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QuantumCharge: Post-Quantum Cryptography for Electric Vehicle Charging

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Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2023)

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Abstract

ISO 15118 enables charging and billing of Electric Vehicles (EVs) without user interaction by using locally installed cryptographic credentials that must be secure over the long lifetime of vehicles. In the dawn of quantum computers, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) needs to be integrated into the EV charging infrastructure. In this paper, we propose QuantumCharge, a PQC extension for ISO 15118, which includes concepts for migration, crypto-agility, verifiable security, and the use of PQC-enabled hardware security modules. Our prototypical implementation and the practical evaluation demonstrate the feasibility, and our formal analysis shows the security of QuantumCharge, which thus paves the way for secure EV charging infrastructures of the future.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note regarding notation: in the key pair \(\{X_{pk};X_{sk}\}\) we use \(X_{pk}\) to denote the public part of the key pair and \(X_{sk}\) for the secret part of the key pair.

  2. 2.

    The encryption is done symmetrically using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for which a symmetric session key is generated with an ephemeral-static ECDH key exchange using \(PC_{pk}\) as the static part on the eMSP’s side (and \(PC_{sk}\) as the static part on the EV’s side).

  3. 3.

    In addition, XMSS and LMS require the selection of parameters that define the maximum number of signatures per public-private key pair. These parameters can be chosen large enough to support the total number of expected charging operations during the lifetime of a vehicle. Given a maximum lifespan of 35 years for an electric vehicle and at most two charging operations per day, a maximum of \(2^{20}\) signatures would provide a significant margin. Nevertheless, procedures for re-keying must be put in place when using XMSS and LMS for this application.

  4. 4.

    Arm Cortex-A53 platforms are increasingly used in more powerful automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs), e.g., see Renesas product range [57].

  5. 5.

    While ISO 15118 allows an EV to confirm meter values via a signature (called meter receipt), using this signature for billing purposes is subject to local regulation [36].

  6. 6.

    Since PQC for TLS is addressed in other work (see Sect. 1), we omit the details on TLS in the following and discuss only the application layer of ISO 15118. In our current design, the choice of algorithms is done independently for TLS and application layer but could also easily be coordinated.

  7. 7.

    Note regarding notation: in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 we use Validate\(_{Cert_{Root}}\)(\(Cert_{Chain}\)) to denote the validation of the certificate chain \(Cert_{Chain}\) based on the root certificate \(Cert_{Root}\) using the default certificate chain validation algorithm from [19].

  8. 8.

    Note regarding notation: in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 we use Sig = Sign\(_{X_{sk}}\)(Data) to denote the generation of a cryptographic signature Sig over Data using the private key \(X_{sk}\). We use Vrfy\(_{X_{pk}}\)(Data, Sig) to denote the corresponding signature verification with the public key \(X_{pk}\). Additionally, we use \(X_{Cert}.pk\) to denote the extraction of a public key from a certificate.

  9. 9.

    https://code.fbi.h-da.de/seacop/quantumcharge-source

  10. 10.

    Message size totals are slightly larger than the sum of element sizes since totals represent the size of EXI-encoded XML messages (as sent between EV and CP) and since element sizes that are independent of the algorithm are omitted for simplicity.

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Acknowledgements

This research work has been partly funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Hessian State Ministry for Higher Education, Research and the Arts within their joint support of the National Research Center for Applied Cyber-Security ATHENE and through the Taiwan Ministry of Science and Technology grant 109-2222-E-001-001-MY3.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences, Darmstadt, Germany

    Dustin Kern, Christoph Krauß, Timm Lauser, Nouri Alnahawi & Alexander Wiesmaier

  2. University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

    Ruben Niederhagen

  3. Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

    Ruben Niederhagen

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  1. Dustin Kern
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Correspondence to Dustin Kern .

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  1. NTT Social Informatics Laboratories, Tokyo, Japan

    Mehdi Tibouchi

  2. Indiana University at Bloomington, Bloomington, IN, USA

    XiaoFeng Wang

A Appendix

A Appendix

1.1 A.1 Tamarin Lemma for \(RS_{7}\)

In Listing A.1, we give the Tamarin lemma for injective agreement under secure algorithms for the CPS. The Commit_CPS_Install event in Line 3 denotes that the CPS accepted a credential installation request by the client (identified by its PCID). The CPS sends accepted requests to the eMSP who generates the client’s certificate, including the client’s public key cc_pub, and sent back to the CPS. The CPS signs the response and sends it to the client (cf. Step 5 to 7 in Fig. 3). We require that for all such commit events, there is a corresponding event Running_EV_Install, denoting that the EV identified by PCID previously sent a certificate installation request (cf. Step 5 in Fig. 3) for the public contract credential key cc_pub (Line 4 to 6). In addition, there must not be an additional commit event for the same public key cc_pub by any certificate provisioning service (Lines 7-9). This ensures that the Running_EV_Install event corresponds to a unique Commit_CPS_Install event, i.e., that no replay attacks are possible. We only require this property to hold if all algorithms used by the involved parties either remain secure during the entire transaction or have been revoked by the CPS before completing the transaction (Lines 10-14). This includes the algorithm used for the provisioning certificate of the EV, as well as the signature testifying its validity, the algorithm used for the contract credentials (cc_pub), and the algorithm used by the CPS’s certificate chain. Note that the CPS will abort the transaction if it uses revoked algorithms. We model the insecurity of an algorithm the same way as the corruption of an entity, that is, the private key of a credential set for this algorithm and entity is given to the attacker, which is denoted by a KeyReveal event.

figure a

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Kern, D., Krauß, C., Lauser, T., Alnahawi, N., Wiesmaier, A., Niederhagen, R. (2023). QuantumCharge: Post-Quantum Cryptography for Electric Vehicle Charging. In: Tibouchi, M., Wang, X. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13906. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33491-7_4

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