Skip to main content

Climate Politics Under Biden: The Clean Energy Revolution, Enhanced Cooperative Federalism and the ‘All-of-Government’ Approach

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?

Part of the book series: Energy, Climate and the Environment ((ECE))

  • 234 Accesses

Abstract

Joe Biden’s election in 2020 led to another radical swing in the political pendulum. Biden reinstated many regulations rolled back under Trump, implementing in the space of only a few years the most far-reaching climate agenda of any US President. Biden’s administration has relied on skillful negotiation to pass through Congress budgetary laws or spending packages involving the highest level of federal climate investment in American history. Likewise, Biden has used his executive authority to enact many far-reaching executive orders to tackle climate change. Democrats have relied on sub-national green initiatives as a springboard to support their ambitious federal climate agenda. This has led to the development of an ‘all-of-government’ approach involving an enhanced form of ‘cooperative federalism’ to closely associate states and local actors in the implementation process. In spite of this, Biden’s administration has encountered significant obstacles, including well-organized Republican opposition in Congress and from the federal court system, which has worsened due to the Republican House majority following the 2022 mid-term elections. Hence, climate policies enacted under Biden are still insufficient to achieve objectives set out in the renewed US Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Moreover, the articulation of multilevel governance with sub-state entities remains inadequate on a number of counts.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Barichella (2021).

  2. 2.

    As in the previous chapter, this chapter is informed by an extensive range of interviews with US public officials currently working at the federal and state levels on climate policy and clean energy, along with civil society experts from academia, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector. They provided relevant insights about Biden’s attempts to re-enact an ambitious federal climate policy agenda, and the ways in which sub-national entities have been closely associated in the implementation process. Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication (see Chapter 1).

  3. 3.

    Zelizer (2022).

  4. 4.

    The level of polarization in American politics has triggered radical changes from one administration to the other over the last few years. It is becoming increasingly difficult for US Presidents to leave legacies. Each administration is only able to establish ‘marks’, which can then be reversed, in part or in full, by their successors. This is especially the case for divisive issues like climate change.

  5. 5.

    Barichella (2019).

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    See IPCC (2014) and (2022).

  9. 9.

    Leiserowitz et al. (2018).

  10. 10.

    Ibid. (2018).

  11. 11.

    Barichella (2019).

  12. 12.

    Ibid. (2021).

  13. 13.

    The ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ plan also contains ambitious proposals in other fields, such as climate adaptation and environmental justice, which fall outside the ambit of this book. See The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/.

  14. 14.

    This had included, for example, Jennifer Granholm as Energy Secretary, Michael Regan as EPA Administrator, along with Gina McCarthy as National Climate Adviser.

  15. 15.

    At the time of writing, fifteen states and territories have taken similar legislative or executive action to achieve 100% clean electricity before 2050, and the list keeps expanding every year.

  16. 16.

    This will probably encourage states across the US to raise their level of ambition regarding clean electricity over the next few years, which shows how the national echelon may galvanize action from the lower levels of governance, as well. This will nonetheless depend on the durability of the Biden administration’s target, and whether or not Democrats succeed in winning Presidential elections in 2024 and beyond. Indeed, a Republican administration may simply rescind this objective, as Trump did with Obama-era climate pledges.

  17. 17.

    The White House (2021). President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/.

  18. 18.

    Yet, this enhanced 2030 target remains insufficient in terms of what the US, as the world’s largest economy and 2nd global GHG emitter, should be contributing to achieve the long-term objective of the Paris Agreement to keep global temperatures below 2 °C by the end of the century.

  19. 19.

    See Hale (2018).

  20. 20.

    This includes the ‘National Climate Task Force’, the ‘Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization’, along with the ‘White House Environmental Justice Interagency Council’. See Executive Order 14008 (2021, January 27). Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.

  21. 21.

    Zelizer (2018).

  22. 22.

    Barichella (2021).

  23. 23.

    Senator Joe Manchin is in a peculiar situation, since he comes from West Virginia, a traditionally coal reliant state, which has made him very reluctant to support Democrats in Congress over ambitious climate legislation. The same also applies to Senator Martin Heinrich who represents the state of New Mexico, which is still very reliant on fossil fuels.

  24. 24.

    Leiserowitz et al. (2018 and 2019).

  25. 25.

    Barrasso (2018).

  26. 26.

    See Turner and Isenberg (2018).

  27. 27.

    Barichella (2019).

  28. 28.

    On special interest group influence in the US political system, see Drutman (2015), Quirk (2016), Brown (2016) and Charnock (2020).

  29. 29.

    On US Congressional procedures, see Oleszek et al. (2019) and Adler et al. (2021).

