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Political-Military Relations. Civil Supremacy Under the Test of Sovereignty

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War, State and Sovereignty
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Abstract

This chapter analyses how the extension of the political uses of the military in liberal democracies might initiate a revival of Civil-Military Studies. Combining the lenses of a jurist and a political scientist, it sheds lights on four concomitant phenomena whose interconnection question the concrete exercise of sovereignty between political authorities and military leaders, particularly in France since 2015. First, the tendency to use the emergency powers and to display the military during successive crises completes a presidentialisation which dynamics are much more political than legal. Secondly, this extension of the uses of the military in homeland security favours a changing perception of officers’ professionalism. Third, the politicisation of general officers is observed not only in France, but also in the United Kingdom and in the United States where political-military relations have taken different historical paths. At last, the return of war in Europe since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine reinforces the concentration of power into the president’s hands.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We add “in theory” because of the tendency towards extremes principle, which holds that war can always become autonomous from the political conditions that brought it about (Clausewitz, 1976 [1832], 80).

  2. 2.

    This chapter does not cover civil-military relations in the broad sense (between armed forces and society) but deals with political-military relations in the narrow sense (between civil authorities, i.e. administrative and political, and military leaders), although obviously the two levels of observation can be complementary.

  3. 3.

    Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from French sources have been translated into English.

  4. 4.

    See the Strengthening internal security and fight against terrorism Act, enacted on the 30th of October 2017, which transposed into the Internal Security Code several mechanisms from the 1955 State of Emergency Act (as modified by the 2015 Act).

  5. 5.

    To quote the qualifier used by candidate Emmanuel Macron during the campaign in an interview with Challenges magazine (16 October 2016) to distinguish himself from the « normal» practice of his predecessor François Hollande.

  6. 6.

    The Parlement is France’s legislature and is made up of the national assembly [Assemblée Nationale] and the senate [Sénat].

  7. 7.

    Embodied by the special chief of staff attached to the office of the president [Chef de l’Etat-major particulier du president] and the chief of staff of the armed forces [chef d’Etat-major des armées]. They serve both as advisors to the president and as a conduit between the government and the military. While the physical presence of the special chief of staff in close proximity to the president is justified in functional terms by the nuclear dissuasion doctrine, this officer may also have a decisive influence on operations as they unfold. The chief of staff of the armed forces is not integrated into the office of the president, because he is in charge of the operational deployment of the armed forces.

  8. 8.

    Battle of Valmy (1792), the Paris Commune (1871), the Dreyfus Affair (1894–1906), La Débâcle (1940).

  9. 9.

    In 1978, the first interministerial provisions related to anti-terrorist vigilance were the predecessors to the Pirate and Vigipirate plans issued respectively in 1981 and 1991. After the terrorists attacks of the Armed Islamic Group perpetrated in Paris in 1995, 2000 Army soldiers were assigned to ensure security at sensitive sites and to border control.

  10. 10.

    In the early days of the French Republic, military action to maintain order was used to control revolutionary outbreaks and rioting. In the circumstances of a “state of siege,” prefects can requisition military forces up to and including units specialised in maintaining order (Gendarmerie mobile, Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité).

  11. 11.

    77% between 2012 and 2019 according to the Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (CEVIPOF) annual survey of trust levels among the French public.

  12. 12.

    Colonel F-R. Legrier’s article on the battle for Hajin was withdrawn from the journal Défense Nationale after the minister of defence’s office reproached him for a “knee-jerk” reaction. The article was shared on military blogs such as La voie de l’ Epée and l’Association de Soutien à l’Armée Française.

  13. 13.

    General C. Piquemal was arrested in Calais on 6 February 2016 during a demonstration against migrants that had been banned by the prefecture.

  14. 14.

    General B. Dary is a co-organiser of “La Manif pour tous,” a movement that brings together various organisations opposed to homosexual marriage.

  15. 15.

    6 December 2018, https://www.facebook.com/soutientauzin/posts/1985989978135045/, accessed 2 September 2020.

  16. 16.

    President Macron’s speech, 13 July 2017, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/07/13/discours-d-emmanuel-macron-a-l-hotel-de-brienne.

  17. 17.

    https://www.facebook.com/notes/chef-détat-major-des-armées/confiance/1548451188570705/, accessed 2 September 2020.

  18. 18.

    Sign our service personnel’s new opinion piece. Valeurs actuelles, 11 May 2021.

  19. 19.

    For example, this valorisation in the wake of Operation Barkhane has marginalised diplomats specialists of regional security in West Africa (Pouponneau, Coutereel, Beaufils, Montini, 2022).

  20. 20.

    Marion Buchet (La République En Marche!, 5th constituency of Meurthe-et-Moselle), Loïc Corregé (La République En Marche!, 4th constituency of Pyrénées Atlantiques), Laetitia Saint-Paul (La République En Marche!, 4th constituency of Maine-et-Loire), Dominique de Lorgeril (independent, Charente), Bertrand Soubelet (10th constituency of Hauts de Seine) and Bertrand Ract-Madoux (1st constituency of Drôme).

  21. 21.

    During the spring of 2006, retired American generals have pointed out Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defence, to be responsible for the failure of the intervention in Iraq. Paul Eaton, “For his failures, Rumsfeld must go,” The New York Times, March 19, 2006, Greg Newbold, “Why Iraq was a mistake,” Times Magazine, April 9, 2006, John Batiste, “A case for accountability,” Washington Post, April 19, 2006.

  22. 22.

    Open Letter from Retired Generals and Admirals, Flag Officers 4 America.

  23. 23.

    The documentary “A President, Europe and the War” [Un président l’Europe et la Guerre, Guy Lagache, L’Éléphant Breath Films / Mile Productions] depicts a direct and virile telephone discussion between Presidents Macron and Putin four days before the invasion of Ukraine while the members of the Elysée’s diplomatic cell passively listen to the exchanges.

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Daho, G., Klein, L. (2023). Political-Military Relations. Civil Supremacy Under the Test of Sovereignty. In: Daho, G., Richard, Y. (eds) War, State and Sovereignty. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33661-4_6

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