, Heidegger does not seem to take advantage of Husserl’s equivocity when he establishes the distinctions between the several meaning of phenomenon spelled out in Being and Time §7a (see Heidegger, 1977, pp. 28–31/27–30).
- 5.
This holds of course only as long as we neglect, for the sake of the argument, that a book has “spiritual” predicates and belongs to the region Geist. According to Husserl, a book counts as a mere “thing” only in the naturalistic attitude. See Hua IV, pp. 173–185/183–194.
- 6.
See Hua III/1, pp. 186–7/159–61.
- 7.
Again, one should not conflate this concrete “ego” (belonging to the region “consciousness”) with a concrete “person” (belonging to the region “spirit”) or a concrete psycho-physiological “soul” (non-independent with regards to its living body within the region “nature”), as Husserl will further clarify in Ideas II.
- 8.
“Higher order personalities” (Höhere Ordnung Persönlichkeiten) belong to the sphere of the Gemeingeist. See Hua XIV, pp. 192–203. On the concept of region see Chap. 4 of this volume.
- 9.
A notable exception can be found in the systematic attempts of Rochus Sowa, which have greatly contributed to the understanding of Husserl’s key ontological notions. See for instance Sowa (2007a).
- 10.
See Hua III/1, pp. 145–8/124–7.
- 11.
See Husserl (1999, pp. 409–429/339–354).
- 12.
Ultimately, the analysis of the relation between (methodic) constitution of εἴδη and (methodological) intuition of eidetic states of affairs might even help understanding what Heidegger (1979, §7, pp. 99–103/72–75) calls the “third fundamental discovery of phenomenology,” after intentionality and categorial intuition, i.e., “the original sense of the a priori”.
- 13.
- 14.
This has certainly nothing to do with Heidegger’s (1977, 1979) search for the Quis? instead of the Quid? And in this sense, one cannot be disappointed if the answer to Heidegger’s question is nowhere to be found in Ideas I. Besides, Husserl explicitly puts aside all analysis related to what he calls “subjectively-oriented phenomenology,” so that the question of the Quis? should find its right context precisely in the analysis of time consciousness (see Hua III/1, pp. 180–3/155–8).
- 15.
The point is made clear in the first part of the second of the Logical Investigations: see, for instance, Hua XIX, II.1, pp. 113–115/ I, pp. 239–40.
- 16.
See Sowa (2007a, pp. 5–10).
- 17.
Husserl follows this third option several times, especially when he talks about non-objective forms of intentionality in his account of inner time consciousness. More details on this point can be found in Majolino (2010, pp. 606–621).
- 18.
Nota bene: this is neither a definition of the term “world” nor a descriptive account of its essential or conceptual features. It is only an indisputable example of what certainly counts as a world—our world. The world of the natural attitude fixes the meaning of the term “world” and establishes its semantic boundaries.
- 19.
Although, strictly speaking, in his studies on phantasy consciousness Husserl rules out the very idea of a “fictional world.”
- 20.
See Hua XXIII, p. 88/95.
- 21.
On this point see Chap. 5 of this volume.
References
I – Works of Husserl
II – Other Works
Husserl, E. (1939). Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik (L. Landgrebe, Ed.). Meiner. 1999. (English Translation by Churchill, J. S., & Ameriks, K. Experience and judgment. Investigations in a genealogy of logic. Northwestern University Press, 1973).
Aubenque, P. (2000). Sur l’ambivalence du concept aristotélicien de substance. In N.-L. Cordero (Ed.), Ontologie et dialogue (pp. 93–106). Vrin.
Descartes, R. (1644). Principia Philosophiæ. In C. Adam & P. Tannery (Eds.), Œuvres (Vol. VIII, pp. 1–353). English translation by V. R. Miller & R. P. Miller, Principles of Philosophy. Riedel, 1983.
Heidegger, M. (1977). Sein und Zeit (Gesamtausgabe 2. Ed. F.-W. von Hermann). Klostermann. English translation by J. Stambaugh, Being and Time. SUNY Press, 1996.
Heidegger, M. (1979). Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Gesamtausgabe 20). Klostermann. English translation by T. Kisiel, History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena. Indiana University Press, 2008.
Majolino, C. (2010). La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience. In F. Mattens, H. Jacobs, & C. Ierna (Eds.), Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl (pp. 573–660). Springer.
Sartre, J.-P. (1938). La Nausée. Gallimard. English translation by L. Alexander, Nausea. New Directions.
Sowa, R. (2007a). Wesen und Wesensgesetze in der deskriptiven Eidetik Edmund Husserls. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2007, 5–37.
Woolf, V. (1925). Mrs. Dalloway. Penguin.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Majolino, C. (2023). Until the End of the World. In: The Invention of Infinity: Essays on Husserl and the History of Philosophy. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 124. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34150-2_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34150-2_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-34149-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-34150-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)