  30. 30.

    In this regard, see Fisher and Harriger (2019) and Coleman and Leskiw (2018).

  31. 31.

    117th US Congress (2021–2022). Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. Public Law 117–58.

  32. 32.

    The White House (2021). Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal/.

  33. 33.

    Ibid. Train infrastructure is generally considered far less polluting, emitting only around half the amount of CO2 compared to airplanes. The IIJA will be financed in several ways, including unspent emergency relief funds for the COVID-19 pandemic.

  34. 34.

    This includes members of the so-called ‘Congressional Progressive Caucus’, who criticized the bill’s lack of ambition and had asked for the simultaneous voting of the ‘Build Back Better Act’.

  35. 35.

    117th Congress (2021–2022). Inflation Reduction Act. Public Law 117–169.

  36. 36.

    Ibid. There is one exception to this, since the IRA also includes a provision to develop a methane program that would collect fees on fossil fuel producers which emit methane over a certain threshold. However, this clause in the law has been left quite vague, including in terms of the level of fees to be collected, which raises doubts about the prospects for rigorous enforcement.

  37. 37.

    For example, the IRA includes a provision to create a $30 billion ‘climate bank’, which will deliver low-interest loans directly to cities and local governments for various climate-related projects (along with domestic manufacturers of electric vehicles and renewable energy infrastructure).

  38. 38.

    On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), as well as Pincetl et al. (2020).

  39. 39.

    On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), Robertson (2017), and Karch and Rose (2019).

  40. 40.

    It is still too soon to establish a precise figure in this regard, as much will depend on disbursement priorities that will gradually unfold over the next few years.

  41. 41.

    Climate Mayors, EV Purchasing Collaborative: https://climatemayors.org/ev-purchasing-collaborative/.

  42. 42.

    As will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7, New York and Massachusetts in our sample have also enacted a number of notable initiatives at the state level in the fields of transportation and the power sector, which will likewise enable them to receive additional funding from the IRA and IIJA in these areas.

  43. 43.

    US Congress (117th), Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684.

  44. 44.

    US Congress (117th), Inflation Reduction Act of 2022: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376.

  45. 45.

    More specifically, Republicans now hold 222 seats against 212 for Democrats. While this may seem like a very short majority, Democrats held the exact same five-seat majority during Biden’s first two years in office. This highlights the growing polarization of US politics, and how both Parties are finding it increasingly difficult to win large majorities in Congress, with only marginal changes at each election cycle.

  46. 46.

    See The Republican Commitment to America, https://www.speaker.gov/commitment/.

  47. 47.

    In fact, Democrats hold only 49 Senate seats in the current Legislature, since there are two additional Senators that are also registered as Independents: Bernie Sanders (Vermont) and Angus King (Maine), who caucus with Democrats on most issues.

  48. 48.

    Executive Order 13990 (2021, January 20). Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis.

  49. 49.

    Executive Order 14008 (2021, January 27). Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.

  50. 50.

    Executive Order 14037 (2021, August 5). Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks.

  51. 51.

    Executive Order 14072 (2022, April 22). Strengthening the Nation’s Forests, Communities, and Local Economies.

  52. 52.

    The White House (2022, May). Permitting Action Plan to Rebuild America’s Infrastructure, Accelerate the Clean Energy Transition, Revitalize Communities, and Create Jobs.

  53. 53.

    US Department of Energy (2022, May).

  54. 54.

    In this regard, the speed at which Trump had been able to rescind many Obama-era climate-related executive orders is revealing (see Chapter 2). See also Shafie (2020) and Smith and Jacques (2022).

  55. 55.

    Zelizer (2022).

  56. 56.

    Barichella (2021).

  57. 57.

    US Supreme Court. West Virginia v. EPA. No. 20-1530, 30 June 2022.

  58. 58.

    For several decades, the Supreme Court had usually upheld that judges should defer to national governmental agencies like the EPA when interpreting the ambit of federal law. This ruling by the Supreme Court clearly points to the eroding of such a practice, asserting instead an opposing legal doctrine known as the ‘major questions doctrine’. The latter emphasizes that the discretion of federal agencies is limited on important issues that encompass potentially wide-ranging regulatory measures, unless Congress has explicitly authorized this through statutory law. This risks significantly limiting the ability of Presidents to rely on broad provisions from the Clean Air Act to address climate change, since the CAA does not explicitly provide a mandate for doing so (see Chapter 2).

  59. 59.

    The White House (2021). Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal/.

  60. 60.

    See Politi and Fedor (2021).

  61. 61.

    Wright and Sands (2022).

  62. 62.

