Abstract
The sign above Plato’s Academy allegedly read: “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter herein.” The sign put above the entrance of Husserl’s “pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy” reads instead: “Fact and Essence—or: let no one ignorant of formal ontology enter herein.” The legend of Plato’s sign doesn’t relate whether anyone was actually prevented from joining his school, let alone understanding his philosophy; but we do know for sure that Husserl’s warning worked all too well—for a whole host of readers, in the last century, have definitively given up joining the club of the “descriptive scientists of transcendentally reduced pure Erlebnisse” because of the abstruse ontological subtleties gathered in this opening chapter. As for the others, both friends and foes of Ideas I have mostly moved into transcendental phenomenology from a backward entrance, as it were. Most analytically inclined philosophers have found in Fact and Essence something like Husserl’s answer to Quine’s question “What is there?” and started drawing long lists of Husserl’s purported “categories” of entities; as for many of the continental bent, they couldn’t find any answer to Heidegger’s question of Being, and concluded that Husserl surreptitiously equates being with being an object. In both cases, Husserl’s sign has been either misunderstood or ignored.
He rushed forward and seized it in his arms, when, to his horror, the head slipped off and rolled on the floor, the body assumed a recumbent posture, and he found himself clasping a white dimity bed-curtain, with a sweeping-brush, a kitchen cleaver, and a hollow turnip lying at his feet! Unable to understand this curious transformation, he clutched the placard with feverish haste, and there, in the grey morning light, he read these fearful words:—YE OTIS GHOSTE |Ye Onlie True and Originale Spook, | Beware of Ye Imitationes. | All others are counterfeite.
Oscar Wilde
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Notes
- 1.
As is well known, Husserl defines phenomenology in §75 of Ideas I as the “descriptive eidetic doctrine of transcendentally pure lived-experiences in the phenomenological attitude” (Hua III/1, p. 156/134, translation modified).
- 2.
See for instance David W. Smith’s repeated attempts to draw a Husserlian list of categories of entities in Smith (2010).
- 3.
- 4.
See also Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I q. 29 a. 4 co.: “Individuum autem est quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum”. Varieties of such definition can be found in Suarez (“Individuum est indivisum a se et divisum a quolibet”) as well as in many scholastic texts. On Suarez see On Individuation (1982). More generally, on the topic of individuation in medieval philosophy see Gracia (1984).
- 5.
In Husserl’s examples, objects denoted by proper names such as “Hans” or “Berlin” (Hua XIX/2, p. 555), definite descriptions like “the greatest German statesman” (XIX/1, p. 91, 108) and indexical expressions having the form “this x” (XIX/2, pp. 554–5) are dubbed as “individual objects” (individuelle Gegenstände). But this also holds whenever the argument of x is a non-independent abstractum like this (individual) lived-experience” (Hua XIX/1, p. 105) or that (individual) red moment (Hua XIX/1, pp. 106, 113). Husserl deals extensively with abstract particulars, especially in the first chapter (Die allgemeinen Gegenstände und das Allgemeinheitsbewußtsein) of the Second Logical Investigation (pp. 108–21/239–47).
- 6.
- 7.
To my knowledge, the first scholar to have consistently warned against this conflation is Rochus Sowa. See Sowa (2007a, b).
- 8.
- 9.
References
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Majolino, C. (2023). Individuum and Region of Being. In: The Invention of Infinity: Essays on Husserl and the History of Philosophy. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 124. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34150-2_4
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