    The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice: https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/.

  63. 63.

    Spending from the IRA is also meant to be disbursed over the course of a decade, which reduces its impact and makes it comparatively small in relation to US GDP growth over that period.

  64. 64.

    US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022).

  65. 65.

    Larsen et al. (2022).

  66. 66.

    Mahajan et al. (2022).

  67. 67.

    These studies have emphasized that for such GHG emission reductions to take place by the end of the decade, the IRA would need to be fully enacted according to the strict timetable set out in the law. Republicans have already threatened to stall or delay the IRA’s enactment if/when they win back control over the Senate and/or the White House, and have already started to do so with their new majority in the House of Representatives following the 2022 mid-term elections.

  68. 68.

    See literature on US environmental politics: Konisky (2020), Rinfret and Pautz (2019), and Rosenbaum (2019).

  69. 69.

    US EPA, Overview of the Clean Air Act and Air Pollution: https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview.

  70. 70.

    Ibid. A notable example of this was the state of California, which failed to meet new national requirements after the 1970 CAA amendment. This led the EPA to launch a lawsuit against the state, which was followed by a federally enforced implementation plan.

  71. 71.

    This is linked to Senator Joe Manchin’s steadfast opposition to include legally binding limitations on pollution backed by sanctions in the final version of the bill, since the economy of the state of West Virginia (which he represents) continues to rely extensively on fossil fuel industries.

  72. 72.

    Brown and Phillis (2022).

  73. 73.

    More specifically, the law prevents the leasing of federal lands for the development of renewable energies unless at least 2 million acres of public lands and 60 million acres in federal waters have been leased for the drilling of oil and gas the year before.

  74. 74.

    US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022). See also US Department of Energy (2022, August).

  75. 75.

    Prest (2022). Still, other studies have lower projections pointing to smaller figures at around 55 million tons of additional new GHG emissions annually by 2030, for example. See Mahajan et al. (2022).

  76. 76.

    Brown and Phillis (2022).

  77. 77.

    US Bureau of Land Management (2023).

  78. 78.

    US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022).

  79. 79.

    US Climate Alliance: http://www.usclimatealliance.org.

  80. 80.

    In this regard, see Hale (2018).

  81. 81.

    IPCC (2014) and (2022).

  82. 82.

    This may apply especially to the US, which has displayed an inconsistent level of commitment towards climate action over the last few years.

  83. 83.

    On federal-state interactions in US environmental law and politics, see Rowell and van Zeben (2021), Kraft (2021), and Vig et al. (2021).

  84. 84.

    Although a certain degree of overlap and duplication is inevitable, especially for a complex policy area like climate change that touches upon multiple different sectors, these examples still highlight clear weaknesses in the US multilevel governance framework and whether the national government is able to mobilize sub-state entities effectively in the implementation process.

  85. 85.

    This includes Executive Order 14008: ‘Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad’ (see above).

  86. 86.

    The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice: https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/.

  87. 87.

    As examined in Chapter 2, all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government are reserved to states according to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment makes it clear that local governments and cities are legally under the authority of states, not the federal government.

  88. 88.

    As will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5, this forms a notable point of contrast to the ‘hierarchical’ and ‘stratified’ nature of the centralized French political system.

  89. 89.

    In some cases, it is possible to identify a process whereby national governments ‘subcontract’ the implementation of policies to sub-state entities for achieving the objectives set out within NDCs.

  90. 90.

    See Hale (2018).

  91. 91.

    Climate Mayors, EV Purchasing Collaborative: https://climatemayors.org/ev-purchasing-collaborative/.

  92. 92.

    Executive Order 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad (see above).

  93. 93.

    Executive Order 14037, Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks (see above).

  94. 94.

    See California Air Resources Board (2022).

  95. 95.

    Overall, while duplication and the risk of conflicting norms are clearly problematic, they are arguably still less of an issue when compared to inaction or aggressive regulatory rollbacks, as had been the case under the Trump administration (see Chapter 2).

  96. 96.

    See National Conference of State Legislatures (2010). An exception to this would be, for example, the city of Detroit, which declared bankruptcy in December 2015.

  97. 97.

    Vermont is the only state that has not set out a legal requirement for a balanced budget, while the states of Wyoming, North Dakota and Alaska also have some flexibility on this issue. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Constitutional and Statutory Requirements for Balanced Budgets, https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-constitutional-and-statutory-requirements-fo.aspx.

  98. 98.

    See America Is All In, https://www.americaisallin.com.

  99. 99.

    Ibid. See also US Department of State. Leaders Summit on Climate, https://www.state.gov/leaders-summit-on-climate/.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    ‘The Climate Group’ serves as the lead organization or Secretariat for the Under2 Coalition, one of the largest transnational climate networks for sub-national actors. Most of the US cities and states in our sample are members of the Under2 Coalition.

  102. 102.

    The Climate Group, US Climate Action Summit 2022: https://www.theclimategroup.org/us-climate-action-summit.

  103. 103.

    On the instability of US environmental policy, see Shafie (2020), and Smith and Jacques (2022).

  104. 104.

    On special interest group influence in the US political system, see Drutman (2015), Quirk (2016), Brown (2016) and Charnock (2020).

  105. 105.

    This is not unique to the US and is in fact a problem impacting most countries around the world, including nations like France that have sought to provide consistent support to sub-national actors on climate issues over the last few decades (see Chapters 4 and 5). Yet, there are a few countries, especially Scandinavian nations in northern Europe, where frameworks and consultative processes to integrate sub-state entities within national climate policy formulation are more robust by comparison.

  106. 106.

    As previously explained, the power sector has since then been surpassed by transportation, which today represents the largest source of US GHG emissions.

  107. 107.

    As analyzed in Chapter 2, while the CPP did not oblige states to adopt their own plan to reduce power plant emissions, if a state chose not to develop one, or if that plan was found not to conform with national minimum standards, then the EPA would assume responsibility for developing a plan and enforcing it directly within that state. See US EPA (2015).

  108. 108.

    President Trump had endeavored to dismantle the EPA and other federal agencies with environmental responsibilities, including from a budgetary perspective, while staffing them with climate change deniers. It has taken the Biden administration some time to renew staff and repair such extensive damage, which has further slowed down the enactment of ambitious climate policies.

  109. 109.

    The Supreme Court issued a ruling in June 2022 which stated that the EPA does not possess legal authority to regulate GHG emissions across entire states or in relation to whole sectors of the US economy, asserting that Congress would need to explicitly allow for this beforehand through statutory law. US Supreme Court. West Virginia v. EPA. No. 20-1530, 30 June 2022.

  110. 110.

    See Stallard (2022).

  111. 111.

    See Larsen et al. (2022) and Mahajan et al. (2022).

  112. 112.

    Barichella (2021).

  113. 113.

    Banks (2018), Kettl (2020), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017).

Bibliography

Books and Articles

  • Adler, E. S., Jenkins, J. A., & Shipan, C. R. (2021—2nd edition). The United States Congress. W. W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Banks, C. P. (2018). Controversies in American Federalism and Public Policy (Controversies in American Constitutional Law). Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Barichella, A. (2019, December 6). ‘The Battle Heats Up: Climate Issues in the 2020 US Presidential Election’. Éditoriaux de l’IfriÉdito Énergie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barichella, A. (2021, January 13). ‘US Climate Politics under Biden: Is the Clean Energy Revolution Under Way?’ Éditoriaux de l’IfriÉdito Énergie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrasso, J. (2018, December 18). ‘Cut Carbon Through Innovation, Not Regulation’. The New York Times.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, H. (2016). Pay-to-Play Politics: How Money Defines the American Democracy. Praeger Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, M., & Phillis, M. (2022, August 19). ‘Climate Bill’s Unlikely Beneficiary: US Oil and Gas Industry’. Associated Press News.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charnock, E. J. (2020). The Rise of Political Action Committees: Interest Group Electioneering and the Transformation of American Politics. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, A. N., & Leskiw, C. S. (2018). Debating Federalism: From the Founding to Today. Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drutman, L. (2015). The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fisher, L., & Harriger, K. (2019—12th edition). American Constitutional Law, Volume 1: Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism. Carolina Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hale, T. (2018, November). ‘The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes’. Chatham House—Research Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamin Infield, E. M., Abunnasr, Y., & Ryan, R. L. (2018). Planning for Climate Change: A Reader in Green Infrastructure and Sustainable Design for Resilient Cities. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hickman, R., & Banister, D. (2014). Transport, Climate Change and the City. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karch, A., & Rose, S. (2019). Responsive States: Federalism and American Public Policy. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kettl, D. F. (2020). The Divided States of America: Why Federalism Doesn’t Work. Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Konisky, D. M. (2020). Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraft, E. M. (2021, 8th edition). Environmental Policy and Politics. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Larsen, J., King, B., Kolus, H., Dasari, N., Hiltbrand, G., & Herndon, W. (2022, August 12). ‘A Turning Point for US Climate Progress: Assessing the Climate and Clean Energy Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act’. Rhodium Group.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Rosenthal, S., Cutler, M., & Kotcher, J. (2018, May 8). Politics & Global Warming, March 2018. Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mahajan, M., Ashmoore, O., Rissman, J., Orvis, R., & Gopal, A. (2022, August). ‘Modeling the Inflation Reduction Act Using the Energy Policy Simulator’. Energy Innovation: Policy and Technology.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oleszek, W. J., Oleszek, M. J., Rybicki, E., & Heniff, B. Jr. (2019, 11th edition). Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. CQ Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pincetl, S., Gustafson, H., Federico, F., Fournier, E. D., Cudd, R., & Porse, E. (2020). Energy Use in Cities: A Roadmap for Urban Transitions. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Politi, J., & Fedor, L. (2021, June 24). ‘Biden Agrees Slimmed-down $1tn Infrastructure Deal With Senators’. Financial Times.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prest, B. (2022, August 15). ‘Inflation Reduction Act Can Achieve Emissions Reductions Even with Oil and Gas Provisions’. Resources for the Future.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quirk, P. J. (2016). Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rinfret, S. R., & Pautz, M. C. (2019). US Environmental Policy in Action. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Robertson, D. B. (2017—2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenbaum, W. A. (2019—11th edition). Environmental Politics and Policy. CQ Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowell, A., & van Zeben, J. (2021). A Guide to U.S. Environmental Law. University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shafie, D. M. (2020). The Administrative Presidency and the Environment: Policy Leadership and Retrenchment from Clinton to Trump. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Z. A., & Jacques, P. (2022—8th edition). The Environmental Policy Paradox. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stallard, E. (2022, June 30). Supreme Court Limits Biden’s Power to Cut Emissions. BBC World News.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, J. M., & Isenberg, A. C. (2018). The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021—11th edition). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century. CQ Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wheeler, S. M., & Rosan, C. D. (2021). Reimagining Sustainable Cities: Strategies for Designing Greener, Healthier, More Equitable Communities. University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, G., & Sands, L. (2022, August 9). ‘US Senate Passes Sweeping Climate, Tax and Healthcare Package’. BBC World News.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zelizer, J. E. (2018). The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zelizer, J. E. (2022). The Presidency of Donald J. Trump: A First Historical Assessment. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Public Policy Documents and Laws

  • California Air Resources Board (2022 March 17). States That Have Adopted California’s Vehicle Standards Under Section 177 of the Federal Clean Air Act.

    Google Scholar 

  • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014). Fifth Assessment Report.

    Google Scholar 

  • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022). Sixth Assessment Report.

    Google Scholar 

  • National Conference of State Legislatures (2010, October). NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced Budget Provisions.

    Google Scholar 

  • The White House—Executive Order 13990 (2021, January 20). Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis.

    Google Scholar 

  • The White House—Executive Order 14008 (2021, January 27). Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.

    Google Scholar 

  • The White House—Executive Order 14037 (2021, August 5). Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks.

    Google Scholar 

  • The White House—Executive Order 14072 (2022, April 22). Strengthening the Nation’s Forests, Communities, and Local Economies.

    Google Scholar 

  • The White House (2022, May). Permitting Action Plan to Rebuild America’s Infrastructure, Accelerate the Clean Energy Transition, Revitalize Communities, and Create Jobs.

    Google Scholar 

  • 117th US Congress (2021–2022). ‘Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act’—An Act to Authorize Funds for Federal-aid Highways, Highway Safety Programs, and Transit Programs, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 117–58, enacted in November 2021.

    Google Scholar 

  • 117th US Congress (2021–22). ‘Inflation Reduction Act’—An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Title II of S. Con. Res. 14. Public Law 117–169, enacted in August 2022.

    Google Scholar 

  • US Department of Energy (2022, May). Regional Direct Air Capture Hubs Program.

    Google Scholar 

  • US Department of Energy—Office of Policy (2022, August). The Inflation Reduction Act Drives Significant Emissions Reductions and Positions America to Reach Our Climate Goals. DOE/OP-0018.

    Google Scholar 

  • US Department of the Interior—Bureau of Land Management (2023, February). Willow Master Development Plan Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement.

    Google Scholar 

  • US EPA (2015—Archive Document). Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants.

    Google Scholar 

  • US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022, August). Summary of the Energy Security and Climate Change Investments in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.

    Google Scholar 

  • US Supreme Court. West Virginia et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al. No. 20-1530, decided on 30 June 2022.

    Google Scholar 

Websites

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Arnault Barichella .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Barichella, A. (2023). Climate Politics Under Biden: The Clean Energy Revolution, Enhanced Cooperative Federalism and the ‘All-of-Government’ Approach. In: Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?. Energy, Climate and the Environment. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-33935-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-33936-3

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics